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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the processes through which the redistribution of political and 
economic power is taking place in post-Soeharto Indonesia. In order to do this, patterns 
of `grand' corruption between the business community and the state are explored in 
three sites: the allocation of government contracts, the interaction between business 
associations and the state, and the negotiations over the repayment of debt. 
It is found that corruption has become more widely dispersed with the inclusion of new 
state actors and that the basis of allocation has moved away from the political influence 
of the Soeharto-era towards the more uncomplicated power of money. It is proposed 
that the conventional arguments which either invest institutions with the sole 
responsibility for limiting corruption or alternatively view them as completely irrelevant 
to the real exercise of power are both flawed. Rather, it is argued in this thesis that 
institutional change does indeed affect patterns of corruption, freezing out some 
participants, introducing others and defining new sites of corrupt exchange. The 
significance of such an analysis lies in the idea that corruption can never be destroyed 
but rather it is controlled through alterations of its character. Thus, any attempts to limit 
corruption must be grounded in such an analysis of its particular character. 
It is further hypothesised that efforts to limit corruption are badly served by an 
exclusive focus on the rules inherent in institutions at the expense of the inclusion of 
corruption's deeper structural causes. In response to this, the idea that corruption is 
partially driven by the need to foster the domestic capital accumulation process in a 
context of historic underdevelopment is explored throughout this thesis. Thus, it is 
proposed that corruption can be viewed as a system of wealth distribution based not just 
on money and connections, but also ethnicity and nationality. 
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MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(People's Consultative Assembly) 
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New Order The period of Soeharto's rule, 1966-1998 
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(Revival of the Religious Scholars; Indonesia's largest traditional Islamic 
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(Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Tugas - KPPT) 
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation (U. S. ) 
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PBSP Panitia Bersama Sertifikasi Propinsi 
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PDT Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(Indonesian Democratic Party; an amalgamation of nationalist and 
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PDI(P) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan 
(Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; the post-Soeharto version of 
PDI) 
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(Indonesian State Oil and Gas Company) 
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XI 
pribumi Literally `sons of the earth', denotes Indonesians of Malay descent. 
putra daerah Literally `sons of the regions', denotes Indonesians who define themselves 
in regional ethnic terms. 
SEKNEG Sekretariat Negara (State Secretariat) 
SME Small and Medium Enterprise 
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
USEXIM Export-Import Bank of the United States 
Walhi Wahana Lingkunan Hidup Indonesia 
(Indonesian Environment Association; NGO) 
Yayasan Foundation; organisations intended as charities but often used for political 
funding. 
xii 
1670-1900 With intcrvcning periods of partial British rule, Dutch colonists eventually 
bring the whole of Indonesia under one government as the Dutch East Indies. 
1928 An Indonesian youth conference pledges to work for `one nation, one language, 
one people'. 
1942 Japan invades Dutch East Indies. 
1945 The Japanese help independence leader Soekarno return from internal exile and 
declare independence. The Dutch only recognise Indonesian independence after a 
further four years of guerrilla warfare. 
1945 - 1959 Freedom of expression and association and a multi-party system form the 
backdrop to the first national elections in 1955. However, political instability ensues 
and there is a rapid succession of governments aggravated by elite conflict between 
political Muslims, an anti-Communist military, secular nationalists and a relatively 
strong Communist party. Regional resistance to centralised rule from Jakarta also 
introduces instability into the political system. In 1957 all Dutch-owned companies 
were taken over by the military. 
1959 - 1965 In response to political instability Soekarno institutes `Guided 
Democracy', a Presidential style of government based on `consensus' rather than 
competition. Political parties are controlled, the press is censored and the National 
Assembly packed with Soekarno appointees. Soekarno's effort to fuse nationalism, 
religion and Communism alarms some Muslim and military elites as his anti- 
imperialist rhetoric moves increasingly further to the left. At the same time, debt, 
declining exports and spiraling inflation ravage the economy as Soekarno focuses on 
maintaining a unified Indonesia in the face of increasing regional rebellions. 
1965 Soekarno is toppled in a coup. Contention still remains today in Indonesia around 
the exact circumstances of the coup with some maintaining that it was engineered by 
Soeharto whilst others claim that Soeharto simply took advantage of a failed coup by a 
small group of military sympathetic to the Communists. The official line that 
Communists were to blame is used as a license to ban Communism and hundreds of 
thousands of suspected Communists are killed in a purge of leftists which descends into 
vigilantism. 
Soeharto establishes the New Order' based on military force. Active or retired 
military officers occupy key national, provincial, and local offices to secure the nation 
against subversion by what they see as atheistic communists and Westernized liberals 
on the left and fanatic Muslims on the right. Restrictions on political activities, parties 
and organisations are introduced where multiple Islamic parties are corralled into one 
encompassing Islamic party (PPP) and nationalist and Christian parties grouped into a 
different party, the PDI. The state party, Golkar, receives substantial government 
funding and enjoys electoral advantages such as compelled support from civil servants 
and the freedom to campaign in rural areas that is denied to the other parties. Golkar 
wins every election from the 1970s onwards. 
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Box One Timeline of Indonesian History 
1974 Increasing unease with Soeharto's reliance on foreign and Chinese-Indonesian 
investment leads to the `Malcri Riots' where tens of thousands of student demonstrators 
protest violently in response to a visit from the Japanese Prime Minister. In the same 
year sharp rises in global oil prices enable less reliance on foreign investment and 
nationalist economic policies are introduced in contrast to the relative economic 
liberalism of Soeharto's early years. Political repression is stepped up. 
1982 Oil prices fall and private domestic and foreign investment is again encouraged 
with partial deregulation of the investment regime. Deregulation increases throughout 
the 1980s with many state monopolies being transferred to a small group of Soeharto 
`cronies' and family. Corruption takes hold throughout the 1990s. 
1997 - Asian economic crisis begins and the Indonesian rupiah plummets in value, 
pushing up the cost of basic necessities. Many firms and banks are pushed into 
bankruptcy as huge levels of dollar denominated debt spiral out of control. 
1998 - Widespread unrest with rising energy prices and increasing student 
demonstrations turn into rioting as security forces fatally shoot six student protesters. 
The defection of many of Soeharto's cabinet members eventually leads to his 
resignation. Soeharto's long time ally and Vice-President, BJ Habibie becomes 
president. 
1999 - Ethnic violence breaks out in Maluku. Free elections are held in Indonesia with 
48 parties participating. The nationalist party PDI(P) gains 34% of the vote, the state 
party Golkar 22% and two Islamic parties account for 23%. East Timor votes for 
independence in a UN-sponsored referendum, after which anti-independence militia go 
on the rampage. The moderate Islamic cleric, Abdurrahman Wahid, becomes president 
in a power sharing deal by the major parties. Economic growth recovers very slowly. 
2001 Outbreaks of new ethnic violence in Kalimantan as indigenous Dayaks force out 
Madurese transmigrants. Mass political demonstrations by Wahid's supporters and 
opponents seen in many major cities as his leadership comes under increasing pressure 
from the parliament. IMF stops further loans. 
2001 July - Parliament dismisses President Wahid over allegations of corruption and 
incompetence. Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri is sworn in as his replacement, 
even as Wahid refuses to leave the presidential palace. 
2002 Top legislators pass constitutional changes seen as a key step towards democracy. 
For the first time, Indonesian voters will be able to elect their president and vice 
president. 
20045 th April - General Elections take place. The results PDI(P) has 18.5% of the 
vote, Golkar 21.6%, PKB 10.5%, PPP 8.15% and the new Democrat Party 7.45%. 
20045 th July - First direct Presidential elections to take place. 
sources: Sejarah Indonesia, http: //www. jzimonca. conVse arah/sejarah. shtml; BBC; 
Network Indonesia, http: //users. skynet. be/network. indonesia/ni600l. htm; Donald K. 
Emmerson (2001) `Indonesia', in Joel Krieger (ed. ) The Oxford Companion to the 
Politics of the World, 2e, Oxford University Press, Oxford Reference Online. 
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Box Two Indonesia: Facts and Figures 
Population 235 million (2003 est. ) 
Ethnic groups Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, Madurese 
7.5%, coastal Malays 7.5%, Chinese- 
Indonesian 3%, other 23% 
I Religion Muslim 88%, Protestant 5%, Roman Catholic 
3%, Hindu 2%, Buddhist I%, other I% (1998) 
Life expectancy at birth 
Literacy 
(15 years and over) 
1970-1975: 49.2 years 
1995-2000: 65.1 years 
1970: 66% 
2001: 87.3% 
Net primary school enrolment 1970-75: 72% 
(% of age group) 1993-98: 99% 
Access to safe drinking water 1970-75: 39% 
(% of population) 1993-98: 62% 
GDP per capita 1975: US$227 1998: US$464 
1997: US$1063 2001: US$678 
GDP composition by sector 1970 2001 
Agriculture: 45% 17% 
Industry: 19% 41% 
Services: 36% 42% 
Labour force by occupation 1970 1999 
Agriculture 66% 45% 
Industry 8% 16% 
Services 26% 39% 
Urban population as 
a% of total population 
1975: 19.4% 
2001: 42% 
Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics; UN Statistics Division; UNDP, Human 
Development Report 2003; CIA, Factbook; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
2001; ILO, Papers and Proceedings of the S`" Meeting of Asian Employment Planners, 29- 
30 November, 1993, Bangkok, Thailand; UN (2003) Economic and Social Survey of Asia 
and the Pacific, NY, UN. 
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Box Three Selected Biographies 
Soekarno President of Indonesia 1945-1966 (died 1970). A founder 
member of the Indonesian National Party in 1927 he was jailed 
" 
, 
and exiled from Jakarta by the Dutch colonial authorities for over 
a decade. He returned from exile in 1942 to work with the 
Japanese occupation force and declared independence for 
Indonesia in 1945. Showing great ability to unite the disparate 
elements within Indonesia, his career reached a peak in 1955, 
when he hosted the first international gathering of African and 
Asian countries. But his authoritarian `guided democracy', a 
confrontational attitude towards Malaysia in 1963-5, a stagnating 
economy and an increasing affinity with the Communist party 
eventually led army leaders to turn against him. 
Soeharto President of Indonesia 1966 - 1998. Estimated wealth: US$ 16 
billion. Rising to power through military ranks from relative 
obscurity, he seized control of the state in 1966 after an aborted 
coup to topple the then President, Soekarno. The major 
characteristics of his regime, known as the New Order', were 
rapid development, corruption and brutal military repression. 
Adept at handling the various military, economic and political 
power blocks over his 32 year reign, he came to embody the 
Indonesian state through a highly centralised system of control. 
Economic instability and popular discontent with his rule forced 
his resignation in 1998. 
Bacharuddin President of Indonesia, May 1998 - October 1999. Estimated Jusuf Habibie. wealth: US$ 60 million. Regarded as Soeharto's 'right hand man' 
for twenty years, Habibie's personal relationship with Soeharto 
began in the 1950s when Soeharto befriended his family and 
became like a father to him. In his capacity as State Minister for 
Research and Technology for twenty years, Habibie came to 
personify the economic development programme he espoused of 
massive state investments in high-technology industries. 
Extensive family business interests (65 companies) in sectors 
ranging from property, telecommunications, transport and 
agribusiness. 
tbdurrahman President of Indonesia October 1999 - July 2001. Grandson of 1Vahid Hashim Ashari, who founded Indonesia's largest traditional 
. us Dur) Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). A Muslim scholar 
and political moderate who supports the separation of religion and 
state and rights for women and minorities, Wahid became head of 
NU in 1984 1990s he became a high profile During the earl . y 
opponent of President Soeharto. In poor health, almost blind, and 
noted for unpredictability and indecisiveness, he was nonetheless a 
popular figure when he was elected President by the parliament in 
1999. His Presidency was dogged by poor management skills and 
hints of corruption until the parliament voted to remove him from 
office in July 2001. 
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Megawati President of Indonesia 2001 - Ongoing. Daughter of 
Soekarnoputri Indonesia's founder and first president, Soekarno. Megawati 
entered politics in 1987 as a candidate of the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI) and served in parliament for 10 years. 
She was elected head of the PDI for a five-year term in 1993 but 
was removed by Soeharto in 1996. Her party won a plurality in 
the 1999 parliamentary elections, and she ran unsuccessfully for 
President the same year; she was later chosen as Vice-President 
under Abdurrahman Wahid. When the parliament voted the 
following year to remove Wahid from office, she was chosen as 
President. Criticised for her `hands off' approach to rule, many 
observers question her personal ability to govern. 
Ginanjar Minister of Mines and Energy (1988-93); Economics 
Kartasasmita Coordinating Minister (1993-1999). Serving in Soeharto's 
cabinet since 1988, Ginanjar has been an influential power broker 
in the state party, Golkar, for many years and is a strong supporter 
of state economic intervention. Since 1998, Ginanjar has been 
questioned and even arrested for his alleged role in several high- 
level corruption scandals from the Soeharto era, none of which 
have made it as far as the courts. Although now out of 
government, he remains influential today. 
Adi Sasono Minister of Co-operatives and Small and Medium Enterprises 
May 1998 - October 1999. Co-founded the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) with former president BJ 
' Habibie in the 1980s. High profile proponent of a `people s 
' t economy where the linking of SME businesses into economic 
-ý rovision of credit to rural clusters is emphasised coupled with the p 
areas. As Minister of Co-operatives under Habibie, he set up 17 
different credit schemes to farmers and SMEs which were poorly 
managed and ultimately unproductive. Out of favour now with the 
political establishment, he has set up his own political party 
(Freedom Party) to contest elections but has received little support. 
Rizal Ramli Coordinating Minister for the Economy August 2000- June 
2001. As a student activist in the late 1970s, Rizal was jailed for 
  18 months for his opposition to the Soeharto regime. He worked 
for many years as an economic analyst in a think tank he helped 
set up before moving into politics after the resignation of 
best known for his Soeharto As chief econo rh i i i t . m e was n s e cs m 
advocation of a more limited role of the IMF in policy making and 
later became a leading light in the Indonesia Bangkit group of 
economists calling for an end to the IMF programme. 
Kwik Gian Economic Co-ordinating Minister 1999-2000; Minister of 
Gie National Development/ Head of Bappenas 2001-2004. Best 
known as an uncompromising critic of Soeharto-era 
conglomerates through his writings in Kompas daily newspaper, 
Kwik has for many years been a high ranking member of the PDI. 
r! After 25 years as a businessman, he moved into politics and 
education in 1990. Since obtaining office in 1999, Kwik has been 
involved in many acrimonious disputes with other members of the 
establishment and has become somewhat sidelined politically in 
recent ears as a result. 
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Siti Eldest child of Soeharto. Estimated wealth: US$ 700 million. 
Hardiyanti Extensive business interests before the economic crisis in more 
"aºQL Rukmana than 90 companies ranging from telecommunications to t ,,, ' (Tutut) infrastructure, including most notably toll road projects in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Politically ambitious, she ascended 
to the level of Minister of Social Affairs in her father's last cabinet. 
Candidate for President in 2004. 
Sigit Second child of Soeharto. Estimated wealth: US$ 800 million. 
Harjojudanto With at least 45 companies under his Arseto Group, Sigit was the 
First of the Soeharto family to go into business. Interests ranged 
across the transport, finance, mining, forestry and trade sectors. 
Known for his gambling, he is said by his friends to have wagered 
up to US$ 3 million a night in casinos overseas. 
Bambang Third child of Soeharto. Estimated wealth: US$ 3 billion. 
Trihatmodjo Owner of one of the biggest conglomerates in Indonesia, 
Bimantara, his businesses are said by observers to be the best 
managed of all the Soeharto family. Interests ranged from 
transportation, telecommunications, infrastructure, chemicals and 
finance. When his bank was closed in 1998 by the government, he 
re-opened it a few days later under a different name before pulling 
out his ownership. 
I Siti Hediati Fourth Child of Soeharto. Estimated wealth: US$ 75 million. 
Harijadi Throughout the Soeharto era, she was married to an ambitious 
Prabowo army officer who was accused around the time of Soeharto's 
aA (Titiek) resignation of brutal violence against some of the country's 
mr 
Chinese-Indonesian minority. Siti is known to have expensive 
tastes in jewellery and a personal art collection valued at more 
than US$ 5 million. Major holdings in finance, forestry, 
chemicals, construction and transportation. 
Hutomo Fifth child of Soeharto. Estimated wealth: US$ 800 million. 
Mandala Reportedly Soeharto's favourite child, Tommy kept a high profile 
Putra in the Soeharto-era with his stock car racing, gambling and 
(Tommy) womanising. Through his Humpuss Group, he had business 
interests in transportation, petrochemical, construction, advertising 
and oil and gas. When the Supreme Court overturned an earlier 
acquittal in a corruption case in 2000, he escaped custody and 
became a fugitive for a year. After recapture, he was eventually 
sent to prison for conspiring to murder one of the Supreme Court 
Judges involved in the original corruption case against him. 
Siti Hutami Sixth child of Soeharto. Estimated wealth: US$ 30 million. 
Endang Emerged in the business world relatively late, Mamiek has stakes 
Adiningsih in several of her siblings' companies plus interests in fruit, 
('Mamiek') transportation and telecommunications. In 1995 the government 
appointed her company Manggala Krida Yudha to undertake a 
the North Jakarta US$ 500 million re lam t ex ndi ti pa c a ng on projec 
seaport. She in turn tried to subcontract the project to Hyundai 
Engineering for US$ 100 million, but the deal was cancelled by 
the government in an effort to purge corruption 
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Ari Haryo Grandson of Soeharto. Son of Sigit Harjojudanto. Head of the 
Wibowo Sigit Arha Wisanto Group, Ari held several notorious monopolies 
(Ari Sigit) selling beer, fertiliser, Chinese medicine and the rights over the 
- lucrative birds nest market in Indonesia. A venture to monopolise 
the supply of shoes to millions of school children in association 
with the Department of Education was too much even for 
Soeharto, who put a stop to it in 1997. 
Sudwikatmono Cousin of Soeharto. He obtained significant interests in at least 
288 Indonesian companies by offering to help foreign investors 
and others with government approvals and then taking a share of 
the equity in payment. He is one of the group of four high profile 
businessmen known as the Liem investors. Of Indonesia's top 
personal taxpayers in 1990, the Liem investors took 4 of the 6 top 
positions. 
Probosutedjo Half brother of Soeharto. Head of the Mercu Buana Group with 
significant interests in at least 119 active Indonesian companies 
including one of Indonesia's largest glassware manufacturers and r Hotel Le Meriden in Jakarta. He has become something of a 
spokesperson for the Soeharto family since 1998. In April 2003 he 
was convicted of corruption and sentenced to four years in jail for 
misusing US$11.4 million dollars in state funds that were 
supposed to have been used for reforestation projects. But he 
remains free pending a lengthy appeal process and recently had his 
sentence reduced to two years. 
Anthony Businessman. Estimated personal wealth: US$ 4 billion (down to 
Salim and US$ 1.7 after the crisis). Arriving in Indonesia from China in 
Liem Sioe 1938, he joined a family business which supplied a division of the 
a 
Liong army with food and medicine. The quartermaster of the division 
.. 
was the then unknown Soeharto. By the time Soeharto became 
President Liem had already established himself as a successful 
businessman, but his fortunes rose exponentially once Soeharto 
became President. With a very close relationship to Soeharto, he 
received numerous monopolies and import licenses. Liem's Salim 
Group was Indonesia's largest pre-crisis conglomerate, 
encompassing 420 highly diverse subsidiaries and its total 
revenues (which exceeded US$ 14 billion in 1996) were 
equivalent to 6% of Indonesia's annual GDP. Its assets included 
the nation's bigggest flour mill, cement producer and private bank 
and the world's biggest noodle maker. Substantial expansion 
overseas, Salim is now run by Liem's son, Anthony. 
Sofyan Businessman. Throughout the Soeharto era, Sofyan was 
Wanandi considered the spokesperson of Chinese-Indonesian 
y conglomerates. He is a controversial figure who fell out of favour 
with Soeharto in the 1990s and fled abroad when the new 
" President Habibie brought corruption charges against him for 
In the final misusin edit US$ 16 million d rth of ll t t . g o ars wo s e cr a 
weeks of Soeharto's rule, he was implicated in a bomb plot in 
probable retaliation for his criticism of then Vice-President 
Habibie. A close ally of Abdurrahman Wahid, he returned to 
Indonesia days after Wahid became President before his 
corruption char es were eventually dropped. 
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Aburizal Chairman of Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kadin) 
Bakrie 1994-2004. Bakrie was a controversial Kadin leader who was 
often implicated in major corruption scandals. The Bakrie Group 
was founded in 1942 and was an original beneficiary of the first 
government programme to promote indigenous Indonesian 
(pribumi) business in the 1950s. When Aburizal Bakrie took over 
in the late 1980s from his father, aggressive expansion resulted in 
around 114 subsidiaries operating across the Indonesian economy. 
However, in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis, the Bakrie 
family retains only 2.5% of the group's shares. 
Mohamad Businessman. A central Java native who met Soeharto in the 
`Bob' Hasan early 1950s as the adopted son of Soeharto's superior, he served as 
(The Kian Soeharto's financier, golf partner and confidant for many years. 
Seng) He became Indonesia's foremost timber baron as chair of the 
Indonesian Plywood Association (Apkindo) and has extensive 
holdings in forestry, pulp and paper, banking and automobile 
manufacturing through the Nusamba Group. Briefly appointed 
Minister of Trade and Industry in Soeharto's last cabinet, he was 
the only major Soeharto crony to be convicted of corruption and in 
2001 he was incarcerated in a remote Indonesian prison. 
Prajogo Businessman. Estimated wealth: US$ 2 billion. Thought to be 
Pangestu the second richest man in Indonesia after Liem Sioe Liong. Boss 
of the Barito Pacific Group, he was involved in many businesses 
94" with the Soeharto children. His major source of wealth was his 
control of licenses to exploit millions of hectares of forest. He 
also had significant involvement in petrochemicals, agribusiness, 
pulp and paper and finance. Barito Pacific is one of the most 
indebted groups in Indonesia today. 
Marimutu Businessman. Owner of the Texmaco Group, whose core 
Sinivasan business in textiles was expanded in the 1990s to include the 
production of textile machinery, engineering, automobiles and 
chemicals and is a major exporter. The biggest debtor in 
Indonesia today, Texmaco has been involved in several highly 
controversial corruption scandals and is alleged to have obtained 
US$ I billion from state banks through the personal intervention 
of Soeharto at the height of the economic crisis. 
Sources: O'Rourke, K. (2002) Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia, NSW, Allen and Unwin; Time, 24.5.99; The Encyclopedia of Asian History; The 
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia; Aditjondro, G. (1998) Harta Hahihie, Jakarta, Pustaka 
Demokrasi; Tempo, 1.4.02; Indonesian Business, July 1998; Backman, M. (1999) Asian 
Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in Asia, Singapore, John Wiley and Sons; 
Indonesian Business, October 2000; http: //www. tokohindonesia. com; Jakarta Post, 9.2.04; 
Warta Ekonomi, 20.8.01, Warta Ekonomi, 25.9.00; Warta Ekonomi, 1 1.9.00; Warta 
Ekonomi, 17.8.98; Warta Ekonomi, 13.3.00; API (2001) Panduan Parlemen Indonesia (CD- 
Rom); PDBI (2000) Anatomy of Indonesian National Assets, Jakarta, PDBI; Data Consult 
(1998) Anatomy of Indonesian Conglomerates, Jakarta, Data Consult. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background and Overview of Thesis 
Straddling the Equator in a chain of islands stretching 3,200 miles, the 
extraordinarily diverse nation of Indonesia was, until 1998, ruled by the same man 
for thirty-two years. With the crucial backing of the military and the increasing 
support of foreign capital, Soeharto's rule mixed a sometimes brutal repression of 
opposition with a commitment to economic growth and political stability. Political 
competition was stifled over the years as Soeharto adapted the remnants of colonial 
era political institutions passed on from the Dutch via Soekarno, Indonesia's iconic 
first President. At the same time, powerful elite factions based around military 
force, ethnicity, religion and class were drawn into the Soeharto system of rule 
through the allocation of national wealth (see Box One). Whilst there were 
demonstrable gains in development for the population as a whole throughout 
Soeharto's tenure (see Box Two), such a system of regime maintenance (controlled 
political competition coupled with co-option of favoured elites) eventually resulted 
in a high concentration of political power and economic wealth. 
The economic growth and political stability which had hitherto legitimised the 
Soeharto regime came to a sudden end in 1998 after the devaluation of Thailand's 
currency precipitated a monetary crisis throughout Southeast Asia. Hardest hit was 
Indonesia where currency losses of up to 75 percent triggered enough capital flight 
to effectively bankrupt the Indonesian economy. Amidst a sharp rise in poverty, 
unemployment and inflation, Soeharto acceded to an IMF programme of 
conditionalities in exchange for a multi-billion dollar emergency loan. As part of 
this programme, subsidies on fuel and utilities were cut, which then combined with 
a general climate of unrest to produce spiralling demonstrations, riots and cabinet 
defections, eventually leading to Soeharto's resignation in May 1998. 
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This thesis will study the redistribution of political and economic power in the first 
phases of a post-Soeharto transition in Indonesia. The position which will be 
developed here views the type of relationship between the business community and 
the state to be a major determinant of the distribution of political power and 
economic wealth in a society. It is further theorised that in Indonesia this 
distribution of power and wealth is, at least partly, performed through a system of 
corruption. In other words, the primary focus of this research is on changing 
business-state relations and the redistribution of political and economic power, 
within which corruption is a component. Therefore, in order to study the 
redistribution of political and economic power in post-Soeharto Indonesia, it is 
necessary to both identify changes in the composition of the business community 
and the state as well as variations in their patterns of corrupt exchange. 
The questions guiding this research topic are: Who are the actors now involved in 
`grand corruption'? Have there been any changes to how the business community 
and the state can now be defined? What are the implications of the inclusion of a 
new set of actors in corruption for the distribution of wealth? On what basis are 
corrupt opportunities now allocated? What effect have institutional adjustments had 
on patterns of corruption? In sum, an exploration of who gets what in post- 
Soeharto `grand corruption', including the basis of allocation, the mechanisms, the 
sites and the sources of change. 
Using corruption in this way, as a phenomenon which is symptomatic of the 
particular ways in which the state and the business community interact, corresponds 
to much of the corruption literature. Corruption is routinely defined as a blurring 
between the analytically distinct public and private spheres or, in less abstract terms, 
a particular state-society relation (Rose-Ackerman 1978, Heidenheimer 1989, 
Medard 1986,1991 in Andvig et at 2000, p. 11). The vocabulary used by different 
sets of theorists may move along a continuum from more abstract to more specific 
('public', `political' `state' or `bureaucracy' on one side and `private', `society', 
`economic' or `business' on the other side) but the basic idea of an analytical 
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distinction remains. These concepts are more fully dealt with in Chapter One, but 
suffice it to say here that corruption is widely understood in the academic literature 
to be an event which occurs through the particular negotiations between these two 
spheres. 
However, it should also be noted that such public/private distinctions are by no 
means uncontested. For example, Gupta (1995) found the division of public and 
private spheres inapplicable to an Indian context (p. 384). Similarly, Icing (1982) 
explores the existence of `bureaucratic capitalism' in Indonesia which groups both 
public (bureaucratic) and private (capitalism) into one single category (p. 106). In 
fact, Gupta's argument actually focuses on the extent to which the blurring of 
public/private boundaries is socially accepted in different contexts rather than any 
fundamental disagreement with the validity of these terms. Similarly, what Icing is 
actually describing through the bureaucratic capitalism model is a situation where 
civil servants are intimately involved in the business sector. In other words, they do 
not question the analytical worth of the distinction per se. 
Here we encounter a fundamental problem of objectivity in political analysis, where 
the very units of initial categorisation are subject to a normative dimension of what 
should happen rather than what is happening. In the corruption literature, drawing 
a distinction between the public and private immediately leads us to be concerned 
with the degree of separation between the two rather than any number of other 
issues. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly useful to keep these two groups analytically 
distinct, even if it is only to notice that there is sometimes a conceptual overlap. 
The definition of corruption in this thesis can be further clarified as focusing on 
patterns of `grand corruption' carried out by economic and political elites as 
opposed to the `petty corruption' which ordinary Indonesians encounter everyday. 
Grand or `political' corruption implies the formulation of policies or legislation that 
is tailored to benefit politicians by enabling them to extract large bribes from 
national or transnational corporations. In contrast, petty or `bureaucratic' corruption 
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occurs at the implementation end of politics where public services in hospitals, 
schools, police or tax offices are delivered directly to the citizen (Doig and 
Theobald 2000, p. 3). Just as the public/private distinction relies heavily on the 
works of Weber, so too distinguishing grand from petty corruption depends on the 
Weberian separation of politics from administration and is open to the same 
criticisms of a normative bias. However, despite some ambiguities surrounding the 
point at which petty corruption ends and grand corruption begins, this analytical 
distinction is useful since it allows the idea of a difference between the deviation 
from formal rules in petty corruption and the creation of formal rules to enable 
corruption implied in grand corruption (Andvig et al 2000, p. 19). 
Analysing Corruption in Indonesia 
Contemporary analyses of corruption in Indonesia can be grouped into three main 
categories depending on their analytical focus. This focus in turn dictates how 
observers in each category see the problem of corruption and thus also the best 
solutions. 
The first category groups those who focus on institutions. The recent ascendance of 
institutional analysis can be traced back to the highly influential works of March 
and Olsen who are credited with pioneering a body of theory known as the `new 
institutionalism' in the 1980s (March and Olsen 1984, March and Olsen 1989). 
Since then, institutional analysis has developed several sub-categories depending on 
the emphasis placed on the particular institutional characteristics which affect the 
behaviour of individuals within institutions. ' However, it nevertheless remains the 
case that they all share a fundamental belief that institutions should be the focus of 
political analysis. 
In analyses of corruption the tendency then is to conceive of the problem of 
corruption to be one of weak institutions so that the solution involves strengthening 
1 For a useful categorisation of institutional theories in politics see Peters (1999). 
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those institutions, in other words making them more 'legal-rational' in nature. This 
approach carries with it a strong normative dimension since it includes a very clear 
vision of what institutions should look like in terms of rules and regulations and 
how they should interact with each other. Most of the very substantial body of 
literature produced by international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF 
focuses on institutions when discussing corruption in Indonesia. 
The second way in which corruption in Indonesia has been analysed focuses instead 
on coalitions of vested interests. In recent years this approach has been popularised 
in the work of Richard Robison, Vedi Hadiz and Andrew Rosser and is collectively 
known as social conflict theory (Robison 2000, Robison 2001, Hadiz 2001, Hadiz 
2003, Rosser 2002) 2 Throughout these writings the problem of corruption is 
viewed as a struggle between various factions of class-based vested interests with 
Rosser making a special plea that international capital be viewed as just another of 
these factions instead of their antidote. However, the traditional solution for a 
problem which emanates from class power of changing the mode of production 
from capitalism to a different economic system does not feature in these analyses. 
Rather the alternative solution of empowering the working class is implied, most 
notably in the work of Hadiz where he posits that the repression of organised labour 
allowed the appropriation of state power by capitalist vested interests but bemoans 
the continuing disorganisation of labour in the Post-Soeharto period (Hadiz 2001, 
p. 137). Similarly, Robison and Hadiz (2004) have more recently highlighted the 
need for a coherently organised reformist coalition to counteract coalitions of vested 
interests (p. 258). 
The third method of analysis has individuals as its focus and is particularly 
prevalent amongst Indonesian observers (Alatas 1986, Lopa 1998, Salim 1998 in 
Harahap 1999). The problem of corruption is here presented as the result of the bad 
morals of individuals in power. There is some overlap from such an analysis with 
2 Amongst the many other theorists who use class as the central unit of analysis when considering 
corruption are Bayart (1993) Fatton (1992) and Szeftel (1998,2000) all writing on Africa. 
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the institutional approach above where the bad morals of elites are differently 
described as having a `lack of political will' but essentially refer to the same sort of 
personal moral responsibility. Apart from a general appeal to elites to abstain from 
corrupt exchanges, this moral approach also tends to emphasise solutions which 
highlight the role of institutions in creating incentives and disincentives to corrupt 
exchange. One well-developed theory of corruption which focuses on individuals in 
this way is known as `principal-agent theory'. It assumes that individuals within an 
institution pursue their personal self-interest rather than institutional objectives and 
offers a model of corrupt exchange between three theoretical participants: principal, 
agent and client (Klitgaard 1988, p. 12). Here, the shaping of the institutional 
environment in which corruption takes place is attributed to public officials which 
then highlights recruitment, promotion and wage incentive systems as solutions to 
corruption (Bardhan 1997, Rauch and Evans 2000, Mookherjee 1997 in Andvig et al 
2000, p. 104). 
All three of the above approaches naturally rely on more fundamental conceptual 
definitions and assumptions derived from more stylised treatments of corruption and 
concerning the very nature of political discourse. These assumptions will be 
highlighted in the literature review in Chapter One with a critical appraisal of three 
major corruption paradigms and differing analyses of business/state relationships. 
Analysing Corruption in this Thesis 
The theoretical standpoint of this thesis is that both the institutional and the social 
conflict perspectives have much to offer when considering the causes, patterns, 
solutions and actors involved in corruption. The technical fixes suggested by the 
institutional and individuals perspectives are extremely seductive, offering real and 
practical solutions backed up by sound logic. Similarly, based on the notion that 
much motivation within the political arena can be sourced back to the maintenance 
of money and power, descriptions of the patterns of corruption forwarded by the 
social conflict approach can be intuitively credible. 
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However, it is proposed in this thesis that a more self-conscious effort is needed to 
understand how vested interests and institutional transformation interact rather than 
simply using the two perspectives as though in competition with each other. In 
practice, many theorists do incorporate such a perspective of interaction. For 
example, Robison talks of the different institutional frameworks that are now 
needed to secure the interests of ruling coalitions citing political parties, elections 
and the press (Robison 2000, p. 186). Similarly, Beeson recognises that institutions 
do not exist in a vacuum but both influence and are influenced by other social 
forces, although he refers to these as the `social setting' rather than specifically 
vested interests (Beeson 2002, p. 9). Despite such references, it nevertheless 
remains true that the two approaches are sceptical of each other on some fairly 
fundamental points. The institutional camp's belief in the universal applicability of 
sound legal-rational institutions puts them somewhat at odds with the rather more 
fatalist belief of the class-based approaches that economic and political power 
inevitably flows to those in charge of the means of production. Meanwhile, 
proponents of the class-based approach dismiss legal-rational institutions as either 
being consumed (Szeftel 2000, p. 304) or captured (Hadiz 2001, p. 120) by coalitions 
of vested interests or as simply irrelevant to the exercise of power (Robison 2000, 
p. 189). 
By making a more concerted effort to link the two approaches and consider how 
institutional transformation affects coalitions of interest, modes of change move 
nearer to the centre of analysis. Using such a perspective, it will be argued in this 
thesis that the recent spate of institution building in the intersections between 
economic and political power in Indonesia has in some cases profoundly affected 
the shape of coalitions of interest in terms of the participants, group formation and 
sites of corrupt exchange. However, it will also be shown that such new 
distributions of opportunities to participate in systems of corrupt exchange are only 
really effective on the state side of the equation and not the business side. In other 
words, the redistribution of the political power necessary to maintain a system of 
corruption has occurred but the inclusion of a set of economic actors beyond those 
who were already prevalent under Soeharto lags far behind. Interestingly, such a 
perspective of the transfer of political power without corresponding economic 
power can also be found in Taylor (1979) when he describes the transfer of power 
from the colonial to post-colonial administrations in Indonesia. Thus, the effect of 
institutional change on the composition of coalitions of vested interests is a central 
concern of this thesis. 
Research Questions and Relation to Analytical Framework 
In order to fill out such a theoretical framework, the substantive research chapters of 
this thesis are organised according to three sites of intense interaction between the 
state and the business community. Chapter Two details the allocation of 
government contracts in three economic sectors which have in the past been major 
sites of corrupt exchange. These are oil and gas, electricity and forestry. The 
research questions which guide this chapter are: Have the old coalitions of vested 
interests which surrounded Soeharto been ousted from their previous favoured 
positions in corrupt exchange? Which groups of economic and political interests are 
now benefiting most from the allocation of government contracts? How have the 
processes of contract allocation changed? 
Chapters Three and Four will move away from a consideration of business/state 
interactions on an individual and company basis to a focus on formal business 
representation organisations, that is sectoral business associations and the 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce. Chapter Three looks at the multiple functions 
which business associations fulfil for their leaders and members. This chapter 
speaks to a consideration of actors in corruption by first disaggregating the business 
representation community in terms of the different interests they serve thus offering 
a more complete picture of business representation organisations in Indonesia. 
The first part of Chapter Three focuses on sectoral business associations. Here, 
original questionnaire-based research is used to answer the question of who sectoral 
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business associations represent and for what purposes? This is an important 
question as it tests the pluralist proposition that business associations have the 
potential to act as regularising institutions in business interaction with the state in 
contrast to individualist, corrupt interactions. In other words, it examines the 
potential of business associations to represent those businesses which do not have 
personal connections to political and bureaucratic power-holders. The second part 
of Chapter Three then treats one of these business association functions in more 
depth. A case study is presented here of a conflict within the business 
representation community around the issue of obtaining a role in the allocation of 
government contracts. It will detail recent institutional change to accommodate a 
greater role for business associations in the government contract process and the 
effects that this has had on interests embedded within business associations. 
Chapter Four stays with an analytical focus on business representation 
organisations, paying greater attention to the state-sponsored peak Indonesian 
business association, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin). 
It considers whether the corporatist methods applied by the Soeharto government to 
ensure a compliant domestic business community have unravelled since 1998. It 
then goes on to detail the effects that changes to corporatist institutions have had on 
the way that Kadin interacts with the state, arguing that overt state control has now 
given way to new coalitions of vested interests. The theoretical implications of 
these developments are then assessed with a consideration of the relationship 
between corporatism and clientelism. 
Chapter Five returns to an analysis of individuals and companies but this time 
looking at the negotiations between the business community and the state over the 
repayment of private sector debt. It explains the causes of private sector debt and 
seeks evidence of the current fortunes of Soeharto era debtors in ongoing debt 
negotiations with the state. To accommodate the debt negotiations, institutional 
change here has been rapid thereby providing many opportunities to investigate the 
effect that these changes have had on already entrenched coalitions of interests. The 
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guiding research questions in this chapter are: Who has benefited most from debt 
negotiations? Who has the power over the debt negotiation process? How have the 
debt negotiations impacted on levels of economic ownership? 
Thus, the data provided by these chapters on contract allocation, business 
associations and debt negotiations will provide information about the patterns and 
actors in corruption under conditions of authoritarian breakdown and rapid 
institutional transformation. Such information is not only limited to the sites of 
business/state activity which organise the substantive chapters, but also to a 
perspective which views business/state activity in terms of the intersection between 
coalitions of vested interests and institutional change. 
Causes of Corruption 
However, seeking to stylise patterns of corruption for easier comprehension and 
refining descriptions of its participants are not the only concerns of this thesis. The 
argument will also speak to understandings of the causes of corruption by 
highlighting the role of a major function of all states around the world. Along with 
other major functions, such as the maintenance of security, all capitalist states seek 
to promote and protect the process of domestic capital accumulation. There is some 
dispute over classification frameworks of state functions and whether some 
frameworks are really describing state functions or something completely different. 
Anglade et al (1985) suggest that describing state functions as `repressive, 
integrative and technical' (Mandel 1978, p. 475) or `coercive, ideological and 
economic' (Poulantzas 1978a, p. 56,1978b, p. 166) are really representing bases of 
state domination rather than state functions (p. 20). Nevertheless, there is some 
agreement in the literature that the promotion of domestic capital accumulation is a 
major state function in capitalist states (O'Connor 1973, Evers 1979 in Anglade et al 
1985, p. 19). 
Yet the idea of the state's role in processes of capital accumulation does not 
penetrate very deeply into the literature on corruption. Whilst some theorists are 
prepared to talk about capital accumulation in relation to corruption, this tends to be 
only as a passing reference, as just another way to describe elite enrichment (Fatton 
1992, p. 77, Robison 1982, p. 148, Khan and Jomo 2000, p. 8). Others simply 
describe corruption as a `primitive form of capital accumulation' but do not take this 
idea much further (Wilkie 2002). Lambsdorff uses the link between corruption and 
capital accumulation to explain why it so difficult to know whether or not 
corruption promotes GDP growth by suggesting that corruption affects capital 
accumulation rather than capital productivity. Thus he turns our attention away 
from the usual focus of the effect of corruption on efficiency and productivity 
towards one which highlights its effects on the ownership of wealth (Lambsdorff 
1999a, Lambsdorff 1999b). Szeftel (2000), Le Billon (2003) and Iyayi (1986) take 
this concern one step further by representing the state's function of the promotion of 
a domestic capitalist class as being intimately bound with the form and prevalence 
of corruption. 
Iyayi contends that in a situation where domestic capital is weak and lacks 
possibilities for accumulation through the exploitation of external, less developed 
markets, the goal of promoting a domestic capitalist class is achieved through 
corruption. Indeed he suggests that `corruption in such circumstances becomes the 
logical, if not the only, means through which accumulation proceeds' (Iyayi 1986, 
p. 27). Such an approach brings in something of the dependency view of 
development where developing countries today are seen as handicapped in 
economic development by a lack of the opportunities which were historically 
afforded to developed countries through colonialism to secure initial resources and 
build wealth (Frank 1966). Although the dependency view is today largely 
discredited due to its sometimes dogmatic views and revolutionary prescriptions for 
change, it still offers a useful perspective of analysing `underdevelopment' (and one 
of its symptoms, corruption) as a product of developing countries' situation in 
global markets. 
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In Indonesia, the process of domestic capital accumulation is politicised not only 
from a rich/poor and international/national dichotomy but also from an ethnic 
dimension internal to Indonesia where it is commonly understood that Chinese- 
Indonesians make up 3 percent of the population, but own 70 percent of private 
sector assets. 3 Debates about corruption in Indonesia are often accompanied closely 
by concerns surrounding the weak economic position of the pribumi or `native' 
Indonesians as opposed to Chinese-Indonesian and/or international economic actors. 
Indeed it is possible to view the history of Indonesian corruption in terms of the 
creation of a system of wealth distribution from the state to groups based not only 
on personal connections but also ethnicity. 
In the initial post-independence period, the new Indonesian state had a strong desire 
to foster domestic capital to counteract the still intact colonial economy. With 
scarce capital and technology capacities but abundant labour and natural resources, 
the role of domestic business was key to converting what capital and technology 
there was available into domestic accumulation. The first effort to prioritise 
domestic capital through direct state economic intervention began in 1950 with the 
Benteng Programme which identified a small group of pribumi businessmen and 
extended preferential loans and import licenses, effectively insulating a group of 
domestic businesses from competition to allow them to grow. This programme to 
nurture private domestic business failed in its goal for many reasons and in the years 
immediately prior to Soeharto's take-over in 1965, the state instead became the 
main domestic economic vehicle. 
In the Soeharto period an initial opening up of the economy to treat Chinese- 
Indonesian capital in law as fully domestic and to encourage foreign investment 
3 This figure has been routinely used in a vast array of literature on Indonesian political economy, 
from academic literature through to media reports and studies from international institutions. 
However, it is important to note that it is by no means uncontested. For arguments which refute this 
figure, see Adicondro (2001), Man Gie (1978) and Hadiz (1997). Nevertheless, it can be said with 
some confidence that there is a high concentration of private assets in the hands of Chinese- 
Indonesian businessmen. 
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gave way to greater controls on Chinese-Indonesian and foreign capital with the 
state's windfall gains from the rise in oil prices. Yet, whilst the controls on foreign 
capital were strictly enforced, those for Chinese-Indonesian capital were not and the 
numerous pro-pribumi government policies were not implemented. From the mid- 
1980s onwards, as the oil money dried up, domestic private business was again 
protected resulting in a network of dominant, mainly Chinese-Indonesian, 
conglomerates. In his latter years Soeharto then turned to nurturing the political and 
economic power of his own children in the name of a greater 'pribumisation' of the 
economy s 
From such an historical perspective, it becomes easier to view corruption as the 
method used by the state to choose particular groups of domestic business (based on 
personal connections and ethnicity) in a project of wealth distribution. This is 
indeed a problematic viewpoint because it appears to offer a veneer of respectability 
to the extraordinarily unjust corruption which occurred under Soeharto. Indeed 
practically all observers, from international institutions to Indonesian NGOs and 
academics, simply dismiss the project of `pribumisation' of the economy as nothing 
more than a thin justification for personal gain, and with good reason. 
The concept of wealth distribution has been largely replaced in the political and 
economic literature by the idea of poverty, which is unfortunate because the two 
concepts are in fact quite different. The less political concept of poverty carries 
with it connotations of a levelling up of the poor in a movement towards the living 
standards of the more wealthy. As well as the levelling up of the poor, the idea of 
the redistribution of wealth also implies a certain levelling down of some of the 
wealthy as part of the process of ensuring poverty reduction. However, the point 
here is that wealth distribution is rarely specifically mentioned in the academic 
4 Such a policy of protecting 'infant industries' was first propounded by the nineteenth century 
German thinker List for protecting German industries from British competition and continues today 
to be a popular strategy for governments all over the world. 
5 This micro-economic history has been taken largely from an informative review in Sato (2003). 
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literature beyond the radical Marxist and Dependencia perspectives of the late 
1960s and 1970s. 
There is some work on the links between corruption and income inequality, but it is 
of little relevance to the concerns of this thesis for two reasons (Johnston 1989, 
Alam 1995 in Husted 1999, Dabla Noris 2001). The first reason is that income 
inequality and wealth inequality are different since measures of wealth take in 
ownership of assets rather than income (Johnson and Tanner 1998). Secondly this 
body of work has little to say beyond the idea that corruption preserves and can 
widen inequalities in income distribution whilst inequality of income promotes 
higher levels of corruption (Husted 1999, p. 342). Meanwhile, Scott (1972) suggests 
that there is a connection between the distribution of wealth and corruption insofar 
as the more equal the distribution of wealth, the more likely there is to be a middle 
class which will in turn organise to protect themselves against the particularistic 
demands which promote corruption (in Husted 1999, p. 342). Thus, rather than 
viewing corruption as a project of wealth distribution, Scott views corruption as a 
product of an unequal distribution of wealth. However, at least one of his 
assumptions, that the middle class will inevitably be self-organising against 
particularistic demands, has been already questioned in Indonesia (Robison 1996). 
Otherwise, the concept of wealth distribution is most often referred to in relation to 
educational subsidies, income tax, inheritance tax or pensions (Jensen 2001, Hill 
1999, Legros 1996, Johnson and Tanner 1998, Huston 1999). 
This is in stark contrast to the situation in Indonesia where the more direct 
distribution of state assets and contracts is at the top of the political agenda and, as 
the following chapters will show, is intimately bound to the discourse on corruption. 
Dismissing the government project of the pribumisation of the economy as a thin 
justification for corruption does not do justice to the role of this idea in systems of 
corruption. For, it is not necessary to decide when a government decision can be 
described as corrupt and when it can be described as the legitimate promotion of the 
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domestic capitalist class to understand that this idea has a substantial role to play in 
corruption. 
Thus, in addition to purely personal monetary gain and the benefits to political 
leaders of an unaccountable system of political finance, it will be argued in this 
thesis that a third function of corruption is to fulfil the need for domestic capital 
accumulation. 6 As such, the landscapes of corruption which are analysed in this 
thesis will also include a consideration of the issue of wealth distribution based on 
ethnicity and argue that until donor strategies take into account the problems of 
capital accumulation within a context of historic underdevelopment, efforts to 
eradicate corruption will inevitably fail (Szeftel 2000). In this way ideas around the 
causes of corruption derived from class-based and institutional approaches will be 
supplemented by this explanation based on the structural exigencies of delayed 
capitalism. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the three main aims of this thesis are firstly to develop a perspective which 
focuses on the intersection of institutional transformation and coalitions of vested 
interests in order to provide insights into changes in the patterns of Indonesian 
corruption. The second main aim is to contribute to understandings of the causes of 
corruption by highlighting the structural exigency to promote domestic capital 
accumulation. The third aim is simply to provide some systematically organised 
data to try to fill the deficit of empirical data on corruption trends in Indonesia. 
Once these aims have been fulfilled, a clearer picture can emerge of the 
redistribution of political and economic power in post-Soeharto Indonesia. 
Finally, although this thesis clearly uses a case study approach, if the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks outlined above are found to be a useful additional way to 
6 There is also a body of work from Huntington (1968) through to Johnson (1986), Campos (1999) 
and Kaufman et at (1999) which debates the thesis that another of corruption's functions is to 'grease 
the wheels' of economic growth. 
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understand corruption in Indonesia, then these can be applied to other settings both 
in the developing and developed world. A conviction that patterns of corruption can 
be better understood from a perspective which focuses on the intersection between 
institutional change and vested interests can be easily relevant to other country's 
experiences at such an abstract level. Moreover, the thesis that the problem of 
domestic capital accumulation should be addressed when considering corruption in 
Indonesia is also relevant to other developing countries which are all in the same 
position of lacking possibilities for accumulation through the exploitation of weaker 
external markets. At the same time, it should be noted that the special twist in 
Indonesia's case of an ethnic split in the domestic capitalist class is only directly 
comparable with a small number of countries worldwide, such as Nigeria or 
Malaysia where a similar politicisation of ethnic groups' control of resources exists. 
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Chapter One 
STUDYING CORRUPTION BETWEEN BUSINESS AND THE 
STATE: IDEALS, ANALYSES AND METHODOLOGIES 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of the distribution of political and economic power is covered by 
several distinct theoretical traditions. Since economic and political power are 
treated in this thesis as the product of the business/state relationship, whose 
method of interaction is corruption, the theories reviewed in this chapter are 
centered on these concepts. Moving from the abstract to the particular, notions 
regarding the ideal relationship of business and the state will first be explored 
before turning to analytical frameworks and finally methodologies of empirical 
investigation. The assumptions and consequent analytical biases of each body of 
theory will be especially highlighted. 
The next section of this chapter will trace the evolution of the philosophy behind 
the dominant definition of corruption through a focus on the notion of the legal- 
rational state and the ideals it embodies. The third section will move away from 
these more abstract concerns to first consider the different ways in which 
corruption is analysed. Since the definition of corruption already developed in 
the introduction to this thesis views corruption as symptomatic of the way that 
business and the state interact, different models of business/state interaction will 
be explored in section four. Section Five will then move on to a more focused 
consideration of the debates surrounding the best way to analyse political and 
economic change in Indonesia. Finally, the sixth section will give way to a more 
focused consideration of exactly how to go about observing the state/business 
relationship. In other words, this section will discuss the various methodologies 
offered in the literature before detailing the methodology that was finally 
employed in the preparation of this thesis. 
Within this review of the relevant theoretical terrain, indications of how each 
theory deals with the major concerns of this thesis will also be sought. 
Definitions of the state and the business community, stylised accounts of how 
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they interact and how their relationship changes, the processes and patterns of 
corrupt exchange and the causes of corruption are all accordingly emphasised 
throughout. 
1.2 Ideals: The Notion of the Legal-Rational State 
Defining corruption is a difficult and much contested matter. As already touched 
on in the introduction to this thesis, the most widely accepted definition of 
corruption today is `the abuse of public office for private gain'. However, such a 
definition has been increasingly criticised by observers questioning not only the 
relevance of public/ private distinctions in all contexts but also an excessive 
reliance on the violation of rules and laws (Williams 1999, Olivier de Sardan 
1999, p. 27 in Andvig et al 2000, p. 66). Szeftel (2000) contends that definitions 
of corruption change according to who is making the definitions and in what 
terms their judgements are made. He argues that lawyers and public officials 
tend to view a particular action in terms of what is legal and what is illegal, 
whereas the public are more likely to have broader ideas, speaking in terms of 
what is right and what is wrong. Thus, there may be cases where officials 
behave in ways that break the rules but have public support or where officials 
follow the law yet the public still consider their actions to be improper (p. 300). 
The latter was in fact the case in Soeharto's Indonesia where he regularly 
released Presidential Decrees encodifying the tariff and contract deals gifted to 
his children in the face of an increasingly cynical public. 
These difficulties of definition lead us to ask who is calling who corrupt and 
what is being described as corrupt (Leys 1965 in Szeftel 2000, p. 291). Such a 
proposition is indeed relevant to Indonesia where Wertheim's classic 1956 study 
of Indonesia's colonial transition observed that government actions considered to 
be `normal' under the colonial administration were immediately labelled 
`corrupt' once Indonesians began to govern (Wertheim 1956 in Baswir 2003, 
p. 170). Similarly, in the immediate post-Soeharto era there has been a huge 
upsurge of criticism from, amongst others, international institutions against 
corruption whereas in Soeharto's days these same institutions more quietly 
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complained of `leakage'. It is, of course, the case that following the break up of 
a violent dictatorial regime there will properly be much higher levels of 
government criticism in a more liberal atmosphere. Nevertheless, it can still be 
held that definitions of corruption also change and are in principle inherently 
flexible. 
However, the definition of corruption which is overwhelmingly used at present 
remains `the abuse of public office for private gain'. Since, as we have seen, 
definitions of corruption are not inherently fixed, it is important to examine more 
critically the assumptions behind this particular definition. 
The most fundamental of these assumptions is the idea of the separation of the 
state from the rest of society. The people who work within the state are expected 
to behave according to different motives from the rest of us, and the environment 
(or `structures') and patterns of formalised relationships (or `institutions') which 
exist around them should ideally operate to support this behaviour. In the hands 
of political theorists the separation of state and society is re-conceptualised as a 
distinction between public and private where the public sphere should be 
distanced as far as possible from private, particularistic concerns. In order to 
ensure that the personal concerns of state officials do not impede on their public 
decisions, two related ideals are operationalised: (1) the rule of law (2) the 
prohibition of the use of public office for private gain. The `rule of law' here 
refers to a conception of fair and impartial rule rather than subjugation to human 
whim so that everyone, regardless of status or power, is equal under the law. 
Essentially, law and not the ruler is sovereign (Hasnas 1995, p. 201; Lee 1995, 
p. 28; Sabine 1973, p. 32). 
All of these ideals, the separation between public and private, the rule of law and 
the prohibition of using public office for private gain, can be grouped together in 
the single notion of the legal-rational state. The legal-rational state model has 
reigned supreme in the world throughout the twentieth century and continues to 
do so. Even in the countries where it is not established, the idea itself is 
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nevertheless used to judge such orders as sub-standard or defective (Lee 1990, 
p. 1). 
The idea of the legal-rational state is presented in the literature as the political 
expression of a completely new way of understanding the world which began in 
seventeenth century Europe. Known as the positivist philosophy of science, this 
new method of looking at the world initially consisted of using mathematics as a 
tool to study and unlock the secrets of nature, thereby introducing the possibility 
of quantification and hence objectivity as desiderata of scientific activity. 
Essentially, it can be thought of in opposition to the immediately preceding 
worldview of medievalism (distilled into the theory of natural law) where God 
was thought to be the maker cum controller of the universe. In contrast, the 
positivist worldview `deposed God and enthroned Man in His place' (Lee 1990, 
p. 2). 
Hobbes subsequently applied this scientific method to his thinking on the legal 
social order to establish `legal positivism' where Man's will becomes supreme 
via the laws he makes, the positive laws. Here, the legal sovereign is the 
legislative will which is omnipotent, supreme and absolute, issuing positive law 
overriding all other forms of obligation that may compete with it for the 
allegiance of the citizen, otherwise known as the doctrine of the rule of law. 
Writing a few years later, Locke developed Hobbes' notion of the rule of law to 
include the crucial stipulation that those who make the laws must themselves be 
subject to these same rules that govern everyone else (Hampsher-Monk 1992, 
p. 104). In order to achieve this aim, Locke further theorised that a separation of 
powers was required where the legislature makes the laws, the executive 
implements them and the judiciary interprets and enforces the law. 
The emergence of positivism and the concept of a new legal order also coincided 
with and assisted the emergence of a new economic order based on 
individualism, private property and the profit motive, known today as capitalism. 
Under the old economic order medieval natural law conceptions of property 
predominated where ownership was attached to the performance of definite 
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social functions. Those who owned property had to give it up for the poor in 
times of need, for example in a period of famine. Owners had neither absolute 
rights to use and abuse their property according to their will nor exclusive rights 
under all circumstances from use of their property. Essentially all natural law 
theorists agreed that, at least in the extremities of famine, the needs of the poor 
must predominate over the rights of ownership. Yet, however egalitarian this 
may sound, it is important to note that not only did property owners have 
paternalist duties to the poor, but the poor were subjected to all kinds of personal 
obligations to the propertied, obligations which expressed relations of 
dependence, servility and bondage (Fine 1984, p. 18). 
Hobbes sought to break from these natural law conceptions of property, positing 
instead exclusive and absolute private property, thus granting the freedom to 
dispose of one's property as one wishes and so providing the philosophical 
underpinnings of capitalism. Yet he did not reject natural law theory in order to 
release private property from any and every kind of social obligation, but he 
transformed the character of such obligations and transposed them onto the state 
(Fine 1984, p. 23). It is with this last point that the significance of the legal- 
rational state becomes most apparent. For if the state was to take on such 
responsibilities, then the establishment of a rational authority whose decisions 
were objectively reached became paramount. 
It should also be noted that the latest, and currently most influential, 
manifestation of the legal-rational ideal was developed by the German 
philosopher Max Weber at the end of the nineteenth century. This is not the 
place to visit the very substantial body of work produced by Weber, other than to 
mention in the most general terms that he considered the West to be `peculiarly 
rational' in its economic, legal and administrative capacities when compared to 
Asia (Brubaker 1984). Indeed, he spent most of his life creating an analytical, 
methodological and normative system around these ideas and must be regarded 
as one of the most influential philosophers of our times. 
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In contrast to this rather neat historical narrative of the development of these 
ideals in the West, scholars struggle to use the same terms to adequately explain 
the absence of a legal-rational state in non-Western contexts. Jayasuriya (1996) 
maintains that East Asian legal institutions will follow a trajectory fundamentally 
different from that traversed by Western European legal institutions, thereby 
denying the possibility of a legal-rational state developing there. Expanding on 
his thesis, he detects stark differences in the functions and emphases of legal 
institutions in East Asia and Western Europe. Whereas East Asian legal 
institutions play a policy implementing role to enforce government policies, the 
legal institutions of Western Europe play a conflict resolution role between 
autonomous private parties (p. 378). Similarly, where private legal regimes in 
Western Europe place emphasis on the distribution of rights and entitlements, in 
East Asia more weight is placed on the performance of public duties (p. 380). 
Such a divergence in the form and function of legal regimes is attributed by 
Jayasuriya to differences in the development of capitalism and more specifically 
differences in the level of involvement of the capitalist class. He suggests that in 
the Western European situation the emerging bourgeoisie saw legalism as a 
means of restraining the power of the state which is evident in the gradual shift 
from the feudal notion of property as service to the idea of property as a 
universal right. In contrast the incorporation of the bourgeoisie into East Asian 
state-managed systems has made it possible for the East Asian state to use 
legalism to expand and consolidate - rather than restrain - the exercise of its 
power. Essentially, then, this is a restatement of Barrington Moore's thesis that 
democratisation occurred as a result of the distancing of the bourgeoisie from the 
state, but couched instead in legalistic terms. 
Dezalay (1997) also identifies indications of a distinctive type of East Asian 
legalism in place of a Western-style legal-rational order. Interestingly, he also 
attributes this lack of legal rationality to differences in the development of 
capitalism. However, where Jayasuriya focuses on the state co-option of the 
capitalist class, Dezalay points instead to a distinctive East Asian `relational 
capitalism' which is so termed because it owes its success to family and personal 
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relations (Dezalay 1997, p. 1 10). In arguments such as these, the conflict 
resolving mechanisms of an independent judiciary are not needed in business 
networks based around kin or ethnicity. For example, contracts, which are 
central to capitalism since they facilitate existing exchange and encourage 
additional transactions, do not rely on law for their enforcement in much of East 
Asia. Rather, they rely on the close knit character of ethnic or kin-based 
business systems where default or deceit is more conspicuous and more easily 
dealt with. Yet, how far this type of capitalism developed in response to an 
inadequate legal framework or how far the typical Western type of legal 
framework did not develop because it was not needed is a crucial question which 
can be endlessly debated. 
In the context of Indonesia, other scholars have also written about the absence of 
legal rationalism along with its indicators of, for example, state strategies to 
employ legal institutions in a policy implementing role and the widespread use of 
particularistic legal standards in place of the general application of law. The 
economist Hal Hill recognises that trade law has in the past and continues to be 
an "explicit instrument of industrial policy" (Hill 1996, p. 113) thereby providing 
illustration of the use of legal institutions to implement policy. He also supplies 
an example of the use of legal standards by noting that: 
there is a wide range of decrees emanating from the bureaucracy, from 
different departments, from different tiers within departments, and from 
both central and regional offices. It is not uncommon for these decrees to 
be inconsistent, either in the letter of the law or in the spirit of its 
implementation (Hill 1996, p. 116). 
Similarly Gray points to the practice in Indonesia of the executive branch making 
a lot of policy through presidential and ministerial decrees and notes that 
although by law the courts can oversee the compatibility of regulations and 
decrees with their underlying laws, this is rarely practised (Gray 1991, p. 771). 
Moreover, she identifies legal processes in Indonesia as inseparable from general 
policy-making and administrative functions, concluding that "direct regulation 
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and government policies of intervention in the market place can be seen at least 
in part as substitutes for an independent, well-functioning legal system. " (Gray 
1991, p. 775). 
Hill offers no explicit explanation for such a state of affairs, and presumably sees 
it as simply a product of the authoritarian nature of the state in Indonesia. In 
other words, he does not search beyond the political process for possible reasons. 
On the other hand, Gray interprets the situation as an adaptation to the high cost 
of risk and information which is in turn attributed to a lack of technology and 
education. 
Thus, it seems that the legal-rational model of state administration emerged in 
the West as the political manifestation of the same rational logic which could be 
found in its economic cousin, competitive capitalism. It is argued in contrast that 
the form of capitalism in non-Western countries, that is a weak and co-opted 
capitalist class and/ or a `familial' way of conducting economic relations, 
similarly accompanies corrupt, personalistic and inefficient state administration. 
A lack of technology and education are also seen as contributing factors in 
explaining the absence of a legal-rational state. 
However, there is a large and persuasive body of literature which denies that 
legal rationality can ever exist. For example, Dezalay repackages the debate as 
one between Weber and Confucious, but sees it as an essentially false opposition. 
He contends that the rule of law represents less the antithesis of guanxi (the 
Asian equivalent of the English old-boy networks) than its continuation in a 
different framework (Dezalay 1997, p. 133). He presents the causes of this false 
opposition as originating from both an elitist representation of authoritarian 
governments within Asia and an idealised representation of relations between 
law and the economy in the US. 
Hasnas also has fundamental problems with the concepts of legal rationality and 
the rule of law. In a highly provocative and entertaining piece concentrating on 
the U. S., he contends that there is no such thing as a government of laws and not 
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people and that the belief that there is constitutes a myth that serves to maintain 
the public's support for society's power structure (Hasnas 1995, p. 199). After 
delineating numerous examples of the impossibility of objectivity in law, he goes 
on to maintain that the myth is necessary because "people are more willing to 
support the exercise of authority over themselves when they believe it to be an 
objective, neutral feature of the natural world. This was the idea behind the 
concept of the divine right of kings" (Hasnas 1995, p. 217). 
There are also those who, rather than doubt the possibility of legal rationality in 
principle, question whether the form of capitalism in the West today still 
supports the rule of law. Neumann maintains that in the course of capitalist 
development in the West there has been a transition from the competitive society 
of entrepreneurial capitalism to a corporate society of monopoly capitalism, 
dominated by cartels, giant business enterprises and other mass organisations. 
This, he argues, `marks the conditions of crisis for the liberty creating role of the 
rule of law' (Neumann 1986 in Cotterrell 1996, p. 456). 
However, the point of this section is not so much to undermine the concept of 
legal rationality as to present it as a contested idea. Such commendable principles 
as the rule of law and freedom from the arbitrary exercise of power may on some 
levels be just illusions, but they are nevertheless powerful illusions which are 
themselves capable of initiating change. The inclusion of the role of law as an 
additional variable in considering business/state relations is also a valuable 
contribution to analyses of corruption. For, as we will see throughout this thesis, 
the role of law in business/state relations has indeed changed following the 
resignation of Soeharto. 
At such a level of abstraction, the body of theory surrounding the legal-rational 
state has little else to offer more detailed considerations of changes to the 
patterns or actors in corruption. However, a link between the type of capitalism 
and the absence of the legal-rational state (and therefore the existence of 
corruption) is established, speaking to a consideration of causes of corruption. It 
is posited here that a `relational' type of capitalism or alternatively one which co- 
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opts the capitalist class are the main determinants of the absence of legal- 
rationality. Such an analytical perspective will prove useful in this thesis where 
it will be argued that another quality of capitalism in Indonesia, its `delayed' 
nature, has influenced both the form and nature of corruption. 
1.3 Analysis: Theoretical Paradigms of Corruption 
The academic literature on corruption is both extensive and diffuse, approaching 
the subject from many different angles. There are strands which look at the 
effect of corruption on economic growth, the relationship between regime type 
and corruption or the institutional characteristics of corruption. Decentralisation, 
international trade or political rights are amongst the other concerns raised in 
relation to both the impacts and causes of corruption. 
' However, overarching 
and encompassing all such questions are three fairly distinct paradigms, each 
with their own conceptual vocabulary and explanatory logic. Following 
Hutchcroft (1997,2000) these three paradigms are identified as rent-seeking, 
clientelism and corruption. 
1.3.1 Rent-Seeking 
A `rent' is an economic concept which describes earnings in excess of all 
relevant costs, and corresponds to what most people think of as monopoly 
profits. The orthodox approach to rents views them as being created when states 
restrict the operation of the market resulting in unproductive investment and 
economic inefficiency. However, rent-seeking, the effort to acquire rents, is not 
necessarily banned by law or regarded as immoral in society, or necessarily 
uneconomical in terms of development if reinvested productively (Coolidge et al 
2000 in Andvig et al 2000, p. 12). 
The most frequent criticism of the rent-seeking literature is its assumption that 
the logic of the market mechanism can be usefully employed as an explanatory 
1 See Andvig et at (2000) for a useful general overview of research on corruption and Lim et al 
(2002) for a review of corruption research on Southeast Asia. 
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framework. Whilst Hutchcroft concedes that the rent-seeking approach can help 
to understand the allocation of particularistic advantages, other critics argue that 
rents are not allocated solely according to market processes, but also according to 
a range of non-market considerations including ethnic, regional and party ties 
(Jomo et at 1995 in Hutchcroft 1997, p. 641). Indeed as this thesis will show, 
ethnicity has long featured as a non-market allocative mechanism in Indonesia 
and is now increasingly joined by both party and regional considerations. 
Since the state is usually implicated in the rent-seeking literature as the source of 
rent creation, another criticism of the approach is its over-reliance on the 
withdrawal of the state from the market as a solution to rent-seeking. Economic 
liberalisation and privatisation of state assets then become the main policy 
prescriptions. However, such simplistic conclusions have been proven erroneous 
in many country contexts, including Indonesia, where the scale, timing and 
transparency of such measures have proven crucial to their success or failure. In 
any case, Khan (2000) has by now moved the rents literature along a few stages 
with his contention that not all rents are created by the state and that they do not 
necessarily result in economic inefficiency. Similarly, one of Hutchcroft's other 
criticisms of the rents approach, that there is scant regard for distinguishing 
between who is capturing the rents, is also now being addressed by Khan et al 
(2000), Ross (2001) and Kang (2002) who all attempt to classify rents as 
emanating from either state or society. 
Generally then, the rent-seeking approach does not condemn outright the capture 
of rents, but rather focuses on the negative consequences of using the rents in an 
unproductive manner. It highlights the allocation of rents, using the market 
metaphor as its explanatory logic and recommends the withdrawal of the state 
from the economy if excessive rent-seeking is to be avoided. 
1.3.2 Clientelism 
Clientelism and patrimonialism together constitute a second major paradigm 
which is defined by their focus on informal relations of power. Clientelism 
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describes a relationship between a patron (relatively high social status) and a 
client (relatively low social status) where the patron is also usually employed by 
the state and the client comes from society. Such patron-client relations are 
conceived of as being long term and `woven in to the very fabric of society' 
rather an `episodic, marginal departure from some Weberian norm of legal- 
rational administration' (Bayart 1993). Whilst patrimonial analysis stays with 
the idea of the informal aspects of power rather than power vested in formal 
political institutions, here the head of state is at its centre, dispensing material 
rewards to preserve their position. Essentially, both clientelist and patrimonial 
approaches perceive personal relationships to be the foundation of the political 
system (Andvig 2000, p. 54). 
Formal institutions in this view are simply a facade that masks the realm of 
personal relations where the real political power flows (Hope 2000; 
Chabal 1999; Bayart 1999; Bratton 1994 in Andvig 2000). A 1979 article by 
Harold Crouch successfully applied the patrimonialist perspective to Indonesia 
and throughout the Soeharto period Crouch's descriptions of power relations 
both within the state and between state and society carried much resonance. 
However, a post-Soeharto re-distribution of political power within the state to 
include political parties and regional administrations has reduced the relevance 
of thinking of the Indonesian state as a single unified patrimonial system under 
one ruler. Yet the patrimonial approach still has value in the Indonesian context 
if it absorbs the new `multi-polar' shape of the state by positing numerous 
parallel patrimonial structures instead of focusing on the head of state. 
Like most theories, clientelism and patrimonialism are not on their own adequate 
to describe the whole reality of the exercise of political and economic power. 
Political conflict in Indonesia is not merely a competition over access to material 
rewards as more widely based policy conflicts have by now become too widely 
documented for such an argument to be accepted. Similarly, the relegation of 
state institutions to the background of patrimonial and clientelist analyses does 
2 See Maclntyre (1991) and Chapter Four for some examples of broad-based policy conflict. 
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not seem to do justice to the very considerable power vested in formal state 
institutions such as the Presidency and the parliament. 
However, the strength of these analyses of informal power are in their 
identification of a system of power which runs parallel to that contained in 
formal institutions. As Reno notes in an essay on Sierra Leone: 
most external actors, including Western governments and the World 
Bank, failed to grasp the actual dynamics of power in Sierra Leone. With 
their eyes fixed on the formal institutions in the capital, they did not see 
that real power and authority was wielded through informal political and 
market networks. Due to the power of this "shadow state", attempts to 
impose economic reform and rationalise formal state functioning often 
had the opposite effect, driving the authorities from the president on 
down, to deepen their reliance on secret economic networks" (Reno 
1995, p. 3). 
Such a possibility is certainly something that international actors should keep in 
mind when considering anti-corruption prescriptions for Indonesia. 
1.3.3 Corruption 
The third and final paradigm describing the allocation of particularistic privilege 
is the literature on corruption. Hutchcroft distinguishes the corruption literature 
from rent-seeking and clientelist approaches by its concerns with the 
public/private distinction inherent in the very definition of corruption `the misuse 
of public office for private gain'. The state then becomes a major focus of 
analysis as the character of state agencies is highlighted. Hutchcroft also 
maintains that within the corruption literature there is a greater attention to 
broader political interactions as corruption is often conceived of as an element of 
such interactions (1997, p. 644). In contrast to the rent-seeking approach, 
Hutchcroft further detects greater space within the corruption literature for the 
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allocation of privileges based not just on market considerations of who can pay 
most, but also non-market considerations such as ethnicity and kinship. 
In the last few years corruption theorists have increasingly turned to the question 
of the different impacts of corruption in different settings. Maclntyre has 
usefully employed a framework from Shleifer and Vishny (1993) in the 
Indonesian context to propose that a highly centralized state system run by a 
strong political leader minimises the damaging effects of corruption even though 
it is likely to extract relatively high levels of bribes. This is in comparison to a 
less centralized state system where political control is relatively weak, resulting 
in less bribes being taken but more damage to the economy. The logic of this 
theory is that the more tightly controlled corruption is, the more likely it is that 
bribes paid by a business to state officials will secure the required state service 
(such as a license), thus enabling the business to continue its economically 
productive activities. In contrast, weak political control in a less centralized 
polity will inevitably lead to independent and uncoordinated extraction by 
officials pursuing their own individual interests. In turn, this raises the unofficial 
price of state services and makes the delivery of state services somewhat less 
predictable than under a centralized system (Maclntyre 2003b). 
Yet here again market logic appears as an explanatory framework for the actions 
of individuals. One of the assumptions of this approach is that a business will go 
on to economic productivity once the required good or service is secured from 
the state, if only they could predictably do so. This of course does occur and 
more often than is admitted in the literature on Indonesia. There are very many 
cases in Indonesia where special licensing privileges were granted to particular 
businesses close to political power-holders enabling them to profit enormously. 
But two very experienced Indonesian business analysts both point to examples 
where special privileges were granted to a number of businesses but only one 
used the opportunity optimally to become genuinely productive. Thus, 
3 Yuri Sato cites Probosutedjo's success with Mercu Buana in Sato (2003) whilst Wilson 
Nababan pointed out in an interview that the notorious flour mill owned by Liem Sioe Liong's 
Salim Group was only one of many businesses which received privileged licenses at the same 
time. 
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receiving special licensing privileges does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility of productive and socially beneficial economic investment. 
However, there are also many examples from Indonesia which could confound 
the assumption that companies receiving special privileges will necessarily go on 
to benefit the economy. This is because companies which obtain special privilege 
based on kinship, ethnicity or money are not by definition those which are likely 
to be most productive in their use of that privilege. Moreover, there is additional 
empirically-based research which could indicate in the opposite direction from 
this model. Instead of distinguishing the economic effects of corruption based 
on a centralised or decentralised state system as Maclntyre does, this research 
classifies the economic effects of corruption based on the method of state/firm 
interaction. The three methods of interaction are state capture, influence or 
administrative. `State capture' refers to firms shaping the formation of laws and 
regulations through illicit private payments to public officials, `influence' refers 
to firms having an impact on laws and regulations though not necessarily through 
payment to state officials and `administrative' is defined as private payments to 
public officials to distort the prescribed implementation of official rules and 
policies (Hellman et al 2000). The salient point for this discussion is the 
findings from this research that state capture has a much more negative effect on 
economic productivity than the other two types of corruption and that the more 
concentrated that state capture is in terms of firm numbers, the more deleterious 
will be the effects on the economy. Thus, if centralised corruption involves a 
smaller numbers of firms than decentralised corruption, then the economic 
effects of centralised corruption will be more grave. 
In other words, the model employed by Maclntyre only takes in one half of the 
participants in corrupt exchange, state officials. If the firm is also included in 
analysis then the link between a more centralised state system and a relatively 
low negative impact on economic productivity becomes more tenuous. 
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In the absence of systematic empirical data4, the idea that the cost of bribes 
automatically rises for a business in a less-centralised system cannot be 
automatically accepted either. For conclusions to be drawn about whether a rise 
in uncoordinated extraction by public officials leads to higher overall bribes 
being paid by firms, a distinction should be made between a situation where a 
greater number of public officials have the authority to issue licenses and where 
the same number of officials can issue licenses as under a centralised system but 
there are now more payment stages in the process. For example, the section on 
the Indonesian forestry sector in Chapter Two shows that under Soeharto's 
centralised system of corruption only the Ministry of Forestry could issue forest 
exploitation licenses, whereas decentralisation has resulted in an expansion of 
such authority to include regional governors and Bupatis. With more outlet 
points for the issuance of forestry licenses, then following the market logic, it 
might be expected that the price of the licenses decreases. 
This discussion about the impact of different types of political arrangements on 
patterns of corruption is part of an increasing body of literature looking at the 
effect of democratisation on corruption. Here, the proposition that the degree of 
corruption varies inversely to the degree that power is consensual remains 
dominant (Andvig et al 2000, p. 52). However, in recent years this proposition 
has been developed to suggest that the relationship between the prevalence of 
corruption and the level of democratisation is not linear but rather bell-shaped. 
In other words, in an immediate post-authoritarian period, corruption initially 
spreads in the absence of authoritarian control and before democratic checks and 
balances can be `embedded'. Only if and when these democratic institutions 
start to function optimally can corruption begin to decline and only then after 
around forty years of consecutive democracy (Treisman 2000, p. 439). 
"A major study on corruption in Indonesia was completed by the Partnership for Governance 
Reform in 2001 which includes the incidence of businesses bribing state officials. However, 
this study does not include a comparison with the situation under Soeharto. The only other data 
found which measures the cost of corruption over time is from a survey by Gadjah Mada 
University where respondents claimed that the level of illegal bribes in the wake of 
decentralisation is the same as before it (Gadjah Mada University, 2002). 
33 
Although Maclntyre speaks of corruption rather than clientelism or rent-seeking, 
his analysis stretches out from the corruption literature towards a rent-seeking 
approach with the inclusion of the market logic. Indeed, the rent-seeking, 
clientelism and corruption approaches all regularly intermingle in any one 
analysis and many scholars would undoubtedly question the schemata used here 
and in Hutchcroft, for example preferring perhaps to view rent-seeking and 
clientelism as forms of corruption. However, the value of dividing the literature 
into rent-seeking, clientelist and corruption approaches is found in the clearer 
view such an exercise affords of some of the assumptions upon which these 
theories rest. For example, the market logic of the rent-seeking approach, the 
separation of business and the state in the corruption literature and the rejection 
of the significance of formal institutions in clientelism. 
Each of these three analytical frameworks has some relevance for the concerns of 
this thesis. The emphasis on the exercise of informal power in clientelist 
approaches provides a useful angle through which processes of corruption can be 
viewed, acting as an antidote to the excessive concentration on institutional 
formation elsewhere. Discussions in the rent-seeking literature also add to 
understandings of the processes of corruption through the inclusion of ethnicity 
as a non-market mechanism of allocation and the identification of different types 
of rents depending on whether they are captured by the state or society. The 
following chapters in this thesis will build on these insights, adding more detail 
to considerations of the informal nature of power by including the effect of 
institutional change on it. Under what circumstances ethnicity acts as a non- 
market allocation mechanism will also be explored in the rest of this thesis, 
along with a further disaggregation of the state and society categories found in 
the rent-seeking literature. By breaking down these state and society categories, 
a greater understanding of the effects that democratisation has on corruption can 
be achieved beyond the observation that it initially becomes more prevalent. 
In terms of Hutchcroft's classifications, this thesis sits within the corruption 
literature. The central distinction between business and the state, the emphasis 
on non-market mechanisms of allocation and the inclusion of a broader political 
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context all describe more accurately the approach taken to corruption in this 
thesis compared to the other two frameworks. Scott contends that by including a 
regime's political dynamics in analyses of corruption, the possibility that 
corruption can have a 'counter-hegemonic influence by promoting the entry of 
new forces' arises (Scott 1972 in Hutchcroft 1997, p. 644). This is another idea 
which will be explored in connection to the empirical evidence throughout this 
thesis. 
1.4 Analysis: Theoretical Paradigms of Business and the State 
Since it has already been established that the business/state relationship is central 
to the analysis of corruption in this thesis, this section will now examine more 
closely the assumptions and biases inherent in another set of more general 
political theoretical paradigms that define business and the state as well as 
describe their interaction. These paradigms are pluralist, elitist, Marxist and 
statist. This section will then conclude with a discussion of the `relative 
autonomy' of business and the state, which on this theoretical terrain comes 
closest to the concerns on the separation of public and private in the corruption 
literature. 
1.4.1 Pluralist Analysis 
In the pluralist tradition the state is seen as a neutral arena of conflict where a 
plurality of different centres of power compete. These centres of power, or 
pressure groups, emanate mostly from society but can also exist within the state 
itself. However, the crucial point is that the state has no collective interests of its 
own. As a whole, the state is simply seen as a cash register that totals up and 
then averages the preferences and political power of actors (Krasner 1984, 
p. 226). 
In this way politics becomes a problem of allocation. The business community 
may have more influence than most on the state but this is simply because they 
tend to possess more political resources. There are no systemic constraints on 
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the state elite and no overriding pattern of social and economic power relations 
within which contestation and organisation operate (Robison 1992, p. 553). 
Pressure exercised on the state by business groups has no special significance 
and must take its place amongst the pressures exercised by other societal actors. 
The reliance of pluralist analysis on the market mechanism to distribute state 
benefits in turn implies a certain neutrality of context and a belief in the power of 
individual rational choices leading to optimal outcomes. These are the same 
assumptions which underlie the institutional approach to studying corruption 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis where the `efficiency' of institutions 
in containing corruption is measured according to such neo-classical principles 
as rational choice and market logic (Beeson 2002, p. 11). Indeed, institutional 
theorists can see institutions as `systems of rules and inducements to behaviour 
in which individuals attempt to maximise their own utilities' (Weingast 1996 in 
Peters 1999, p. 19). 
In pluralist analysis, individuals are rather conceived of as groups rather than 
individuals but the market logic remains the same. The power of business is 
seen as contained not only by the pressure of other interests but also by its own 
internal diversity. Thus, it becomes apparent that definitions of the business 
community do not include the notion of the business community as a potentially 
cohesive actor, but rather irredeemably split. Similarly, the state, which has 
become merely a site of interaction, is usually divided into policy domains which 
form distinct sub-governments involving for example parts of the bureaucracy, 
committees and interest groups. It is in this way that the intrusion of a strong 
central authority, such as a reified state, is resisted (Ripley and Franklin 1978; 
McFarland 1983 in Knoke 1990, p. 154). 
Furthermore, it is often noted that pluralist analysis contains within it a strong 
normative dimension so that it is often unclear whether this model is actually 
describing a reality or proposing an ideal pattern of relationships. In any case it 
is clear that pluralist models have a limited application in authoritarian contexts 
where the role of the state in politics is always much more pronounced than in 
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liberal democracies (Alatas 1997, p. 313). This has not, however, stopped 
theorists from attempting to perceive pluralist tendencies even in the most 
authoritarian of contexts. 
One of the best known and most influential books on the interaction of business 
and politics in Indonesia, called Business and Politics in Indonesia, attempts 
such an analysis. The author, Andrew Maclntyre, characterises the business/state 
relationship as one following a corporatist pattern which itself shares one of the 
fundamental assumptions of pluralist analysis that `politics is about group 
politics' (Mitchell 1997, p. 16). Thus, by focusing his analysis on business 
groups, any indication that these groups are not completely controlled by the 
state leads him to a conclusion that pluralism indeed exists in Indonesia. 
Although he concedes that such pluralisation and diffusion of power has only 
just begun to emerge and even then only in some parts of the business sector 
(MacIntyre 1991, p. 259), the question of how important these pockets of 
pluralism are in relation to corrupt particularistic relations remains unanswered. 
Corporatism also shares the pluralist assumption that politics is about groups. 
The most important difference between corporatist and pluralist analyses is the 
centrality which corporatism attaches to a high degree of institutionalised 
interaction between societal interests and the state. In other words, under a 
corporatist system the state is intimately involved in both the initial organisation 
of societal groups as well as the basis upon which they interact with the state. 
Thus, the traditional distinction made in pluralist analysis between public and 
private is fatally undermined (Mackie 1990). The corporatist paradigm was 
frequently applied to Indonesian labour organisations, business organisations and 
political parties under Soeharto and one of the major concerns of this thesis is to 
test the validity of using corporatism to explain post-Soeharto politics. As such, 
corporatist theory is dealt with more substantially in Chapter Four. 
In sum then, it is apparent that a pluralist model of state/business interaction 
presupposes (1) a neutral, unreified state with no interests of its own (2) a neutral 
context where the market mechanism can function rationally to distribute 
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benefits throughout society optimally (3) groups are the most important actors. 
Even though some pockets of pluralism may have been detected throughout the 
Soeharto period, it is clear that the general winners were not groups of 
businesses but rather a small selection of individual ones. Similarly, an 
unreified state does not describe the state under Soeharto which was 
exceptionally centralised through his personage. The task then is to discover 
whether there have been any changes in these regards since the fall of Soeharto. 
1.4.2 Elite Analysis 
Here privileged individuals and groups are seen as occupying positions of power 
and authority. However, their dominant position is not associated with class 
positions, class associations or even economic power, but rather their personal 
attributes and values such as superiority of intelligence or character and political 
skill coupled with their situation in an elite network of personal connections 
(Alavi 1982, p. 290). An elite-mass dichotomy exists with the masses 
distinguished by their passivity and incompetence (Schwarzmantel 1993, p. 83). 
It therefore follows that those in the business community who do not possess the 
personal attributes or connections required to be a member of the elite have no 
special influence on state policy. The state is conceived of as neutral but in the 
hands of elites. 
The most persuasive proponents of the elite theory in recent times have been 
Michael Useem and William Domhoff, whose work has been referred to as 
power structure theory and takes its inspiration largely from Mills' 1956 book 
entitled The Power Elite. Writing in the US from the mid-1970s onwards, 
Useem and Domhoff detected an elite group, variously called an `inner group' 
(Useem 1979, p. 552) or a `power elite' (Domhoff in Knoke 1990, p. 156) who 
occupy the controlling positions of the most important economic, political and 
social organisations. Domhoff sees the ruling class in the U. S. as a three sector 
power elite made up of (1) the upper social class: the top half percent of wealth 
holders where class consciousness and cohesion is achieved through social clubs 
and private schools (2) the corporate community: the owners, major stockholders 
, 0, pperº1 
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and top level executives of the largest corporations and financial institutions (3) 
the policy planning network: non-partisan organisations, and research institutes 
which bring together academics, business men and political leaders to discuss 
general problems and propose policy solutions. 
Mills offers a different classification suggesting that the power elite be divided 
instead into (1) executive: those who occupy the top posts in the executive 
branch of government (2) corporate: those who occupy the top posts of major 
corporations (3) the leaders of the military (Mills 1956 in Alatas 1997, p. 290). 
But these classifications do not have to be made in opposition to each other. 
The difference between Domhoff's and Mills' classification may be attributed to 
changes in the American political system in the twenty years that separates them, 
coupled of course with a personal inclination by each theorist to emphasise some 
sections of the elite over others. 
In any case these classifications should certainly be redesigned when thinking 
about countries other than the U. S. In the case of Indonesia the inclusion of the 
upper social class and the policy planning network into the power elite can 
certainly be thought of as more tenuous than in the U. S., whilst Mills' inclusion 
of the executive and the military was very important in an authoritarian context 
like that found in pre-1998 Indonesia. Interestingly, in a recent survey of 
Indonesian business associations undertaken for this thesis, the respondents 
considered the most powerful policy-making constituents after the President and 
the cabinet to be the IMF, the parliament and the media, well above the military, 
research institutes and domestic and foreign conglomerates (see Table 3.6 in 
Chapter Three). Although such a survey can only measure perceptions of policy 
power, business associations might be thought of as being in a better position 
than most to give an accurate representation. Based on these survey answers 
then, an Indonesian `power elite' could include the IMF, parliamentarians and 
journalists as well as the executive. Military and conglomerate categories could 
also be included on specific security and business issues respectively. 
39 
Apart from who makes up the power elite, there is also the question of their basis 
of power. Useem sees elite networks in the USA as all emanating from the 
corporate sector and forming an `inner circle' to act as a conscious vanguard of 
the capitalist class across many sectors (Useem 1979). In contrast, Knoke 
suggests that in principle the elite concentration of power reflects not class 
interests but institutional and organisational imperatives (Knoke 1990, p. 153). A 
reflection on the Indonesian context would suggest that different elite 
constituents have different bases of power. For example, the military's basis of 
power is undoubtedly its control over the means of violence, whereas control 
over the means of production is clearly the basis of power for both domestic and 
international business, the latter operating through the IMF. As for the executive 
and members of parliament, their basis of power is likely a more complex 
mixture with institutional imperatives also playing a role. 
Focusing exclusively on the section of the elite whose basis of power is the 
ownership of the means of production, the question of how far these elites 
represent the whole of the capitalist class is also of concern in this context. A 
related question is their degree of cohesion and solidarity as well as the 
possession of common interests and common purposes (Miliband 1969, p. 47 in 
Useem 1979, p. 554). In regard to the first question, in the case of Indonesia 
elites are all from large corporations and as such cannot be said to represent the 
whole of the capitalist class which must itself include small businesses. In 
answer to the second question it would seem sensible to conclude that it depends 
very much on the issue at stake or the historical conditions. For example, if the 
state were to try to impose a tax increase on all firms over a certain size, 
concerted co-ordinated action by those firms would likely follow. By the same 
token, if a tariff reduction was introduced on the import of a particular type of 
machine, then those who used that machine in their factories would support it 
and presumably those who manufactured that machine themselves in country 
would oppose it. 
The importance of deciding on the cohesion of the capitalist class elites is 
derived from the pluralist interpretation of the existence of elites that they bring 
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the divergent views of a multiplicity of social groups into greater harmony 
(Heinz 1990, p. 357). Mills and Domhoff both refute this in the U. S. context and 
it is also unlikely in the Indonesian context for the reasons explained above. 
However, it should also be remembered that groups are defined in relation to 
each other so that if one is willing to speak at such a level of abstraction as `the 
state' or `labour' then `business' automatically becomes a cohesive group with 
its own very general common interests such as the provision of infrastructure or 
the protection of private property rights. 
One of the major concerns of elite network analyses is to trace the personal and 
inter-organisational connections amongst different elite constituents which are 
necessary for policy consensus and concerted action (Knoke 1990, p. 157). The 
relevance of elite analysis for Indonesia lies particularly in this idea of a 
`coincidence of interests' which Mills thought of as crucial for an elite network 
to function (Mills in Alatas 1997, p. 290). Such an idea is echoed in the 
corruption literature through Bayart who talks of a `reciprocal assimilation of 
elites' that downgrades to secondary importance such common distinctions as 
public/private, bureaucracy/business and military/civilian (Bayart 1993 in 
Andvig 2000). However, the empirical work of this thesis in the chapters to 
follow indicates that the level of elite cohesion within Indonesia now is in fact 
much less than under Soeharto, as the state elite in particular has fragmented 
creating a `multi-polar' state. 
1.4.3 Marxist Analysis 
Marxism postulates that the state is subordinated to private property. However, 
once it is accepted that political domination of the capitalist class is achieved 
through control over the state it still remains to be explained exactly how this is 
accomplished. There are two viewpoints: 
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1.4.3.1 Instrumentalist 
This view has long been held to be Marxist orthodoxy. As its name suggests the 
state is seen simply as an instrument in the hands of the capitalist class, whether 
it be through class-based parties, recruitment into the state apparatus or 
ideological hegemony. Personal positions and relationships are also emphasised. 
The state in this perspective is thus conceived of as neutral but in the hands of 
capitalists, the `ruling class'. The state may be a repressive force used by the 
bourgeoisie to keep itself in power, but all that is needed to change things is a 
victory for the proletariat who can then grab the state and use it for its own ends. 
As described above instrumentalism may seem rather crude and it may also seem 
rather unlikely that the strong states representative of so many authoritarian 
states are only possessed of the typical motivations of the capitalist class. All 
states take actions which are either not related to capital accumulation at all or 
act against the interests of capital accumulation. Defenders of the instrumentalist 
point of view would counter that the state can take actions against capital 
accumulation in the short term but they could very well turn out to benefit capital 
in the long term. However, this is the kind of theory which can never be refuted 
and so has only limited value. For, short of total collapse or a communist 
revolution, it can be presumed that a capitalist economy will go on evolving into 
the future so that if a scale is used which is long term enough anything can be 
said to benefit capital. 
In the Indonesian context, some scholars may reject outright instrumentalist 
conceptions of how business and the state interact citing the perceived weakness 
of the domestic capitalist class and its dependence on the state. But, as 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, in recent years there has been a 
resurgence of a class-based social conflict approach which views the state as 
having been captured by a ruling oligarchy. Hadiz is most explicit about his 
instrumentalist approach, maintaining that `the consolidation of an oligarchy in 
the 1980s virtually transformed the apparatus of the state into a committee that 
presided over the protection of its interests' (Hadiz 2001, p. 120). Such are the 
diverging views of the Indonesian capitalist class in the literature, as a weak 
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group dependent on the state or as part of a rapacious oligarchy in complete 
control of the state. The apparently mutually exclusive viewpoints here can be 
reconciled by examining differing definitions of the capitalist class, which will 
be returned to at the end of this section. 
1.4.3.2 Structuralist 
Derived from Marx's theory of the Bonapartist state, structuralists deny the idea 
of a class conscious ruling class implicit in instrumentalism. Instead attention is 
paid to the relative autonomy of the state from society without losing sight of the 
structural constraints on the state (Hawes 1993). These structural constraints 
arise out of the idea that in the long term the state cannot contradict the logic of 
the economic system or override the interests of the capitalist class because 
capitalist power stems from the very indispensability of the capitalist class as the 
machine which drives the economy. In this sense capitalists exert a veto power 
over the state, whose leaders, although exercising a degree of autonomy, must 
always consider the consequences of policies which threaten the flow of 
investment (Robison 1992, p. 87). Variations in this theory have been forwarded 
by, amongst others, Poulantzas (1978a, 1978b) and Alavi (1972,1982), but the 
core idea described above remains the same. 
The structuralist approach was reinvigorated in the 1970s from the U. S. with the 
highly visible `conversion' of two of its most prominent pluralists, Charles 
Lindblom and Robert Dahl, reflecting a growing trend in political theory away 
from treating business as just another interest group (Vogel 1987, p. 386). Whilst 
Dahl contended that corporations should be subject to social control and 
governed by democratic processes, Lindblom revived structuralism with his 
seminal work, Politics and Markets. He maintained that business enjoys a 
privileged position within the political economy because society has given 
business the responsibility for mobilising and organising society's resources. In 
effect corporate executives `decide a nation's industrial technology, the pattern 
of work organisation, location of industry, market structure and resource 
allocation' (Lindblom 1977, p. 171). Thus corporate owners and their executives 
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must be induced to perform these primary social functions through, for example, 
monopoly rights, limited liability, subsidies and tax incentives. The power of 
business is such that the slightest reforms that run counter to business interests 
are enacted only after a ransom is paid in the form of new inducements (Vogel 
1987, p. 392). Essentially, then, the state must act in the interests of the business 
community. 
Vogel critiques the structuralist viewpoint in principle on a number of issues. 
For example, he concedes that the government is dependent on the decisions of 
businessmen, but argues that businessmen are equally dependent on the 
government for such safeguards as the protection of property rights and 
reasonable levels of taxation. Moreover, in response to the idea that the 
economy is dependent on investor confidence, he maintains that consumer 
confidence is just as important economically. 
However, such a critique is again derived from the questionable market logic that 
different sources of power can somehow balance each other out. This may work 
well in theory, but in practice it is rarely as neat. For example, it may be true that 
consumers also have a lot of power, but the point is that they only have this 
power collectively. Following Olson, it is accepted that such widely dispersed 
and unorganised constituencies as consumers will find it much more difficult to 
organise than businesses. 
One of the more valid criticisms of the structuralist thesis is that, just as in the 
case of instrumentalism, structuralism can never be refuted. If, for example, a 
political outcome hurts workers and benefits big corporations, structuralists can 
say that the state is acting to sustain existing arrangements because such 
outcomes preserve the unequal relationships that are fundamental to capitalism. 
If, on the other hand, the state acts to help the subordinate classes while hurting 
the largest corporations, a structuralist can still argue that capitalism is being 
sustained because these political outcomes legitimise current economic and 
political arrangements while undercutting dissident justifications for action 
against the existing order (Jacobs 1985, p. 6). 
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In his earlier writings Richard Robison used structuralism to describe the way in 
which the business community and the state interact in Indonesia. He states 
`while the New Order may politically exclude the dominant social forces from 
direct access to political power, it rules nevertheless with their general 
acquiescence and in their general interests. It provides the conditions for 
economic growth and the stability of the existing social order' (Robison 1986, 
p. 120). He does not argue that the `state is a powerless cipher whose responses 
are predetermined by some structural mechanism', but rather that within this 
framework of structural constraints the state has become a central element in the 
mediation of the conflicting interests of different segments of the capitalist class 
(Robison 1986, p. 121). 
However, Indonesia's economy is, for better or for worse, a capitalist economy 
and there is no serious debate within Indonesia about whether this should 
change. As such it is overwhelmingly accepted that certain minimal levels of 
fiscal, monetary and economic infrastructure and the protection of private 
property should be provided by the state. For whilst the benefits of capitalism 
may be greatly skewed in favour of the owners of capital, it is undeniable that 
workers benefit to some extent from the smooth functioning of a growing 
economy. Thus, it could be argued that state provision of such fundamentals as 
infrastructure and private property rights do not benefit the capitalist class 
exclusively but rather society as a whole so that it would be erroneous to suggest 
that it forms evidence of the influence of the capitalist class. 
Furthermore, Hal Hill makes a point which has often been repeated that `there 
remains a deep-seated mistrust of market forces, economic liberalism and private 
(especially Chinese-Indonesian) ownership in many influential quarters in 
Indonesia' (Hill 1996, p. 93). If this is indeed the case then it would follow that 
the structural influence of the capitalist class is weak in Indonesia. However, in 
the light of the recent economic crisis in Indonesia is there likely to be a 
strengthening or a weakening of business power? In theory, Vogel argues that 
good economic performance decreases business political power, as the public 
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raise their expectations about what business can afford. Conversely poor 
economic performance, through its effect on public perceptions, increases 
business political power (Vogel 1989, p. 7). In contrast, Mitchell contends that 
poor economic performance decreases public confidence in business and so 
weakens its political power (Mitchell 1997, p. 20). 
However, any explanation which relies on the state responding to public views 
encounters difficulties when applied to the Indonesian context where public 
resentment towards the biggest Indonesian conglomerates is palpable whilst at 
the same time many are still receiving government bailouts. Post- economic 
crisis, some administrations have seemed keener to attract back domestic capital 
into Indonesia than others. Playing to his role as protector of pribumi interests, 
President Habibie asserted that the Chinese-Indonesians who left the country 
with their capital as a result of the May 1998 riots could stay away and that their 
positions would be easily filled by others (Eklof 2002, p. 232). Yet under 
President Wahid there was a great deal of effort expended to try to persuade 
conglomerate capital to return to Indonesia which is likely to have continued 
under President Megawati. The power of the domestic capitalist class relies not 
only on political power holders' needs for personal and political funds but also 
from its domestic status. The increasing international take overs of domestic 
businesses in the wake of the economic crisis have fuelled a nationalist agenda of 
the promotion of the domestic capitalist class. 
External sources of economic power can be divided broadly into the power of 
international capital and the power of international organisations such as the IMF 
and the World Bank. It should be noted that these two dimensions of external 
power should not be conflated, for, whilst they share the same broad goals of 
opening up recalcitrant economies in the long term, in the short term they diverge 
considerably. The IMF ostensibly seeks to impose procedures of accountability, 
transparency and efficiency whereas international business does not. It is a 
fallacy to suggest that private foreign investors seek efficiency, rules and 
standards for their investments; rather their priorities are to protect their 
investments and to maintain a profit. Economic rationality may be a defining 
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feature of business in general, but rationality is a context-specific term. For 
example, it was economically rational under the Soeharto regime for foreign 
investors to make use of the illegitimate channels of personal influence in order 
to secure their investments, as evidenced by the steady stream of revelations 
concerning the role of foreign investment in corruption which have surfaced 
since the fall of Soeharto. 
Assessing the relevance of the structural approach to Indonesia is thus rather 
complex. For example, distinctions have to be made between the structural 
power of international and domestic business. However, despite some 
theoretical weaknesses, the structuralist approach can be used effectively in 
Indonesia to at least partly explain capitalist class power over the state, 
especially in a situation where private investment is desperately needed in the 
wake of economic collapse. 
1.4.4 Statist Analysis 
Most of the other theories reviewed here have the state at the centre of analysis. 
Marxist analyses regard the state in relation to class formation, patrimonial 
analyses concentrate on the ways that modem state structures and traditional rule 
interact and modernisation theory (along with its contemporary theoretical 
equivalents) define the state as an institutional amalgam which is more or less 
legal-rational. In these analyses the state is a major character in the story of 
political power but crucially can not act independently. 
Popularised by Skocpol and taken to extremes by Anderson, statist analysis sees 
the state as an autonomous structure with a logic and interests of its own not 
necessarily equivalent to or fused with the interests of the capitalist class 
(Miliband 1983, p. 27). From this perspective the state should be seen as an 
institution, comparable to the university, the church or the modem firm. Like 
other bureaucracies, state institutions have their own memory and perpetuate 
self-preserving and self-aggrandising impulses which are articulated by particular 
officials, but are not simply a function of passing personal ambitions (Anderson 
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1983, p. 478). At the heart of this analysis is the idea of a fundamental 
disjunction between the interests of the state and society. The state is almost 
entirely detached from and unresponsive to societal interests, including those of 
the capitalist class. 
According to this theory we should not conceive states as simply the place where 
social groups fight it out. States should be conceived of as autonomous actors in 
the policy process (Mitchell 1997, p. 26). In order to achieve this, a certain 
degree of state autonomy in relation to societal influences is necessary. But 
critics have pointed out that the boundary between state and society is 
indeterminate, an imprecision which often obscures the fact that explanations 
based on state autonomy usually end up referring to the motivations of civil 
servants or elected officials. As Mitchell continues: 
We are indebted to the concept of state autonomy for its notion of 
autonomy, not for the state. Its value lies in encouraging us to estimate 
the degree of independence that public officials exercise in the policy 
process and the sources of this independence. Its value diminishes as 
these officials are wrapped in the loose-fitting concept of the state. There 
is more to be gained from disaggregating the state, and, society too, for 
that matter (Mitchell 1997, p. 27). 
Wibisono agrees in the Indonesian context, criticising the state-centric approach 
for failing to cope with differences of viewpoint within the government 
apparatus. He concludes that `it is not unusual to find agencies with different 
levels of expertise, authority and interest that cannot always be co-ordinated 
(Wibisono 1989, p. 32). 
Apart, perhaps, from a fundamental disagreement over whether individuals can 
ever be left out of an analysis of an institution such as the state, the debate in the 
theoretical literature about the use of statist analysis is really one about the 
cohesion of the state. There is often a degree of ambiguity in the literature on 
Indonesia surrounding distinctions between the President, the state and the 
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regime precisely because the state and the regime were highly centralised around 
Soeharto. Whilst Anderson's view of the Indonesian state as possessing its own 
`self-preserving and self-aggrandising impulses' was useful in tracing its colonial 
roots, one suspects that what he was describing had more to do with Soeharto's 
role as integrator of state, regime and President than with any essential state 
characteristics. This is evidenced by the spectacular fragmentation of post- 
Soeharto state power which is a definite theme throughout this thesis. 
1.4.5 Relative Autonomy 
The relationship between business and the state is also explored in this literature 
through the concept of `relative autonomy'. Some theorists suggest that the state 
in Indonesia did not have enough autonomy from the capitalist class to avoid 
sinking into corrupt relations (Gomez 2002, p. 9). Alavi, however, maintains that 
post-colonial states are more autonomous from their domestic capitalist class 
compared with the situation in the West. This, he argues, is because a post- 
colonial capitalist class is made up of both metropolitan and indigenous 
bourgeoisie as well as a landed class and it is this complexity which enables the 
post-colonial state to be relatively autonomous towards each of these sections 
within the capitalist class (Alavi 1972, p. 62). Although Alavi is criticised for 
failing to recognise that relative autonomy is a general condition of capitalism 
everywhere (Alatas 1997, p. 292), the Indonesian state has been portrayed 
elsewhere as impervious to the influence of the capitalist class in policy networks 
(MacIntyre 1991,1995). 
Reconciling these two views hinges on definitions of the capitalist class. Where 
Gomez is probably thinking of a tiny favoured section of the capitalist class, 
Maclntyre uses a broader definition to encompass the whole of the Indonesian 
business community. This imprecision over how the capitalist class is defined is 
sometimes matched by confusing the capitalist class with civil society. For 
example, Weiss begins an article on state capacity in East Asia by quoting the 
orthodox argument that the state in authoritarian contexts has a high degree of 
`operational autonomy' which implies both insulation from social forces and a 
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certain `hardness' in the implementation phase. Then, through a case study of 
Japan, she suggests that fostering ties across the public-private divide, such as 
pulling into the state's orbit economic bodies such as banks, conglomerates, 
industry associations and trading companies, actually acts to preserve state 
autonomy at the same time as transforming this autonomy into capacity (Weiss 
1994, p. 88). Her point is that state autonomy is strengthened by collaborative 
state-industry relations, which `inverts the conventional understanding in which 
the state's autonomy increases in direct proportion to actions taken against, or in 
spite of, capitalist interests' (Weiss 1994, p. 92). 
But the definition of state autonomy is that it takes little account of extra-state 
input, so how can a state which takes more account of extra-state input be said to 
be more autonomous? The fundamental weakness in her analysis is that she 
conflates the business sector with society as a whole. For surely the point is that 
through such institutional linkages with business as she suggests the state is not 
becoming more autonomous from society as a whole, rather it is becoming more 
autonomous from all other sections of society which do not originate from the 
business community. In other words the state becomes less autonomous towards 
business, but in so doing becomes more autonomous towards all other sections of 
society. 
Debates around the strength of the capitalist class suffer from the same confusing 
apparent contradictions. For example, Hadiz speaks of a `powerful domestic 
capital-owning class' (Hadiz 2001, p. 121) whilst Eklof maintains that `the 
political strength of the bourgeoisie is limited in spite of their domination of the 
economy' (Eklof 2002, p. 222). Again, such an ambiguity is simply enough dealt 
with by fencing off the most highly visible few favoured business people from 
the rest of the capitalist class. However, it should also be remembered that the 
whole domestic capitalist class in Indonesia is as dependent on the state now as it 
was under Soeharto as government consumption and investment continue to be 
the main pillars of economic growth. 
Minoring the experience of Thailand and the Philippines following 
democratisation (Gomez, 2002, p. 15) there has been a new development in the 
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role that the capitalist class plays in Indonesian governance as business people 
increasingly move into formal politics. Although members of the business 
community have for many years been involved in the MPR and to a lesser extent 
the DPR, 5 the reformasi era has seen a substantial increase in the number of 
6 parliamentarians from a business background. 
Throughout the New Order period, the positions given to business people in 
formal politics functioned mainly as an exercise in mutual legitimisation between 
the regime and the business community and were devoid of any real power. Yet, 
post-Soeharto this situation seems to be changing as more and more business 
people are chosen by political parties to become members of an increasingly 
powerful parliament, 7 in some cases occupying positions of considerable power. 8 
Moreover, a glance at the biographies of members of parliament suggests that 
many MPs with a business background have moved up through the ranks of New 
Order business associations such as REI, Kadin and HIPMI. 
Analyses of the relationship between business and the state have most to offer 
this thesis in terms of defining the two terms. Definitions of the state in statist 
analyses as a cohesive actor in its own right may have been more acceptable 
under Soeharto, but when compared to the situation today have much less 
explanatory value. Whilst the neutral contexts implied in pluralist analysis are 
blind to the political realities of Indonesian political economy, its description of 
an unreified state now has more resonance in the post-Soeharto era. Meanwhile, 
the elite cohesion found in elitist theory has similarly become more questionable 
post-Soeharto. Marxist and elitist models have most resonance in Indonesia 
because they are the only two theories here to define the business side of the 
'See for example, Warta Ekonomi, 12.10.92. 
6 See Indonesian Business, October 2000. 
7 The Indonesian election system as it stands means that people vote only for political parties 
and not particular individuals. The political parties decide themselves who will fill the 
positions for parliament. 
For example, Arifin Panigoro (founder of the larget private oil company in Indonesia) is 
Chairman of the biggest faction in the DPR (PDIP) and PDIP Deputy Chairman. Jusuf Kalla 
(PT Bukaka executive) was briefly Minister of Trade and Industry, as was Rini Soewandi (long- 
term executive of PT Astra) for 3 years. 
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relationship as a small number of favoured individuals. All the other analyses 
attempt to group the capitalist class as a whole, which is out of place in 
Indonesia where there are important differences in the way that different 
segments of the capitalist class interact with the state. Nevertheless, it has been 
argued elsewhere that Marxist theories are of limited use in describing Indonesia 
because of their presupposition of rigid social classes and their consequent 
neglect of ethnic or religious based ('aliran') divisions (Mackie 1990, p. 1). This 
is an important point in regards to this thesis, where an attempt will be made to 
include the ethnic dimension into an analysis of the distribution of power. 
1.5 Analysis: Political and Economic Processes in Indonesia 
As already explained in the introduction to this thesis, analyses of corruption in 
Indonesia can be grouped into several categories depending on their analytical 
focus. These categories can also be employed to analyse political and economic 
processes in Indonesia in more general terms. Broadly speaking there are three 
categories of analysis: neo-liberal, institutionalist and social conflict. This 
section will describe and critically appraise some of the arguments which run 
through these categories of analysis whilst revealing each school's particular 
assumptions and biases. 
1.5.1 Neo-liberal Approaches 
The neo-liberal label is most often used to describe the work produced by the 
major international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. 9 There is 
also a sizeable body of academic literature which analyses political and 
economic processes in Indonesia on the same terrain and in the same terms as 
these international institutions. 
9 Some recent examples of major reports on Indonesia are: World Bank (2000a) Indonesia: 
Accelerating Recovery in Uncertain Times, Brief for the Consultative Group on Indonesia, 
Report No. 20991-IND; World Bank (2001b) Indonesia: The Imperative for Reform, Brief for 
the Consultative Group on Indonesia, Report No. 23093-IND; World Bank (2000b) Indonesia: 
Public Spending in a Time of Change, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector 
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The neo-liberal approach is based on the ideal that business-state relations 
should be characterised by the state's retreat from the activities of business, with 
the state's role limited to providing the support necessary for the market to 
function optimally. The major themes found in this literature are therefore 
concerned with assessing the degree to which Indonesia measures up to this ideal 
in terms of its progress in deregulation and privatisation. For example, some of 
the most prominent issues explored include an assessment of the deregulation 
measures which the Indonesian government has undertaken to attract foreign 
investment (Dick 2001, p. 2; World Bank 2003a; Pangestu 2001, p. 142, p. 147; 
Siregar 2001, p. 290, p. 295) and the speed and progress of the sale of state owned 
assets (Dick 2001, p. 21; Pangestu 2001, p. 142; Pangestu 2001, p. 171; Siregar 
2001, p. 290; World Bank 2001b; World Bank 2000a) 
Macroeconomic. policies, such as those concerned with inflation, interest rates, 
exchange rates and consumption levels, also feature heavily in this literature as 
the key to ensuring economic growth or as an explanation for the economic crisis 
(McLeod and Garnaut 1998, p. 36). Although such an emphasis can be seen as a 
reflection of the fact that many neo-liberal analysts have a background in the 
discipline of economics, it is also an indication of one of the major limitations of 
their analysis: their view of economic processes taking place in isolation from 
political and social processes. Thus, where economic changes are analysed, they 
tend to descend into technical economic debates concerned with the appropriate 
level of interest rates, bond issues or fiscal austerity. Such an analysis is again 
derived from the neo-liberal ideal that economic decisions should be divorced 
from politics. In this regard, another theme of the neo-liberal literature concerns 
complaints about the interference of `politics' in `economic decisions' (Mcleod 
and Garnaut 1998, p. 35; Pangestu 2001, p. 143). 
Because the neo-liberal route to reform in business-state relations lies in the 
retreat of the state from the economic sphere, their analyses of the post-Soeharto 
reform process tend to focus exclusively on the progress of deregulation. When 
Unit; World Bank (2003a) Maintaining Stability, Deepening Reforms, Report No. 25330-IND; 
IMF Country Reports published every two or three years entitled: Indonesia: Selected issues. 
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explaining the lack of such reform, their faith that the economic and political 
domains can operate independently of one another means that any political 
decisions which do not conform to the neo-liberal agenda are simply attributed to 
a lack of political will (Dick 2000, p. 7; Siregar 2001, p. 292). Where there is 
some acceptance of the idea that the interests of broader coalitions are at work, 
only the domestic rent-seekers standing behind nationalist economic policy are 
identified. These groups, it is argued, block the good intentions of the 
technocrats to introduce efficiency-maximising deregulatory policy. Reform to 
business-state relations is thus conceived of as a matter of enlightened policy 
makers, insulated from the influence of rent-seekers, introducing deregulatory 
economic policies and thus freeing the potential of the market to benefit all. The 
key, then, is to persuade (or force) policy makers into agreeing that this is the 
right course of action to take. 
But as the social conflict theorists point out, `technocratic' policies of 
deregulation and privatisation are not naturally efficient but predominantly 
benefit a different group of interests: international capital. In other words, most 
deregulatory policies and some anti-corruption strategies do not divorce politics 
from economics, but rather shift economic gains from the domestic elite to the 
international elite. 
Such a viewpoint will be developed in this thesis where it will be shown that the 
political influence of domestic rent-seekers on state economic decisions can be 
compared in some places to the political influence of international business. 
Where the influence of domestic business is more direct, the influence of 
international business is mediated through the leverage which international 
institutions and international states have gained as a result of Indonesia's 
sovereign debt. Similarly, it will also be shown that post-Soeharto governments 
face more complicated decisions than the neo-liberals allow for. Decisions over 
the level of debt forgiveness for domestic rent-seekers or reductions in their 
stranglehold over government procurement are more a matter of juggling the 
interests of both domestic and international interests. This is because one of the 
most important legacies of the economic crisis is that the coincidence of interests 
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which occurred between international business and domestic rent-seekers under 
Soeharto no longer exists. 
1.5.2 Institutionalist Approaches 
Although institutions appear in most political analyses, institutionalist 
approaches are distinguished by their particular emphasis on institutional 
configuration in explaining political and economic processes. There are several 
sub-categories of institutionalist analysis which diverge on questions of method 
and theory. For example, to rational choice institutionalists, institutions are an 
intervening variable capable of affecting an individual's choices and actions but 
not determining them. To historical institutionalists, institutions can play a 
determinant role since they shape the actions of individuals but are at times 
affected by collective and individual choices. To sociological institutionalists, 
institutions are themselves dependent on larger `macro level' variables such as 
society and culture, and the individual is a dependent and rather unimportant 
variable (Koelble 1995, p. 232). 
In terms of the application of institutionalist analysis to Indonesian political and 
economic processes, there have recently been two major works which broadly 
follow rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism. These are, 
respectively, Andrew Maclntyre's The Power of Institutions (2003c)1° and 
Natasha Hamilton-Hart's Asian States, Asian Bankers (2002). 
In a bid to explain the varying impacts of the economic crisis across Southeast 
Asia, Maclntyre focuses on the dispersal of decision-making authority in 
political institutions in order to discover its effect on the policy environment. He 
links institutional configuration to the impact of the economic crisis by 
maintaining that investors' decisions to withdraw from or remain in various 
Southeast Asian economies were dependent on the type of policy chosen by 
national governments. In the second half of his book, he also maps post-crisis 
10 The major part of his work was first published as an article in 2001 in International 
Organization. 
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institutional reform, but rather than explaining the changes to institutional 
configurations, he himself states that he simply describes them (2003c, p. 107). 
Throughout this informative section of his book Maclntyre states explicitly that 
institutional reform can be explained by coalitions of actors seeking to advance 
certain interests (2003c, p. 106). However, because he does not expand on this, 
the changes to the dispersal of decision-making authority which he (quite rightly) 
detects may seem to the reader to have arisen from some sort of happy 
consensus. 
The first part of the book does address causality. Here he contends that the 
fragmented nature of veto authority over policy in Thailand led to `policy 
rigidity' in response to the economic crisis. In other words, at the time of the 
economic crisis there were so many different actors with the ability to block 
('veto') policy in Thailand, that policy reform in response to the crisis was 
woefully slow and thus ineffectual. At the opposite end of this scale, the 
concentration of veto authority over policy in Indonesia led to a severe form of 
`policy volatility'. Here, Soeharto's sole veto power over policy-making meant 
that policy `vacillated wildly' (2001, p. 84) in response to the economic crisis, 
thus scaring off investors and further aggravating the effects of the crisis in 
Indonesia. By comparison, Malaysia and the Philippines fell in between these 
two extremes. 
Maclntyre is well aware that such a `tight analytical focus' on institutions is only 
partial in nature. He repeatedly points out that other factors matter in explaining 
the impact of the economic crisis, such as short-term capital flows, financial 
regulation and patterns of business-government relations (2001, p. 84). 
Nevertheless, he claims an `independent and significant relationship between 
institutions and investment that sheds light on the dynamics of the economic 
crisis' (2001, p. 84). However, Maclntyre's argument that such an `independent' 
relationship exists between institutions and investment rests on the assumption 
that at the time of the crisis investors were making rational decisions about their 
investments based on each government's policy responses. Yet, it is also 
possible to look beyond such a level analysis, which only really scrapes the 
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surface of causality. For example, some analysts eschew explanations for the 
economic crisis based on investor motivation in favour of such factors as the 
openness of capital accounts, changes in the international and regional balance of 
power (Pempel 1999, p. 6) or more fundamental problems with particular 
capitalisms (Rodan et al 2001, p. 25). 
Another caveat which Maclntyre applies to his own work is that he is not arguing 
about the appropriate content of policy but rather its fonn (Maclntyre 2003c, 
p. 9). Yet, this is in fact something of a misrepresentation because it is also 
possible to view his arguments as explaining these governments' failure to adopt 
neo-liberal policies in terms of malfunctioning institutions. For example, the 
Philippines' policy process is described as `steady, coherent and timely' 
(MacIntyre 2001, p. 116), but it also closely followed the advice of the IMF with 
cuts in government expenditure, liberalisation of the oil sector and the 
introduction of new banking oversight arrangements (MacIntyre 2001, p. 101- 
106). In the section on Malaysia, Maclntyre clearly states that he sees a `strong 
connection among the configuration of veto authority, the government's policy 
posture and the severe investment reversal' (MacIntyre 2001, p. 106). Yet, his 
analysis is actually entirely based on the struggle between the orthodox neo- 
liberal policies of the ill-fated Anwar and the nationalist tendencies of President 
Mahathir. 
In the case of Indonesia, Maclntyre's argument rests on the idea that Soeharto's 
policy signals to investors were `hopelessly changeable' (Maclntyre 2001, p. 115) 
and `wildly vacillating' (MacIntyre 2001, p. 116) when in fact they only really 
changed once. As Maclntyre himself notes (Maclntyre 2001, p. 113), at the 
beginning of the crisis Soeharto followed IMF advice, producing orthodox neo- 
liberal policy such as floating the rupiah, cutting government expenditure and 
lifting restrictions on foreign ownership. Yet a few months later Soeharto's 
policy changed direction sharply away from the IMF policies with a programme 
of bank bailouts and the resumption of government spending on mega-projects. 
The point here is that it wasn't so much the fact that policy had changed that was 
the problem, but rather how it had changed. It seems more likely that investors 
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were troubled by the direction of policy rather than the fact that it had changed. 
For, when the economic crisis forced Soeharto to choose between international 
and domestic interests, he eventually came down firmly on the side of the latter. 
Maclntyre's point that the speed and ease of such a policy reversal is only really 
possible under conditions where a single veto over policy exists is a useful one. 
He searches for greater analytical clarity by self-consciously isolating the effect 
of institutions on the policy environment and in doing so has produced a 
stimulating and valuable addition to the theoretical literature. However, by 
professing to disregard the actual content of policy, he is in danger of leaving the 
reader with the false impression that political change is an apolitical process 
which can be brought about by better institutional design. 
Institutions are important, but they do not work in isolation, something which 
Maclntyre himself concedes when he recognises the significance of other factors 
such as `interests, ideas and international systemic forces' (MacIntyre 2003c, 
p. 11). For the purposes of this thesis, the most interesting section of his work 
touches on the issue of how institutions interact with the interests that surround 
them. 
Maclntyre recognises that his `veto player' analysis does not take into account 
the influence of important groups operating outside formal institutional 
structures such as big business, but makes the case that they should be kept out 
of his analysis in order to see more clearly the effect of these formal institutions. 
Interests such as these, he claims, are ultimately mediated through formal veto 
institutions that differ fundamentally across country settings and it is precisely 
these differences and their consequences which interest him (Maclntyre 2001, 
p. 90). Yet, as this thesis will show, it is equally possible to describe formal 
political institutions as being mediated by such interests. In other words, not 
only do institutions dictate how and when interests are articulated, but also the 
manner in which they function is also dependent on the interests which constitute 
them. Thus, institutions in this thesis are not only conceptualised as a set of 
rules which guide the behaviour of political and economic elite, shaping the way 
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interests are expressed, but their functioning also reflects the configuration of 
these interests. Where Maclntyre's analysis seeks to separate institutions from 
interests, the analytical framework developed in this thesis rather attempts to 
bring the two together. For, if it is accepted that the way institutions function is a 
reflection of coalitions of interests, then it becomes meaningless to speak of them 
in isolation from those interests as does Maclntyre. 
Hamilton-Hart's work on the configuration of financial institutions, such as 
central banks, across Southeast Asia has many similarities with that of 
Maclntyre. Where Maclntyre maintains that policy responses to economic crises 
are most effective when they are reasonably fast and based on some consultation, 
no matter what the actual content of the policy, Hamilton-Hart considers 
financial policy to be best when it is implemented consistently and in an 
organised manner, regardless of its content. Thus, where Maclntyre's analysis 
explicitly isolates the effects of institutional configuration from the interests and 
policies which flow through them, so too Hamilton-Hart explicitly states that she 
wishes to `disentangle arguments about the effects of organisational 
characteristics from arguments about the effects of different policies' (MacIntyre 
2003c, p. 9). 
Hamilton-Hart begins by tracing the evolution of central banks' internal 
`governing capacity' across Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, where the 
optimum governing capacity is roughly equivalent to the Weberian legal-rational 
ideal (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 12). Anchored `within the institutional framework 
of the broader state system' (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 9), her descriptions of the 
historical evolution of these central banks provides a detailed picture of the 
different `structures, routines and norms' of each. 
She then goes on to delineate her central argument, that `within a fairly wide 
range of policies, policy choice is less critical to determining financial stability or 
economic sustainability than consistent implementation of declared financial 
policy (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 6). As evidence for this proposition, she cites the 
success of interventionist financial policies in Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia 
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compared to the costly results of the same type of policies in the Philippines and 
Indonesia (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 23). She then links the various levels of 
governing capacity across these countries with the success or failure of these 
same types of interventionist policies, concluding that it is this internal governing 
capacity of financial institutions which determines financial stability rather than 
the actual nature of the policy. In other words, in a country like Indonesia where 
governing capacity is weak, it doesn't matter whether policy revolves around 
heavy government subsidies or follows a more deregulatory path, neither can 
produce a financial system that is both stable and efficient (Hamilton-Hart 2002, 
p. 6). 
She further develops her argument by stating that `organisational characteristics 
that underlie state capacity are likely to predispose government actors towards 
certain goals and away from others' (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 9). In this regard, 
the lack of governing capacity in Indonesia has meant that `financial-industrial 
policies tend to degenerate into costly exercises in channelling rents to favoured 
interests' (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 22, italics added) and that `the disorganisation 
and indiscipline of most state organisations ... meant that they were vehicles 
for 
private interests' (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 40). 
This is in contrast to the position taken in this thesis where `grand' corruption is 
explicitly described as a system of wealth distribution. In other words, the 
corruption which exists in Indonesia today is not seen as some sort of primordial 
original condition which occurs because institutions have not yet developed 
robust administrative practices, or because their staff are uneducated in the ways 
of Weberian organisation. Rather, grand corruption is a system created and 
perpetuated by economic and political elites in order to both benefit themselves 
personally and support their own structures of power. 
This is not to deny Hamilton-Hart's position that organisational characteristics 
predispose government actors towards certain goals and away from others, which 
certainly is the case to an extent. But again, like Maclntyre, Hamilton-Hart only 
tells part of the story because the evolution and reform of institutions occurs 
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more organically than either seem to suggest. The view taken in this thesis is 
that institutional change occurs not only as new rules are introduced aimed at 
transforming internal organisational characteristics, but also as a result of the 
interplay between these new rules and the interests which surround them. It may 
be that organisational characteristics predispose government actors towards 
certain goals, but it is also the case that certain goals (corruption) pre-dispose 
actors towards creating institutions with those organisational characteristics. 
This may seem like unnecessary pedantry, but the very important corollary of this 
is that if it is accepted that private interests dictate how far institutional reform is 
implemented as much as institutional configuration affects private interests, then 
the seeds of institutional change must also be sought from changes to the 
composition of these interests; something to which the social conflict theorists of 
the next section are most attentive. 
Hamilton-Hart touches briefly on the way she sees other factors interacting with 
institutions, acknowledging that `the attributes of particular state organisations 
are a product of the specific contexts in which they evolved' (Hamilton-Hart 
2002, p. 20). However, rather than identifying coalitions of vested interests as 
part of the specific context of state organisations, she instead points to the 
existence of political cleavages, the degree of political insecurity, the dispersal of 
political power and abundant natural resources (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 20). 
Hamilton-Hart's certainty that `organisational-level characteristics have enough 
independent significance to be considered as explanatory variables in their own 
right' (Hamilton-Hart 2002, p. 20) is carried through from her book on Southeast 
Asian banks to an article on anti-corruption strategies in Indonesia (Hamilton- 
Hart 2001). Here, she makes the case that anti-corruption measures should 
focus not only on monitoring mechanisms which are external to organisations, 
but also on the internal self-discipline of organisations. Again, this point is both 
astute and useful, since if such internal self-discipline did exist then corruption 
would undoubtedly decline. However, the difficulty of her analysis lies in the 
absence of an explanation as to how this is to be achieved. Identifying best 
practice for institutions is certainly beneficial, but it does not contribute towards 
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an understanding of how and why institutions evolve in reality. As this thesis 
will show, attempts to impose new internal and external institutional structures 
in Post-Soeharto Indonesia have simply resulted in changes to the composition of 
interests. For this reason, the approach taken in this thesis towards analysing 
political organisations is very different from that taken by Hamilton-Hart. For 
example, Chapter Three deliberately avoids an analysis of business associations 
based around their internal organisational features in favour of one which 
distinguishes business associations based on who they represent and for what 
purposes, thereby establishing their connection to the wider political economy. 
1.5.3 Social Conflict Approaches 
If political change is all about economic deregulation for the neo-liberals and 
institutional design for the institutionalists, for the social conflict theorists the 
story is one of contending groups of social interests. The approach taken in this 
thesis owes most to this type of analysis, although it will be complemented by 
the sort of attention to institutional configuration which the institutionalists 
perform so rigorously. 
Whereas the neo-liberals and the institutionalists view the reform process as a 
struggle between inherently efficient and inefficient political and economic 
systems, the central proposition of social conflict theorists is that the struggle is 
one between ` shifting coalitions of state power and social interest' (Robison and 
Hadiz 2004, p. 5). Markets and the institutions that define them are `forged in 
system-level processes of social and political conflict' and cannot be understood 
away from these power relations (Rodan et al 2001, p. 7). Such a view is 
particularly aimed at counteracting the neo-liberal belief that markets are 
naturally and universally efficient constructs driven by `their own internal laws 
and the rational choices of individuals who seek to maximise their gains (Rodan 
et a12001, p. 2). 
The manner in which social interests interact with institutions is dealt with more 
comprehensively in this body of theory. Particular institutional configurations, it 
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is argued, exist because they are integral to specific power relations which are 
located within them (Rodan et al 2001, p. 7). Social conflict over production, 
profits, wealth and power, both drives the policies which create new institutions 
and defines the social forces which capture them. 
This is precisely the position taken in this thesis with the rejection of the 
institutionalists' idea that institutions can be understood in isolation from vested 
interests. The approach taken in this thesis agrees that institutions can only be 
conceived as a reflection of the interests which flow through them. However, it 
is also important not to underplay the very significant role that institutions play 
in defining these interests. Within this body of theory, the tendency is to 
concentrate on the ways in which social conflict shapes institutional change. 
Their analyses of the `contests over reforming political institutions and the 
vested interests involved' (Robison and Hadiz 2004, p. 227) are both persuasive 
and informative. But presenting coalitions of vested interests as reconstituting 
themselves within new institutions (Hadiz 2003b, p. 593; Robison and Hadiz 
2004, p. 225) leaves the impression that they are untouched by institutional 
reform, able to avoid its effects and recapture these new institutions at will. By 
comparison, this thesis builds upon the social conflict analytical framework by 
drawing attention more explicitly to the ways in which institutional changes have 
created new divisions within the coalitions of vested interests, redefining who 
they are and where they operate. For, institutional change in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia has opened up new opportunities for many to participate in corruption, 
and because the pool of wealth is not infinite, this inevitably means that these 
new participants benefit at the expense of more established interests. 
Andrew Rosser (2002) presents a persuasive case when he argues that the 
struggle over economic liberalisation in Indonesia must be understood as a 
political process of winners and losers rather than a technical process of 
choosing the right policies. He identifies the international interests which lie 
behind technocratic policies of economic liberalisation in the same way that this 
thesis identifies them behind anti-corruption strategies. Although Rosser 
focuses on different sectors from the empirical research in this thesis, the 
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approach is broadly similar and in many ways this thesis represents a 
continuation from where Rosser's work ended in 1999. 
However, there is also a slight refinement in the approaches used by Rosser and 
in this thesis which is derived mainly from this difference in time-scale. The 
majority of Rosser's work relates to the pre-crisis struggle over economic 
liberalisation which means that he is largely concerned with charting the ways in 
which conglomerates accepted or blocked reforms depending on whether they 
represented a threat to their interests. In this way, when he describes the 
difficulties the technocrats encountered in introducing prudential `legal-rational' 
type reforms, he does so in terms of their power relative to the conglomerates. 
For example, he describes the way in which prudential reforms were seriously 
compromised at the outset when only partial reforms in the capital market and 
banking sector were able to be introduced (Rosser 2002, p. 67; p. 72; p. 101) or the 
way in which technocratic power was enhanced in the wake of reported scandals 
surrounding the conglomerates (Rosser 2002, p. 97; p. 103; p. 108). 
In contrast, the research undertaken for this thesis was carried out at a time when 
it was not necessary for the technocrats to struggle so hard because of an old ally 
with an extraordinary new level of influence in the policy process: the IMF. 
Although the IMF certainly did not achieve everything it wished for, it did 
manage to push through very many comprehensive programmes of institutional 
reform. This means that it became less relevant in the immediate post-Soeharto 
era to analyse the relative power of the technocrats and the conglomerates in 
introducing new reform and more relevant to assess the ways in which the 
packages of reform pushed through by the IMF have interacted with 
conglomerate interests. Similarly, since new electoral laws and decentralisation 
laws were only just being enacted at the time of Rosser's work, the effects of 
such far-reaching institutional redesign were not yet clear. Thus, the slow and 
fitful struggle over economic deregulation and corruption of the Soeharto years 
which Rosser describes has been replaced in post-Soeharto Indonesia with 
comprehensive and far-reaching programmes of institutional reform, so that the 
concept of institutional reform must move closer to the centre of any analysis. 
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Because `social interests' are at the forefront of analyses by social conflict 
theorists, another major concern of this body of theory is in delineating exactly 
who makes up these forces. Most recently Hadiz (2003b) and Robison and 
Hadiz (2004) have produced insightful and detailed accounts in this regard. 
Again such an approach corresponds closely to that taken in this thesis where the 
identification of new interests, such as new local interests, small and medium 
businessmen and medium level civil servants (Hadiz 2003b, p. 597) are 
confirmed by the research undertaken for this thesis. However, accounts of 
`reformist' forces are less developed with the strange bed-fellows of labour and 
neo-liberal technocrats often brought together under the banner of `reformers' 
(for example, Hadiz 2003b, p. 596). It is conceivable that organised labour may 
share some of the neo-liberal goals if the latter's agenda can be characterised by 
the liberalisation of civil rights as well as property rights. However, in post- 
Soeharto Indonesia, labour has only really been involved in the negotiations of 
such classic labour issues as wage levels and redundancy pay, pitting them 
strongly against the neo-liberals. In any case, it is undoubtedly true that 
reformist forces are slow to organise and are still in their infancy in Indonesia at 
present. Nevertheless, it would be useful to have a more in-depth analysis of 
who reformers are and what change they are actually advocating. 
Another reason for this may be connected with the way in which this body of 
theory undervalues the role of ethnicity in Indonesian political economy. Where 
`nationalist' or 'pro-pribumi' sentiments are acknowledged, they tend to be 
described as part of the anti-reform movement (Rosser 2002, p. 197) because of 
their potential to be captured by rent-seekers (Hadiz 2003b, p. 599). All forms of 
state intervention carry rent-seeking opportunities, just as deregulated markets 
carry especially attractive opportunities for international interests, but to 
immediately consign pro pribumi sentiments to the anti-reform camp effectively 
concedes the neo-liberal point that the only route to reform is for the state to 
retreat from the economy. Scepticism of pro-pribumi policies is well justified 
based on past experience where it was effectively used as a euphemism for 
corruption and there have been few indications that this has changed 
substantially in recent times. But neither has the traditional representatives of 
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the working class, labour unions, proved themselves particularly reformist, beset 
as they are by elite infighting and disorganisation. The possibility must therefore 
remain that those who advocate pro pribumi policies form an important element 
of a reformist working class. However, such a proposition only becomes possible 
if it is accepted that ethnicity is woven into class issues in Indonesia, something 
which this thesis will attempt to show. 
1.5.4 Theoretical Inter-Connections 
Finally, it may be useful to briefly review the connections between these three 
schools of theory and those from the business-state and corruption literature. 
The neo-liberal category of analysis is clearly linked to the pluralist ideal 
reviewed in the business-state literature, not because the state is a neutral arena 
of conflict or because business represents just another interest group which must 
compete for influence in government with all the other interest groups, but 
because according to the neo-liberals, this is the way it can and should be. There 
is also something of the elitist view of politics within neo-liberal analysis, where 
political and economic processes can be explained as a matter of political will 
from the prevailing political elite. 
Institutionalist approaches may in some ways be seen as a latter day version of 
statist analyses. Where Anderson (1983) made the case for state institutions to 
be seen as having their own memory and perpetuating self-preserving impulses 
(p. 478), the institutionalists build on this fundamental idea by re-asserting the 
value of regarding state institutions as independent variables in explanations of 
political change. However, Mitchell's entreaty (see section 1.4.4 above) that 
statist analyses move towards disaggregating the state seem to have been adhered 
to by the institutionalists who very carefully consider state institutions 
individually. Having said this, however, it is clear that the institutionalist 
approach owes more to the type of organisation theories which are taught on 
business studies syllabuses the world over. 
The tendency of the social conflict approach to view political and economic 
processes as the product of social conflict which is itself `intimately bound to the 
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trajectory of various classes' (Rodan et al 2001, p. 8) situates this body of theory 
broadly within Marxist analysis. Although much of the most recent literature 
produced by social conflict theorists explicitly links their analyses to the 
instrumentalist view where the state is in the hands of the capitalist class, there 
are also elements of structuralism, especially where the power of international 
business is considered. 
The analyses of corruption reviewed earlier in this chapter tend towards focusing 
on the internal dynamics of corruption as an independent phenomenon rather 
than linking it to wider political and economic processes. However, there are 
still some connections, with the rent-seeking literature, for example, viewing the 
solution to corruption as intimately bound up with the withdrawal of the state 
from economic activities. On the other hand, clientelism, with its analysis of 
corruption based on relations of power, has something of the social conflict 
approach in it. However, the difference between the two approaches is derived 
mainly from the clientelist focus on power at an individual, personal level and 
the social conflict focus on the power of wider aggregations based on class. 
1.6 Methodologies: Observing Business/State Relations 
Constructing methodologies which are capable of adequately describing the 
interaction between the state and the business community is an exercise 
inevitably fraught with difficulty. Not only is such an endeavour hampered by 
the often secretive, or at least obscure, nature of such interactions but it also 
serves to highlight the highly subjective nature of scientific enquiry in politics. 
This section will describe the main approaches to observing the relationship 
between business and the state found in the literature, concluding with a brief 
discussion of methodologies used in this thesis. 
1.6.1 Inference of Business Power from Economic Structure 
This method looks at the impact of the business community on political decision- 
making by observing the economic structure of society, translating this into 
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corporate control of resources and then using this information as a variable in 
models of political outcomes. 
The first stage of this methodology is to calculate the industry share controlled 
by the largest firms, usually a four firm concentration ratio (Grant 1997, p. 454). 
The hypothesis that concentrated resources enhances organisational capabilities 
and improves the likelihood of political outcomes which are consistent with 
firms' interests is then tested against political outcomes. The most commonly 
used indicator of a beneficial political outcome is a lowering of tax rates since it 
is assumed that when firms pay more, it is improbable that their political 
influence is expanding (Jacobs 1988, p. 854). Salaman agrees about the suitability 
of using tax rates as indicators of corporate power, but for different reasons, 
suggesting that because tax policies are examples of re-distributive policy arenas, 
class conflict and opposition to economic elite dominance are usually evident 
here. Thus, if the corporate sector is successful in obtaining its desired outcomes 
in this policy arena, despite the contentious nature of such a success, this will 
indicate corporate power even more forcefully (Salaman 1977, p. 1035). 
The hypothesis that economic concentration gives rise to greater political 
influence, as indicated by levels of tax, is usually tested using time series 
regressions. So, for example, one could take a measure of economic 
concentration in a sector in the years 1980,1985,1990,1995 and 2000 then look 
at the tax rates levied against this sector for the same years. If the results show 
that in the years where economic concentration was greatest tax rates were 
lowest, then the hypothesis that economic concentration equals greater political 
influence will be proven. 
Although such a methodology has a certain elegant simplicity, it nevertheless 
contains within it some questionable premises. Firstly, it is tacitly assumed that 
the major unit with shared interests is the narrowly defined industry rather than 
the capitalist class as a whole or individual corporations. The underlying 
assumption is that firms pursue only the parochial interests of their industry and 
ignore or actively oppose the legislative goals of other industries. This, it is 
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argued, constitutes an unstated preference for a pluralist worldview with its 
corresponding emphasis on interest groups instead of class (Jacobs 1988, p. 856). 
A second difficulty with this methodology is that there is potentially a multitude 
of reasons why taxes could go up or down. Even if attempts are made to control 
for such exogenous factors in the research design, it nevertheless remains true 
that the researcher cannot know all of the additional reasons why tax rates 
fluctuate. It may be, for example, that the manufacturing sector has historically 
had low taxes levied against them for reasons of national development, but that a 
new change of government has brought a different perspective in this regard. 
Such a rigid methodology, attempting as it does to quantify the political power of 
business, will inevitably run into difficulties in a real world situation if only for 
the simple reason that social science research cannot operate within a closed 
system as research in the natural sciences can. Rather there will always be other 
factors at work, both known and unknown, which influence results in 
unpredictable ways. 
Attributes of a firm derived from its market position undoubtedly can have an 
impact on the political power of such firms if only for the reason that the market 
leaders have more resources to finance political parties or figures (either 
legitimately or not) and to purchase expertise to generate information in the 
policy process and liaison agents to transmit this information to the relevant 
policy makers (Salaman 1977, p. 1031). However, the ability of such a 
methodology to uncover the extent of business power in Indonesia is limited. 
For, although the issue of tax rates is as crucial to Indonesian businesses as it is 
anywhere, the `re-distributive policy arena' in Indonesia also includes a more 
direct struggle over government contracts, licenses and debt deals. There is little 
evidence of sectoral alliances between businesses in Indonesia where the 
influence of individual corporations on more particularistic issues is more keenly 
felt. In other words, such a methodology is not suitable for accessing the reality 
of corrupt exchange. 
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1.6.2 Policy Networks 
In contrast to the above methodology, which attempts to measure the interaction 
between the state and the business community in terms of beneficial outcomes 
for business, this methodology looks instead at the processes by which business 
and the state interact. In other words emphasis is taken off corporate control of 
resources and replaced by an analysis of elite behaviour. However, it should be 
remembered that these distinctions are not absolute and a consideration of 
outcomes will inevitably be included in any analysis of processes of interaction 
whilst control of resources tends to determine, or at least benefit, participants in 
the policy process. 
In order to study these processes of interaction the general concept of networks is 
utilised. Although there are as many different ways of using this methodology as 
there are writers on the subject, in general a research design would include first 
identifying organisations/elites who are attempting to influence policy in a 
specified policy domain. A sample based on the level of policy-making activity 
from these organisations/elites would then be taken before situating them in a 
network and following their progress in terms of their success in achieving their 
preferred outcomes. This can be done through interviews with participants 
and/or the collation of relevant media reports (Heinz 1990). 
One of the most contentious issues within this general framework centres around 
the first step above of how to decide who to include in the network. Those with 
a pluralist view tend to concentrate on participants in decisions, whilst elitists 
use reputational analysis (Berg 1978, p. 136). For those following the 
reputational approach two specialist journalists are first chosen for a particular 
policy field to nominate around twenty people who they regard as the most 
influential people in their field. The researchers then write to those nominated 
by the journalists and ask them in turn to nominate around twenty people who 
they regard as the most influential in their field. The snowball is kept rolling 
until a near-consensual list is arrived at, that is until almost no new names are 
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being nominated. At no stage is any nominator shown lists prepared by anyone 
else (Muller and Headey 1996, p. 138). 
The pluralist view, concentrating on the actors involved in the making of 
important decisions, has been criticised for its case specific nature and its neglect 
of those dimensions of power involved in keeping subjects off the agenda of 
political decision-making altogether. On the other hand, the reputational 
approach has been criticised for focusing on presumed rather than actual power, 
and for beginning with a self-fulfilling prophecy in positing the existence of a 
power structure at the outset (Salaman 1977, p. 1027). 
The concept of networks can be employed to good effect in thinking about the 
actual process of policy-making. However, if used strictly, difficulties arise 
which stem mainly from its esoteric language and schemata. Many practitioners 
end up by plotting the networks they have discovered onto computers using 
graph theory or smallest space analysis which in practice means little to the 
uninitiated and at best describes frequency of contact rather than relations of 
power. 
Focusing on the interaction between the business community and the state in the 
policy process may offer some insights into the power of business in relation to 
the state but it obviously does not provide any insights into the more informal 
nature of corruption. However, the network approach has also been used to 
identify the existence of a dominant segment of the capitalist class, which moves 
closer towards the idea of a favoured section of the business community found in 
analyses of Indonesia which emphasise oligarchic rule. 
Here, networks are used to theorise the relations that exist between corporations, 
emphasising the social networks in which corporations are embedded through the 
study of interlocking directorships. An interlocking directorship exists when a 
particular individual sits on two or more corporate boards. The boards of large 
corporations include both internal executives and outside non-executives among 
their members with the outside directors including a number of public and 
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political figures. Many hold only outside directorships, but others are internal 
executive officers (generally presidents or chief executives) of companies in 
which they have their principal business interest. Their directorships spread 
throughout the economy, and they form a business elite, an `inner circle' of 
corporate decision-makers with power and influence across the business system 
as a whole (Scott 1991, p. 182). 
The best known proponent of research on interlocking directorships is Michael 
Useem whose work is limited to the U. S. In order to discover a network of 
interlocking directors, he first drew up a list of the directors of 800 of the largest 
U. S. corporations in a particular year. The identities of over eight and a half 
thousand directors of the 800 corporations were then compiled from standard 
sources enabling the identification of those individuals who held two or more 
directorships among the 800 firms (Useem 1979, p. 558). 
The resultant data highlights the existence of a dominant segment of the 
capitalist class which can then be used to explore the link between, for example, 
interlocks and political donations (Koenig and Gogel 1981 in Scott 1991, p. 189), 
interlocks and corporate profitability (Burt 1983, Richardson 1987 in Scott 1991, 
p. 189) or interlocks and business crises (Glasberg 1981 in Scott 1991, p. 189). 
Useem most famously used his data on corporate interlocks to find the 
involvement of the `inner group' in the governance of other institutions such as 
government advisory bodies and business associations (Useem 1979, p. 559). 
Potentially such research has the ability to uncover both a dominance by business 
people of positions of governance and also the existence of a certain degree of 
class unity. However, it could be argued that a dominance of business people in 
positions of governance can only be proven if a comparison is made between 
business involvement and involvement by other sections of society in 
governance. Similarly, class unity cannot be presumed as there is no indication 
of agreement between the `inner group' on the issues raised in these institutions. 
It should also be cautioned that overrepresentation of inner group members in 
governance does not automatically imply that they are decisively shaping the 
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policies of the subject institution. For, as Useem himself recognises, power 
cannot necessarily be equated with participation, although there is usually a 
strong relationship between these analytically separable dimensions (Useem 
1979, p. 568). 
These network methodologies were all developed for use in the U. S. and have 
limited value when translated into the Indonesian context. For example, there is 
a much higher incidence of owner-managers in Indonesian corporations than 
there is in the U. S., so that directors of Indonesian corporations are less likely to 
be in complete charge which means that they do not hold as much significance as 
in the U. S. Another difficulty is that in Indonesia most business power is 
expressed through the attainment of state privileges rather than any involvement 
in forums such as government advisory bodies. Finally, and most seriously, an 
elite class of Indonesian business people is not derived from private sector co- 
operation (`interlocks') but rather from business/state co-operation. Basically, 
the use of both corporate and policy network methodologies in the Indonesian 
context would lead the researcher to search for indications of the business/state 
relationship in precisely all the wrong places. 
1.6.3 Measuring Structures of Power 
The structural power thesis states that business is in an inherently privileged 
position in relation to the state compared to other interest groups because state 
officials need to maintain business confidence to keep the economy and 
ultimately the nation-state from collapsing. But how can the structural power of 
business be measured? 
Attempts to measure the less visible face of power have ranged from Bachrach's 
theory of nondecision-making power (the capacity of groups to restrict the scope 
of decision-making) to `anticipated reactions' (A may influence B because B is 
fearful of the reactions of A) to `potential power' (Stone 1980, p. 979). But, as 
critics have pointed out, it is simply not possible to study non-events. 
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Clarence Stone distinguishes these attempts from his own attempt to study 
systemic power by stating that systemic power is purely situational. He argues 
that in order to study systemic power its consequences can be observed since, 
systemic features impinge on the behaviour of official decision-makers 
and that impingement can be translated into power terms by means of the 
concept of `opportunity costs'... If some actors encounter less resistance 
than others, they must expend fewer resources to achieve their goals - in 
short their opportunity costs are lower... Because system features 
predispose officials to favour some interests and to oppose others, those 
system features lower the opportunity costs for some groups while raising 
them for others (Stone 1980, p. 981). 
In other words, `the weak must struggle while the strong have only to ask' (Stone 
1980, p. 981). However Stone's attempts to further develop these ideas into 
concrete methodologies never really amount to anything more than a vague idea 
that the behaviour of public officials should be examined. How far the 
behaviour of public officials can be attributed to structural (or in the lexicon of 
Stone `systemic') power is never really explained. 
Looking at the problem from a different angle, many researchers have provided 
some indirect evidence for the structural power argument by looking at the 
importance of `economic voting', that is asking voters how important the 
economy is in casting their votes. But herein lies the fundamental problem of 
those who argue from the structural point of view: keeping business happy is 
only one dimension of running a functioning economy and as such the two 
cannot be directly equated. 
Perhaps the most compelling approach to the problem of how to study structural 
power is provided by Mitchell who contends that: 
the connotation of structural power is that it has an impersonal and 
constant quality that operates independently of other dimensions of 
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business power. However, accepting governments' general 
predisposition to improving or maintaining business confidence, the 
measures that governments need to take, or the actions they should avoid, 
to achieve these goals, are not self-evident. They must be communicated 
to government officials, and officials must make choices in the context of 
their own economic-theoretical assessment of the policy problem. 
Business lobbyists and economists represent the `structural power' of 
business in the arguments that they make to policy-makers, and in this 
way governments gather information relevant to anticipating the impact 
of their decisions on business decisions (Mitchell 1997, p. 5). 
In general, there are enough difficulties in measuring readily observable 
dimensions of power in terms of data availability without trying to measure 
invisible dimensions. As such, these attempts to measure the structural power of 
business have not developed far enough to even be considered a methodology, let 
alone examine its relevance to Indonesia. 
1.7 Methods and Sources used in this Thesis 
The above methodologies have the limitations of only being concerned with the 
influence of business on state decisions over policy and are thus unsuitable to 
provide insights into the sort of complex interactions between the state and the 
business community which give rise to corruption in Indonesia. Because the 
scope of this thesis is so wide, covering many different sectors and constituents, 
the methods used for the collection of data do not add up to a single 
methodology such as those outlined above but rather draw on many diverse 
sources is a less rigidly stylistic way. Such an approach is perhaps less scientific, 
leaving as it does much more room for both the interpretation of the data and its 
organisation into meaningful narratives. Nevertheless, a topic as broad and 
complex as corruption would be badly served by anything other than the widest 
possible selection of materials. 
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As such, the methods used in this thesis were designed to access both qualitative 
and quantitative types of data in order that a degree of triangulation could be 
achieved wherever possible to ensure reliability and validity. Most of the 
information presented in this thesis was obtained from archival research of 
printed media, but this was enriched by interviews, official documents and, for 
the chapters on business associations, a postal survey. Each will be dealt with 
separately below. 
1.7.1 Printed Media Archives 
Magazine and newspaper articles are the main sources of information on 
corruption in Indonesia. The public exposure of journalists gives them a large 
supply of informants and necessitates that they handle data carefully in order that 
they are not later sued (Andvig 2000, p. 36). However, there are also a number of 
quite substantial biases inherent in an exclusive reliance on the print media. The 
media tend to concentrate on the more spectacular stories of corruption and often 
report only on initial accusations without any depth of analysis or even following 
up the progress of investigations. In part, this is a reflection of the reality of the 
public exposure of corruption in Indonesia where accusations are often made by 
opposing groups of political elites for short-term political gains. 
Another serious drawback to using media reports is that the number of stories on 
corruption are not likely to be determined only by how many stories that exist out 
there, but is also a question of press freedom, the market for corruption stories, 
journalistic professionalism and resources available (Andvig 2000, p. 37). 
Immediately following Soeharto's resignation in Indonesia, the press was filled 
with reports on Soeharto family corruption, attesting to the sensitivity of 
corruption reports to the freedom of the press. Whilst this meant that there has 
been an upsurge in information available on corruption through the press in 
recent years, it also tends to lead researchers to automatically conclude that there 
has been an actual rise in corruption. 
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However, with these caveats in mind, media reports are really the only way to 
gather large volumes of detailed information on corruption and business/state 
relations which can offer a semblance of nation-wide patterns. In an 
environment such as Indonesia's, where events quickly overtake each other, 
gathering articles from the press can also be the only way to obtain information 
which has not yet been picked up by secondary reports. 
I decided early on in the research design for this thesis that reports in the 
Indonesian media were a crucial source of information which meant that it was 
necessary to first learn Indonesian. For, although there are some excellent 
English language newspapers and magazines in Indonesia, I the quality of detail 
in the Indonesian press cannot be matched. Arriving in Indonesia without any 
contacts also meant that the Indonesian press became a source for the names of 
people who would later become key informants for interviews. The newspapers 
and magazines consulted for this research are listed in the bibliography. 
1.7.2 Interviews 
The types of interviews conducted for this research were both semi-structured 
and unstructured. Lists of potential interviewees were gathered from press 
articles, conferences attended, as authors of reports by international institutions 
or official lists of Indonesian government employees. Depending on their area of 
expertise, interviews were then conducted using several sets of relevant 
questions which were asked in roughly the same way each time. However, there 
was a good deal of flexibility in these questions, allowing for further probing 
where appropriate. 
The types of respondents varied widely from Kadin and sectoral business 
association staff, government officials of SOEs or government departments, 
employees of Indonesian NGOs and research organisations, Indonesian 
academics and employees of international business consultants and international 
11 The Jakarta Post is a solid daily newspaper in English and the weekly news magazine Tempo 
now publishes an identical English language version. 
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institutions such as the ADB, World Bank and the IMF. Following Manheim et 
al (2001) these could be termed `elite interviews' where `their elite status 
depends not on their role in society but on their access to information that can 
help answer a given research question' (p. 320). However, none of the 
interviewees were elites in the broader definition of the term in political science, 
ministers or top businessmen for example, whose contact details were difficult to 
find or who declined to be interviewed when contacted. 
Interviews were conducted from October 2001 to June 2002 in Jakarta. Around 
45 semi-structured interviews were recorded and later fully transcribed, with a 
further 29 non-structured interviews which could be regarded more as leads to 
other sources of information rather than as interviews. Around a third of the 
semi-structured interviews were conducted in Indonesian. Qualitative interviews 
of this nature have the benefit of allowing the interviewer to observe both the 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour of the respondent as well as allowing a higher 
degree of mutual understanding of the meaning of questions and answers. This 
is especially important when researching the sort of highly polemicised issues 
found in a treatment of business/state relations, as a number of the respondents 
gave indications of being disingenuous in their answers which could only be 
detected in personal interviews. These interviews also allowed a deeper 
treatment of topics which were sometimes dealt with in a cursory way by the 
Indonesian press. 
Although only a handful of respondents asked that they remain anonymous, 
interviewer sensitivity and respondent confidentiality is an obvious issue when 
dealing with research on corruption. In view of this, respondents' anonymity has 
been preserved in more cases than was actually requested. A list of interviews is 
included as Appendix One. 
1.7.3 Official Documents 
A wide range of documents from various government sources were also 
consulted for this thesis. The staff at Kadin were very helpful in providing 
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documentation as were the anti-monopoly commission and Indonesian National 
Office of Statistics (BPS). The Department of Public Works, Bappenas, the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of State Owned 
Enterprises were amongst those other government agencies which were prepared 
to provide assistance in a search for relevant information. In terms of state- 
owned enterprises, Pertamina was the most accessible, Bulog moderately so and 
Jasa Marga the least. Extraordinarily, the State Audit Agency, the BPK, does not 
allow the public to view the audits placed in their library. 
Reports from international institutions provided rigorous and detailed 
information on many aspects of this thesis, most of which are easily accessible 
from the internet. In Jakarta, the libraries of the World Bank (WB) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) were a useful source of reports, although some of the 
project documents from the ADB were off limits to the public. In contrast, it 
took a great deal of effort to even find the address of the IMF in Jakarta, let alone 
gain access to their archives. 
Indonesian NGOs and research institutes are increasingly at the forefront of 
research into the topics addressed in this thesis and were invariably extremely 
helpful in the provision of final reports and other documentation. In contrast, 
there are a few business research organisations whose output is prohibitively 
expensive for ready consultation; however many such publications can be found 
in business libraries across Jakarta, such as the small but comprehensive 
collection at the British Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta. 
Total reliance on any one document from the organisations reviewed above 
would inevitably create biases arising from an organisation's particular remit or 
basis of funding. However, generally these are biases in the scope of an 
organisation's output rather than the quality of information presented. 
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1.7.4 Postal Survey 
A mailing of self-completion questionnaires was conducted in February 2002 to 
Indonesian business associations. This method was used in order to cover as 
wide a range of business associations as possible since time constraints 
precluded individual interviews with the same size of sample. The use of 
questionnaires also opens up the possibility of a more sophisticated statistical 
analysis of the data gathered and allows a more objective collection of data in the 
absence of interviewer bias. This point is made by May who maintains that 
questionnaires are more objective since: 
if all respondents are asked the same question in the same manner and if 
they express a difference in opinion in reply to those questions, then these 
variations result from a true difference of opinion rather than as a result 
of how the question was asked or the context of an interview' (May 1997, 
p. 84). 
Designing the questionnaire was a long process that began in July 2000 with my 
attendance at the Essex summer school in survey methods and also included 
much background reading on the structure, wording and style of surveys in 
general as well as learning from other surveys aimed at the same sort of potential 
respondents. 
In the end 46 completed questionnaires were returned. The process of obtaining 
these responses is detailed below: 
"A database of all known business associations in Indonesia was compiled 
from any lists that could be found. In the end, the database contained 390 
entries for business associations and groupings of entrepreneurs, including 
some co-operatives. The main sources for the database were: 
 Richard Mann (1999), Business in Indonesia, Indonesia, Gateway Books 
 The Jakarta Yellow Pages 
 Official Kadin List of Business Associations from Kadin office, dated 
10.8.01 
 Indonesian Business Associations (1998), Asia Pulse from World Reporter 
at: Http: //www. asiapulse. com/ 
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 DTI (UK), Indonesian Trade Associations 1995/96 
 Masindo (2000), Associations and NGOs in Indonesia, Jakarta, Masindo 
 Kadin, Kadin Indonesia Directory 2001 - 2002, Jakarta, Kadin 
 Business in Indonesia 2000-2001 (document from The British Chamber of 
Commerce in Jakarta) 
 Interview with Amrir Kotto, Departmen Perindustrian dan Perdagangan, 
Direktorat Bina Usaha dalam Negern. Mr Kotto is in charge of maintaining 
the registration of BAs for the government. 
" Each of the 390 entries into the database compiled was then contacted by 
phone. Out of the 390, only 232 could be contacted to confirm their address 
and name of the present Chairman. 25 organisations whose addresses could 
not be confirmed by phone were then added to this figure, resulting in a 
mailing of 257 questionnaires in total. 
" Follow up/reminder calls were then made one week later to those BAs which 
had not yet replied. 49 of the 257 reported that they had not received a copy 
of the questionnaire. These 49 were then re-sent using a private courier to 
avoid the inconsistencies of the Indonesian post office. 
" Statistical analysis of the completed questionnaires was carried out using 
SPSS. 
Despite these efforts, the response rate of 46 seems low but a few words can be 
said in mitigation. Firstly, in separate interviews three Kadin employees and one 
independent researcher who had been involved in a recent project on business 
associations (BAs) estimated the number of active BAs in Indonesia to be from 
100 - 160. In view of this, 46 completed returns represents a sizeable proportion 
of all Indonesian BAs. Secondly, the only comparable survey of BAs is that 
carried out by Anek Laothamatas in 1992 for Thailand which received 56 
responses, only slightly higher than the amount obtained here. A copy of the 
questionnaire and covering letter can be found in Appendix Two in both English 
and Indonesian. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This review of the literature surrounding corruption between business and the 
state has provided some useful points of departure in answering the major 
questions of this thesis. It was found that the Indonesian state has been defined 
variously as unreified, a cohesive actor in its own right or as neutral but in the 
hands of a `ruling class'. On the other hand, definitions of Indonesian business 
have varied from business groups to a broad class to a select few conglomerates. 
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Definitions of Indonesian business based on aliran (ethnic or religious identity) 
were also touched on. Throughout the rest of this thesis, these definitions will be 
tested against the empirical data gathered at the sites of grand corruption in 
government contract allocation, business associations and debt negotiations to 
find evidence of changes in how business and the state can be defined in the 
post-Soeharto era. 
The terms in which political and economic processes in Indonesia are currently 
analysed were also touched on. Here, it was found that the social conflict 
approach to analysing the political and economic changes which are presently 
underway in Indonesia has the most resonance for this thesis since deeper 
explanations of change than those provided by the neo-liberals or institutionalists 
will be sought throughout. However, it was also concluded that social conflict 
theory's exclusive focus on class at the expense of ethnicity and their 
underestimation of the effect of institutional change on Indonesia's power 
structure are two areas which need further refinement. 
In terms of another major question of this thesis, patterns of post-authoritarian 
corruption, the literature suggests that corruption initially expands before 
democratic checks and balances are embedded, but does not attempt further 
clarification of new sites or actors in corruption. In order to fill in these 
empirical gaps, the following chapters will highlight any new information of 
relevance. Staying with new patterns of corruption, the informal exercise of 
power found in clientelist interpretations will be built on in this thesis by adding 
the variable of institutional change. Similarly, the idea of ethnicity as a non- 
market allocative mechanism of corruption will be taken up in this thesis and 
expanded to include the conditions under which such a situation occurs. 
Finally, theorists of corruption have forwarded many different explanations of 
the causes of corruption. A `democratic deficit' (Amundsen 1999), a lack of 
modernisation (Myrdal 1968), economic undevelopment (Treisman 2000) or 
cultural obligations of mutual assistance (Sissener 2000) have all been suggested 
as broad determinants of the existence of corruption. From this chapter, it was 
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also seen that too much state involvement in the economy, not enough 
state/business autonomy and a particularly `relational' or co-optive type of 
capitalism are also implicated in the prevalence of corruption. Bearing in mind 
that the causes and effects of corruption can rarely be separated which means that 
correlations rather than causes are in fact being talked about here, this thesis will 
contribute to this debate by highlighting the role that `delayed capitalism' plays 
in the existence of corruption. 
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Chapter Two 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Since independence, the allocation of government contracts to private business has 
been a major source of corruption in Indonesia. Although there is a widespread 
perception that the government mega-projects of the Soeharto era have declined, 
overall levels of government procurement remain high, with the government 
spending an estimated US$ 6.1 billion on procurement nation wide in 2001 (Asian 
Development Bank 2002a, p. 5). 
Since the resignation of Soeharto there have been some substantial changes in 
patterns of procurement as new decentralisation laws have enabled the regional 
administrations to gain a higher share of government spending relative to that of the 
central government (World Bank 2003, p. 2). ' There has also been rapid institutional 
change in the procurement regime with the introduction of new laws and regulations 
aided by a strong donor commitment to reform. At the time of writing, a new law 
aimed at encompassing all government procurement and creating a single oversight 
body is in its pre-drafting phase? In the meantime, there are a number of often 
contradictory and overlapping laws and regulations governing procurement and, 
following the dissolution of WASBANG in May 1998, there is no longer a central 
oversight body for procurement policy and compliance. 3 
So far, the most significant reform of government procurement in the post-Soeharto 
era is Keppres 18/2000 (Presidential Decree) which was preceded by Keppres 
16/1994. The effect of the new decree on the business association community is 
' This point was also made in an interview with Graham Rettke (12.4.02). 2 Including one year to be debated by parliament, it is estimated that this law may be in operation by 
around 2006 (interview with Stuart Andrews, 26.4.02). 3 WASBANG was a state-run body located within the Ministry of Economic Co-ordination. The 
dissolution of WASBANG is mentioned in World Bank (2001), p. 17. Other procurement oversight 
bodies which have come and gone in the post-Soeharto period are "Lembaga PengembanSan 
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examined further in Chapter Three, but for the purposes of this chapter its 
significance can be found in the decentralisation of state authority to grant contracts. 
As Table 2.1 below shows, project managers, ministers, governors, mayors and SOE 
executives all now have more sole responsibility in allocating government contracts 
than they did under the previous decree. Even taking into account the devaluation 
of the rupiah since 1994, the rise in the worth of contracts which various levels of 
authority are permitted to grant without the requirement to refer to higher authorities 
is quite substantial. 
Table 2.1 Responsibility for Authorisation of Public Procurement: A Comparison 
of Keppres 16/1994 and Keppres 18/2000 
Keppres 16/1994 Ke res 18/2000 
Head of Up to Rp5 billion. Up to Rp50 billion, no approval 
Office/Project from Ministers. 
Manager 
Minister Rp5 billion - RpIO billion. Over Over Rp50 billion. 
Rp10 billion requires approval from 
EKUIN/WASBANG. 
Governor Rp2 billion - Rp5 billion. Over Rp5 Over Rp50 billion, no approval 
billion requires approval from from Minister of Home Affairs. 
Minister of Home Affairs. Over 
Rp10 billion requires approval from 
EKUIN/WASBANG. 
Regent/Mayor Up to Rp2 billion. Over Rp2 Over Rp50 billion , no approval 
billion requires approval from from Minister of Home Affairs. 
Governor. Over Rp5 billion 
requires approval from Minister of 
Home Affairs. Over RplO billion 
requires approval from 
EKUIN/WASBANG. 
SOE Board of Up to Rp10 billion. Over RpIO Over Rp50 billion, no approval 
Directors billion needs approval from from Minister of Home Affairs, 
EKUIN/WASBANG. Regents or Governors. 
Notes: Rp I billion = US$ 100,000 
Sources: Keppres 18/20(X), Chapter II, Paragraph 5, Article 11; Office of the Co-ordinating Minister for the 
Economy, Finance and Development Supervision, An Overview of the Indonesian Procurement System, 
21.10.96, p. 
Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang dan Jasa Pemerintah " under Bappenas and BP4S-PU under the 
Department of Public Works. 
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Within this general framework of the redistribution of state authority over 
procurement, this chapter will examine more specifically the allocation of 
government contracts in three important sectors: oil, electricity and forestry. A brief 
background sketch of each sector will give way to a consideration of the structure of 
contracts between the state and private business before and during the Soeharto 
period. Finally, post-Soeharto changes will be explored in terms of processes of 
contract allocation and final beneficiaries. Only then will it be possible to engage in 
some of the theoretical concerns of this thesis in relation to the approaches of the 
social conflict theorists, institutionalists and the neo-liberals. For example, it will 
become possible to provide evidence for the proposition that institutional change 
has a very real impact on the composition of interests as well as bringing attention 
to the way in which international interests benefit from anti-corruption measures 
and deregulation in general. The role of ethnicity in considerations of the 
distribution of wealth will also be highlighted throughout this chapter as a step 
towards a greater understanding of the way that ethnicity interacts with class. 
2.2 The Oil and Gas Sector 
If politics is fundamentally a struggle over the control of resources, nowhere in 
Indonesia has that struggle been more obvious than at Pertamina, the state oil and 
gas company. Since the early days of its exploitation, Indonesia's oil and gas 
reserves have been a crucial economic resource with oil and gas output accounting 
for 42 percent of Indonesian domestic revenues and 48 percent of all export income 
in 20014 Vast amounts of money flow through Pertamina with an average of US$ 6 
billion per year contributed to state coffers from Pertamina's operations 
5 This 
means that control over and access to these funds has in the past, and will continue 
to be, a major source of political contention. 
4 The Jakarta Post, 29.10.0 1. 
5 The Jakarta Post, 29.10.01. 
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But Pertamina's significance in the Indonesian economy goes beyond its monetary 
value. More than any other state owned enterprise (SOE) it has attained a certain 
symbolism of Indonesian, as opposed to foreign, control of national resources. In 
other words, the issue of who makes money from Pertamina is particularly sensitive 
to nationalist sentiments of developing a native or pribumi tier of companies that are 
able to develop and profit from the oil and gas sector. This last point should be 
kept in mind throughout a reading of this section as it provides the context within 
which Soeharto and his `cronies' were able to legitimise their involvement in 
Pertamina's operations. 
2.2.1 The Structure of Contracts at Pertamina 
Up until 1951, Indonesian oil and gas were completely owned and managed by 
Dutch and American companies, which meant that the Indonesian government had 
no claim over any profits made. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Indonesian SOEs 
gradually took over these individual foreign companies, and several reorganisations 
later Pertamina eventually emerged as an umbrella under which these state 
companies were unified. Over the period 1960 - 1966 contracts of work began to 
appear where ownership of the oil was returned to the state, but the management of 
the exploration and processing of oil and gas remained in the hands of foreign 
investors. 
Then in 1966 the production-sharing contract (PSC) was conceived and has 
remained the main type of government contract used in the oil and gas sectors 
today. Foreign companies continue to be crucial to Indonesian oil and gas 
exploitation because the sector depends on extremely complex technology, requiring 
huge levels of both investment and expertise, commodities which are at present 
more widely available from foreign companies. 
6 Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 23.11.98. 
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Under PSCs, Pertamina manages the operations of a foreign contractor but the 
contractor is obliged to provide all funds for operations, only recovering its start up 
costs after commercial production begins. Most PSCs last for 30 years and the 
profit-sharing split is on a net income basis of 85/15 (government/ contractor) for 
oil, and 70/30 for gas (U. S. Embassy 2001). Another aim of PSCs is to promote the 
use of Indonesian firms through a clause compelling all oil and gas foreign 
companies working in Indonesia to use a minimum local content of 35 percent of 
goods and services in their activities. However, in practice the local content figures 
are far below this, usually ranging between 10 and 20 percent. The PSCs also carry 
a stipulation that Indonesian companies be used in any domestic trade by foreign 
companies such as the sale of petroleum equipment or services 7 
Thus, co-operation with foreign firms means that the Indonesian government can 
still gain a substantial share of the profits from oil and gas without having to find 
initial investments. However, the contract stipulations surrounding the level of local 
content in oil and gas projects highlight the fostering of domestic involvement in the 
sector as an additional government aim. Many might question the efficacy of such 
schemes in principle, arguing perhaps that the best way to foster domestic business 
is through the provision of better education, infrastructure or similar less direct 
approaches. Nevertheless, such pro-pribumi schemes find support in Indonesia 
because they address the very real domination of ownership in the oil and gas sector 
by foreign firms. 
Corruption occurred through these schemes as the general class of Indonesian 
companies which were supposed to be fostered in practice became conflated with 
companies owned by those close to Soeharto and especially his children (See Table 
2.2). The scale of corruption at Pertamina can be inferred from a 1999 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) audit which calculated that in the two years 
covered by the audit (1996-1998), an astonishing US$ 6.1 billion was lost through 
7 Indonesian Market Profile: Oil and Gas, http: //www goldglobal com/data/oilgas. htm_i. 
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`inefficiencies'. 8 The forms which corruption took at Pertamina ranged from fees to 
sales intermediaries who were not in fact needed, to mark-ups in the costs of 
refinery construction to the granting of exclusive exploitation permits. In exchange, 
PWC estimated that Pertamina officials pocketed around US$ 128 million in 
commissions from collaboration with Soeharto-connected companies from 1996 
to 1998.9 
Table 2.2 Soeharto-Linked Partners of Pertamina 
No. Owner Company 
Number Percent 
1. Ind ividuals 65 47% 
1 Bambang Trihatmojo 22 16.0% 
2 Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy) 16 11.5% 
3 Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut) 7 5.0% 
4 Sudwikatmono 5 3.5% 
5 Siti Hediati Haryadi Prabowo (Titiek) 3 2.0% 
6 Ari Haryo W. (Ari Sigit) 4 3.0% 
7 Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih (Mamiek) 3 2.0% 
8 Probosutejo 2 1.5% 
9 Mohammad `Bob' Hasan 2 1.5% 
10 Indra Rukmana 1 1.0% 
II. Soeharto Relatives and Business Partners 43 31% 
111. Consortiums 27 19% 
IV. Other 4 3.0% 
Total amount of Pertamina's Partners 139 100% 
Source: From various sources, processed by Prospek's research department (Prospek, 6.7.98). 
Explanatory notes: Consortium relates to a grouping of Soeharto family, foreign, Pertamina and other 
known business partners; Other is given where there are no known relations with Soeharto. 
2.2.2 Post-Soeharto Reforms 
On the 21" of May 1998, after months of political uncertainty and weeks of student 
protests, President Soeharto resigned. The country was racked by fears of instability 
and no-one could yet be sure what the future held; the new President Habibie may 
R This figure was later revised down to US$ 4.7 billion after discussions with Pertamina who 
maintained that the difference between the two figures was due to discrepancies in accountancy 
terminology. It should also be noted that 'inefficiencies' cannot be directly translated as corruption, 
although corruption is considered one of the main causes of 'inefficiencies'. However, this figure 
still gives an idea of the scale of abuses at Pertamina. 9 Far Eastern Economic Review, 30.5.02. 
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not be accepted, there may be a military coup, massive street protests could 
continue. Yet, under these circumstances, just four days after Soeharto's 
resignation, the Minster of Mines and Energy announced that two notoriously 
inefficient contracts between Pertamina and two Soeharto children were to be 
reviewed. 10 In a matter of weeks after this Pertamina began to announce its own 
audit of contracts suspected of containing elements of corruption. A good deal of 
publicity was created around these announcements which eventually resulted in a 
list of 159 contracts between Pertamina and Soeharto-related companies which were 
thought to be corrupt. 
To be sure, Pertamina has gone further than any other SOE in its attempts to rid 
itself of corruption. It has not only released relatively systematic details of specific 
contracts involving the Soehartos, but has also been forthcoming with estimations of 
how much the cancellation of these contracts will save Pertamina. However, many 
have questioned why the audit only concentrated on Soeharto companies and why 
there has, until now, been no systematic data released to the press on the progress 
made in cancelling these corrupt contracts. At times Pertamina officials have been 
very candid in discussing contract details, whilst at other times refusing to elaborate 
on even the names of the companies involved. 
Some sources suggest that the majority of the questionable deals have been 
cancelled" but others are more cautious. 12 In November 1998, it was reported that 
32 of the 159 contracts had been cancelled, 13 in February 2000 this had risen to 59 
cancellations 14 and by May 2000 it was reported that 82 had been cancelled, 26 
renegotiated and 51 left to proceed as there were no irregularities found. 
15 
10 The contracts are between Pertamina and Perta Oil Marketing and Permindo Oil Trading, See The 
Jakarta Post, 29.5.98. 
" For example, IMF; Tempo, 18.2.02; The Jakarta Post, 12.8.99; Indonesian Commercial 
Newsletter, 23.11.98; Interview with Ibrahim Z. Fahmy (October 2001). 
12 For example, Tempo, 5.3.01; Warta Ekonomi, 4.8.98. 
13 Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 23.11.98. 
14 Prospektif, 7.2.00. 
1s The Jakarta Post, 3.5.00. 
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My own detailed analysis of all the information reported in the Indonesian media 
over a period of 3 years from 1998 to 2001 shows that 125 out of 162 Soeharto- 
related contracts at Pertamina have been cancelled (see Appendix Three). Despite 
the reliance of this data on unidentified and sometimes contradictory sources, it 
nevertheless indicates something of the complexity of the negotiations at Pertamina. 
Appendix Three shows that at least sixteen of the 125 cancellations were for 
projects which had just made the proposal stage and a further seven had been 
completely finished for some time anyway. Six of the cancelled contracts were 
partner buyouts where the original foreign partner of a Soeharto company was asked 
to buy out the Soeharto shares to proceed with the contract. 
These last six caused some strident debate between various sections of the state 
concerning the high degree of foreign ownership left in these projects which 
indicates that there is still a good deal of commitment in political circles for the 
inclusion of pribumi partners in Pertamina. Towards the end of 1998 the Minister 
for Mines and Energy released a number of statements calling for foreign partners to 
buy back Soeharto partner-company shares as Pertamina did not have the financial 
resources to do so themselves. He later amended these statements to include 
requests that these foreign companies should not pay their Soeharto company 
partners for their shares but rather redirect their payment towards the government or 
otherwise sell them on to other local companies. Although it seems that in the end 
many of the foreign companies have acquired 100 percent ownership and have not 
included other local companies, there was a good deal of pressure on the Minister of 
Mines and Energy from the DPR Commission V assigned to oil and gas issues to 
make sure that this would not be the case. 16 
Given that well-known Soeharto-related companies have become very conspicuous 
in the post-Soeharto era, it may seem like a relatively simple task to root out their 
involvement from Pertamina activities. But it is not. For example, some of the 
16 See Suara Pembaruan, 10.10.98; Bisnis Indonesia, 24.11.98; Bisnis Indonesia, 10.12.98; Kompas, 
10.12.98. 
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Soeharto companies entered into partnership with Pertamina quite legally through 
the Jakarta Stock Exchange'7 and some through open tenders. It seems that the 
government attitude to Soeharto companies involved in Pertamina is that if their 
contracts can be renegotiated in light of new open tenders for the same projects, 
then these companies should be kept on. 18 In other words many of the better-run 
Soeharto companies will have their special facilities taken away but will remain 
operational within Pertamina. 
Another complication is that if contracts are not proven in a court of law to have 
been involved in corruption or nepotism then any company whose contract is 
cancelled unilaterally by Pertamina has the right to claim compensation from 
Pertamina for the capital they have already invested. 19 It is extremely difficult to 
prove nepotism in the courts under the best of circumstances, but when the 
extremely corrupt nature of the Indonesian courts are taken into account, it seems 
like an impossible task. Indeed, until the promulgation of the 1999 corruption law 
there were not even any provisions in the previous corruption law for prosecuting 
nepotism and, in principle, laws cannot be applied retrospectively 20 
As with the many thousands upon thousands of incidences of corruption across the 
whole of the Indonesian economy, the legal process to convict for corruption at 
Pertamina has been slow, incoherent and practically non-existent. Until the middle 
of 2002, out of the 159 cases of corruption suspected at Pertamina, 23 have been 
forwarded to the Attorney General's Office and out of those 23 only nine have so 
far entered the stage of criminal investigation. Out of those nine to have reached the 
stage of criminal investigation, four relate to a set of projects which were already 
cancelled as far back as 1995 21 Pertamina has announced that if no evidence can 
17 Bimantara through PT Elnusa is one such example, in Tempo, 11.9.00. 18 Kompas, 13.6.98. 
19 Koran Tempo, 11.10.01. 
20 Interviews with Arya Dwi Paramita (12.12.01) and Adiatma Sardjito (20.2.02). 21 The companies involved are: PT Ustraindo Petrogas Pendopo; PT Ustraindo Petrogas Prabumulih; 
PT Ustraindo Petrogas Jatibarang; PT Ustraindo Petrogas Bunyu. 
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be found of losses to the state then the contracts are technically allowed to proceed 
without revision. 2 
Thus, it seems that the majority of the 159 contracts which were suspected of 
containing elements of corruption at Pertamina have been either cancelled or 
renegotiated. This indeed represents a significant achievement even if it is 
recognised that the figure of 159 probably only represents at most three-quarters of 
the total amount of corrupt contracts at Pertamina. It should also be noted that many 
of the companies affected by cancellations were companies which were so indebted 
as to be close to collapse anyway and whose external sources of foreign finance had 
already dried up. In other words, the cancellations are as much a result of the 
economic crisis and the withdrawal of foreign funds as any substantial shifts in 
policy towards the Soeharto-related companies. Even if foreign companies cannot 
be said to have been actively involved in corruption, this point nevertheless 
highlights the pivotal role that foreign involvement in the economy has played in 
systems of corruption. However, with or without foreign involvement, many of the 
stronger Soeharto-related companies will retain their contracts at Pertamina albeit 
without the special facilities which they had previously enjoyed. 
Another reason why a clean-up at Pertamina has been relatively successful is 
because of the installation of genuine reformers into the top jobs of Pertamina 
director and the Minister of Mines and Energy. In the post-Soeharto period so far, 
Habibie, Wahid and Megawati have had a relatively strong presidential commitment 
to reform at Pertamina. Across all sectors of the economy, who becomes the head 
of large state firms is often the result of political horse-trading between political 
parties at the DPR who promise the President support on other issues if their 
preferred candidate is chosen. It is often alleged that this enables an indebted 
candidate to then channel the proceeds of corruption to the political party that 
helped put them there. In this context, it is nothing short of miraculous that a widely 
respected professional, Baihaki Hakim, has survived as director of Pertamina 
22 `Jangan Memvonis', Bulletin Pertamina, Http: //www. pertamina. com. 
93 
throughout not only several changes of cabinet but also the transition from President 
Abdurrahman Wahid to President Megawati. 
However, all of these changes in Pertamina are fairly ad hoc and vulnerable to 
sudden swings in political fortune and it is important not to confuse the freezing-out 
of one section of the business community (Soeharto-related companies) with 
potentially long-term change in the system of political and economic power. It is 
important therefore, to also consider change in terms of control over the decision- 
making process at Pertamina. 
In 1996 Pak Gandhi, the then head of the state audit agency (BPKP), had a meeting 
with President Soeharto to explain the results of a recent audit of Pertamina. In the 
meeting Pak Gandhi brought up some findings which showed that Pertamina was 
losing millions of dollars per month by employing two companies to act as agents 
for the import and export of crude oil. Pak Gandhi later related that in response, 
President Soeharto told him to forget about it, that it was `his responsibility'. 23 The 
companies were owned by two of Soeharto's children. 
Even though it could be argued that it is in the interests of such employees to relate 
stories illustrating Soeharto's ultimate responsibility for decisions on contracts, 
there are too many similar reports to ignore such a perspective. It is generally 
acknowledged that neither Pertamina officials, ministers, DPR members-or extra- 
state constituents had the authority to get involved in many aspects of decision- 
making at Pertamina, from the most general strategy to detailed negotiations of 
contracts. 24 Regulations concerning accountability for decision-making at 
Pertamina certainly did exist but were regularly flouted. Some recent corruption 
investigations have illustrated this point as the previous Minister of Mines and 
Energy, Pertamina's director and the Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy fight 
23 Kompas, 5.6.98. 
24 See, for example, Tempo, 8.10.01. 
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in court over who can be held responsible for the authorisation of some of 
Pertamina's past projects 25 
But today, the situation is very different, reflecting mostly an increased power of the 
DPR. Time and time again Pertamina directors as well as the Minister of Mines and 
Energy have been called to the DPR to speak in front of the Commission 
responsible for oil and gas affairs, often about very detailed aspects of individual 
contracts, which then get reported on extensively in the press. 26 Wherein the past 
many of these kinds of decisions were made behind closed doors amongst the most 
powerful bureaucrats and Ministers, now some of this information is more widely 
available to sections of society beyond the elite. 
One of the most contentious debates to take place in the legislature over Pertamina 
has involved a new law covering deregulation in the entire oil and gas sector. This 
law's history is a reflection of the controversial nature of its contents. It was first 
presented to the then President Soeharto in 1995 but was shelved until the Habibie 
government took it to the legislature in 1999. After seven months of debate in a 
legislature that was appointed in Soeharto's time, it was finally rejected. After the 
general election of 1999 it was again tabled for debate where its progress was 
repeatedly hampered by allegations of Pertamina officials buying legislators' 
compliance and encouraging them to stall the final vote. 7 Despite last minute 
protests from some of the legislators, however, the law was finally passed in 
October 2001. 
This law has two main purposes. The first is to eliminate Pertamina's monopoly on 
the downstream sector which basically means that foreign companies are now able 
to have more control over their investments in refineries and can also sell the 
resulting fuel themselves instead of having to go through Pertamina. The second 
25 Tempo, 27.11.00. 
26 For example, see Merdeka, 2.7.98; Suara Karya, 27.5.98; Kompas, 23.9.98; Warta Ekonomi, 
5.10.98; Warta Ekonomi, 15.2.99. 
27 Warta Ekonomi, 27.9.99. 
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purpose of the bill is to strip Pertamina of the right to award contracts and regulate 
and manage oil and gas contractors which is now in the hands of two newly created 
regulating agencies under the auspices of the government. Thus, Pertamina's 
previous control over the production and distribution of oil has been handed in part 
to foreign companies and in part to new agencies under the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. 
Another change to decision-making procedures at Pertamina will be instituted 
through this law in a clause bringing Pertamina's status into line with other SOEs in 
Indonesia. The previous law, which had regulated Pertamina since 1971, gave 
Pertamina a special status of something between a government body and a 
company, blurring the lines of accountability and enabling Soeharto's interventions. 
Now, Pertamina is set to become a limited liability company which will bring it 
under the control of the Department of SOEs. This in turn means that the selection 
of the directorate of Pertamina should become more regularised, following the same 
rules as other SOEs where a general meeting of shareholders, amongst other things, 
may determine who is appointed28 
Thus, there have been many ostensible reforms surrounding Pertamina's operations 
that are designed to regularise contact between business and the state. An effort to 
clean out past corruption has taken place, information on contracts is more widely 
available and control over decision-making is-shared between the legislature, the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of SOEs, Pertamina and the President. 
For some types of decisions, control has left the state completely and is now in the 
hands of mostly foreign private firms. But does this mean that corruption has been 
`institutionalised out'? 
In answer to this question, it seems that the reforms themselves do not always mean 
as much as they profess to. For example, the heads of the new regulating agencies 
are picked by the President and can be removed by the President under a set of 
28 The Jakarta Post, 1.9.01. 
96 
rather loose criteria. Moreover, the appointment of the head of Pertamina may fall 
more clearly under the power of the same regulations for all SOEs, but in practice 
these regulations mean little as the heads of all the most strategic SOEs (known as 
`wet seats') are always the result of political horse-trading in the legislature. 
Meanwhile the legislature may have a role in making information more accessible, 
but some parliamentarians have also been reported to be involved in brokering deals 
between big business and Pertamina. 29 
Thus, it seems that changes in the institutional landscape such as a newly powerful 
legislature, the installation of new oversight bodies and adjustments of Pertamina's 
position within the state system of accountability have not been wholly successful at 
eliminating corruption. Rather, the first indications are that such changes have led 
to a spreading of corruption to various different elements of the state. Meanwhile, 
on the business side of the equation the involvement of Soeharto-related companies 
in Pertamina's operations has declined effectively in favour of international 
business, who now have greater freedom from the intervention of the state as a 
result of the new oil and gas law. 
Such freedom from state control may indeed see a decline in the involvement of 
domestic companies appointed by political power-holders to skim off profits from 
Pertamina and direct them towards individual state personnel. However, at the same 
time such legislation intensifies the same fears of foreign control of domestic 
resources which have been apparent from the very birth of Indonesia as a nation and 
in some cases the retention of Soeharto companies at Pertamina has been publicly 
defended by Pertamina officials as preferable to foreign control 30 
29 For example, see Prospektif, 27.3.00. 
30 Bisnis Indonesia, 3.7.98. 
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2.3 The Electricity Sector: The Case of the Independent Power 
Producers 
In 1994 President Clinton visited Jakarta for an APEC conference. Whilst attending 
the conference, he signed several deals to finance a new programme being 
developed by the Indonesian government to supply electricity throughout Indonesia. 
Whereas in the past funding for the development of the electricity sector was 
provided by the Indonesian government, this radical new programme handed over 
the finance, construction and operating responsibilities to the private sector for the 
first time. 
Clinton gave his backing to finance one particularly big electricity project called 
Paiton I through the U. S. government's Export-Import Bank and a sister U. S. 
agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corp. The Indonesian company appointed 
to the project without tender was PT Batu Hitam Perkasa which received 15 percent 
of the project without itself making any investments. This company is owned by 
Hashim Djojohadikusumo, businessman, ex-minister of Mines and Energy and the 
brother of one of the Soeharto children's husbands. The foreign partner in this 
project was Mission Energy, a huge private U. S. company with close connections to 
the Clinton inner circle. 31 
Some analysts interpret this deal in the light of a separate scandal surrounding the 
illegal contribution of funds from a prominent Indonesian conglomerate to the 
Clinton campaign in 1992.32 With such a precedent already set of the Clinton 
campaign receiving illegal payments from Indonesian conglomerates, 33 insinuations 
31 Clinton's Secretary of State who accompanied him to the 1994 APEC Conference, Warren 
Christopher, later went on to become one of the board members of Mission Energy (Wall Street 
Journal, 11.2.04, Wall Street Journal 23.12.99). It has also been alleged that Mission Energy is a 
regular contributor to the Clinton campaign fund (see Charles Smith's extensive research on this 
topic at http: //www. softwar. net/paiton). However, see also footnote 67 in regard to the truth of this 
claim. 
32 Mochtar Riady of the Lippo conglomerate was convicted of making illegal donations to the 1992 
Clinton campaign in 2001 and ordered to pay a fine of US$ 8.6 million (Wall Street Journal, 
1.12.01). Lippo was also involved in the financing of Paiton. 
33 There have also been investigations into the Indonesian Artha Graha Group, which is alleged to 
have paid illegal donations to Clinton's 1997 Presidential campaign (Aditjondro, G., 
http-//www. unhas. ac. id/-rhiza/gial. html). 
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regarding the propriety of the negotiations between the Clinton administration, 
private Indonesian and U. S. interests and the Indonesian government over Paiton I 
have become more significant. However, in the absence of incontrovertible proof, 
how far this represents the direct involvement of the Clinton administration in 
corruption over Paiton I must be left up to individual interpretation. In any case, it 
is publicly documented that one of the original financiers for Paiton, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), pulled out when they discovered that relatives of 
Soeharto were involved. But this apparently did not concern the U. S. Commerce 
Department who pressed ahead to find a new consortium of banks to replace the 
ADB. 
In the wake of the economic crisis, the Paiton project turned out to be a disaster for 
Indonesia's electricity sector. The state-owned electricity company, PLN, was 
required under the Paiton contract to pay an extremely high price for the electricity 
produced by the private companies. 34 There is also evidence of a vast mark-up of an 
estimated US$ 600 million to US$ 1 billion35 in Paiton's construction costs and a 
clause stipulating that PLN had to pay Paiton for electricity which they did not even 
use. 
The Paiton story goes some way towards illustrating the nature of business/state 
relations in the electricity sector, highlighting especially the role played by some 
foreign interests in patterns of Indonesian corruption. For, all of the 27 private 
power projects in the Indonesian electricity sector grossly favoured the private 
consortia over PLN, leaving PLN with an astonishing debt of over US$ 7 billion and 
not even capable of undertaking standard maintenance work, let alone making new 
investments. 36 The next section will now examine more closely the nature of 
business/state interaction in this sector. 
34 After the economic crisis, with the drastic devaluation of the rupiah, the sale price of electricity 
produced by the private projects reached three times the price of electricity produced by PLN 
themselves (Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 19.12.00). 
33 Tempo, 18.9.00. 
36 Indonesian Buisness, Feb 2001. 
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2.3.1 The Structure of Contracts at PLN 
After a series of Presidential Decrees opened up the electricity sector for private 
involvement in the early 1990s, more than 50 domestic and foreign companies 
sought a government license to build power stations, but only 27 were granted. 
According to the head of PLN at the time, these licenses were all handed out 
without tender to companies close to political power-holders under pressure from 
Soeharto. 37 This resulted in a very strong bargaining position for the private 
consortia, which in turn led to very favourable terms of contract. 
Despite a clause in a 1985 law which stated that electricity had to be bought from 
private projects in rupiah, 38 the contracts later negotiated fixed prices in U. S. 
dollars. The contracts also included clauses obliging PLN to buy around 85 percent 
of the capacity of the power stations whether or not it was actually needed. With 
the onset of the economic crisis and the subsequent devaluation of the rupiah, these 
two clauses meant that PLN was under obligation to buy a guaranteed amount of 
electricity at a very high cost. This is a highly irregular situation in business where 
the norm is that either a product has guaranteed sales at low cost or uncertain sales 
at high cost, but not guaranteed sales at a high cost. 
The economic crisis also meant that projections for demand in electricity made in 
the 1990s became redundant as the economy slowed down, businesses went 
bankrupt and people tightened their belts. 39 Thus, this decrease in demand coupled 
with PLN's obligation to buy and the increased costs of buying resulted in a 
ridiculous situation where PLN was buying expensive electricity which was not 
needed. Indeed at one point PLN even had to close down production in its own 
power stations just to accommodate private sector electricity when the reality was 
that the electricity produced by PLN's own plants was substantially cheaper. 
4° 
37 Warta Ekonomi, 13.11.00. 
38 Law No. 15/1985. 
39 The projections for electricity demand made in the 1990s were for an annual 12-15 percent rise. 
The actual demand for the first three years after the economic crisis only reached 3-5 percent (Warta 
Ekonomi, 13.11.00). 
40 Tempo, 18.9.00. 
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Such a situation belies the argument that allowing a greater involvement of foreign 
companies in government procurement automatically results in a more efficient use 
of resources. Such a position is usually stated in comparison to the inefficiencies 
produced by particular domestic companies as a result of government favouritism. 
In the electricity sector however, around 20 of the 27 power projects were majority 
owned by established international power companies (see Appendix Four), yet the 
structure of the contracts caused substantial losses to the Indonesian state. 
Andrew Rosser questions the motivations of international capital and its institutional 
allies who present economic liberalisation as a universal rational good, preferring 
instead to view international capital as just another segment of society seeking 
economic policies to benefit themselves (Rosser 2002). The argument in this 
section takes such a viewpoint one step further by highlighting the indicators which 
can be used to put international business on a par with domestic vested interests in 
terms of corruption. The case of the independent power projects shows that 
international business interests can be as prepared as their domestic counterparts to 
milk Indonesian state-owned enterprises through manifestly inequitable contracts. 
Where domestic businesses bribe Indonesian officials directly for beneficial 
contracts, international business can ensure beneficial outcomes from the pressure 
exerted on the Indonesian state through their own heads of state. This point will 
become clearer as the section proceeds. 
The financial backers for the power projects were all international credit export 
agencies such as OPIC, USEXIM, JBIC, EID/MITI, ERG and HERMES and 
international institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the World 
Bank 41 The loans generally consisted of what is known as `two step offshore loans' 
which means that the money was first lent to the Indonesian government who then 
lent it on to PLN. 
41 These credit export agencies are domiciled respectively in the U. S., the U. S., Japan, Japan, 
Switzerland and Germany. A more detailed definition of credit export agencies is found in the 
glossary, but suffice it to say here that they are heavily criticised as a major source of unethical 
international business investment. 
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Such a system of finance meant that there were plenty of opportunities for state 
officials to each take a share of the massive loans. According to a PLN source to the 
Indonesian NGO, Indonesian Corruption Watch, corruption at PLN included not 
only PLN management but also a number of outside institutions, such as Bappenas, 
BKPM, the Department of Mining and Energy, the Department of Finance and the 
Coordinating Ministry for the Economy (ICW 2000b). 
But it was particularly the Department of Mining and Energy that was alleged to be 
the centre of decision-making about PLN, serving as a conduit for Soeharto's 
control. However, there was also at times a good degree of independence from 
Soeharto within the department, especially under the tenure of Ginanjar 
Kartasasmita who was Minister of Mines and Energy from 1988 to 1993 (see Box 
Three). At that time, the department reportedly became like a mini-fiefdom where a 
core of bureaucrats serving Ginanjar became known as `Ginanjar's Boys', to whose 
interests the PLN Heads of Project had to defer (ICW 2001). In support of this 
view, it is instructive to note that it was Ginanjar rather than the head of PLN who 
officially detailed the final purchasing agreements for the private electricity projects 
(ICW 2000a). 
2.3.2 Post-Soeharto Reforms 
Since the onset of the economic crisis, there have been no less than four Presidential 
Decrees regarding the private power projects and whether they should be cancelled 
or continued. First, when the crisis initially hit, they were all cancelled with the 
support of the IMF who advised a programme of fiscal austerity and a cutting back 
on mega-projects. Then there was a re-evaluation and it looked like at least some 
were to be continued. But as the crisis showed no signs of abating in 1998, all the 
projects were cancelled again before a final Presidential Decree in 2002 gave the 
go-ahead once more. 2 
42 Indonesian Business, May 2002. 
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But for a few of the foreign investors, the frustrations and costs of being involved in 
the Indonesian economy under such circumstances proved too much and they 
decided to pursue compensation for breach of contract through the international 
courts. One of the contract clauses had stipulated that in the case of any disputes, 
resolution would be sought through the Switzerland-based International Arbitration 
Court. In 1999, this court found in favour of two private consortia involved in three 
of the 27 projects and ordered the Indonesian government to pay compensation for 
breach of contract (see Appendix Four for the consortiums involved). The court 
decided on US$ 261 million compensation to be paid for PLTP Karaha and US$ 572 
million for PLTP Dieng and PLTA Patuha. 
In the case of the Dieng and Patuha projects, PLN was in no position financially to 
cover the US$ 572 million compensation which meant that the private investors 
could legitimately claim US$ 260 million from their insurance company, OPIC. 
However OPIC, an insurance company owned by the U. S. government, then 
demanded that PLN cover this US$ 260 million payment. OPIC's demands were 
particularly vociferous as they were keen to set a precedent in terms of PLN's 
liability because they had insured other private investors in the Indonesian 
electricity sector to the tune of US$ I billion, or 5 percent of its total global 
exposure 43 
Despite the facts that a Presidential Decree from 1992 had already stated that the 
Indonesian government would under no circumstances guarantee the investments in 
the projects, 44 and that the Indonesian government was not a legal party to any of 
the contracts made, it nevertheless came under immense pressure to honour this 
payment on behalf of PLN. At one point the American Trade Secretary wrote to the 
Indonesian government threatening to seize government assets abroad if OPIC was 
not paid (ICW 2000c). PLN's debt to OPIC is now being dealt with through the 
Paris Club, a government to government negotiating forum on debt. Essentially 
43 Charles Smith, Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, http: //www. worldnetdaily. com 44 Keppres 37/92. 
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then, the Indonesian government has ultimately become responsible for PLN's debt 
to OPIC. 
Meanwhile, without the direct involvement of the U. S. government which OPIC 
was afforded, the Karaha court case has become more protracted. The company 
Karaha Bodas Co. has sought rulings in Singapore, New York, Hong Kong, Canada, 
Houston, Texas and Delaware45 in a bid to seize Pertamina's overseas assets. Since 
the Karaha Project was a geothermally fuelled electricity plant it is the responsibility 
of Pertamina, not PLN. 
Interestingly, Karaha Bodas have not had as much success in holding the Indonesian 
government responsible for the compensation due to it according to the International 
Arbitration ruling. A New York court ordered that the company had no right to 
seize a U. S. -based bank account belonging to Pertamina after Pertamina argued that 
the bank account contained proceeds from the sale of liquid natural gas which thus 
belonged to the Indonesian government 46 Whereas in the OPIC case no distinction 
was made between the Indonesian government and PLN, in the Karaha case this 
distinction was upheld. 
Throughout these court proceedings Pertamina has continually asked the IMF to 
testify to the reasons behind the suspension of the project in order to convince the 
judges that the contract was breached as a result of `force majeure' 47 Indeed, it was 
reported that in 1997 when PLN officials wanted to persuade the Indonesian 
government to suspend the electricity projects, they first lobbied the World Bank 
and the IMF for the support they needed, eventually resulting in the first Presidential 
Decree to suspend all projects (Data Consult 2000; ICW 2000d). However, the IMF 
as Jakarta Post, 24.7.02; Jakarta Post, 6.6.02. 
46 Indonesian Business, May 2002. 
47 The concept of `Force Majeure' can be used to legally justify breach of contract and includes 
within it a sense that the parties had no other choice than to breach a contract in the face of 
extraordinary circumstances. 
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has so far refused to become involved in the Karaha case, stating simply that the 
suspension was the Indonesian government's responsibility. 8 
But, generally, it is neither in the government's nor the private consortia's interests 
to pursue changes in these contracts through the courts. Such a course of action 
does not reflect well for Indonesia's investor relations but leads instead to an 
acrimonious and often protracted struggle with no clear winners and mounting legal 
costs. Another reason for avoiding the legal route is that questions of corruption in 
the projects in the form of mark-ups could arise since if corruption can be proven 
then the contracts would not be legally binding. But this would cause 
embarrassment not only for the private consortia but also for the Indonesian 
government, since many of the bureaucrats and politicians who drew up these 
contracts are still in service. 
In terms of the Indonesian legal process, a team consisting of the Indonesian police, 
the Attorney General's Office, PLN and Pertamina staff did at one point embark 
upon an investigation into the Karaha project. This was because the US$ 100 
million which Karaha Bodas claimed to have invested in the project was considered 
to be around three times higher than it should have been 49 However, this 
investigation came to nothing and was probably only ever meant as a bargaining 
tool for the Indonesian government to threaten Karaha Bodas. 
One mark-up case which did make it to the Indonesian courts, however, was over 
Paiton I, the project with which this section began. After months of failed 
renegotiations over the Paiton I contract, the director of PLN, Adhi Satrya, filed a 
lawsuit against the Paiton I consortium for alleged mark-up of the project 
construction which had subsequently contributed to the extremely high price for the 
sale of the electricity produced. However, the Wahid government demanded that 
this lawsuit be withdrawn and Mr. Satrya subsequently resigned in protest. 
48 Jakarta Post, 6.6.02. 
49 Jakarta Post, 14.5.02. 
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Although, at the time, the government promised a full investigation of the 
allegations, which had first appeared in two separate audits, S° this again came to 
nothing. Another lawsuit was attempted in 2001 against Paiton I by PLN's labour 
union charging that the contract had violated the constitution51 and the 1985 law 
which stated that the price of electricity should be in rupiah. One year later, the 
52 Court ruled that the labour union was not authorised to bring such an action. 
The refusal of Wahid to allow the Paiton I project to be settled in court again 
indicates the pressure his administration must have been under from the 
international interests which stood to lose most if corruption could be proven. It is 
also interesting to note that whilst political influence on the legal system is still very 
much a reality in keeping some corruption trials from ever making the courts, in this 
case the Wahid government pressurised the person making the lawsuit, the head of 
PLN, to withdraw it. This could indicate that Wahid was not sufficiently confident 
that he could influence the trial once the lawsuit had entered the legal process which 
is in stark contrast to the Soeharto period where the courts generally followed the 
President's will, cementing political and economic power. This point will be 
elaborated in Chapter Five in relation to the role of law in debt negotiations, but at 
this stage it will suffice to highlight a theoretical distinction between political 
influence in the law courts and the influence of monetary bribes. 
All the remaining 24 power projects were resettled through closed-door negotiations 
between the government and the private consortia. All 24 have reduced their selling 
price to PLN substantially to move more in line with international comparisons of 
similar projects (see Appendix Four). However, not all of the details of these new 
contracts have been released to the public and it is understood that as well as the 
cost of the sale of the electricity to PLN, there are also enormous debts which PLN 
is obliged to settle with the project developers. For example, under the new contract 
50 The two audits were carried out by the state audit agency, Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan 
Pembangunan (BPKP) and the international audit firm SNC-Lavalin. 51 Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution states that all production which affects the basic needs of 
ordinary people is prohibited from control by private individuals. 
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in the case of Paiton I, the cost of electricity has fallen from an average of 6.4c per 
kWh to 4.9c per kWh. But added to this is a sum of US$ 4 million per month which 
PLN have to pay the Paiton consortium for 30 years, and the clause which binds 
PLN to buying 85 percent of Paiton I's capacity still applies. Thus, the apparent 
price reductions shown in Appendix Four may not actually reflect the real price paid 
53 by PLN 
There have been six projects cancelled out of the original 27 and three are still in 
dispute. The deals which were renegotiated with all the 18 remaining power projects 
must be at least satisfactory for the private consortia because many have opted for a 
longer contract than was originally agreed to in the 1990s and some are building 
new power projects. 4 The massive investments already made need to be recouped 
and the legal route has its costs. From the Indonesian government's perspective, the 
demand for electricity has apparently rebounded to pre-crisis levels and given the 
parlous state of PLN and the country's finances in general, the only other option to 
private investments in the electricity sector seems to be blackouts. 
Again, throughout these closed door negotiations the U. S. government has used its 
position in the Paris Club to pressurise the Indonesian government into leaving U. S. 
projects alone ss A letter from the financial backers of the projects was also written 
to the Indonesian government in 1999 demanding that the government take 
responsibility for the negotiations between PLN and the private consortia and to put 
a stop to any legal actions that PLN might be planning S6 The importance of the 
issue can be seen by the seniority of the members of the Indonesian government's 
52 Jakarta Post, 19.4.02. 
53 ICW 2000b; Jakarta Post, 24.7.02; Asia Times, 20.9.02. 
54 For example, Energy Sulawesi will be extending its capacity in Sengkang (Indonesian Business, 
February 2001). Paiton I's contract is now running for an extra 10 years and Paiton Energy were 
exploring the options for an extension of capacity at Paiton I as of the beginning of 2002 (Jakarta 
Post, 4.1.02). 
ss Tempo, 18.9.00. 
56 The signatories of the letter are OPIC, USEXIM, JBIC, EID/MITI, ERG & HERMES (ICW 
2000d). 
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negotiating team which was set up by Presidential Decree and meets with the major 
financial backers of the projects every three months. 7 
Indonesia's economy is, of course, a capitalist economy which has provided very 
many benefits over the past 50 years for its people. Similarly, international capital 
is today vitally important for all capitalist economies and as such has a relatively 
strong bargaining position anywhere in the world. However, the tendency of 
overseas governments to use government to government debt negotiations in order 
to protect the interests of their own private domestic firms must surely be 
considered an abuse of position. For is this not anathema to the mantra so often 
heard from international institutions that private businesses obtaining government 
contracts should do so purely on the basis of ability rather than relationships with 
political power holders? International hypocrisy is also evident when it is 
understood that foreign consortia and credit agencies have avoided the very business 
risks that those same credit agencies continually pressure the Indonesian 
government and business sector into accepting. The contracts originally signed in 
the early 1990s have meant that PLN has had to bear all the costs from risks of 
dollar fluctuations, force majeure, the `take or pay' clause and over optimistic 
forecasts for electricity demand. 
The international institutions working in Indonesia have also been vocal on the 
contract renegotiations, with the ADB tying its loans to the conclusion of contract 
negotiations as well as the ratification of a new power law (Law on Electricity, 
No. 20/2002). This new law, like the oil and gas law, gives an even greater role to 
private investors and its deliberations have also been extremely contentious, taking 
one and a half years to pass through parliament 58 
57 The members of the government's negotiating team are: The Coordinating Minister of the 
Economy, The Minister of SOEs, The Minister of Finance, the Minister of Mining and Energy and 
the Foreign Minister. 
58 For example, one of the contentions about this new law is that the profitable side of electricity 
production in the densely populated areas of Java and Bali will be handed over to the private sector 
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One of the central institutional changes under this new law is the transfer of the 
rights to sell electricity to the public from PLN to private sales agents. A special 
body, the Power Market Supervisory Agency (PMSA), was due to be set in 
September 2003 to determine the price of electricity to the consumer before full 
free-market competition is phased in Province by Province after 5 years. This body 
will also be responsible for allocating sales licences to the new sales agents (ADB 
2002b). Local governments also now have the right to issue licenses to private 
companies to both set up power plants and sell power directly to the public in their 
respective jurisdictions. 9 
Thus, the appointment of sales agents to take over from PLN will now be carried out 
by the PMSA and local governments, opening up new opportunities for corruption. 
The potential for local governments to be involved in corruption is great, as can be 
seen from the analysis of local government involvement in the forestry sector which 
is explored in Section 2.4. In the case of the PMSA, its members will be appointed 
by the President with prior approval from the DPR. Although it is too early to make 
any judgements about the functioning of the PMSA, handing out a limited amount 
of licenses to private businesses participating in a lucrative economic sector such as 
electricity inevitably creates incentives for corruption. 
Moving onto a consideration of domestic vested interests, compared to Pertamina, 
little has been heard from or even about the Indonesian business partners of the 
overseas consortia throughout the contract renegotiations. However, this does not 
mean that they have not participated in negotiations, both through legitimate 
channels and more suspect ones. For example, another chairman of PLN, Djiteng 
Marsudi, was reportedly pressured through the Minister of SOEs by both senior 
ministers and Soeharto cronies when he became vocal about the need to revise 
existing contracts. 60 
whilst PLN remains responsible for the poorer and less profitable more sparsely populated outlying 
islands. Such 'cherry-picking' is a feature of privatisation programmes the world over. 59 Jakarta Post, 13.9.02; Jakarta Post, 5.9.02; Asia Times, 20.9.02. 
60 Prospek, 13.7.98. 
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In contrast to Pertamina, the issue of removing Soeharto family and crony elements 
from PLN has been relatively muted. This could be because of differences in the 
structure of contracts between the two SOEs. A quick appraisal of Appendix Three 
shows that most of the Soeharto contracts at Pertamina were for intermediary roles 
such as the sale, purchase and transportation of gas, oil or premix, whereas in PLN, 
domestic companies tend to have a relatively small share in each project. Or 
perhaps many of the Pertamina contracts were more easily broken because they 
were for projects which had not yet started or where the Soeharto-linked companies 
could not afford future investment anyway, whereas in PLN most of 'the power 
projects have already been completed. In at least one case, a project has been 
bought out completely from the local partners. 1 It is likely that a few others have 
already, or will in the future, follow this pattern as the domestic partners search for 
valuable dollars to hold up other sections of their business empires. One of the 
Soeharto children received a buy-out offer from her international partners in 1998, 
but she refused. 62 In general, though, unless there is a new push by either the 
Indonesian government or the international partners to pressurise the Soeharto- 
linked companies into giving up their share of the contracts, it is likely that they will 
continue in these profitable ventures. 
There have, however, been some controversies surrounding new contracts at PLN. 
The most publicised case involved a company called Bukaka which is owned by 
Jusuf Kalla, the previous Minister of Trade and Industry. This company won a- 
project to build a transmission network to distribute the electricity produced by 
Paiton I when Habibie was President in 1998/99. But the contract was not finalised 
and the PLN chairman was ordered not to sign the contract in 1999 by the newly 
elected President Wahid and Bukaka effectively lost the contract. Since then there 
have been many allegations surrounding the re-tendering of this project which 
indicate that the office of President is still very much involved in appointing the 
winners of contracts at PLN. One allegation came to light at a closed hearing with 
61 The Japanese giant Sumitomo Corporation has taken over the Tanjung Jati B power plant 
(Indonesian Business, December 2000). 
62 Charles Smith, Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, ttp: //www worldnetdaily com 
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the DPR when the Chairman of PLN admitted that he had been approached by 
Wahid's personal masseur in connection with a Chinese consortium taking part in 
the tender. 63 Another story has it that Wahid withdrew the Bukaka contract in a deal 
made with a Japanese firm in recognition of a debt-rescheduling scheme which the 
firm had agreed upon for an unconnected bankrupt petrochemical project (Data 
Consult 2000). 
The subject of the amount of local content used in the electricity projects has at 
times been raised but generally seems to have been somewhat over-shadowed by 
price negotiations. It is also the case that many of the projects have already been 
built and are operating, so that local content is no longer such a big issue. 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the details of the new contract terms have not 
been systematically released into the public domain, although it is likely that the 
degree of local content used formed part of the negotiations. In at least one project, 
a foreign firm has demanded that the requirement to use local content be eliminated 
as one of the conditions for lowering its prices to PLN M 
The growing power of the DPR has also had an impact at PLN. In a similar way to 
Pertamina, there have been numerous meetings between the Minister for Mines and 
Energy, the director of PLN, the governmental negotiating team and Commission 
VIII at the DPR about the re-negotiation of the 27 projects' contracts. 65 Throughout 
these meetings, the Commission VIII members have generally been vocal in favour 
of a more punitive approach towards the private project developers and have , 
criticised the Indonesian government for what they see as something of a sell-out to 
foreign interests. However, the depth and detail of the information exchanged by 
the government on PLN has been modest compared to the meetings on Pertamina. 
For example, the Minister of Mines and Energy has often refused to give any details 
63 Indonesian Business, June 2000 
64 French company Alsthom at the Kediri power transmission project (Indonesian Business, 
29.11.00). 
65 For example, see Suara Pembaruan, 11.7.00 and Indonesian Business January 2002. 
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on the re-negotiations, stating simply that the information is confidential. 66 This is 
quite extraordinary in view of the fact that it is the same minister who has been 
forthcoming with information on Pertamina, who refuses to elaborate on PLN's 
contracts. It seems that the political exigencies which made it possible for the DPR 
to criticise the Soeharto contracts at Pertamina do not extend to a critical approach 
to the international contracts at PLN. 
The main lesson from this consideration of the business/state relationship in the 
electricity sector is that international business can be just as appropriately described 
as a vested interest, intimately involved in corruption, as can Indonesian business. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that international businesses have made 
personal payments to either their own politicians or Indonesian ones to win 
contracts, the possibility that official campaign contributions serve the same purpose 
cannot be ignored. 7 Whether or not such cases are widespread enough to provide a 
legitimate generalisation, it is nevertheless the case that the U. S. government has at 
least abused its position as a major Indonesian creditor to protect private business 
interests at the expense of a crucial public utility. Furthermore, the popular 
perception that foreign interests have gained the most from privatisation in the 
electricity sector can only add to the nationalist argument that domestic capital 
accumulation has been disregarded. 
The major source of institutional change in the electricity sector has been the new 
power bill, ratified by the DPR at the end of 2002. Because the bill will not take 
effect until 2007 at the earliest, there is as yet no information on the functioning of 
the PMSA, which was due to be set up in September 2003. However, the transfer 
66 Tempo, 18.9.00 
67 Although Charles Smith, a U. S. journalist who has done extensive research on corruption at Paiton 
I, alleges that Edison Mission was a `major contributor' to the Clinton campaign, this was not 
confirmed by Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) documents on political contributions from 1993- 
1996 which were recently obtained for this thesis. Smith alleges in particular that the CEO of 
Mission Energy, John Bryson, made contributions to the Clinton campaign but the FEC documents 
record only one such donation of US$ 1000. Margaret Thatcher also tied the appointment of a 
British construction firm, Foster-Wheeler, to the financing of an extremely corrupt oil refinery 
project, Balongan, in 1985 (The Jakarta Post, 23.11.01). The U. K. has only just begun to release 
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of the authority to appoint sales agents to the PMSA and local governments should 
be treated with caution. Again, it seems that state participants in corruption within 
this sector are likely to proliferate, whilst the original vested interests of the 
Soeharto era, international business with their domestic partners, have become more 
deeply entrenched. 
2.4 Timber: A Unique Resource 
An analysis of business/state relations in the forestry sector must take into account 
the unique nature of this resource. For, unlike oil and gas or electricity, the forestry 
sector engenders a certain emotional subtext. In addition to the usual economic 
value of a natural resource, Indonesia's forests also contain a certain intrinsic value 
derived from their fundamental connection to life on our planet. As one report 
states, 
Indonesia's forests are considered to be among the most diverse and 
biologically rich in the world. Although the country comprises only 1.3 
percent of the earth's land surface, it holds a disproportionately high share of 
its bio-diversity, including 11 percent of the world's plant species, 10 
percent of its mammal species, and 16 percent of its bird species... Forest 
cover in Indonesia fell from 162 million hectares in 1950 to only 98 million 
hectares in 2000. The country's richest forests, the lowland forests, are 
almost entirely gone in the island of Sulawesi and will disappear in 2005 
from Sumatra and in 2010 in Kalimantan (Barber et al 2002). 
From an international perspective, the emotional appeal of the exploitation of a fast 
diminishing environment which supports such an extraordinary ecosystem far 
outweighs that of ordinary Indonesians subsidising corruption in the electricity and 
oil sectors through sharp rises in petrol or electricity rates. 
details of corporate contributions to political parties with no information available for the period 
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This point affects business/state relations in the forestry sector by effectively 
increasing the international pressure on the Indonesian government to regularise its 
dealings with private domestic timber firms. This pressure is exercised through 
such mechanisms as the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), an institution 
which co-ordinates Indonesia's major aid donors. It is also notable that foreign 
NGOs and research institutes are extremely vocal in this sector. This is in contrast 
to the situation in the oil and gas and electricity sectors where international pressure 
through foreign institutions and governments is fed largely by international business 
interests. Such international interests are generally absent from the Indonesian 
forestry sector except, perhaps, in terms of the international market's access to 
unprocessed as opposed to processed timber through trade. 
Within Indonesia, business/state relations in the forestry sector are shaped not only 
by the above concerns with the diminishment of an intrinsically valuable resource 
but more importantly by a discourse on land ownership which has remained 
unresolved since independence in 1945. Conflict over land is common place in 
Indonesia. This is partly because of unfulfilled promises from the Indonesian 
government immediately after independence over the distribution of land which had 
previously belonged to vast Dutch-owned plantations and partly because of an 
extremely uncertain legal regime of land ownership rights. It is a truism that land is 
the fundamental basis of wealth in any economy, but this is especially the case in 
Indonesia where the majority of people derive their living directly from the land, 
and where it is practically impossible to obtain even small amounts of credit from 
banks without a plot of land as collateral. Added to this is the special meaning 
which many traditional communities accord to the land which has often provided 
the means of existence for generations of families. The close proximity of such 
communities to forest land compared to the distance from which many large timber 
companies operate further adds to local resentments. 
before 2000. 
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Timber is also an important resource in terms of the Indonesian economy in general, 
with the export value of forestry products standing at 16 percent of the value of non- 
oil and gas exports in 1999. It is also estimated that the forestry sector provides 
direct employment for 2.5 million workers and indirect employment 
for a further 1.5 
million (Resosudarmo, 2003). 
All of these points taken together mean that land, especially productive 
land such as 
forests, is a principal focus of the redistributional debates which have regained in 
prominence since the fall of Soeharto. The struggle for control over oil and 
electricity can also be interpreted primarily as a redistributional issue, but one 
located at the national level between foreign and Indonesian companies. It is, of 
course, also possible to conceive of struggles over oil and electricity as a domestic 
issue, but this requires a further level of abstraction that is often absent from 
debates. In contrast, redistributional debates in the forestry sector are firmly placed 
within Indonesia's borders at the sub-national level, emphasising pribumi as 
opposed to Chinese-Indonesian control which is reflected in the co-operative/ 
conglomerate opposition. 
2.4.1 The Distribution of Forestry Exploitation Licenses 
Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (HPH) (Forest Cultivation Rights) are licenses distributed 
by the Indonesian government to both private and state-owned timber companies. 
These licenses, which usually last for around 20 or 30 years, permit the companies 
to clear most of the forest on the allotted land and sell the resulting timber to be 
processed. Central to the HPH concept is the idea that forest lands be maintained in 
permanent production which means that a HPH holder is under an obligation to cut 
only large trees and replant blocks of forest at the same time as clearing other 
blocks. Each HPH holder must also pay a sum of money to a central fund called the 
Dana Reboisasi (DR) (Reforestation Fund) which is controlled by the Department 
of Forestry for each cubic meter of wood harvested. These funds should then be 
reallocated to timber companies in order to facilitate replanting. 
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When corruption occurs in the forestry sector it generally occurs in four main areas. 
Firstly, the granting of HPH is based on personal connections. Secondly, the 
obligations of HPH holders to maintain their concessions in a reasonable condition 
is not enforced. Thirdly, manipulation of data about the amount of timber harvested 
occurs in order to obtain illegitimately high levels of funds from the DR. Fourthly, 
contracts from the Forestry Department for other services are given without tender 
to well-connected companies. 
In terms of the distribution of HPH, the respective shares controlled by the state and 
private companies will first be considered. According to ITFMP, 68 the total area 
controlled by the four largest state-owned timber companies is just over 4 million 
ha. The total amount of HPH coverage in operation for the whole of Indonesia in 
1997/1998 was estimated to be 51.5 million ha (Brown 1999). This means that 
according to ITFMP, the state sector accounts for around 8 percent of total HPH 
ownership. But it should also be noted that the total amount of HPH in operation is 
in fact different from the total amount of HPH in existence. As a percentage of 
HPH in existence, a different source has estimated that in mid-1998, the state sector 
accounted for 20 percent, the private sector 56 percent, state/private partnerships 12 
percent and the remaining 12 percent had been slated for conversion to non-forestry 
uses (Fox 2000). Whatever the exact figure, there is a general consensus that the 
private sector controls the majority of HPH. 
Within the private sector, data on the exact distribution of HPH vary widely 
depending on the source. Table 2.3 below shows a comparison of four different 
data sources. 
68 ITFMP is the Indonesia-UK Tropical Forestry Management Project, a project funded by the 
Department for International Development, U. K. ITFMP's information is based on a database 
designed by a member of staff, Dr. Adrian Whiteman, which itself draws from various Indonesian 
government and business information sources. 
116 
Table 2.3 Comparison of Rankings of Top Fifteen Private Timber Concession 
Holders 1997/1998 
ITFNIP Concession Owner* ITFMP PPIIFI''°*° APHI=D** Warta 
ranking holder estimate estimate estimate N konomi 
(Group) (ha) (ha) (ha) estimate 
(ha) 
1 Barito Prajogo 5,043,067 1,819,100 3,356,800 2,724,100 
Pacific Pan estu 
2 D'a'anti Burhan Uray 3,365,357 3,632,235 3,996,200 2,953,900 
3 Kayu Lapis Hunawan 2,806,600 3,358,700 3,142,800 3,496,000 
Indo. Wid'a'anto 
4 Alas P. O Suwandi 2,661,376 2,778,500 2,189,000 1,198,726 
Kusuma 
5 Bob Hasan Bob Hasan 2,131,360 1,472,800 1,352,000 1,627,800 
_ 6 Armed Armed Forces 1,819,600 
Forces 
7 Korindo Kim Hoon 1,589,228 764,000 1,493,500 1,281,000 
8 Kodeco 1,081,700 1,126,700 
9 Sumalindo Adi Resanata/ 997,800 852,300 796,300 850,000 
Wi narto 
Utomo 
10 Salim Anthony Salim 979,027 969,500 
11 Daya Sakti Widya 919,925 671,625 672,000 567,000 
Rachman 
12 Surya Martias 852,827 832,773 1,080,00() 
Dumai 
13 Hanurata Yayasan 796,754 487,893 
Harapan Kita 
and Trikora 
14 Bumi Raya Pintarso/Adiya 745,900 1,264,500 1,036,455 
Utama nto 
15 Uni Seraya 708,140 959,050 885,000 
Sources: Brown, David (1999) Addicted to Rent: Corporate and Spatial Distribution of Forest Resources in 
Indonesia; Implications for Forest Sustainability and Government Policy, DFID/ITFMP, 
irttP: //www. geocities. corn/daridbrown id/Atrmain. htntl; Warta Ekonomi, 10.8.98. 
Notes: * Prospektif, 26.2.99; ** PPHH stands for Direktorat Pemanfaatan dan Peredaran Hasil (Directorate for the 
Utilization and Distribution of Forest Products), a section located within the Department of Forestry; *** APHI 
stands for Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia (Indonesia Association of Forest Concessionaires), a forestry 
business association. 
In the shifting world of Indonesian business ownership, it is always very difficult to 
identify group ownership of companies as well as decide what defines group 
ownership, which may account for some of the differences shown in this table. 
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However, these discrepancies between data sources are not inconsequential; in some 
cases they differ by millions of hectares which is itself illustrative of the dire lack of 
dependable official data in the forestry sector as a whole. Nevertheless, roughly the 
same groups appear in all of the rankings and thus this information still serves to 
illustrate the concentration of ownership of HPH amongst a handful of 
conglomerates. According to the ITFMP estimates above, the 15 largest groups 
together account for over 50 percent of total HPH ownership in operation. 
Practically all of the largest timber companies above have the involvement of the 
Soeharto family to a greater or lesser extent through directorships and 
shareholdings. The Bob Hasan Group and the Barito Pacific Group (see Box Three) 
are the most widely acknowledged partners of various Soeharto children's 
businesses and yayasans (foundations), but their reach extends into all corners of the 
forestry sector along with many other well-known political figures. 
69 Walhi, an 
Indonesian environmental watchdog, estimates that around 80 percent of HPH were 
obtained through corruption 70 
The process through which this concentration of control over the forestry sector 
came about serves well as an illustration of the changing nature of business/state 
relations over the 32 years of Soeharto rule. The distribution of HPH started soon 
after Soeharto came to power in 1967 with the promulgation of the 1967 Forestry 
Act. Initially it was the military and senior bureaucrats who received the most HPH 
as payment for loyalty to the new regime. However, it soon became apparent to this 
newly created class of land owners that time, skills and capital were needed to reap 
the maximum profit from their concessions and many sold stakes in their HPH to 
private domestic and foreign (mostly Malaysian) firms who were prepared to 
provide such inputs. ' This trend continued until 1985 when, ostensibly in a bid to 
raise the amount of value added to forestry exports, a new government regulation 
obliged all HPH holders to own sawmills. This was part of a wider package of 
69 For a more detailed list of Soeharto family holdings in the forestry sector, see Brown 1999. 
70 Tempo, 5.3.01. 
71 Kompas, 30.8.99 and Warta Ekonomi, 10.8.98. 
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government regulations which also outlawed the export of unprepared logs and, in 
1992, imposed a 100 percent tariff on the export of rough sawn timber which in 
practice meant that the only export option for timber was in the form of plywood. 
However, because the cost of building a plywood mill at the time was around Rp12 
billion (US$1,200,000), 72 there was a rush by many of the original HPH owners to 
sell to companies who could afford such a large outlay. Companies, that is, who 
had special access to state credit. 
Thus, the initial transference of stakes in HPH from military and bureaucratic elite 
to private business was compounded by government regulations. Once private 
business obtained a strong foothold in the sector, trends of concentration of 
ownership intensified as the Soeharto children came of age and began their 
involvement in the Indonesian economy. Indeed, it has long been recognised that 
the first step to become a major conglomerate in Indonesia is an involvement in the 
forestry sector where the enormous profits can be used for subsequent expansion 
into other sectors of the economy. 
The whole forestry sector was effectively `wrapped up' by well-connected 
conglomerates when Bob Hasan (see Box Three), perhaps the most notorious 
Soeharto `crony', was put in charge of several forestry business associations. The 
best known, and most widely written about, is called Apkindo, the Indonesian 
Plywood Association. This association was given a monopoly to export plywood, 
charged all producers an exorbitant fee for each cubic meter of plywood exported 
and obliged the producers to use a Hasan-owned shipping company and insurance 
company for all transactions. It has been estimated that Apkindo made Bob Hasan 
around US$2 -3 billion during his 12 year tenure as chairman 
73 
721nfobisnis, January 1999. 
73 Tempo, 3.4.00. 
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2.4.2 Post-Soeharto Reforms 
Out of the three sectors reviewed in this chapter, the most prolific post-Soeharto 
institutional reforms have been in the forestry sector. Authority over the allocation 
of HPH has shifted dramatically within the state from central to regional 
government and two new regulations have been introduced to limit the amount of 
HPH ownership for individual timber companies and allocate a percentage of newly 
granted and newly extended HPH to local co-operatives. Tariffs on the export of 
rough sawn timber have also been slashed and the requirement of HPH holders to 
build plywood mills has been rescinded. Each of these changes will be further 
explored before considering their effects on the distribution of HPH. 
Changes in the control over the distribution of HPH have taken place within the 
context of a decentralisation programme underpinned by two 1999 regional 
autonomy laws 74 Weakened by his longstanding proximity to President Soeharto, 
these laws were introduced by President Habibie in a bid to legitimise his 
transitional administration and gain popular support for re-election. Immediately 
after Soeharto's resignation, many believed that his protracted suppression of 
separatist movements in the outer regions would leave a legacy of the fragmentation 
of the Indonesian unitary state. These two laws constituted Habibie's attempt to 
forestall such a threat. 
One of the key motivations of regional opposition to central government was the 
revenue-sharing regime of wealth derived from natural resources located in the 
regions, which was heavily skewed in favour of the central government. Up until 
1999, the share of forestry resources received by regional governments had been in 
the form of a land tax, 15 percent of one type of reforestation fund and 35 percent of 
another type. 5 In contrast, the new regional autonomy laws specified that 80 
percent of all state income from forestry and 40 percent of all reforestation funds 
74 The Basic Law on Regional Government (No. 22/1999) and The Basic Law on Financial Balance 
Between Central and Regional Government (No. 25/1999). 
75 The land tax is known as Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan (PBB), 15 percent was received from luaran 
Hasil Hutan (IHH) and 35 percent from Dana Reboisasi (DR) (Kompas, 27.7.00). 
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would now go to the regions. 76 Within these new regional allocations, the district as 
opposed to the provincial level benefits the most (see Appendix Five) 77 In addition, 
a new revised forestry law was also introduced in 1999 which supported the key 
regional autonomy laws by granting provincial and district heads with the right to 
award certain types of HPH. 78 
However, the ideals represented in these laws have proven difficult to implement in 
view of the extremely complex implementing regulations attached to them. They 
are also weakened by a raft of other contradictory laws governing the same issues. 
Indeed, there can even be seemingly irreconcilable contradictions within the same 
law. For example, article 7 of law 22/99 gives the legal basis for transfer of 
authority to regions for everything except foreign affairs, religion, and other matters, 
one of which is utilisation of natural resources. Yet in the same law, article 10 
states that regions have the authority to manage all natural resources within their 
jurisdictions (Resosudarmo 2003). 
This chaotic situation is in part a reflection of the ongoing discourse in Indonesia 
over the appropriate level of regional autonomy, where the features which make the 
forestry sector an ideal focus of redistribution have also ensured that it is caught in 
the crossfire of such debates. The Habibie, Wahid and Megawati administrations 
have each brought with them different conceptions of the ideal level of regional 
autonomy. Moreover, within and between these administrations, both the Ministry 
of Forestry as well as the actual Minister have been in a high state of flux, with each 
change of Minister heralding a new set of policies. 9 
76 The Basic Law on Financial Balance Between Central and Regional Government (No. 25/1999), 
Section 3, articles 6 and 8. 
77 Indonesia is divided into 27 provinces (propinsi) and 246 districts or regencies (kabupaten). The 
highest office at provincial level is the Governor (Gubernor) who is elected by the Regional 
Assembly level I (DPRD I). The highest office at district level is the Bupati who is selected by the 
Provincial Governor from a list of candidates given by Regional Assembly level II (DPRD II). 
78 Law No. 41/1999. 
79 Until 1998, the Ministry was called the Ministry of Forestry. From 1998 to 2000, it was known as 
the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (MOFEC). In August 2000, a new Cabinet was formed and 
MOFEC was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and renamed the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry. This lasted just 3 months, when the name reverted once more to the Ministry of Forestry 
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This has led to a situation where central, provincial and district levels of government 
all now have the right to issue HPH along with a certain degree of control through 
forestry SOEs and a new institution, known as Badan Pengelola Kellutanan (BPK) 
(Forestry Management Body). Theoretically, forestry is ultimately under the control 
of central government through the forestry SOEs and it is central government who 
has the right to define the status of land and plan its use through 1992 Spatial 
Planning Law. However, at the same time the new forestry bill specifies that 
`attention be paid' to local land use plans (Barber 2002). The Minister of Forestry 
has also been active in granting new HPH, even though this goes against the spirit of 
the regional autonomy laws and often results in allegations of corruption. 
80 
Provincial Governors also have rights to grant HPH up to 10,000 ha to co-operatives 
and local SMEs as part of the central government's policy of redistribution of forest 
lands. 
Meanwhile, at District level many Bupatis have been taking full advantage of their 
rights through a 1999 forestry regulation81 to grant small plots of HPH of up to 100 
ha to local co-operatives and SMEs. Thousands of such licenses have already been 
issued, 82 in some cases generating revenues of over US$ 5 million for a single 
district within an eighteen month period (Resosudarmo 2003). Despite subsequent 
orders from the Ministry of Forestry rescinding these rights, some Bupatis have 
refused to stop the practice. 83 Under a different Minister of Forestry another 
regulation was then introduced in 2000 authorising Bupatis to grant large scale HPH 
of up to 50,000 ha, but when this regulation was revoked in 2002 Bupatis again 
ignored the instructions, questioning whether Ministerial Decrees have more 
authority than regional regulations (Resosudarmo 2003). 
(Barber 2002). From 1998 until August 2001 there were no less than four different Ministers of 
Forestry. 
so For example, see Kompas, 11.12.00; Warta Ekonomi, 2.9.00; Kompas, 4.3.00. 
81 PP6/1999. 
82 Certification In Indonesia: A Briefing, Down to Earth, June 2001 http: //dte. gn. apc. org/Ccert. htm 
S3 Tempo, 24.7.01. 
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In response, the Ministry of Forestry has made several additional attempts to regain 
a centralised control of HPH allocation. At one point the Ministry issued an 
implementing regulation for one of the regional autonomy laws stating that all forest 
land without a concession-holder was to be transferred to state companies. This 
plan faltered and was abandoned after protests from the Districts and existing HPII 
holders (Resosudarmo 2003). Most recently another implementing regulation was 
issued reserving the rights to grant large-scale HPH for the Ministry, but whether 
this one can have any effect where the others have failed remains to be seen. From 
2001, a new institution called the BPK is also set to be involved in forest 
management on a national scale by issuing licenses for harvesting and becoming 
involved in planning. 84 But, as yet, little is known about whether this new body 
will be empowered or treated simply as another appendage to all the other activities. 
This extraordinary proliferation of new constituents in the control of the distribution 
of HPH has led to conflicts between different levels of government as they each 
jostle for a bigger cut of forestry revenues. Two examples from Kalimantan serve 
to illustrate this point. The first represents a conflict between the Provincial 
Governor and the Central Government, where the Governor of South Kalimantan 
attempted to grant a concession to a well-known timber conglomerate for a plot of 
land which was not classified as potential HPH status. He became vocal in the press 
about the central government reneging on its promises of greater control over 
regional resources when the Minister of Forestry turned down his request to change 
the status of the land. 85 The second represents conflict between the Provincial 
Governor and the District Bupati as a result of the regulation which specifies that a 
Governor can only grant HPH on receipt of a recommendation from the Bupati. In 
this case, after protests from several NGOs, the Bupati decided not to give a 
recommendation for the granting of a HPH. However the Governor then invoked a 
Ministerial decree which stated that if the HPH area covered several district areas 
4 Kompas, 11.12.00. 
85 Kompas, 25.7.01. 
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then the Governor did not need the recommendation of a Bupati and in the end the 
HPH was granted anyway. 86 
Throughout these protracted struggles the one remaining constant has been 
accusations of corruption in the granting of HPH. The Ministry of Forestry, 
regional assemblies, Bupatis and Governors have all been accused of allocating 
HPH according to personal payments from timber companies where co-operatives 
are merely `front organisations' for well-known conglomerates. 
87 Thus, the myriad 
institutional changes which have occurred in the forestry sector have enabled a 
much broader distribution of opportunities to participate in corrupt exchange. This 
section will now turn to a consideration of the effects of reform on the business side 
of the corruption equation. 
In an attempt by the Indonesian government to answer its critics on the issue of the 
concentration of HPH in the hands of a favoured few conglomerates, two new 
reforms were instituted in 1999. The first concerns the mandatory granting of up to 
20 percent of new or newly extended HPH to local co-operatives and small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). The second limits the area of HPH which one 
company is allowed to control to 400,000 ha throughout the whole of Indonesia and 
100,000 ha in each Province. 
The new regulation on co-operatives will be dealt with first. This regulation states 
that at least 10 percent and at most 20 percent, of the shares in new and newly 
extended HPH should be given to co-operatives and SMEs which are local to the 
HPH area. 88 This may seem like a laudable idea, but there are in fact many flaws to 
this plan. 
86 Kompas, 29.6.01. 
87 Kompas, 26.2.01; Kompas, 23.5.01; Kompas, 11.12.00; Warta Ekonomi, 2.9.00; Kompas, 4.3.00. 
88 Based on Permen Negara Agraria/Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional (BPN) No. 2/1999 10.2.99 
and SK No. 732/Kpts-I1/1998 (Infobisnis, January 1999). 
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Such a plan has been around in Indonesia for many years, except that co-operatives 
were previously entitled to only 5 percent of the shares of HPH. 
89 There are no 
current figures for the amount of co-operatives which have benefited from this 
regulation since the resignation of Soeharto, but Adi Sasono (see Box Three), the 
self-styled `people's economy' spokesperson, testified at a hearing with the DPR 
that 89 HPH holders had already distributed shares to 415 co-operatives by the end 
of 1998 90 
Critics of this approach to re-distribution point to the experience of the 1960s when 
the original bureaucratic and military recipients of HPH sold their rights to private 
businesses rather than become full participants themselves because of a lack of 
capital and skills. The new reforms have resulted in a repeat of such patterns, with 
co-operatives in practice almost always entering some kind of arrangement with a 
capital provider such as a foreign investor, well-connected entrepreneur or one of 
the timber companies that dominated in the Soeharto era. McCarthy (2001) 
estimates that the total cost of obtaining a HPH and logging 100ha of forest is at 
least RplOO million (US$ 10,000), which militates against small community 
involvement and in favour of local elites with strong political or financial 
connections (Algadrie et al 2002; Barr et al 2001 in Resosudarmo 2003). 
Other weaknesses include the manipulation of co-operatives for the benefit of 
conglomerates and the non-transparent manner in which the allocations are given 
where the details of co-operatives receiving shares cannot be found in the public 
domain. This inevitably leaves the way open for the continuation of practices of 
patronage. There has been the occasional report in the press of co-operatives 
gaining shares of HPH through this programme which may have benefited a few 
genuine local co-operatives or small businesses, 91 but these seem to be the exception 
rather than the rule. 
89 Prospektif, 20.1.99. 
90 Prospekt if, 26.2.99. 
91 For example, see Kompas, 26.4.99. 
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The second major forestry reform of placing limits on the maximum amount of 
HPH which can be controlled by one company had more potential for changes in the 
concentration of ownership of HPH 92 Similar to the co-operatives programme, it 
appeared in 1999 to much fanfare when the then Minister of Forestry claimed that 
they were `no longer scared' of conglomerates since the resignation of Soeharto 93 
The idea was to phase in these limits by initially applying the regulation to only new 
or newly extended HPH. Such a policy again had its critics, with some maintaining 
that limits could be easily circumvented by the creation of dummy companies, 94 
and others noting that a similar regulation issued during the tenure of Hasjrul 
Harahap as Minister of Forestry (1988-93) had had no effect on conglomerate 
9s concentration. 
In any case, in an extraordinarily under-reported move, it was decided in late 1999 
that the new regulation be withdrawn, most likely under pressure from the timber 
companies 96 The Minister of Forestry still claimed that he did not agree with the 
concentration of HPH ownership and as a substitute offered `investigations' and the 
use of a progressive tax where those in control of 100,000 ha of forest would pay 
double to those in control of 50,000 ha. 
Thus, it seems that both of the new efforts to decrease the concentration of HPH in 
the forestry sector have been less than successful. In order to further investigate 
this, some figures detailing the amount of HPH in operation are presented in Table 
2.4 below. 
92 This regulation is PP No. 6/1999. 
931nfobisnis, January 1999 
94 See for example, Brown 1999; Barber 2002; Prospektif, 26.2.99. 
95 Prospektif, 26.2.99. 
96 See Warta Ekonomi, 4.10.99. When this regulation first came out it was reported for days in all of 
the major media. But when it was withdrawn it only appeared for one day in this edition of Warta 
Ekonomi. This story is confirmed by Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan dan Perkebunan, Nomor : 
084/Kpts-II/2000 (a Minister of Forestry Decree). 
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Table 2.4: HPII in Operation 1989 - 2001 
Year 
Number of 
HPH 
Area of IIPII 
(Millions ha) 
1989/1990 557 58,88 
1991/1992 567 60,48 
1992/1993 580 61,38 
1993/1994 575 61,70 
1994/1995 540 61,03 
1995/1996 487 56,17 
1996/1997 447 54,09 
1997/1998 427 52.28 
1998/1999 420 51.58 
1999/2000 387 1,84 
2000 362 39,16 
2001 351 36,42 
Source: Direktorat Jenderal Bina Produksi Kehutanan 
(Directorate General of Forest Production 
Development), Department of Forestry, 
Http: //www. dephut. po. id/statistik 
The above figures show that the number and coverage of HPH in operation has 
fallen by around a third since 1989. The reasons which the Department of Forestry 
have given for the withdrawal of HPH range from non-payment by the companies of 
DR to harvesting timber beyond the contractual limits of their HPH. Walhi, an 
Indonesian environmental watchdog, estimate that around 15 percent of the 25 
biggest timber groups' holdings have been affected by withdrawals because of such 
violations, 97 whilst it was reported in July 1999 that violation-related withdrawals 
amounted to 1.36 million hectares (Robison 2004, p. 202). 
However, other figures show one of the most significant reasons for withdrawal 
could be that many of the concessions have already been exploited to such a degree 
that they are no longer productive and so represent little loss to the companies 
concerned. A report by the Ministry of Forestry in July 2000 indicated that about 30 
percent of active and expired HPH were degraded, reduced to scrub, or converted to 
97 InfoBisnis, August 1999. 
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agriculture 98 Nevertheless, the withdrawal of HPH on the basis of violations does 
represent something of an achievement given the involvement of well-connected 
conglomerates and the `backing' that many still have from minor stakeholders such 
as high up bureaucrats or military personnel 
99 
HPH concessions whose term of contract has ended and has not been extended are 
shared between the forestry SOEs, co-operatives and small businesses. However, 
until the middle of 2001, out of the 15 million ha of HPH which were not extended, 
over 11 million ha were so degraded as to be basically unproductive and the 
responsibility to rehabilitate the land falls to the new owners with possible help 
from the DR funds. '°° There are no definitive figures for the relative amounts that 
co-operatives and SOEs have received of these ex-HPH concessions, but it seems 
that the majority goes to SOEs with the co-operatives gaining perhaps 2 million 
ha. '°' 
Due to the high state of flux within the forestry sector at the moment, there are no 
data detailing the post-Soeharto distribution of HPH amongst specific conglomerate 
groups. However, since the fall in the overall amount of HPH has not been targeted 
at particular conglomerates, it seems likely that the same levels of relative 
concentration amongst the biggest timber conglomerates remains. This can also be 
inferred from the data presented in David Brown's report which compared the 
results of a similar shake-up of HPH ownership in 1994/95 with the situation in 
1997/98. Here it was found that, despite an overall reduction in HPH across the 
forestry sector, the same levels of concentration were sustained (Brown 1999). 
102 
98 Barber et at 2002. For other estimates of HPH degradation see Warta Ekonomi, 4.9.00; Kompas, 
3.2.01. 
99 Warta Ekonomi, 10.8.98. 
10° Kompas, 26.6.0 1. 
101 There are conflicting figures about the amounts of HPH whose term of contract has ended, and 
will not be extended. See Prospektif, 20.1.99; Kompas, 26.6.01; Kompas, 3.2.01; Indonesian 
Commericial Newsletter, 8.8.00; The Jakarta Post, 19.4.99. 
102 This was confirmed by an interview with David Brown (8.4.02). 
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Another difficulty in obtaining accurate data is derived from the involvement of 
IBRA, the state agency assigned to collect repayments from the private sector after 
the government bailed out the banking sector at the height of the economic crisis. 
Part of the debt of some debtor companies has been repaid to the government with 
company assets and it is the task of IBRA to restructure and sell these assets. 
However, IBRA has encountered many problems when trying to sell the assets, 
some of which come from the forestry sector, which means that in the intervening 
period before a sale can be made, IBRA is now the single most important holder or 
potential holder of forest and estate crop assets in Indonesia. 103 
This consideration of the forestry sector shows very clearly the effect of institutional 
change on patterns of corruption. The decentralisation programme along with 
numerous Ministerial Regulations from a Ministry in an extreme state of flux have 
opened up many more corruption opportunities for a much broader range of the state 
elite. But where forestry policy reform in the 1980s ensured a transfer of HPH from 
military and bureaucrats to private conglomerates, the post-Soeharto reforms have 
so far had little impact on the distribution of HPH nation wide. Without the 
provision of capital and training support, those co-operatives which actually receive 
re-distributed HPH will very likely turn over most of the value to conglomerate 
control. 
The distribution debate in the forestry sector may at first seem very different from 
Pertamina or PLN, given the absence of a foreign dimension. 104 However, implicit 
in the distinction between co-operatives and conglomerates in Indonesia is an ethnic 
dimension where co-operatives are synonymous with pribumi and conglomerates 
with Chinese-Indonesians. Indeed, there is a common perception in Indonesia that 
103 Jakarta Post, 27.1.00. 
104 Many sources mention the involvement of Malaysian firms in the Indonesian forestry sector, but 
in the absence of Malaysian firms from the top 15 holders of HPH, it must be assumed that their 
involvement is minimal. 
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a small group of Chinese-Indonesian business people looted the forestry sector in 
order to build their business empires. 105 
When used in relation to the forestry sector, the term 'pribumi' also takes on a more 
local regional character rather than simply a catch-all term for Indonesians who 
cannot be described as Chinese-Indonesian. The post-Soeharto rise of the 'putra 
daerah', 106 regional elites whose identity is tied to local ethnic groups, has already 
been described by Minako Sakai (2003) in relation to power struggles over the giant 
cement factory in Sumatra. Because land use is such a locally sensitive issue, 
analyses of the forestry sector would also benefit from such a further distinction 
within the term 'pribumi' between those elites based locally and in Jakarta. In any 
case, corruption in the forestry sector is still entangled in issues of both capital 
accumulation and ethnicity. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In terms of the major themes of this thesis, the three sectors reviewed in this chapter 
present some quite dramatic post-Soeharto changes to patterns of corruption in the 
allocation of government contracts. Most notably, the breakdown of the centralised 
political control exercised by Soeharto has resulted in the rapid proliferation of new 
state constituents in corruption. The national parliament, regional assemblies, 
Bupatis, Governors and new government agencies have now joined ministries and 
the President as the state beneficiaries of corrupt exchange. As institutional change 
and policy reform have proceeded apace and political power has become more 
widely dispersed, there has been no sense of the introduction of a system of checks 
and balances, but rather a spreading of corruption. In other words, the participants 
may have changed, but the way that business and the state `do business' has 
remained the same. 
105 For example, see Propektif, 26.2.99, Suparlan (2002), Robison (1996), Barber (2000). 
106 Literally `sons of the regions'. 
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In contrast, movement on the business side of corruption has been much slower. In 
the oil and gas sector there has been a fairly successful freezing out of the most 
easily identifiable Soeharto-related companies with foreign interests taking up the 
slack. In the electricity sector some foreign governments have gone to 
extraordinary lengths to protect their national private business interests and as a 
result the structure of the Soeharto-era contracts have changed little. The business 
interests of the forestry sector have changed the least since the Soeharto period, 
although some redistribution to co-operatives seems to be occurring at the fringes. 
By distinguishing the actors in corruption in this way, categorising according to 
business or the state and then further disaggregating within these categories, it 
becomes possible to flesh out the bare bones of the literature which deals with the 
effects of democratisation on corruption. Corruption has indeed initially spread in 
democratising Indonesia, but if the evolution of corruption in terms of who gets 
what at which sites is also focused on then the analysis has more significance. Such 
a significance is derived from the idea that corruption can never be destroyed but 
rather it is controlled through alterations of its character (Werner 1983, p. 638 in 
Moran 1999, p. 583). Thus, efforts to control corruption should be fed by analyses 
which highlight its particular forms. 
Definitions of the Indonesian state must also be reconsidered in the light of the data 
presented in this chapter. Where various sections of the state were integrated 
through Soeharto before 1998 in one overarching patrimonial structure, the sub- 
patrimonial relationships which were its constituent parts now have more individual 
importance, especially where they are removed geographically from the centre of 
power in Jakarta. In other words, the centralised state of the Soeharto regime can 
now be described as multi-polar. 
However, just as it is somewhat inadequate to simply describe corruption as 
spreading in response to democratisation, so a more detailed analysis of the effects 
of decentralisation on corruption is called for. In this regard Bardhan and 
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Mookherjee (2002) have forged new ground with their study of the determinants of 
the relative capture of local and state governments. Here, the authors posit that the 
degree of income inequality, the cohesiveness of interest groups and the level of 
loyalty to political parties within a region all affect the degree of government 
capture by vested interests. Their theoretical model carries with it some 
questionable assumptions, focusing exclusively on political party finance rather than 
personal enrichment, but they have nevertheless opened the way for a more 
sophisticated analysis of the effect of decentralisation on corruption. Whilst the 
data presented in this chapter does not consider Bardhan and Mookherjee's 
determinants of state capture, given that both Bupatis and Governors are chosen by 
the regional assemblies, there is much scope for further research on the effects that 
local political configurations have on patterns of corruption in the regions. From the 
standpoint of this chapter it may seem as though corruption automatically becomes 
endemic wherever new opportunities arise through institutional change, but a closer 
examination of the type forwarded by Bardhan and Mookherjee would likely turn up 
many other determinants of corruption besides the simple availability of 
opportunities. 
In terms of the deeper structural determinants of corruption, this chapter has also 
shown that perceptions regarding the economic weakness of one ethnic group 
relative to another closely accompany corruption in all three sectors. In the oil and 
gas sector, the competition for contracts between domestic and foreign business. 
interests is intense, and whilst it is recognised that foreign investment is needed, at 
the same time foreign control is feared. At least part of the motivation for 
government favouritism can be attributed to such a situation. The section on PLN 
highlights the strength of international capital, which is derived not only from 
superior access to capital and skills, but also from their own government's global 
political power. The way that economically weak groups define themselves in 
relational terms was demonstrated by the final review of the forestry sector. Where 
foreign control is less of an issue, the distributional focus returns exclusively to 
domestic constituents. 
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Whether the comparisons are between Indonesian and foreign, pribumi and 
Chinese-Indonesian, or even different putra daerah, ethnicity is a more prevalent 
unit of analysis than class in the domestic discourse on wealth distribution. Thus, if 
corruption is viewed as a system of wealth distribution, any attempts to eradicate it 
must also address this issue. For, whilst most anti-corruption programmes have 
already recognised that two of the functions that corruption fulfils, enhancing civil 
servant pay and providing political funding, have to be replaced, there is less 
appetite to address the issue of domestic capital accumulation in the same way. 
The theoretical relevance of such a position is the support it gives to the idea that 
corrupt opportunities are not always allocated according to the market logic of who 
can pay the most, thus undermining one of the major tenets of the rent-seeking 
approach. That is not to say that the market mechanism of allocation is absent 
altogether; indeed it will be shown in Chapter Four that potentially lucrative 
positions within the business association community are now more likely to be 
allocated on these market terms than according to political influence as in the 
Soeharto era. Nevertheless, the point that ethnicity is under some circumstances one 
of the bases of corrupt allocation remains a valid one. 
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Chapter Three_ 
INDONESIAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR ROLE 
IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The government contracts reviewed in the last chapter were mostly for big, fairly 
spectacular projects negotiated by a select number of Chinese-Indonesian or 
Soeharto-family conglomerates with senior bureaucrats or Soeharto himself. But 
for a larger number of smaller pribumi companies and conglomerates in Indonesia, 
government favouritism is administered through business associations (BAs). 
Instead of direct contact with Soeharto or his aides, the rank and file of pribumi 
business people have their own contacts in the bureaucracy at a lower level for 
which BAs can be a useful vehicle. ' The peak BA in Indonesia, Kadin (Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce), is especially renowned as an organisation which groups 
relatively large pribumi business interests and has been regarded for many years as 
largely compliant towards the state. Sectoral BAs, some of which have been found 
to be more effective as representative policy advocacy vehicles, are generally 
considered to be more inclusive but still with a pribumi bias in membership 
(MacIntyre 1991). 2 
Analyses of BAs in the academic literature tend to reflect broader ideological 
divisions in attitudes towards private business in general. On the one hand there are 
those who see business as representing a legitimate section of civil society, acting to 
balance the power of the state. When dealing with the state, representative BAs are 
its proper expression (Bernstein et al 1998; Lucas 1997). On the other hand, there 
are those who regard business as occupying an especially powerful position in 
constellations of political power due to its control of resources. Here BAs are much 
more likely to be considered rent-seeking vehicles, formed in order to seek material 
rewards from the state for their small and exclusive membership (Moore 1993). 
1 Kontan, 13.12.99. 
2 In this thesis, the term 'BAs' is inclusive of both Kadin and Sectoral BAs. Where it is important to 
distinguish between the two 'Kadin' and `sectoral BAs' will be used. 
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Each of the above views is more or less relevant depending on different country 
settings. The nature of the state, its historical evolution and resultant methods of 
maintaining power affect the role of BAs just as much as the structure of the 
economy and the character of the business community in general. However, it is 
also true that within a single country setting, BAs can be simultaneously conceived 
of as both rent-seeking vehicles and representative advocacy institutions. Thus it is 
also important to examine the more particular domestic circumstances under which 
each type of BA proliferates. 
This chapter will explore the several different functions that Indonesian BAs serve. 
It will begin with a detailed examination of sectoral BAs in a bid to discover who 
they represent and for what purposes. The second half of the chapter will focus 
further down onto one specific function of BAs, their role as intermediary in the 
allocation of government contracts. Special reference will then be made to recent 
reforms in the government procurement process and the effects that these have had 
on the distribution of power in the BA community in general and on their role in 
contract allocation in particular. This section of the chapter will also offer insights 
into the idea that institutions can only be analysed as reflections of coalitions of 
interests, something which is denied by the nature of institutionalist analysis. 
3.2 The Nature of Indonesian Business Associations 
This section will provide some insights into the questions of who Indonesian BAs 
represent and for what purposes with the use of data collected from a questionnaire 
distributed for this thesis. 3 The results obtained from this questionnaire point to a 
clear division of Indonesian BAs into two distinct categories based on differences in 
their activities, attitudes, functions and membership structure. Firstly, there are BAs 
whose membership numbers are extremely small (on average fifteen members) and 
are solely constituted from large enterprises. Secondly, there are BAs whose 
membership numbers are much larger (from several hundred to several thousand) 
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and anchored in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
4 The first type of BA will 
herein after be referred to as `large enterprise associations', the second type as 
`SME associations'. 
In terms of the type of businesses comprising BA membership, the data showed that 
almost a third (31 percent) of the BAs polled had a membership 100 percent 
constituted from large enterprises. An additional third (31 percent) had a 
membership profile of 75 percent or more of SMEs. Thus, one third of BAs polled 
had an extreme concentration of large enterprises as its members, one third had a 
mixture of large and SME members and one third had a very high concentration of 
SME membership. 
Significant statistical correlations were found between the number of members and 
the type of membership .5 In other words, the more members a 
BA has, the more 
likely that their membership is made up of SMEs. Similarly, the fewer members a 
BA has, the more likely they are to be from large enterprises. Thus, it was shown 
that the third of associations who have membership made up of 75 percent or more 
SMEs also have large numbers of members, whilst the associations whose 
membership is 100 percent large enterprises also have small numbers of members. 
This initial and rather crude measure to distinguish between two types of BA was 
bolstered by later findings of differences in a wide variety of questions relating to 
contact and attitudes towards the government and Kadin, as well as the internal 
3 Analysis is based on 46 returned questionnaires. For further details of this questionnaire, see 
Introduction: Methods and Sources Used in this Thesis and Appendix Two. 
4 The definition of SMEs used in the questionnaire was a company who has less than 100 employees. 
This definition was chosen because it is the one used by the Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (Indonesian 
Central Bureau of Statistics) and so lends continuity to other BPS statistics on SMEs used elsewhere 
in this thesis. It should be noted that other Indonesian government agencies such as the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Co-operatives and 
Development of Small Entrepreneurs use monetary definitions for SMEs such as assets or turnover 
(LP3ES et al 1998a). 
S Using the Pearson correlation technique, a -0.47 score was found to be significant at the 0.01 level 
for the two variables of the number of members and the percentage of members from big enterprises. 
A Pearson correlation of 0.37 was found to be significant at the 0.05 level for the two variables of the 
number of members and the percentage of members from SMEs. 
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nature of the BAs themselves. In order to further explore this distinction, the next 
section will begin with differences in the internal characteristics and capabilities of 
these two types of BA. 
3.2.1 Internal Business Association Characteristics 
Table 3.1 below shows some differences between SME associations and large 
enterprise associations in terms of some of their internal characteristics. 
Table 3.1 Some Internal Business Association Characteristics 
Characteristic All Respondent SME Associations Large Enterprise 
Associations (mean) (mean) Associations (mean) 
Length of 4.72 years 3.85 years 7.62 years 
service of 
chairman 
Number of full- 6.12 employees 8.25 employees 4.55 employees 
time employees 
Association has 60.9 % 92.3 % 15.4% 
branches in the 
regions 
SME associations are likely to have more staff than large enterprise associations, 
which could mean that they take on more activities. There is also a stark difference 
between the likelihood of the two categories of BA having a branch in the regions. 
If a BA has branches in the regions then it is more likely to represent a large cross- 
section of their economic sector, rather than just a few companies. 
The length of time the chairperson of an association has held that position is 
interesting because it shows some indication of the degree to which democratic 
practices are adhered to within the structure of a BA. This is especially relevant 
given the perception that many BAs function solely for the interests of the board and 
particularly the chairperson of the board. However, if the frequencies rather than 
the averages for the length of the chair's service are taken, a picture emerges where 
nearly 60 percent of the chairpersons of all respondent BAs have only held their 
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position since 1998 or later. Given the absence of comparative data for the period 
before 1998 it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the meaning of this 
figure, but it is possible that a new generation of chairpersons are starting to come 
through since the fall of Soeharto. 
Indications of the degree to which a BA is the `property' of the board is also implied 
through a consideration of Charts 3.1 and 3.2 below. 
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Chart 3.1 indicates this point literally with a consideration of who owns the office 
premises of BAs. It can be seen that large enterprise associations are more likely to 
be located on premises which are provided free of charge from a board member. 
This is relevant in view of the idea that the more board members contribute facilities 
and finance to the running of a BA, the more likely they are to expect a return on 
their investment in terms of how the BA can be used for the benefit of their own 
businesses. However, it should also be noted that the majority of BAs of all types 
pay for their premises out of the BAs' own funding which is contrary to other 
anecdotal evidence. 6 
See for example, LP3ES et al 2000. 
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Another surprising result concerns the source of income for the two different types 
of BA. Chart 3.2 below shows that for all respondents, 68 percent of their income is 
derived from membership fees, whilst for SME associations that figure falls to 55 
percent and for large enterprise associations, their income is 91 percent derived 
from membership fees. The received wisdom on Indonesian BAs is that many 
depend on donations from the board to survive which compromises the BA's 
activities in favour of the board's own businesses. 7 This is not borne out in the 
results of the questionnaire where respondents claimed that board members' 
donations on average made up a shortfall of only 5 percent of total income for all 
associations and 0 percent for large enterprise associations. It is, however, 
reasonable to expect that the BAs with a few big members would find it easier to set 
a sufficient level of membership fee and collect it. 
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Chart 3.3 below turns to actual levels of income. It can be seen that 50 percent of 
large enterprise associations have an income over RplOO million (US$ 10,000), 
which is lower than the 58 percent of SME associations. SME associations are also 
more numerous in the Rpl billion (US$ 100,000) or over category than the large 
enterprise associations. It was also found that there was no statistical evidence of 
7 LP3ES et al 1998a, p. 47; Maclntyre 1991, p. 52. 
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any relationship between the level of income of BAs and the percentage of members 
from big enterprises. 8 This indicates a trend whereby big businesses may keep a BA 
running for certain tasks, but do not rely on them for all of their representation 
needs. If the BAs were indeed central to the activities of large enterprises, then it 
should follow that they would be generously funded. 
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The overall picture of income levels shows that 81 percent of all respondents have 
an annual income of less than Rp 500 million (US$ 50,000). Considering this figure 
has to cover all the costs of a BA such as overheads, salaries and marketing, it is 
difficult to see how quality can be maintained at such an income level. In 
comparison, the average income for a British BA in 1999 was £ 848,000 
(Fairclough 1999). When a purchase power parity calculation is applied to equalize 
the cost of living in the UK and Indonesia, the average income of an Indonesian BA 
is approximately one fifth of the income that a British BA receives in real terms. 
9 
8 Using a Pearson correlation technique, the score of -0.24 was found to have no significance. 9 Purchase power parity conversion factor of 0.2 was obtained from the World Bank website. This is 
the number of units of a country's currency required to buy the same amount of goods and services in 
the domestic market as a U. S. dollar would buy in the United States. 
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Thus, some indicators of the internal characteristics of Indonesian BAs are that 
income is generally low. The majority of income is derived from membership fees, 
with the shortfall being made up from member and board donations, other 
institutions and association work. However, income-generating work is still 
relatively underdeveloped. 10 The absence of direct government funding may have 
positive implications for the independence of BAs, although as we will see in the 
next section, BAs are still dependent on informal sources of government funding 
derived from the process of government contract allocation. 
Whilst, on average, the length of service of the chairperson is lower than other 
anecdotal evidence suggests, a frequency distribution on the same data shows that 
15 percent of respondents have had the same chairperson for 10 years or more. In 
addition, given that the sample is biased towards national level associations, " it is 
perhaps surprising to see that only 61 percent have branches in the regions. It is 
difficult to see how BAs can be truly representative without this connection to 
businesses located in the regions. 
In terms of a comparison between the subsets of large enterprise and SME 
associations, the data shows that large enterprise associations are likely to have less 
income and fewer employees than SME associations and rely more on membership 
fees. The chairperson of large enterprise associations is also likely to hold the 
position for longer and to provide the association office premises free of charge. 
The likelihood of BAs having a branch in the regions is drastically reduced if its 
membership is made up of large enterprises. Essentially then, large enterprise 
associations have less internal capacity, are more reliant on their board or 
chairperson and have fewer connections to the regions than SME associations. 
10 In comparison, U. K. business associations obtained on average 33 percent of their income from 
commercial services (Fairclough 1999). 
11 The sample is most likely biased towards national level associations as a reflection of the original 
sources of lists of business associations (see Introduction: Methods and Sources Used in this Thesis). 
Section 3.2.2 Business Association Activity 
Table 3.2 below gives some indications of which categories of activity a BA 
undertakes. It can be seen that a high percentage of respondents give information to 
members, socialize with members and lobby the government and other institutions. 
This is in comparison to the lower figures for providing managerial support and 
other services. Although the exact nature of the government lobbying can not be 
deduced from the table below, it is nevertheless interesting to note that such a high 
percentage of respondents are engaged with the government. A further breakdown 
of BAs interaction with government will be provided in Section 3.2.4. 
Table 3.2 Percentage of BAs Which Engage in Given Activities 
Activity All SME Large Enterprise 
Associations Associations Associations 
Giving information to 94% 92% 100% 
members 
Lobbying the 83% 69% 100% 
government to 
influence government 
policies 
Lobbying other 76% 77% 85% 
institutions (media, 
BAs, international) for 
members' interests 
Providing technical or 56% 77% 46% 
managerial support for 
members 
Providing other 57% 85% 31% 
services to members 
such as issuing 
certificates 
Meeting and socialising 91 % 100% 100% 
members 
The figures from Table 3.2 also indicate some interesting differences between the 
activities of large enterprise and SME associations. The most marked divergence 
between these two types of BA are in the provision of technical/managerial support, 
other member services and lobbying the government. SME associations are less 
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likely to engage in lobbying the government and more likely to provide 
technical/managerial support and other services than large enterprise associations. 
Whilst it may be intuitive to presume that large enterprises are in less need of 
managerial/technical support than SMEs, it is surprising that nearly a third of SME 
associations claimed not to engage at all on lobbying the government. This is in line 
with the LP3ES study which found a mismatch between the needs of SMEs and the 
services provided by BAs. Basically, BAs target their SME programmes to the 
provision of managerial help whilst SMEs themselves would rather BAs provide 
them with help in activities such as contacting the government (LP3ES 1998a, 
p. 38). 
Table 3.3 below shows a remarkable divergence in the percentage of respondents 
who have ever sanctioned a member. This question was included in the 
questionnaire because of its potential to indicate the level of professionalism that a 
BA demands from a business in order to become a member. If a BA has never 
sanctioned a member, then the likelihood is that there are no checks on the quality 
of service that a business provides to the public. This is in contrast to the perception 
of the role of BAs in the West, where membership of a business association often 
denotes a degree of professionalism. 
Table 3.3 Percentage of BAs Who Have Ever 
Sanctioned a Member 
All SME Large Enterprise 
Associations Associations Associations 
47% 69% 25% 
Since more than half of all respondents have never sanctioned a member, if, for 
example, a foreign business was searching for Indonesian partner companies, then 
BA membership would provide no assurance of quality. The fact that 75 percent of 
large enterprise associations have never sanctioned a member shows that their 
ability to `police' the behaviour of their members in such a way is seriously 
compromised. Indeed, it seems that it is only the Indonesian government who rates 
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BA membership as important since it has been both a formal and informal 
prerequisite for a business to bid for government contracts. 
12 This again points to 
the idea that the organisational principle of BAs is geared towards obtaining 
government contracts for their members. 
Thus, in terms of activities, most BAs spend time giving information to members, 
socialising members, lobbying the government and other institutions and less time 
providing managerial support and other services. Comparing large enterprise and 
SME associations shows that the former are more likely to engage in lobbying 
activities with the government and less likely to sanction members or provide 
technical/managerial support or other services. 
Section 3.2.3 Business Association Relationship with Kadin 
The distribution of power in the BA community is generally conceived of as being 
shared between sectoral BAs on the one hand and Kadin, the Indonesian Chamber 
of Commerce on the other. At the end of the 1980s, Maclntyre (1991) found that, in 
contrast to the state-sponsored and largely compliant Kadin, some sectoral BAs 
fulfilled pluralist aspirations by acting as representative organisations in the policy 
process. Over the years, there have been indications of conflict between these two 
BA constituencies in their struggle to attain close contact with the government 
which will be explored in more detail in Section 3.4. This section will first provide- 
some initial data about the BA/Kadin relationship. 
Firstly, in terms of membership, Table 3.4 below shows that 78 percent of all 
respondents claimed to be members of Kadin. However, it should be remembered 
that this figure is not likely to faithfully reflect the overall situation in Indonesia. 
12 The importance of BA membership for businesses taking part in government procurement was also 
touched on in interviews with Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01), Faisal Basri (14.11.01) and Ibu Tuti 
(5.12.01). 
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Rather, it is probable that there are hundreds of BAs that are not members of Kadin, 
but are extremely difficult to locate. 13 
Table 3.4 BA Membership of Kadin 
All SME Large Enterprise 
Associations Associations Associations 
Membership of 78% 92% 61% 
Kadin 
In comparative terms, there is some divergence between the inclination of SME 
associations and large enterprise associations to become members of Kadin, with 
SME associations more likely to do so. Since large enterprise associations engage 
more in lobbying the government than do SME associations, membership of Kadin 
could be considered by the former to be somewhat redundant. It seems that SME 
associations value Kadin membership more than large enterprise associations. 
Chart 3.4 gives an idea of the number of times that a BA has contact with Kadin in a 
six month period. The figures for those who have no contact at all tally roughly 
with the figures for non-membership of Kadin, except for a few large enterprise 
associations who have contact with Kadin even though they are not Kadin members. 
It is difficult to read much meaning into the chart below, except to give a rough 
picture of BAs contacting Kadin around once a month. What does this say about 
the relationship between Kadin and its BA members? Perhaps only that it does not 
seem particularly vigorous. 
1; This point was also made in interviews with Tulus Tambunan (1.11.01), M. Husain (27.1 1.01) and 
Arfan Sofyan (2.11.01). 
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Chart 3.4 Frequency of BA Contact with Kadin in Last 6 
Months 
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When asked about their own opinion of their relationship with Kadin, Chart 3.5 
shows that a slim majority of BAs felt that Kadin did not care at all about their 
members' interests. This was followed by fairly large numbers of BAs who gave a 
noncommittal `cares occasionally' answer. The low numbers of respondents who 
felt actively positive about the quality of contact they have with Kadin attest to the 
strains which will be explored in Section 3.4 below. Even though SME associations 
are more likely to have Kadin membership, it can be seen that they are also the most 
dissatisfied with their relationship with Kadin. 
Chart 3.5 Level of Kadin Responsiveness to BAs 
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In order to ascertain whether, in the opinion of BAs, there had been any changes to 
Kadin after the fall of Soeharto, respondents were asked to compare its level of care 
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with five years ago. 14 As can be seen in Chart 3.6, the majority of all types of BA 
felt that there had been no changes. Again, it is the SME associations who are the 
most dissatisfied group, although they marginally form the biggest group in the 
`cares more' category. 
Chart 3.6 Level of Kadin Responsiveness to BAs Compared to 5 
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Generally then, the overall levels of satisfaction with Kadin are low. In the 
questionnaire, respondents were given the opportunity to add their own comments 
and it is instructive to note that most of the respondents who used this facility did so 
in order to berate Kadin. SME associations were seen to be more likely to hold 
membership of Kadin, but less likely to be satisfied with Kadin's service than large 
enterprise associations. 
Section 3.2.4 Business Association Relationship with Government 
This section now moves to the relationship between BAs and the government, 
which is, after all, one of the main concerns of this thesis. Table 3.5 below shows 
that the vast majority of BAs have had contact with government, although a small 
proportion of SME associations claimed to have never had any contact at all. 
14 The survey was carried out in 2001, so that five years ago means 1996. 
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Table 3.5 Has this BA ever had Contact with any Level of Government? 
All SME Large Enterprise 
Associations Associations Associations 
Answered `Yes' to 96% 85% 100%7C 
Contact with 
Government 
The respondents were then asked to fill in a grid which offered different levels of 
state and categories of frequency of contact. Data structured in this way can be 
presented in many different ways, with some ways lending themselves more easily 
to comparison than others. Chart 3.7 below presents the data as the average 
frequency of contact for each type of BA. Thus, for example, 'all associations' 
contacted ministers on average one to three times in the last six months. SME 
associations also contacted ministers one to three times, but their score is closer to 
the next category than `all associations', so that they can be said to have been in 
contact with ministers more frequently. 
the Last 6 Months 
I Over 20 
11-20 
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Chart 3.7 shows that for all associations, the level of state which is contacted most 
frequently is Echelon I bureaucrats, ' 5 followed by Director General, ministers, then 
local government. Members of parliament receive the least amount of contact from 
BAs. Since it is the Echelon I and Director General levels which create policy at the 
15 This is the highest grade in the Indonesian bureaucracy. The grades run from Echelon V to 
Echelon I. 
Ministers Directors Echelon I MPs Local Gov. 
General 
148 
implementing stage rather than the law making stage, this data substantiates the oft- 
mentioned proclivity of businesses to try to influence the government at the level of 
policy implementation rather than policy formulation (Gray 1991, p. 774). 
It can also be seen that, out of all the levels of the state, members of parliament are 
the least contacted by all types of association. Since the demise of Soeharto's rule, 
the previously submissive parliament has been growing as an additional locus of 
power. Coalitions of political parties have formed and dissipated over many 
different issues and even played the central role in forcing out President Wahid in 
2001, something which would have been inconceivable under Soeharto. Members 
of parliament have also been frequently implicated in corruption, being paid off to 
support one motion or reject another. 
Such anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that there is the potential of a conflation 
of interests between the business community and MPs, so why is this not expressed 
through BAs? It could be that the type of issues that form the main focus of BA 
representation are targeted at the level of policy implementation rather than the 
policy formulation. MPs are only really involved in policy formulation; in other 
words their power resides in the ability to pass or reject laws and because laws are 
difficult to withdraw or change they usually only regulate general principles. 
Adding more detail to laws, or `implementation', is carried out through Presidential 
Decrees (Keputusan Presiden), Minister's Regulations (Peraturan Menteri), 
Director General Instructions (Instruksi Direktor-Jenderal) or Director Letters 
(Surat Direktor). 16 
However, there is also a tendency for regulations to be made from the bottom of the 
system upwards, with lobbying from public servants to raise the status of a 
regulation to the next level in the hierarchy. Sectoral decisions, made by senior 
public servants in different Ministries, may thus eventually join with other decisions 
to form a government regulation authorised by the President after ratification by the 
16 The higher the issuing official, the more powerful the regulation or decision (see Appendix Six). 
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Parliament (Freeman 1993, p. 45). There is, therefore, also some scope for a 
coalescence of interests between MPs and BAs. Perhaps the reason why there is not 
much contact between BAs and MPs is simply that there has not been enough time 
for connections to develop. It would be interesting to see if contact has become 
more frequent in ten years' time. 
One of the most surprising aspects of Chart 3.7 is that, marginally, SME 
associations have more frequent contact with all levels of the state. The greatest 
difference between SME associations and large enterprise associations is the 
frequency of contact with local government. There are two levels of regional 
assembly in Indonesia which have the power to issue regulations along with the 
Governor and other local officials. Again, the reasons why SME associations have 
more contact with local government may be around the requirements that SMEs 
face if they wish to enter bids for government contracts. In any case, it seems that 
with greater numbers of members, more regional branches and a closer connection 
to local government, SME associations are representing their members much more 
substantially throughout the whole of Indonesia. 
When asked about the reasons for contacting government, both types of association 
claimed that influencing laws was their main reason. However, because there was 
no distinction made between the stages of the laws, that is formulation or 
implementation, this question provides little additional insight. The other categories 
offered were goods inspection, transport and electricity tariffs, trade tariffs and 
employment law. These other categories gained low scores, except for large 
enterprise associations who differed substantially from the other types of 
associations in rating trade tariffs as a major reason for government contact. 
In terms of how satisfied BAs are with the level of care they receive from the 
government, it can be seen from Chart 3.8 that the government fares better than did 
Kadin in Chart 3.5. A substantial number of respondents from both types of BA are 
actively positive about the responsiveness of government. However, it can also be 
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seen that SME associations are less satisfied with their relations with government by 
the numbers in the `does not care at all' category, a sharp disparity when compared 
with large enterprise associations. 
Chart 3.8 Level of Government Responsiveness to HAs 
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Similarly, Chart 3.9 shows that respondents reacted more positively to a five-year 
comparison of government behaviour than they did to the same comparison for 
Kadin, with a third of all associations feeling that the government had improved in 
responsiveness to their needs. This is most likely connected to the decline of state 
corporatist control over BAs since the Soeharto period which will be further 
explored in Chapter Four. Here, once again, SME associations prove to be less 
satisfied, perhaps highlighting the higher levels of need of these associations and/or 
the neglect of both Kadin and the government of substantial help to the SME 
constituency. 
Chart 3.9 Level of Government Responsiveness to HAs 
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In summary, the vast majority of BAs have had contact with the government, 
although not particularly frequently. Only the Echelon I officials have more 
frequent contact than 1-3 times in a six month period. Predictably, it is at the two 
senior bureaucratic levels that there is the highest level of communication. The data 
also indicates that links have yet to be forged between BAs and MPs. Yet there is 
real potential for a role for BAs in the parliament since MPs and parliament 
commissions have few resources to research the sectoral issues about which they are 
expected to make decisions. 17 It is also interesting to note that ministers are 
apparently open to direct contact. '8 The main difference between SME and large 
enterprise associations in terms of contact with the state is that SME associations 
have more contact with local government. 
The levels of satisfaction with the quality of BA contact with the government is 
surprisingly high, especially when compared with how they feel about the quality of 
their relations with Kadin. In other words, from the perspective of BAs, the 
relationship between them and the state is more robust than with their own peak 
organisation Kadin. However, SME associations are consistently less satisfied than 
large enterprise associations with their relationship with government which 
correlates with findings that SME associations are less likely to have influence on 
government policies because they are less likely than large enterprises to have 
contacts within the government. 19 
Section 3.2.5 Business Association Attitudes towards Influencing Government 
Policy 
This section will explore BA perceptions of which constituencies have the most 
influence on government policy and their opinions on the best methods for 
influencing government policy. 
17 Interview with James Castle (29.11.01). 
18 The fact that BAs deal directly with Ministers was confirmed by interviews with Anthony Sunarjo 
(13.12.01), and Utama Kajo (28.1.02). 
19 Interview with Faisal Basri (14.11.01). 
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The first question asked which constituencies respondents considered to be the most 
influential at national policy level. This question was included in order to ascertain 
BAs' opinion on their relative power in the policy process compared to other 
constituencies. Respondents were asked to write a number next to each 
constituency where one = has very weak influence, two = has a little influence, three 
= has quite a strong influence, four = has a strong influence and five = has a very 
strong influence. Essentially, the higher the score, the more influential each 
constituency is considered. Table 3.6 below shows the average score that both types 
of BA gave to each constituency. 
Table 3.6 Relative Influence of Various Constituencies on National Policy 
Constituency All Associations SME Associations Large Enterprise 
Associations 
President and 
Cabinet 
4.31 4.1 4.45 
IMF 3.65 3.9 3.6 
DPR 3.15 3.3 3.4 
Mass Media 3.11 3.70 2.7 
Local Government 2.63 2.3 2.9 
Domestic 
Conglomerates 
2.54 3.27 2.4 
Trade Unions 2.51 2.8 2.8 
Foreign 
Conglomerates 
2.47 3.2 2.4 
BAs 2.32 2.09 2.45 
The Military 2.32 2.6 2.7 
NGOs 2.24 2.4 2.3 
Kadin 2.14 2.2 2 
Universities and 
Research Institutes 
1.97 2.2 1.7 
The general consensus from all associations was that the President and the cabinet 
had the most influence on government policies, followed by the IMF, the DPR and 
the mass media. Although there is nothing particularly surprising about this result, 
it nevertheless attests to the emergence of a major new player in the policy struggle, 
the IMF. It is also interesting to note the relatively high scores which the DPR 
obtained despite the fact that, in Chart 3.7, MPs were the least frequently contacted 
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by BAs. This could lead to the conclusion that it is MPs who are not very receptive 
to contact from BAs rather than BAs who consider them superfluous to their needs. 
Respondents considered themselves to have a relatively low level of influence, 
outranking only NGOs, Kadin and Universities. Again, this points to the low regard 
in which BAs hold Kadin. Time and time again it seems that Kadin is considered 
somewhat redundant to the needs of the business community. 
The most marked divergence between SME associations and large enterprise 
associations was that the former considered foreign conglomerates, domestic 
conglomerates and the mass media to be more influential than did the latter. Yet, 
even in view of these higher scores which SME associations attributed to 
conglomerates, they are still relatively lower than one might have expected. The 
image of Indonesia, especially abroad, is of a country in the hands of a small circle 
of elite businessmen and their state patrons, but this view does not seem to have 
quite so much currency from these respondent BAs. 
Curiously, SME associations, which were shown in Chart 3.7 to have the most 
frequent contact with local government, also consider them to be less influential 
than did the other two types of association. This could indicate that SME 
associations contact local government for reasons other than influencing policy. 
Moving on to BAs' opinions of the best ways to influence government policy at 
national level, respondents were asked to give a score for each method of influence, 
where one = not at all effective, two = not effective, three = quite effective, four = 
effective and five = very effective. 
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Table 3.7 Most Effective Methods of Influencing Policy 
Method of Influence All Associations SNIE' Associations Large Enterprise 
Associations 
Direct contact with 3.56 3.82 3.56 
Ministers 
Direct contact with 3.35 3.36 3.8 
government officials 
Forming coalitions with 3.34 2.30 2.44 
other organisations 
Testifying before a 3.34 2.6 2.11 
DPR commission 
Holding a press 3 3.20 3.44 
conference 
Direct contact with 2.83 3.20 2.67 
MPs 
Asking members to 1.97 1.8 1.89 
contact government 
departments 
Direct contact with 1.89 1.91 1.89 
Kadin 
Asking members to 1.74 1.8 1.44 
contact MPs 
Holding a 1.51 1.90 1.22 
demonstration 
Table 3.7 shows most associations consider that contacting ministers, government 
officials, forming coalitions with other organisations and testifying before DPR 
commissions are the best ways to influence government policy. This last method, 
testifying before DPR commissions, adds an extra dimension to a consideration of 
the relationship between BAs and parliament. BAs asking their members to contact 
the government directly is considered by the respondents to be ineffectual and 
obtains the lowest scores along with working through Kadin and holding 
demonstrations. 
One of the biggest differences between SME associations and large enterprise 
associations is that the former rate contacting MPs more highly than the later. This 
corresponds with the findings in Table 3.6 and again highlights the potential of 
greater connections between BAs and the parliament. It also indicates that the 
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views expressed by respondents in this question may not be based on actual 
experience but rather preconceived attitudes since actual contact with MPs is so low 
(see Chart 3.7). The other biggest difference between the two types of BA is that 
SME associations regard holding a demonstration to be more effective than do large 
enterprise associations. 
Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5 have provided some clues to the nature of Indonesian BAs in 
general. Their internal capacities are weak and their income is limited. Satisfaction 
levels with Kadin are low and contact infrequent. Communication with the state is 
concentrated around the bureaucracy, but also includes substantial contact with 
ministers who are considered to be the best route for policy influence. Even though 
MPs are also considered influential, their relationship with BAs is relatively 
undeveloped. 
In a bid to discover whether Indonesian BAs can be considered rent-seeking 
vehicles or legitimate representatives of a section of civil society, it was found that 
there are two distinct types of BAs. The first represent mostly SMEs with a 
relatively more inclusive membership both sectorally and geographically. This type 
of BA focuses more on providing managerial and technical support to their 
members than on lobbying the government, but where government contact does 
occur it tends to be at a local level with bureaucratic heads. The second type of BA 
has a small membership of large companies and is more orientated towards lobbying 
the government, especially on national level issues such as trade tariffs. 
Thus, the two functions so far found in Indonesian BAs are firstly, to assist SMEs 
with managerial capabilities and government regulations mostly at the local level. 
The second function a BA may serve is to provide the public face of lobbying for 
large enterprises on issues such a trade tariffs. Instructive as the results of the 
questionnaire proved to be, they nevertheless capture only a limited picture of all the 
functions which BAs serve. In order to gain a fuller understanding of Indonesian 
BAs, it is now necessary to bring in some more qualitative evidence of the type 
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which is impossible to uncover in a self-completion questionnaire. The next two 
sections will therefore examine the cartel function of some BAs and their role in 
government procurement. 
Section 3.3 Business Associations' Cartel Function 
The definition of a cartel is an association of producers who agree to fix common 
prices and/or output in a particular sector of the economy. It can also involve bid- 
rigging, allocation of customers and allocation of sales by product or territory. 
Essentially, a cartel can only work with a small group of businessmen who each 
control large portions of a whole sector which is why BAs with a small membership 
of large sector-specific enterprises are particularly disposed to such practices. 
Enforcement is crucial for the successful operation of cartels since if one major 
player in a sector does not co-operate then the cartel disintegrates. Also, as the 
numbers in a cartel grow, the gain from violating it generally increases faster than 
the loss from a punishment when detected (Eatwell et al 1987, p. 373). Thus, in the 
context of this chapter, only large enterprise associations with small numbers of 
members have the opportunity to act as cartels, so that this forms another major 
difference between SME associations and large enterprise associations. 
Although cartels only really began to arise at the end of the nineteenth century with 
the appearance of large private firms, the history of BAs across the world from 
medieval times onwards shows that cartels and BAs were often synonymous. 
However, led by the U. S. in the 1930s, the practice began to be outlawed after 
World War II in most industrial non-communist countries, although they do still 
exist (Eatwell et al 1987, p. 373). 
Today, BA functions are expected to be concentrated around representation of 
sectoral interests at all levels of the legislature, the supply of information to 
members, the promotion of standards and market opportunities (DTI 1996). The 
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vast majority of the literature on BAs in developing countries focuses on these 
functions and rates BAs in terms of how far they measure up to these ideals. 
Consequently the cartel functions of BAs are either ignored or simply dismissed as 
perversions which should be prohibited. 
Indonesia has a long history of cartels. Table 3.8 below gives some examples of the 
types of cartel practices and BA involvement in recent years. 
Table 3.8 Some BA Cartel Practices 
Business Association Details 
APKI (Asosiasi Pulp dan APKI has been accused of fixing prices for print paper. One 
Kertas Indonesia) (Association company controls 72% of production capacity of print paper 
of Indonesian Pulp and Paper) and effectively has the power to decide on the price of print 
paper, especially if imported print paper is more expensive 
than the local variety. The Secretary General of APKI has 
gone on record as admitting to price fixing before 1997. 
ASI (Asosiasi Semen Indonesia) ASI has been operating a price fixing cartel since the mid- 
(Association of Indonesian 1970s. There is a high concentration of companies in the 
Cement) cement sector, with one company controlling 28% of the 
cement market and around 5 other major players. With the 
approval and involvement of the government, cement 
suppliers fixed prices and shared the market between there. 
The market was shared on a geographical basis by the 
companies and the amount each could sell in each region 
was decided between the government and ASI. 
ASMINDO (Asosiasi Industri The Sulawesi branch of ASMINDO arranged limits on the 
Permebelan dan Kerajinan) trade of rattan (bamboo cane) between Indonesian Provinces 
(Association of Furniture and with support from a local Governor's decree. No rattan 
Handicraft) carrying boats were allowed out of Sulawesi unless the 
rattan was of a type that was too big for local use. For this 
type of rattan, export to other Provinces was allowed only by 
obtaining licenses from ASMINDO. To obtain a license it 
was obligatory to be a member of ASMINDO. 
ORGANDA (Organisasi ORGANDA has been involved in setting taxi tariffs. 
Angkutan Darat) (Organisation 
of Land Transport) 
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Table 3.8 Some BA Cartel Practices 
INACA (Indonesian National INACA was permitted by the ministry of Transport to 
Air Carriers' Association) collectively set price benchmarks from which airfares in 
Indonesia may be calculated. 
APKINDO (Asosiasi Panel Only companies who were listed as registered exporters with 
Kayu Indonesia) (Association of APKINDO were allowed to export. The export of plywood 
Indonesian Plywood Producers) was controlled by APKINDO through a market zoning and 
quota system and prices were also fixed. The Department of' 
Trade legitimised all of these policies. There were also 
overseas markets whose exports were not subject to quotas 
but export had to be through an APKINDO marketing board. 
APRINDO (Asosiasi There was an unwritten contract between the distributors of 
Pengusaha Retail Indonesia) milk and retail businesses through APRINDO for a 
(Association of Indonesian minimum sale price of milk. This was based on the 
Retail Businesses) government's decision of the price of milk. 
IPIES (Ikatan Pengusaha The price of ice supplied to businesses, restaurants and for 
Industri Es) (Federation of Ice export was fixed by IPIES in conjunction with the 
Producers) government. 
AEKI (Asosiasi Eksportir Kopi In order to export coffee, companies had to be registered 
Indonesia) (Association of with the Department of Trade and Industry on the 
Indonesian Coffee Exporters) recommendation of AEKI. 
GAKESLAB (Gabungan In order to import or trade in medicines, companies had to 
Perusahaan Alat-alat get a license from the Department of Health on a 
Kesehatan dan Laboratorium) recommendation from GAKESLAB. 
(Federation of Medical 
Instruments and Laboratories) 
ASBI (Asosiasi Sarang Burung The export of bird's nests for Chinese cuisine has a lucrative 
Watet Indonesia) (Association multi million dollar market. ASBI was run by Soeharto's 
of Swallow Nests) grandson, Ari Sigit, and had monopoly rights on the export 
of the nests. A fee was also charged to exporters for every 
kilogram exported. 
INKOPTI (Induk Koperasi INKOPTI was involved in fixing the price for soybeans, the 
Produsen Tempe Tahu staple ingredient of the very popular tenipe and tofu- 
Indonesia) (Tempe and Tofu 
Producers' Cooperative) 
Sources: The Center for Indonesian Policy and Law Studies, Georgetown University & Partnership for Business 
Competition (2001), Position Paper: Pengantar Menuju Pelaksanaan Persaingan Usaha; Republika, 11.5.01; 
Loughlin, C., Marks, S., Shauki, A., Sirait, N., (1999) Laporan Kebijakan Persaingan Indonesia, USAID; Business 
News, 25.6.01; Meier, Markus, The Republic of Indonesia's Antitrust Law and Its Commission for Business 
Competition, CSIS, USAID & PEG, Seminar on Indonesian Economic Institution Building in a Global Economy, 
Borobudur Hotel, Jakarta, 13.8.01; Jakarta Post, 30.6.01; Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, No. 238,27.2.98; 
Info Bisnis, April 1998; LP3ES (1998) (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information), 
CIPE (Center for International Private Enterprise; an affiliate of the US Chamber of Commerce), LP3E-Kadin 
(Institute for Economic Studies, Research and Development - Kadin), Studi dan Dialog Kehijaksanaan Peningkatan Daya Suing Usaha Kecil dan Menengah (UKM), Prosiding Dialog Ketiga, Peranan Asosiasi Usaha 
Dalam Peningkatan Dava Suing UKM, Hotel Aryaduta, Jakarta, 31" March 1998; Backman, M. (1999) Asian 
Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in Asia Singapore, John Wiley & Sons. 
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Undoubtedly Table 3.8 only scratches the surface of BA involvement in cartels as 
there are likely to be many more undocumented cases. 20 Like so many other aspects 
of the Indonesian economy, by fixing prices, restricting access of new entrants and 
bid-rigging, cartels ensure a high concentration of economic resources in the hands 
of the few. However, there are crucial differences between the degrees and 
motivations of the above examples. Whilst there are some cartels such as 
APKINDO and ASBI which were clearly exploitative and earned their well- 
connected directors vast amounts of private funds at the expense of other producers 
and consumers, most of the other cartels in Table 3.8 also served alternative 
purposes. 
There is a clear distinction in economic theory between public and private cartels. 
In the former the government theoretically makes and enforces the rules but 
typically under strong influence from the affected industry. In the latter, cartels 
involve private agreements with no government involvement (Eatwell 1987, p. 372). 
Many of the cartels detailed above were not only organised with the acquiescence of 
the government but in fact implemented government policies. 
For example, the justification for the cement cartel run through ASI was to keep the 
price of cement lower in the regions. Development in its crudest form is based on 
construction and without affordable materials in the regions, construction and thus 
development suffers. The government's policy was to encourage the sale of cement 
at a level higher than market prices in the more developed regions of Indonesia so 
that the price of cement in the regions could be subsidised. Similarly, restrictions on 
trade in rattan from the island of Sulawesi to Java were supported by the local 
government in order to protect the cottage industries on Sulawesi which used rattan 
as a principal material. The higher prices which rattan can fetch on Java would 
otherwise have directed it away from Sulawesi and many local industries would 
20 The vice head of the KPPU has also implicated Gabungan Agen Tunggal dan Asembler Kendaraan 
Bermotor Indonesia (GAIKINDO) and Gabungan Pengusaha Elektronik Indonesia (GPEI) (Bisnis 
Indonesia, 28.9.00; Kontan, 18.9.00). Beer and soft drinks sectors have also been suspected of cartel 
practices (Interviews with Thomas Darmawan, 16.11.01 and with M. Husain, 27.11.01). 
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undoubtedly have suffered. These cartels were thus operated in order to correct 
market imperfections arising from the extreme geographic spread of the Indonesian 
state. 
The stabilisation of prices is also a major motive for cartels and APKINDO, 
APRINDO and INKOPTI all achieved this goal for plywood, milk and soybeans 
respectively. However, by manipulating the market in such a way, producers or 
consumers at other points in the production chain inevitably suffer. It also provides 
opportunities for the exploitation of such regulations and the handful of well- 
connected individuals who ran these cartels were able to amass vast pools of wealth. 
In 1997 the IMF made it one of the preconditions for obtaining emergency funds 
that Indonesian cartels be abolished, arguing that other methods of, for example, 
subsidising development in the regions be used instead of the operation of cartels. 
The new 1999 anti-monopoly law has also had an effect on cartelisation with the 
anti-monopoly body, the Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU), ruling on 
ORGANDA and INACA and investigating INKOPTI and APKI. The Indonesian 
government has also unilaterally withdrawn their support for many of the cartels 
listed above, but in oligopolistic markets it can be very difficult to ensure that some 
form of cartel does not still exist. Indeed, the vice head of the KPPU has admitted 
the difficulties they face in dealing with BAs since the jurisdiction of the anti- 
monopoly law covers individuals rather than organisations? ' 
Thus, whilst the cartel function of BAs has been affected quite substantially in the 
post-Soeharto period, there is still likely to be a degree of cartelisation in the 
Indonesian economy. 
21 Bisnis Indonesia, 28.9.00; Kontan, 18.9.00. 
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Section 3.4 The Role of Business Associations in Government 
Procurement 
As we will soon discover in the next chapter, the fall of Soeharto has led to the 
dissolution of formal corporatist methods of state control over the BA community. 
The sectoral BAs which Maclntyre (1991) identified in the late 1980s as prime 
examples of a new trend in collective action can only benefit from this new 
environment. Especially where there are clear issues around which BAs can 
organise, 22 there are undoubtedly some BAs that fulfil the pluralist aspirations of 
becoming extra-bureaucratic groups, shaping sectoral policies and securing 
autonomy from the state. 23 
Changes in the BA sector have also been elicited by the economic crisis and 
resultant political instability. For, as Haggard and Kaufman (1995) suggest, "the 
implicit or explicit bargains between political leaders and key support 
groups... break down under conditions of economic crisis, thereby creating 
incentives for the private sector to defect from the bargain and begin political 
protest `from below"' (p. 55). 
With this decline in corporatist control and the breaking apart of previous coalitions, 
there are indeed signs that the BA sector in Indonesia has entered into a stage of 
renewed invigoration since 1998. Firstly, although exact figures are difficult to 
come by due to the informal nature of many BAs, there is no doubt that there has 
been a proliferation of new BAs in recent years. 24 Secondly, the state-sponsored 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kadin), which has always faced challenges 
from other BAs and federations of BAs keen to establish their relative legitimacy as 
22 For example, ASIRI (Asosiasi Industri Rekaman Indonesia) (Association of the Indonesian 
Recording Industry) have been active on the issue of copyright and IKAPI (1katan Penerbit 
Indonesia) (Indonesian Publishers' Association) on tax exemption for books and copyright 
(Interview with M. Husain, 27.11.01). 
23 These three features were identified in Thai BAs by Anek Laothamatas in 1992 and in Indonesian 
BAs by Maclntyre (1991). 
24 For example, it has been estimated that 95 new business associations have been formed from 1998 
- 2001 in the food and beverage sector alone (interview with Thomas Darmawan, 16.11.01). 
Meanwhile, the chairman of the BA section in Kadin estimates there have been 45 new BAs formed 
from 1998 - 2001 across all sectors (interview with Arfan Sofyan, 2.11.01). 
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representatives of the business world, has recently been confronted by an 
extraordinary level of bitter criticism from many sectoral BAs. The regional 
branches of Kadin, known as Kadindas, who were up until 1998 considered weak 
and compliant entities, have also recently been challenging Kadin's authority. 
However, these new developments are far from fulfilling the pluralist aspirations of 
effective and representative non-state actors in the policy process. Rather, they 
represent a dispute between sectoral BAs, Kadin and Kadindas over access to a 
share of the value of government contracts allocated to private business. 
This section will use a case study approach to explore BAs' role in the process of 
government procurement and the effects that recent institutional change has had on 
this role. It will also detail the effects that these reforms have had on the structure 
of power within the BA community. It will do this by exploring the process through 
which various sections of the BA community have appropriated access to the system 
of government procurement at the expense of others. 
3.4.1 Funding: A Long Term Problem for Business Associations 
Funding has always been an issue for all three sections of the business association 
community in Indonesia, that is, Kadin, Kadindas and sectoral BAs. The 1987 law 
which gave Kadin a legal basis, also rather grandly proclaimed that all businesses 
(including SOEs) and BAs in Indonesia were Kadin and Kadinda members. 5 The 
law did not, however, follow this principle through to its logical conclusion by 
making provisions to impose penalties on businesses or BAs who have not become 
fully paid up members of Kadin. Thus, in practice, there is no obligation for 
businesses or BAs to become members of Kadin. 
In addition, a general dissatisfaction with the service provided by Kadin and 
Kadindas has meant that Kadin and Kadindas rely on donations from board 
163 
members and a handful of conglomerates for operational costs. In practice, it is the 
Chairman of Kadin who guarantees Kadin's funding which means that the job of 
Chairman is effectively restricted to those from a conglomerate background, which 
itself has obvious implications for Kadin's representativeness. 
These funding problems have been recognised and debated by Kadin itself. The 
1999 Munas26 formed a committee to deal with this issue which resulted in a 
recommendation that Kadin's funds should come from a percentage of the 
export/import earnings of Indonesian business. Such a scheme would have to be 
guaranteed in some form by the government and is highly unlikely to occur. Kadin 
officials have also been very vocal about their share of the delegation of income- 
generating services for the private business sector. Services such as the issuance of 
certificates of origin, recommendations for the provision of business licenses and 
the registration of companies have long been a source of contention between Kadin 
and the government since these functions are administered from government 
departments rather than Kadin. 7 
Sectoral BAs also generally have difficulties sustaining themselves financially as 
can be seen from Chart 3.3 above. It should also be noted that the survey 
respondents who produced this data were all fairly well-established national level 
BAs, 28 which means that even these findings likely correspond to the most 
prosperous segment of Indonesian BAs. Other research on Indonesian BAs has also 
confirmed the insufficiency of BA funding (LP3ES 2000). 
Apart from this obligation to supplement the organisational income of BAs, it is also 
widely recognised that the board members of many BAs often use their position for 
25 Individual businesses can only become members of Kadin through the regional Kadindas. Only 
those sectoral BAs which are national (are active in at least 5 provinces) can become members of 
Kadin. 
26 Munas (Musyarawah Nasional) is the highest decision-making body within Kadin. It is a meeting 
held every 5 years to vote in a new Kadin Chairman, decide on Kadin policies and appraise the work 
of the previous 5 years. 
27 Interview with Utama Kajo (28.1.02). See also Merdeka, 23.1.99 and Bisnis Indonesia, 15.1.99. 28 90 percent of the respondent BAs were formed before 1990. 
164 
the exclusive benefit of their own businesses. 29 In view of this, any access to more 
opportunities for personal self-enrichment will obviously be met with a high degree 
of enthusiasm. 
3.4.2 The Role of Business Associations in Government Procurement under 
Keppres 16/1994. 
This section will provide a context within which to situate the effects of a new 
government procurement regulation on the BA community. It will briefly present 
the role of Kadin and BAs in the government procurement process prior to the new 
procurement regulation. 
Before the new procurement regulation was introduced in 2000, the government 
procurement process was regulated by Keppres 16/1994 and associated ministerial 
and other implementing regulations. In order to compete for government tenders, 
businesses were required to be registered with the local government by providing 
such information as the name, address, sector of business, experience and levels of 
30 capital. 
The formal role of sectoral BAs and Kadin in the tender process was as a site of 
advertisement for the tenders, in addition to the national media. However, in 
Indonesia, it is often difficult to distinguish between formal regulations and informal 
practices and in reality businesses had to be a member of Kadin and one of three 
BAs before they were considered by the heads of government projects for a 
contract. 31 The three BAs in question are called INKINDO (the Indonesian 
Association of Consultants), GAPENSI (Indonesian Contractors Association) and 
29 For example, LP3ES 1998b, p. 10. In an interview with a long-term head of a BA conducted for 
this thesis, it was estimated that at least 50 percent of all BAs operated exclusively for the benefit of 
the board members' companies. 30 Keppres 16/1994, Lampiran 1, Nomor 3. 
31 The authority to decide on who are the winners of government contracts varies depending on the 
value of the contract. Government projects are divided amongst departments, where, for example, a 
project to make school books will be under the Department of Education. Each department appoints 
a project manager (Pimpro) who is authorised to decide on the winners of a tender. As the value of 
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ARDIN (Association of Indonesian Suppliers). These three cover large swathes of 
the economy and have a substantial membership base 32 
BAs in Indonesia are often criticised for covering multiple sectors of the economy 
rather than specific sectors. One of the reasons why BAs have formed in this way 
may be because of their role in the government procurement process. If BAs were 
formed to become policy advocacy vehicles then they would be much more likely to 
organise around specific industries with specific problems. But it is clear that the 
successful BAs are those who cover multiple sectors in order to have a high degree 
of involvement in as much government procurement as possible. If this point is 
taken into consideration then the trend in recent years of BAs splitting into several 
smaller ones covering more specific sectors, 33 may have wider implications for the 
future of interaction between BAs and the government. 
Over the years, ARDIN, INKINDO, GAPENSI and Kadin all became clubs where 
the board members, in partnership with government officials, extract a share of the 
value of a government contract as payment for their recommendation to win a 
tender. 34 Motivation for getting onto the board of these BAs was in consequence 
particularly high and bitter personal conflicts often resulted. Since it was 
particularly important to be involved in ARDIN for success in government 
procurement, 35 there have been many bitter struggles for the lucrative position of 
Chairman of this association. All over the country there are different versions of 
ARDIN who all claim legitimacy as the real ARDIN, causing much confusion 
36 amongst business people and observers alike 
the project rises then extra authorisation is needed from the department's Director General, the 
Minister and the Economics Minister. 
32 Inkindo has membership of 3,450 and Gapensi has 43,000 members (World Bank 2001). Ardin has 
8,000 members in Jakarta alone (Kompas, 6.9.02). 33 This trend was recognised in LP3ES 2000. 34 The amount skimmed from government projects by these BAs was usually from 2-5 percent of the 
total value (Kontan, 21.2.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 27.1.00). 
35 Bisnis Indonesia, 27.1.00 
36 See, for example, Suara Karya, 3.4.00; Media Indonesia, 30.6.00; Suara Pembaruan, 25.8.00; 
Business News, 28.8.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 16.3.01. 
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Thus, although BAs had a rather limited formal role in the government procurement 
process under Keppres 16/1994, their informal role of diverting government 
contracts towards favoured businesses was monopolised by three BAs and Kadin. 
3.4.3 The Role of Business Associations in Government Procurement under 
Keppres 18/2000 
Since the fall of Soeharto, reform in the government procurement regime has 
become a major issue for donors, the Indonesian government and domestic and 
international business alike. One aspect of this reform process has been the 
introduction of a new regulation, Keppres 18/2000. This regulation covers topics 
such as basic principles and ethics of procurement, tasks of project heads, systems 
of evaluation and qualifications and classes of potential providers. 
In substance, the new Keppres is not a huge departure from the previous one but 
there have been some changes. For example, the responsibilities of project 
managers have been clarified, authority to grant contracts has been adjusted 
according to the worth of contracts, and qualification prerequisites for becoming a 
project manager have been introduced (World Bank 2001). No doubt under 
pressure from international donors, restrictions based on the domicile of bidders 
have also been removed and the inherent preference which the 1994 regulation 
espoused for `economically weak groups' (`golongan ekonomi lemah') 
has now changed to the slightly more egalitarian `small and medium firms'. This is 
more egalitarian because `economically weak groups' is synonymous with pribumi 
business whereas `small and medium enterprises' does not carry such a strong 
notion of ethnicity. 
But for the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting reform which Keppres 
18/2000 instituted was that the certificates previously provided by the local 
government to enable companies to participate in government procurement were 
from then on to be issued by BAs. Subsequent implementing regulations stated that 
Kadin's new role would be limited to assessing the competence of BAs to give these 
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certificates to companies. If Kadin decided that the BAs were up to the job then 
they could be accredited by Kadin to certificate companies in their sector who were 
interested in government contracts. 
These directions seem clear enough. The formal and informal benefits of 
involvement in the government procurement process which the three BAs and 
Kadin had previously enjoyed were now to be distributed to a wider variety of BAs. 
In comparison, Kadin's role was to be relatively minor, effectively limited to setting 
up the system. However, there was a grey area in the implementing regulations that 
allowed Kadin to hijack the process mainly for the benefit of their regional 
Kadindas and led to much acrimony from the sectoral BAs. 
Just a few weeks before the new Keppres was to come into force there was a 
meeting between the Chairman of Kadin and two senior bureaucrats from Bappenas 
and the Ministry of Finance, which resulted in the issuance of an implementing 
regulation 37 This implementing regulation stated that if a BA was not considered 
by Kadin to have the requisite capabilities to issue certificates to companies in its 
sector, or if there was no obvious BA which covered a particular sector, then the 
certificates could be issued temporarily by Kadin. Since it is largely the regional 
Kadindas that deal with individual companies, the Kadindas set about forming 
centres where certification could take place. 
These centres are called Panitia Bersama Sertifikasi Propinsi (PBSP) (Joint 
Committee for Provincial Certification) and were touted by Kadin as organisations 
of co-operation between BAs and Kadindas in the awarding of certificates to 
companies. But it soon became apparent that it was the Kadindas who controlled 
these new institutions. All certificates had to be signed by only the head of the 
Kadinda and the head of the PBSP, which meant that certificates could be issued 
37 The meeting occurred on 19`h December 2000 between Anshari Ritonga (Dirjen Anggaran 
Departemen Keuangan) and M. Abduh (Deputi Bidang Pembiayaan Bappenas). Keppres 18/2000 
was due to begin on the 1" January 2001. The implementing regulation is called: Surat Keputusan 
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without the acquiescence or even knowledge of sectoral BAs 
38 Moreover, whilst 
10 percent of the profit-share from certification went to Kadin Indonesia, the 
remaining 90 percent was left to be `organised' by each Kadinda and PBSP 
39 This 
degree of latitude in profit-share from certification which the Kadindas have found 
themselves with has led to variations across the country. In some provinces, the 
Kadindas seem to have offered enough to some BAs to make it worth their while to 
participate in the PBSP and a protracted conflict was avoided. In others the battle 
between BAs and Kadindas over who has the right to provide certification is still 
continuing. 40 
Another implementing regulation was later released by the Ministry of Finance and 
Bappenas which clarified that it should be BAs and not Kadin who provide 
certificates to companies 41 But the Kadindas claimed that they had already 
invested a great deal in setting up their PBSPs and refused to comply, pressuring 
Kadin Indonesia to support their position. 2 
And the stakes are indeed high. Estimates vary about the total worth of 
certification. One source suggested that there were around 50,000 companies that 
need certification and that Kadin is charging between Rp 250,000 to Rp 4 million 
(US$ 25 to US$ 400) for each certificate43 which works out at around US$ 10 
million per year. 44 Another estimates that there are 2 million companies who will 
need certificates at an average cost of Rp 30,000, which translates at around US$ 6 
Bersama (SKB) (Letter of Joint Decree) No. S-2262/D: /05/2000, dated 3.5.00 (Buletin Kadin, No. 31, 
December 2000; Satunet Online, 13.12.00). 
38 Buletin Kadin, Nomor 31, December 2000. 
39 Buletin Kadin, Nomor 31, December 2000. 
40 For example, the East Java Kadinda and Ardin have been working together (Bisnis Indonesia, 
29.11.00). The West Sumatra Kadinda and most BAs except Ardin agreed to co-operate in that 
region's PBSP (Bisnis Indonesia, 22.12.00). Continuing conflicts over PBSPs have been occuring 
in 
North Sumatra (Kompas, 19.5.01) Central Java and Nusa Tenggara Barat (Kompas, 22.1.02), 
amongst others. 
41 SKB No. 61961B-08/11/2000, dated 10.11.00. 
42 Bisnis Indonesia, 4.12.00; Rakyat Merdeka, 24.11.00; Satunet Online 13.12.00. 
43 SatunetOnline, 13.12.00. 
44 This figure is an approximation. It is calculated by multiplying the amount of companies (50,000) 
by an average cost (Rp 2,000,000) and dividing by an approximate exchange rate of 10,000. 
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million. 45 Whatever the real figures, it is clear that every year certification is 
formally worth something in the region of a few million US dollars, which is quite 
substantial in view of the average BA income of US$ 50,000 or under. 
In addition to the formal costs of certification to companies, there have also been 
confirmed reports of informal costs or bribes that companies have to pay to the 
PBSPs or the BAs in order to get their application processed. 46 Then there are the 
other rent-extraction opportunities that will inevitably present themselves once a 
foothold in the bureaucratic chain of decisions on government contracts is 
established. 
The potential gains in both formal and informal funding are not the only issues for 
BAs. The three big BAs which were previously involved in certification under the 
last Keppres have the most to lose if they cannot regain control over the certification 
process. For example, the Jakarta branch of ARDIN has recently complained that 
its membership in Jakarta has fallen from 8000 to 600 because the PBSPs have 
taken over certification. 7 
However, it is unlikely that any more than around 20 national level BAs will 
eventually be accredited by Kadin. 8 Those associations who do receive the 
accreditation are generally already dominant ones which have the requisite 
capabilities to provide certification because of their history of links to the Golkar 
party. 49 There have also been allegations that the Chairman of Kadin has had 
undue influence over deciding which associations will receive accreditation. 50 
As far as the business world is concerned, Keppres 18/2000 has been nothing short 
of disastrous. There have been thousands of instances where companies have 
45 Interview with Elias Tobing (14.11.01). 46 For example, the DPR has received many complaints about the high informal costs of certificates 
from Kadin. See Kadinet, 21.2.01. 
47 Kompas, 6.9.02; Business News, 28.8.00. 
4 Suara Karya, 26.8.00. 
49 Business News, 28.8.00. 
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bought certificates from one source, only to be told from another source that they 
are invalid. s' The parallel system of accreditation and certification in the 
construction sector has led to similar confusion as two separate bodies vie with each 
other to issue certificates, each claiming that certificates from the other are invalid . 
52 
Complaints have also been reported from companies wishing to bid for multi- 
sectoral contracts which detail the costs both in time and money that they must 
endure to obtain certificates from many different BAs 53 
From the government's point of view the new Keppres has also been far from 
successful. One of the stated goals of the Keppres is to reduce corruption in 
government procurement by ensuring that companies who win tenders are not 
fictive fronts for other companies and can manage the contract themselves. But, 
judging from the speed of issuance of certificates, the checks made on companies 
are minimal and no different in substance from the certificates that were previously 
issued by local government. 4 International donors are also sceptical of the system 
and take the position that only those companies who have been accepted into the last 
ss stages of a bid should be evaluated 
Essentially, then, the changes to the certification regime embodied in Keppres 
18/2000 has enabled a wider range of BAs more opportunities to gain a share of 
government procurement through corrupt practices. The proliferation of new 
sectoral BAs since 1998 has been largely in response to these new opportunities as it 
has been alleged that many have formed simply to get a piece of the certification 
action. 56 
50 Interview with John Palinggi (27.11.01). s' Bisnis Indonesia, 13.11.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 22.11.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 6.12.00; SatunetOnline 
13.12.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 14.4.01; Bisnis Indonesia, 17.4.01. 
52 Kompas, 22.1.02. 
33 Kompas, 6.9.02. 
sa For example, in 10 months the South Sulawesi Ardin issued 2000 certificates (Bisnis Indonesia, 
13.12.00). In 11 months, Gapensi issued 4000 certificates (Kompas, 16.2.01). In 12 months, the 
Jakarta PBSP issued 4000 certificates (Suara Karya, 2.3.01). 
ss Interview Rana Naseer Ahmad (19.10.01). 
56 Interview with Arfan Sofyan (2.11.01). Interview with John Palinggi (27.11.01). See also Suara 
Karya, 7.2.01. 
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It is also no coincidence that two of the three BAs who previously held a monopoly 
on involvement in the certification of companies under the 1994 Keppres are now 
beset by newly established rivals. GAPENSI, the construction association, now 
faces a challenge by a new construction association called GAPEKNAS who are 
fighting for recognition from Kadin. GAPEKNAS' membership of Kadin is being 
denied on the grounds that it would mean two associations catering to the same 
business members which is against Kadin's rules. However, GAPENSI have also 
hit out at GAPEKNAS by, in some cases, suspending members from their 
57 organisation if they are seen to be involved with their new rival. 
There is also a new rival association to ARDIN in the provision of government 
goods and services sector, called ASPANJI. Whilst ASPANJI too has been denied 
membership by Kadin for the same reason as GAPEKNAS, there have been 
allegations that in order to reduce the power of the troublesome ARDIN, the 
Chairman of Kadinda Jakarta has been conspiring with ASPANJI to get it accepted 
into Kadin whilst at the same time manipulating the election of the board to the 
58 local ARDIN. 
In addition to these new opportunities for BAs to participate in corruption, Keppres 
18/2000 has also had a marked effect on the structure of power within the BA 
community, catalysing long standing resentments between the sectoral BAs and 
Kadin over Kadin's bias towards pribumi conglomerates and the weak position of 
BAs within Kadin's decision-making structures. 
There has been a dramatic rise in the level of criticism aimed at Kadin with 
individual sectoral BAs, loose coalitions and more formal federations filling 
Indonesian newspapers with statements of discontent with Kadin and particularly its 
handling of the certification issue. ASPANJI, ARDIN, HIPLI, ABE, GP. FARMASI 
and GAKESLAB, INKINDO and GAPENSI all made separate and joint statements 
 Liputan6 Online, 10.7.0 1. 
58 Suara Karya, 7.2.01; Bisnis Indonesia, 11.4.01; Suara Karya, 9.4.01. 
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about their disaffection with Kadin S9 Federations such as FNKA and Kadin UKM 
were formed around the issue of certification, 60 whilst others such as Fornas UKM 
and a proposed federation from PIBI concentrated on other perceived inadequacies 
of Kadin. 61 Indeed, the exchanges between ARDIN and Kadin became so 
acrimonious at one point that ARDIN's membership of Kadin was temporarily 
frozen due to its `anti-Kadin feelings'. 2 
Criticism of Kadin also came from a more unexpected quarter, the regional 
Kadindas. In the late 1980s, Maclntyre (1991) described the Kadindas as `passive 
and pliant organisations' who could be `orchestrated without great difficulty' (p. 48- 
50). However, the certification issue galvanised the Kadindas into action since, as 
already mentioned, it was the Kadindas who were set to benefit most from Kadin 
taking over the certification. 
At the end of 2000 and throughout 2001, Kadin came under enormous pressure from 
Kadindas to maintain control of certification. Despite circulars that Kadin sent to 
Kadindas to remind them that they only had authority to certificate companies who 
did not belong to a BA, 63 the Kadindas maintained their position and even attacked 
particular Kadin members for conspiring with the government to take away this 
`right' TM It was also the Kadindas who reportedly pressurised Kadin into 
suspending ARDIN's membership 65 
The source of the Kadindas' power to exert this level of pressure on Kadin is 
derived from their position within Kadin's overall decision-making structures. For 
59 See for example, Bisnis Indonesia, 12.4.01; Gatra Online, 21.12.00; IndonesiaMu Online; Bisnis 
Indonesia, 23.10.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 13.11.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 11.12.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 
19.2.01; Bisnis Indonesia, 21.2.01; Suara Karya, 7.4.01; Bisnis Indonesia, 17.5.01; Bisnis Indonesia 
19.5.01; Suara Pembaruan 17.5.01. 
60 Interview with Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01). Interview with Elias Tobing (14.11.01). See also 
Liputan6 Online, 11.4.01; Suara Karya, 11.4.01; Bisnis Indonesia 11.4.01; Republika, 12.4.01; Suara 
Pembaruan, 13.6.01. 
61 For Fornas UKM see: Bisnis Indonesia, 6.9.00. For PIBI see: Bisnis Indonesia, 20.7.00. 
62 See: Bisnis Indonesia, 5.12.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 6.12.00; Suara Karya, 21.12.00; Bisnis 
Indonesia, 19.3.01; Republika, 21.3.01; Suara Karya, 21.3.01. 
63 Bisnis Indonesia, 16.11.00. 
64 Bisnis Indonesia, 4.12.00. 
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it is the Kadindas, rather than individual companies or sectoral BAs, who can vote 
for the Chairman of Kadin and who can call special meetings to hold the board of 
Kadin to account. 66 Thus, coded threats to exercise these rights were made by some 
Kadindas through the press67 and no doubt more explicitly to the Kadin board 
themselves. In the end, the Kadindas received the requisite support from Kadin to 
continue their certification operations. 
However, this show of strength indicates a glimmer of future possibilities for 
change in the BA sector. Not only have the Kadindas tapped a potentially lucrative 
and sustained new supply of resources through their role in certification, but they 
are also likely to be bolstered by the new regional autonomy laws introduced in 
1999.68 Although it seems that the central government has so far been less than 
forthcoming with the promised decentralisation of government procurement to the 
regions, 69 the general trend for regional governments to have more control over their 
procurement budgets can only benefit the Kadindas. Some influential board 
members of the powerful Kadinda Jakarta7° have also recently been talking of the 
need for a change to Kadin's articles of association in the direction of a more federal 
type of organisation as a response to the perceived centralisation of Kadin as it now 
stands. 71 
In addition to this criticism from BAs and Kadindas over certification, Kadin has 
also encountered disapproval from various levels of the government. Aggrieved 
65 Bisnis Indonesia, 16.3.01 
66 According to Kadin's articles of association, Kadindas have the right to call a meeting called a 
Munaslab (Musyarawah Nasional Luar Biasa) (Extraordinary National Conference) to hold the 
national board accountable if at least half of the Kadindas consider that there has been a violation of 
the articles of association. Kadindas also have the right to call a Munassus (Musyarawah Nasional 
Khusus) (Special National Conference) if two thirds of them support it. A Munassus is called to 
change Kadin's articles of association or dissolve Kadin. See Keppres 61/2000 'Persetujuan 
Perubahan Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Kamar Dagang dan Industri'. 
67 Rakyat Merdeka, 24.11.00. 
68 The Basic Law on Regional Government (No. 22/1999) and The Basic Law on Financial Balance 
Between Central and Regional Government (No. 25/1999). 
69 Interview with Graham Rettke (12.4.02). 
70 Kadinda Jakarta is the most powerful Kadinda due to its location and the fact that it was the first 
chamber of commerce to be established in Indonesia. 
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over the loss of their function to certificate which Keppres 18/2000 took away, local 
governments have reportedly been paying groups of businessmen to demonstrate 
outside Kadin and call for the return of certification to local governments. 72 The 
signatories to the implementing regulations which attempted to clarify the roles of 
Kadin and BAs have also openly criticised Kadin73 and, in a rare expression of her 
opinion, President Megawati has even proffered some veiled criticisms on Kadin. 4 
A Trade Union leader has also questioned the right of Kadin to take over the 
certification process. 75 
Although Kadin's formal position as Indonesia's peak BA is not seriously 
threatened by any of these criticisms, its credibility has inevitably suffered and it 
risks becoming somewhat obsolete if this trend were to continue. Kadin's 
legitimacy is actually highly dependent on the 1987 law that legally encoded its 
organisational existence. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary how often statements 
made by the Kadin board in response to the above criticisms carry a reference to this 
1987 law. At the national level, there is no need for BAs to go through Kadin in 
order to hold policy dialogues with the government and it is more often the case that 
the largest BAs do not 76 Although the Kadindas seem to have manoeuvred 
themselves into a beneficial position, as we have seen, this does not necessarily 
mean that Kadin at national level will also benefit. Indeed, it is possible that the 
Kadindas become more influential at the expense of Kadin Indonesia. 
This recent wave of attacks on Kadin Indonesia in the wake of Keppres 18/2000 has 
also been fed by a set of existing dissatisfactions. Kadin is widely perceived as 
nothing more than a club of conglomerate pribumi businessmen who, under 
Soeharto, used their positions to obtain government contracts and vast amounts of 
cheap state credit. As we will see in the Chapter Five, the post-Soeharto era has led 
71 Interview with Amaluddin Ganie (12.12.01), Vice Chairman of Kadin Jakarta and one of the 
original founders of Kadin Indonesia. 72 Kontan, 26.2.01. 
73 Satunet online, 13.12.00. 
74 Gatra Online, 11.4.01. 
75 Suara Karya, 18.6.01. 
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to some changes in the substance of favouritism to include not only government 
contracts and credit but also now special deals on existing debt. This is certainly 
one of the allegations aimed at the board of Kadin and especially the Chairman, 
Aburizal Bakrie. 
BAs, Kadindas and even other senior members of Kadin's board have all accused 
Bakrie of using his position in Kadin to concentrate on lobbying the government for 
dollar debt forgiveness, which largely benefits big crony conglomerates in general 
and his own companies in particular. 77 Bakrie has also been implicated in high- 
level corruption scandals78 and is privately considered by the international business 
community to be a 'crook'. 79 
There is also a strong belief that Kadin does nothing substantial for SMEs, despite 
their many statements of various schemes in the press. 80 In general, 
pronouncements on the issue of SMEs and their perceived neglect by government 
policy form a major part of political rhetoric from NGOs, the government and all 
the major political parties, and Kadin is no exception. New programmes are 
continually initiated by all sections of the political community as a populist response 
to the concentration of economic resources in the hands of a few conglomerates. 
However, the substance of the programmes is often very weak and uncoordinated 
and in reality SMEs more often receive minimal benefit from these efforts (LP3ES 
1998a). Nevertheless, as the purported representative of the entire business sector in 
Indonesia, Kadin has more of an obligation than most to look after the interests of 
the SME sector which they are clearly not fulfilling. 
Another major source of contention between sectoral BAs and Kadin which has fed 
the current climate of dissatisfaction with Kadin is the issue of sectoral BA 
76 Interviews with Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01) and Tulus Tambunan (1.11.01). 77 Merdeka, 22.6.98; Media Indonesia. 10.2.00; Rakyat Merdeka, 12.2.00; Merdeka, 8.12.98; Suara 
Pembaruan, 9.12.98; Suara Pembaruan, 4.12.98; Kompas, 14.12.99; Kompas, 11.12.99. 
78 Berpolitik Online, 10.3.00; Berpolitik Online, 4.12.00. 
79 Interview with an employee of an international institution, who wished to remain anonymous. 
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representation within Kadin's decision-making structures. The election of the 
Chairman of Kadin is held every five years at the Kadin Munas, but only the 
Kadindas have the right to participate in the vote. BA members of Kadin have for 
many years protested against this system and the issue resurfaced at the last Munas 
held in December 1998. 
Over the years there have been incremental changes to give BAs more of a voice 
within Kadin. In 1983, they were given the right to put forward candidates for the 
election of Kadin Chairman but were still excluded from the final vote (Kadin 
1983). The 1998 Munas saw some more changes whereby BAs can now vote for 
two of the four members of aformatur, a group of people who are voted in to help 
the separately elected Chairman choose the board of Kadin. 81 There have also been 
some minor changes to give BAs more of a role in Kadin's decision-making through 
commission meetings (rapat komisi) at the Munas. 82 However, despite protestations 
from Kadin that those involved in the elections and decision-making processes often 
have a sectoral BA background, the struggle to gain more institutional power for 
BAs in Kadin remains unresolved. 
Thus, changes to the certification regime have affected the BA community in three 
main ways. First, it has ensured a proliferation of opportunities to participate in 
corruption within the BA community, encouraging the formation of new BAs with 
an aim to gain a foothold in the `government contract loop'. Secondly, it has 
strengthened the resource base of some well-established BAs and especially the 
regional Kadindas. At present, it has been estimated that only around 6 out of the 
27 Kadindas are active. 83 However, if this new source of funds from certification 
continues and the government's general policy on regional autonomy is fully 
implemented, then it is possible that the Kadindas could emerge alongside the 
already established BAs to become influential players in the business representation 
80 Media Indonesia, 10.2.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 6.9.00; Bisnis Indonesia, 20.7.99; Suara Pembaruan 
4.12.98. 
81 Interview with Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01). 
82 Suara Pembaruan 7.11.98 and Interview with M. Husain (27.11.01). 
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sector. Thirdly, the new Keppres has galvanised criticism of Kadin by sectoral BAs, 
building on existing conflicts between BAs and Kadin and weakening the position 
of the latter. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the functions of BAs in Indonesia in an attempt 
to better define this constituency from the business side of state/business relations. 
It has been shown that BAs are not a monolithic category, but rather should be 
defined based on the many different functions they serve. They can be 
representatives of the personal businesses of those who run BAs in order to obtain 
government contracts, or they can profit the heads of BAs from the opportunity to 
skim off part of the value of government contracts as intermediaries for other 
businesses. They can act as cartels, fixing prices and maintaining the monopoly 
position of its members. They can represent SMEs from large swathes of a sector, 
concentrating on providing managerial and technical support to their members as 
well as help in fulfilling the obligations of government regulations on SMEs. Or 
they can represent a small number of large enterprises that are more oriented 
towards government lobbying on national level issues such as trade tariffs. There 
are also an increasing number of BAs which are being groomed by Western donors 
to fulfil the ideal notion of BAs as policy advocacy vehicles for SMEs. 84 
This view is in some ways contrary to parts of the literature on BAs in developing 
countries. For example, building on the work of Streeck and Schmitter (1985), 
Doner et al (1998) recommend that the functions of BAs be analytically divided in 
terms of the logic of membership, influence and implementation. The authors 
further highlight various organisational features, such as the scope and inclusivity of 
membership, level of resources and capacity to induce compliance from members, 
83 Interviews with Tulus Tambunan (1.11.01) and Amaluddin Ganie (12.12.01). 84 For example, Swisscontact and TAF USA have helped to fund forums such as Fornas/Forda 
which groups together SMEs at the local and national level. USAID and the Asia Foundation have 
also been involved with the development of SME associations, providing support and advice on 
advocacy skills (Interviews with Roderick Brazier, 26.4.02 and Ibu Tuti, 5.12.01). 
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before positing that each of these features influences the degree to which a BA 
fulfills these logics (p. 129-131). In this way the authors hope to discover the 
conditions under which BAs can contribute to development and democracy. In a 
similar line of argument, Lucas (1997) also explains the capacity of BAs to be 
representative in terms of organisational factors, such as their level of internal 
centralisation, the degree of government influence within a BA and a BA's 
resources (p. 75). 
In contrast, this chapter has argued that a more profitable analytical distinction of 
BA functions can be made based on who they represent and for what purposes. 
Thus, the conditions under which BAs contribute to development and democracy 
are understood in terms of the motivation of both BAs and their members derived 
from their historical economic context rather than in terms of a BA's organisational 
features. This way enables a more realistic analysis of BAs since it establishes their 
connection to the wider political economy rather than presuming a somewhat 
neutral context where the only important factors to consider are organisational. 
The analyses of BAs by these theorists very often include a sizeable section pointing 
to the potential pluralist tendencies of BAs, and it sometimes seems as though they 
are dazzled by these possibilities into assuming that BAs are naturally vehicles for 
pluralist contestation. Lucas (1997), for example, claims that `by representing 
collectivities, BAs are less susceptible to rent-seeking' (p. 74), whilst Bratton (1989) 
contends that by definition the emergence of associations serves to `pluralize' the 
institutional landscape and impose some level of accountability on the state (in 
Lucas 1997, p. 89). 
This is quite contrary to the story which has unfolded in this chapter. For, whilst 
BAs have entered into a new stage of invigoration and their access to resources has 
increased, where the motivation is to find an institutionalised role in the `contract 
loop' this is unlikely to lead to a more representative policy advocacy function. In 
other words, if the main motivating factor for the work orientation or new formation 
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of BAs is to gain a bigger share in government contracts, then serving their 
membership (which is often limited in a real sense to the companies of the board 
members) becomes more a matter of getting involved in patrimonial networks rather 
than policy advocacy networks for a wider and more inclusive membership. 
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Chanter Four 
CORPORATISM 
4.1 Introduction 
In addition to corruption as a system of interaction between business and the 
state, some theorists have identified another system known as `corporatism'. 
The theory of corporatism can be used to describe interaction between the state 
and all types of civil society, not just business. The most widely used definition 
of corporatism is Schmitter's: 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
support (Schmitter 1974, p. 13). 
The corporatist doctrine behind this system of interest representation is based on 
the notion that, without the guidance of the state, damaging conflict would ensue 
between different interests in a society. Accordingly, state-society dialogue will 
be more efficient and harmonious if groups such as labour, capital, the 
professions, agriculturalists, students, religious organisations and the military are 
regulated by the state. 
Corporatism is generally defined in terms of degrees depending on the level of 
control that the state exerts over a system of interest representation. On one end 
of the scale there is `societal corporatism' where initiative and power are located 
in independently organised societal interests which impose their own agendas on 
the state. This type of corporatism can be seen in several European countries 
such as UK, France and Germany. At the opposite end of the scale is 'state 
corporatism' where initiative and power lie with the state. This is the type of 
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corporatism more often found in developing countries (Moore 1993). Most 
Indonesianists regarded the form of corporatism throughout the Soeharto period 
to be of the state variety (King 1982, p. 111 and Maclntyre 1994b, p. 3). 
Although corporatism and corruption are most often explored as separate 
phenomena, there have been some attempts to reconcile the two. For example, 
in a seminal discussion of the nature of the Indonesian regime, King suggests 
that corporatism and clientelism are `highly functional or symbiotically 
connected' (King 1982, p. 115). In support of this position, he quotes Kaufman 
that 
on the one hand, corporatist arrangements discourage autonomous group 
competition and perpetuate more particularistic forms of individual 
problem-solving behaviour. Clientelistic forms of problem-solving 
behaviour, in turn, vastly increase the flexibility of what would otherwise 
be quite rigid corporatist legal structures. ' (Kaufman 1977, p. 113). 
Thus, if the corporatist system was found to be in decline, it might be expected 
that the `autonomous group competition' which corporatism discouraged will 
strengthen and eventually impinge on the prevalence of clientelist behaviour. 
King further adds that corporatism and clientelism are part of the same 
`bureaucratic-authoritarian' system. The difference between the two is that 
corporatism operates at the macro level of analysis to describe parties, 
bureaucracies or even entire national political systems, whereas clientelism 
describes individual orientations or dyadic relationships at the micro level (King 
1982, p. 113). Whilst this is a useful additional insight, it has little to say about 
how corporatism and clientelism interact because he does not tackle the issue of 
the relationship between the macro and micro levels. 
However, the possibility has at least been raised that changes in the corporatist 
system of state control can have an impact on patterns of corruption. This 
chapter will keep this question in mind whilst focusing on the central concern of 
whether corporatism can be said to have declined in the post-Soeharto era. In 
contrast to the proceeding chapter, the attention here will be on national level, 
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`encompassing' organisations since this level of organisation is both crucial to 
an understanding of the broader currents of interest representation and is much 
more likely to be the locus of corporatist practices. In the Indonesian context 
this translates as a focus on the peak business association, Kadin, with additional 
references to other national level BAs. 
Three indicators of the existence and degree of corporatism will be used to 
identify post-Soeharto changes. These are: (1) the degree of state control over 
the internal leadership of Kadin (2) the degree of state control over the content of 
Kadin's policy advocacy (3) the degree of Kadin's influence on government 
economic policies. 
The next section will begin with a brief description of the system of corporatism 
under Soeharto. 
4.2 Overview of Corporatism under Soeharto 
The most systematic analysis of corporatist practices in Indonesia come from 
King (1977,1979,1982), Maclntyre (1989,1991), Reeve (1985,1990) and 
Hadiz (1992). Maclntyre usefully provides an overview of writings on 
corporatism in Indonesia in a 1994 unpublished paper (MacIntyre 1994b). All of 
these scholars have detected exclusionary corporatist institutions across the 
Indonesian political system. Whilst King took a system-wide view, Reeve has 
concentrated on political parties, Hadiz on labour and Maclntyre on business. 
Since Maclntyre's work is most relevant to this chapter, a comparison to some of 
his observations will be made throughout. 
Soeharto used corporatist techniques to control the political discourse since his 
rise to power in the mid 1960s. The parliament, the three state-organised 
political parties and the whole range of interest groups from peasants to business 
to Muslims were all state-controlled to some degree. 
The parliament is made up of two bodies, the DPR (Dewan Penvakilan Rakyat) 
(People's Representative Council) and the MPR (Majelis Penvakilan Rakyat) 
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(People's Consultative Assembly). The MPR is the highest body in the country 
with the authority to elect the President, change the constitution and debate the 
five-year economic plans that Soeharto employed. Under Soeharto, the MPR 
was constituted from all of the 425 members of the DPR plus 575 government 
appointees and convened just once every five years. The DPR is the house made 
up of elected representatives which functions more like a parliament by debating 
legislation. In Soeharto's time, the 400 elected representatives in the DPR were 
complemented by 100 government appointees. Dissent was rare and legislation 
almost exclusively emanated from the President or the executive. 
Such compliance was made possible through state control of the political parties. 
When Soeharto came to power, all political parties were obliged to group 
together in one of three state-recognised parties. There was one state-sponsored 
party and two non-state parties. ' The two non-state parties came under fairly 
loose state control, but whenever their actions were deemed threatening enough 
were immediately dealt with. These two parties were government funded. The 
government party, Golkar, was very well funded and supported by the state to 
spread to every village and township throughout the whole of Indonesia. 
Membership of Golkar was essential for all state bureaucrats and Golkar has 
been used for distributing and receiving all forms and sizes of government 
patronage. Golkar was routinely elected as the majority party in the DPR due to 
this extensive network. 
In terms of interest groups, a gradual and systematic infiltration of the state 
occurred over the first twenty years of Soeharto's rule based on corporatist 
inducements (such as sole representation status) and constraints (such as the 
threat of marginalisation). 2 Existing organisations were joined by new specially 
created ones and Kadin became the corporatist face of the business sector. 
' The state-sponsored party was GOLKAR (Golongan Karya) (Group of Functionaries). The 
non-state parties were PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) (Indonesian Democratic Party) and 
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) (United Development Party). PDI was formed from 
nationalist and Christian parties, whilst the PPP was formed from Muslim parties. 2 The very useful notion that corporatism can be analytically divided into constraints and 
inducements is from Collier and Collier (1979). 
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It was impossible to become involved in Kadin's leadership without state 
sanction. In addition, both Kadin and its regional branches, the Kadindas, had 
strong links to Golkar with all Kadin officials being told that they had to be 
Golkar members. 3 State involvement in Kadin was also channelled through a 
young business person's association called HIPMI (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda 
Indonesia) (Indonesian Young Entrepreneur's Organisation) which has strong 
links with Golkar and is known as a grouping for business people who are 
related to civil servants. The usual channel to obtain a leadership role in Kadin 
was to move up through the ranks of HIPMI first .5 
However, all of these inter-linkages between Kadin and the state did not mean 
that they were particularly influential. In fact, Kadin served more to contain the 
business sector rather than give them a fast track to policy-making circles within 
the executive (MacIntyre 1991, p. 47), and was regularly described by industry 
insiders as nothing more than a `talking shop' and an `extension of the 
government's arm'. With low levels of organisational funding, the 
prioritisation of government loyalty over capability for leadership roles is sure to 
have had an effect on the quality of Kadin's work. In addition, the most 
powerful sections of the business community, the big Chinese-Indonesian 
conglomerates, have traditionally stayed away from Kadin which means that 
government officials have been less likely to take Kadin seriously as the 
representative of big business. 
Rather, economic policy-making under Soeharto was monopolised by a small 
hand-picked coterie of economists and politicians. Since Soeharto's general 
economic outlook was pro-private sector anyway, any influence from the 
business community was more likely to follow a patron-client pattern on specific 
issues such as tariffs and monopolies than any general policy advocacy from 
business groups. These patron-client dependencies coupled with the interlacing 
of Kadin with the bureaucracy, also meant that Kadin's attitude towards 
government policies was rarely very critical. 
3 Interview with a senior Kadin official. 
4 Bisnis Indonesia, 3.11.99; Media Indonesia, 23.7.98. 
5 Interview with Amaluddin Ganie (12.12.01). 
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In sum, prior to 1998, Kadin's leadership was both state controlled and co-opted 
by formal and informal links with the bureaucracy. Generally, its policy 
advocacy was at best tolerated by policy makers and at worst ignored. It was 
also unlikely that any serious policy conflicts would occur between Kadin and 
the government. Has this remained the case in the immediate post-Soeharto era? 
Have there been any incremental or major changes to this story? The next two 
sections will elaborate on the above corporatist patterns whilst reconsidering the 
level of state control and co-option of Kadin in the post-Soeharto period, before 
moving onto the position of Kadin in national economic policy-making. 
4.3 State Control of Kadin Leadership 
The selection of Kadin's chairman has, from Kadin's very inception, aroused 
controversy. Where institutional strength is low and systems of allocating tasks 
and responsibilities are undeveloped, an organisation's leader is absolutely 
crucial to influencing the way that organisation functions. 
The issues involved in the selection of Kadin's leaders have in the past centred 
around the background of candidates. In the early days of Soeharto's rule, 
whilst there was still a good deal of instability, military figures were provided by 
the government to be Kadin's chairman. Subsequently, candidates with a 
background from the private sector were permitted to stand for leadership but 
they still had to be palatable to Soeharto (MacIntyre 1991, p. 42). Ethnicity was 
also a major issue since there was scant involvement in Kadin from the Chinese- 
Indonesian minority who control most of Indonesia's economy. Indeed, because 
Kadin was formed in response to this Chinese-Indonesian domination of the 
economy, it would be in a sense antithetical for Kadin's leadership to involve the 
Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates. It is instructive in this regard to note that 
the Kadin Chairman from 1994-2004, Aburizal Bakrie, is the son of an original 
Benteng (Fortress) programme beneficiary. To a lesser extent, religion is also a 
factor in the credentials of potential Chairmen, with Islam the preferred option. 
6 Bisnis Indonesia, 8.12.98 and interviews with several respondents. 
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In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the informal qualifications for a leadership role in 
Kadin have continued to stipulate a background from a big pribuini private 
sector conglomerate. The first post-Soeharto election of Kadin's leadership took 
place at the end of 1998, just six months after Soeharto's resignation and still 
under the authority of President Habibie. At the leadership elections, there 
appeared to be almost unanimous support for the re-election of the already 
incumbent chairman, Aburizal Bakrie. Some other names were talked about in 
the initial stages, all of whom were also pribumi conglomerate bosses. 
However, in the end the regional Kadindas, who have the exclusive voting 
power in leadership elections, unanimously nominated Aburizal Bakrie and no 
other candidate completed all of the official procedures for declaring themselves 
candidates. 8 
Bakrie is a controversial figure and has received a great deal of bad press about 
his enormous debts and alleged past involvement in corruption and there were 
also clearly other credible candidates who were able to obtain some levels of 
initial support. 1° But Bakrie has an anti-establishment aura due to his first 
election to the Kadin chairmanship in 1994 when it was widely known that 
Soeharto backed a different candidate. " Whilst his election in 1994 was indeed 
the first time that a government candidate had been defeated, it has since been 
suggested that each candidate was in fact supported by different ministers so that 
Bakrie's win simply reflected the power of one minister as opposed to another. 
12 
Bakrie's substantial support in Golkar and HIPMI also militate against his anti- 
establishment image. Nevertheless, in the first flush of a post-Soeharto society, 
These were: Siswono Yudohusodo (Bangun Tjipta Group), Iman Taufik (Guna Usaha Group), 
Pontjo Sutowo (Nugraha Santana Group), Sugeng Sarjadi (Kodel Group) and Jusuf Kalla (Kalla 
Group) (Bisnis Indonesia, 8.12.98). 
8 Merdeka, 9.12.98. 
9 Kompas, 11.12.99; Kompas, 14.12.99; Berpolitik Online, 10.3.00; Berpolitik Online, 10.3.00; 
Merdeka, 9.12.98. 
10 For example, Kadinda Yogyakarta reportedly supported Siswono Yudohusodo (Suara Karya, 
9.12.98). 
" The other candidates for the 1994 Kadin leadership election were Abdurachman Ramly, Bob 
Hasan and Prosbutedjo. Abdurachman Ramly was reported as Soeharto's preferred leader 
(Sjahrir 1994). Incidentally, Megawati also benefited from an anti-Soeharto aura after he 
engineered her ouster from the leadership of PDI in 1994. Like Bakrie, her credentials as a 
reformist were shaped by this incident rather than anything she particularly said or did. This 
more recently evident with the rise of Susilo Yudhono as the favourite 2004 Presidential 
candidate after he was sacked from Megawati's cabinet. 
12 Interview with Amaluddin Ganie (12.12.01). 
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when political and economic elites everywhere scrambled to distance themselves 
from the Soeharto name, Bakrie became something of a symbol of a previous act 
of Kadin defiance and independence and won the leadership role for a 
consecutive term. 13 
The absence of Chinese-Indonesian involvement in Kadin has also not changed. 
In the past, Soeharto had preferred to keep the big Chinese-Indonesian 
conglomerates separate from the pribumi-oriented Kadin so that they could be 
better controlled, but it was never a particularly difficult task to do so. 
Generally, pribumi business and Chinese-Indonesian business seek different 
kinds of support from the government. The former tend towards seeking favours 
in government contracts whilst the latter are more likely to seek trade tariff and 
monopoly concessions. 14 This, coupled with a longstanding distrust between the 
two communities emanating from colonial days, meant that Soeharto did not 
have to work too hard to keep the two groups separate. 
The Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates formed one group in 1995 called 
Jimbaran but this was subsequently over taken by the already existing Prasetiya 
Mulia. Ostensibly these two groups are not business associations in the sense 
that is. Jimbaran was set up to institute a Soeharto pet project to forge links 
between conglomerates and SMEs, but was roundly dismissed as an exercise in 
propaganda when it failed to produce any meaningful results and faded into 
obscurity. Prasetiya Mulia has around 400 active members and is actually a 
social and educational foundation which runs a successful management school. 
15 
The reason why these two groups are conceived of as representing Chinese- 
Indonesian conglomerates in the same way as Kadin is conceived of as 
representing pribumi conglomerates is simply because of their membership. In 
other words, it is not the formal function of the organisation that matters but 
rather who their members are. It is also unclear whether the various members of 
13 There is also the possibility that Bakrie bought his way into the position. However, numerous 
Kadin interviewees all talked with pride about the fact that Kadin had elected a candidate in the 
1994 elections who was not the chosen Soeharto candidate. 
10 Interview with Roderick Brazier (26.4.02). 
15 Republika, 9.1.93. 
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Jimbaran or Prasetiya Mulia regularly met together and used their collective 
strength to push for particular policies or concessions, but it seems unlikely. 
16 
The two groups generally act more like collective markers to identify Soeharto- 
favoured Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates. 
Bakrie himself is well aware that the continued absence of Chinese-Indonesian 
involvement in Kadin is a problem for its image as an organisation 
encompassing the whole of the Indonesian business world. Around the time of 
the 1998 Kadin election he claimed that Prasetiya Mulia had now joined with 
Kadin under one roof, 17 but this is untrue in both a formal and informal sense. 
Neither as an educational foundation, nor as a euphemism for Chinese- 
Indonesian conglomerates does Prasetiya Mulia have any new involvement with 
Kadin. 18 However, since 1998 there have indeed been new developments which 
could see the positions of these two business communities coming closer 
together, which will be returned to in Section 4.4.3.2. 
Thus, in recent years the leaders of Kadin which have been palatable to the 
government have been pribumi private sector conglomerate bosses and judging 
from the 1998 Kadin elections, there have been no real changes in these 
requisites. The 1998 elections did suggest that a candidate's connection to 
Soeharto is still an issue, except that now distance is preferable to proximity, at 
least publicly. Bakrie's background in HIPMI and Golkar also illustrates that 
connections with these organisations are still central to achieving leadership in 
Kadin. 
In the past, the government would make its preference known for a particular 
candidate through a mixture of persuasion, money and sometimes simple threat. 
For sectoral BAs, a blessing was necessary from the minister or Director General 
of the department in charge of that sector. If a BA elected a leader who did not 
16 However, because of the dominant control of some sectors by Prasetiya Mulia's members, 
there have been allegations that Prasteiya Mulia acts like a cartel. This suspicion intensified in 
1993 over some members dealings in the automobile sector (Republika, 14.1.93 and 15.1.93). 
17 Kompas, 9.12.98; Media Indonesia, 10.6.98. 
18 Interviews with Thomas Darmawan (16.11.01), Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01), Amaluddin 
Ganie (12.12.01), Soy Pardede (16.11.01), Bernard Drum (31.10.01), John Palinggi (27.11.01) 
and Arfan Sofyan (2.11.01). 
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fit the department's criteria, then they would be quietly called into the 
department and told that they would have to wait for another time before they 
could take up the chairmanship. 19 For Kadin or Kadinda leadership elections, 
the government's preference was usually communicated through the local 
Governor and/or more powerful ministers. 20 
All interviewees were unanimous that this sort of direct interference in 
leadership elections no longer occurs. Instead, a picture emerged from the 
interviews where the relative power of political backing from a minister or the 
President has now been overtaken by the more uncomplicated power of money. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, many BAs, including Kadin, have problems 
finding sufficient funds and rely on their leaders for donations. In a way, the 
amount of money that a candidate is willing to spend bribing their way into 
office could be a good indicator of how much they have to spend within the 
organisation once they take up the position of chairman. 
Very recently, a new Kadin leader was elected in February 2004 as Bakrie 
(unsucessfully) joined the race to become Golkar's 2004 presidential candidate. 
The new leader, Moh. S. Hidayat, was the Golkar treasurer until his election and 
is a pribumi property magnate. 21 Thus, there appears to have been no new 
political or ideological shifts within Kadin, although it remains to be seen how 
Mr. Hidayat runs Kadin. It has always been unlikely that Kadin's leader would 
be a break from the previous norms, despite the fact that the government seems 
to be no longer concerned with controlling BA leaders to the same degree as in 
the past. The government's new found detachment from BA leadership elections 
is more likely to benefit sectoral BAs than Kadin because in the final analysis 
Kadin was created as an extension of the New Order bureaucracy. It has 
extensive links and shared ideals with the government bureaucracy and 
especially Golkar. 22 
19 The interviewee who related this story wished to remain anonymous. In this particular case, 
the prospective chairman did not fit the government's criteria because he was Chinese- 
Indonesian. 
20 Media Indonesia, 22.10.98; Suara Karya, 10.12.98 and interview with a senior Kadin official. 
21 Laksamananet, 22.2.04. 
22 Interviews with Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01), Amaluddin Ganie (12.12.01), John Palinggi 
(27.11.01), M. Husain (27.11.01). See also Merdeka, 22.12.98. 
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Where Prasetiya Mulia tended to interact directly with the President, Kadin's 
connection with the state is mostly through the bureaucracy where decisions on 
government contracts are taken. 23 It has been estimated that 80 percent of all 
Kadin and Kadinda boards are members of HIPMI, 24 a Golkar-created 
organisation, and anything short of a complete overhaul of personnel throughout 
Kadin and all its Kadindas will not change that fact. Indeed, it is an interesting 
aside that neither Golkar nor HIPMI have any formal voting rights in Kadin's 
leadership elections, yet seem to be by far the most influential groups. These 
kinds of networks of influence show the weakness of depending on institutional 
fixes. For, if it were perceived to be unhealthy for Kadin to have such wide- 
ranging connections with the bureaucracy, changes in voting procedures for the 
Kadin leadership would not necessarily have much impact. 
Thus, from the data presented in this section, it seems that methods of corporatist 
control in the selection of BA leaders are no longer used. Even under Soeharto 
in 1994, the election of Bakrie showed that the state would accept some 
flexibility in Kadin's leader, even if certain background parameters were still in 
place. When the focus is widened to include evidence around state control of 
leadership in sectoral BAs, there is also an indication that the government is no 
longer active in dictating who should be leader. 
In contrast, the prevalence of bureaucratic connections points to the continued 
importance of corruption in binding Kadin to the state. This is because one of 
the founding principles of Kadin, as implemented by Soeharto, was to create a 
pribumi class of businesspeople who could compete with the Chinese- 
Indonesian conglomerates and the only way to do this was by giving them work 
from government contracts. If it is accepted that one of Kadin's purposes is to 
put this principle into practice, then it follows that a shared bureaucratic culture 
will develop between the state bureaucracy and Kadin. This shared culture is at 
the same time strengthened by the added glue of involvement in two 
organisations, HIPMI and Golkar. 
23 Kontan Online, 13.12.99. 
24 Suara Karya, 10.12.98. 
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Whilst the economic crisis has meant that many of the big ostentatious 
government mega-projects have been scaled back or put on hold, the 
government's procurement budget continues to be worth billions of US dollars 
each year. There have been no revolutions in the changeover of Kadin personnel 
since the resignation of Soeharto and whilst some of the very top bureaucratic 
jobs have become highly politicised and unstable with their dependence on party 
politics, the bureaucracy is largely the same one which Soeharto left behind. As 
we saw from the previous two chapters, the government tendering process also 
remains largely intact and still provides opportunities for discretion in awarding 
government contracts. Taken together, this all means that Kadin's function of 
channelling government support (or `patronage') for well-connected pribumi 
businesses is likely to persist. The continued minimal involvement of Chinese- 
Indonesian conglomerates in Kadin also indicates that this Kadin function will 
continue to be a relatively important one. 
The early indications are therefore that a decline in corporatist control has not 
had a substantial impact on the prevalence of corruption. Exclusionary state 
corporatist structures certainly still exist: for example it is still necessary for 
Kadin to obtain a Presidential decree whenever it wishes to change anything in 
its articles of incorporation. However, the practices of state control over 
leadership seem to be in decline. Meanwhile, in view of the continued 
connections between Kadin and the bureaucracy over the award of government 
contracts and the decline of influence based solely on political position, systems 
of patronage are widening out beyond senior influential figures to become more 
encompassing. 25 
In order to explore more fully changes in corporatist practices, the next section 
will focus on Kadin's policy advocacy, situate Kadin within the economic 
policy-making community and assess the degree of state corporatist control in 
this area. 
25 Interview with a senior Kadin official. 
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4.4 Policy-making 
No examination of the interaction between the business sector and the state is 
complete without a consideration of the economic policy making process. 
According to pluralist democratic ideals, it is preferable that state policy is 
derived, at least in part, from consultations between various elements of the state 
and a variety of representative and organised voices from civil society. 
However, there are of course many reasons why a state leader might want to 
avoid such a system and use instead the tools of corporatist constraints mixed 
with patrimonial inducements. 
The economic policy making process is especially pertinent to the subject of 
state/business interaction because it constitutes the subject of the state and the 
business community's own dialogue about how they should interact, or in other 
words, what their respective roles should be in the governing of the economy. 
As Lindblom suggests, `power in a capitalist economy is shared between 
business and government... the pertinent question concerns what the appropriate 
division of responsibilities is, and how the two should interact. ' (Lindblom 1977, 
p. 6). 
Throughout the New Order regime, economic policy making was widely 
believed to be exclusively in the grip of President Soeharto and his closest aides. 
With the exception of negotiations between individual conglomerates and state 
officials over access to favourable government contracts or trade tariffs, the New 
Order state was considered to be largely immune from any sort of societal input 
on broad issues of economic policy. Rather, economic policy was characterised 
as the result of competition between two distinct groups of Soeharto aides: on 
the one hand `technocrats' who favoured economic liberalisation and more 
adherence to market principles, and on the other hand `nationalists' who sought 
a deeper involvement of the government in the economy. Each camp had the ear 
of President Soeharto who himself vacillated between the two depending on 
other political or economic conditions. 26 Other potential sources of input into 
26 For two excellent examples of this type of analysis see Hal Hill (1996) and Adam Schwarz 
(1999). 
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the policy process from civil society were contained through a mixture of 
patrimonial practices and corporatist techniques. 
This section will focus primarily on the role of Kadin within the economic 
policy process at a national level, whilst occasionally referring to other national 
level sectoral BAs. The goal of this section is to assess how far the state 
corporatist paradigm can still be applied to Indonesia in terms of policy-making 
and whether any new patterns of control and influence from the state can be 
discerned. In order to do this, three main questions will be addressed: (1) How 
far does the state shape BA interests? This question is translated into research as 
a concern with the content of sectoral BA and Kadin's economic policy 
advocacy in comparison to the governmental stance on the same issues. (2) How 
much access does Kadin and sectoral BAs have to government decision-makers? 
(3) How much actual influence do Kadin and sectoral BAs have over the 
economic policy process? 
4.4.1 Policy Advocacy Content 
Andrew Maclntyre's 1991 book on the role of Indonesian BAs in policy 
formulation pointed to some examples where BAs were able to disagree with 
and transform certain government economic policies. Yet, despite this initial 
identification of the more independent elements within the BA sector, Maclntyre 
later wrote that `the likelihood of the New Order regime permitting sectoral 
associations to vigorously probe and question established government policy is 
remote' (MacIntyre 1994b, p. 9). 
The majority of respondents interviewed for this research all maintained that this 
was no longer the case and that both Kadin and sectoral BAs were now much 
more critical of government policy. In order to test this proposition, a brief 
survey of both internal Kadin policy documents and newspaper stories featuring 
sectoral BAs was undertaken. 
A subject classification of reports on sectoral BAs in Indonesia's major English 
language newspaper throughout 2000 can be seen in Table 4.1 below. Although 
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In sum, it may be that there were two motivations for Kadin policy throughout 
the New Order. On the one hand Kadin tried to ensure a certain image of 
harmony between itself and the government which corresponded to the 1987 law 
on Kadin identifying it as the main `communication and consultation forum 
between entrepreneurs and the government'. 29 On the other hand, Kadin's 
second motivation was to advocate to obtain contracts, regulations or policies 
which would be beneficial to either a particular business, a wider circle of 
sector- specific large pribumi businesses or an even wider circle of simply large 
pribumi businesses. Today, the cultivation of harmony and thus the avoidance 
of open criticism seems to have subsided leaving the Kadin leadership to 
concentrate on promoting their own businesses or at most businesses very much 
like theirs. For example, from the main issues which exercised Kadin 
throughout 2000, debt relief and entrance to AFFA have a greater relevance to 
big business than to SMEs. In other words, the decline of corporatist control has 
not translated into a pluralisation of interests channelled through Kadin to the 
government. 
There are, of course, also times when some of the issues which Kadin takes up 
with the government are a real priority for most, if not all, of the domestic 
business community. The rise in electricity tariffs is just one such example. 
However, the lack of credibility which results from the patrimonial tendencies of 
some of Kadin's leaders ensures that such times are generally considered more 
of an aberration than the norm. 
Section 4.4.2 Access to the Executive Branch 
Although the 1987 law on Kadin legitimised it as the government's official 
intermediary with the business world, it failed to make provisions for regular 
meetings or channels through which this principle could be realised. 
contracts" (Masukan Kadin Indonesia Kepada Fraksi Karya Pembangunan Mengenai RUU 
Migas, Jakarta, 29.3.99). See also Aburizal Bakrie's calls to place national assets in pribumi 
hands (Business News, 25.8.99). 
29 Opening remarks (d), Undang-Undang No. 1/1987. 
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Consequently, over the years a familiar refrain from Kadin officials has been the 
lack of access and inclusion of Kadin in policy formulation circles. 30 
Nevertheless, the government has provided certain established roles for Kadin as 
an institution in addition to the otherwise ad hoc contact which fluctuates 
depending on personal or national circumstances. Some examples of Kadin's 
institutional roles are seats on government committees which deal with issues 
such as export promotion, or involvement in economic bodies such as those set 
up to deal with the economic crisis. A member of Kadin has also had a 
guaranteed seat in the MPR since 1977 as a representative of the business 
world, 31 there is usually a Kadin presence at the annual budget speech, 32 and an 
institutionalised dialogue with economic ministers once a year. 33 During the 
Soeharto period, there were likely many more official roles of this type for 
Kadin. However, other than some personal and patrimonial style relationships, 
channels of communication on substantive policy issues seems to have been 
problematic. 
According to many of the interviewees from both a sectoral BA and Kadin 
background, there is now generally a new atmosphere of accessibility in 
government circles. 34 One of the respondents felt that throughout the New Order 
`the President and Ministers were like gods' with whom access was difficult and 
disagreement awkward, but that this was no longer the case. 35 
In terms of a more regularised point of contact for policy input from Kadin, one 
of the Economic Co-ordinating Ministers who served under the Wahid 
administration, Rizal Ramli, announced to the press upon taking his position that 
he would meet once a month with Kadin officials to garner their opinions on 
30 For statements to this effect, see Suara Karya, 11.6.98; Bisnis Indonesia, 15.1.99. 31 Suara Karya, 6.12.99. 
32 Suara Karya, 11.6.98 and interview with Tulus Tambunan (1.11.01). 33 Maclntyre 1991, p. 45. 34 Interviews with Amaludin Ganie (12.12.01), Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01), John Palinggi 
(27.11.01), Soy Pardede (16.11.01) and Arfan Sofyan (2.11.01). 35 Interview with BA respondent. 
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economic policies. 36 However, some Kadin employees later confirmed that 
these ground to a halt in a matter of weeks. 37 
This lack of a meaningful institutional channel which can bring together top 
government officials with BAs can be contrasted to the situation in Thailand and 
Japan. In both these countries, corporatist structures have at least provided BAs 
opportunities to hold a dialogue with influential government officials 
(Laothamatas 1992, p. 39). 
However, one major new source of access to the policy process for both Kadin 
and sectoral BAs are the public hearings and committee sessions at the newly- 
invigorated parliament (DPR). The reasons why a policy may be blocked or 
passed as a result of these sessions is often unclear. Party lines on policies can 
be contradictory or non-existent and MPs often suddenly change their mind 
which in turn leads to suspicions of bribes. Nevertheless, these parliamentary 
sessions have the right to call top officials and ministers before them and, 
depending on the issue in debate, can also generate considerable attention from 
the media. Kadin is often called for input into hearings which affect the business 
world. 38 
In sum, beyond the increased role of the DPR, there appears to have been no 
new institutional channels which can act as sites of communication between 
Kadin and/or sectoral BAs and the government on issues of national policy. Yet 
at the same time, interviewees maintained that access to top state officials and 
ministers has opened up. The relatively high frequency of contact between BAs 
and ministers was also confirmed by the questionnaire findings in Section 3.2.4 
of the last chapter. 
However, although the issue of access to policy-making circles is an important 
one, it cannot fully demonstrate influence without the added consideration of the 
36 Satunet Online, 9.9.00. 
37 Interviews with Tulus Tambunan (1.11.01) and Utama Kajo (28.1.02). 38 For example, Kadin has attended many DPR committee meetings (Rapat Dengar Pendapat 
Umum) on the oil and gas bill, electricity bill, manpower bill or on general economic reforms. 
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competition which sectoral BAs and Kadin face from other sources of policy 
input. This is the subject to which the next section will now turn. 
Section 4.4.3 Influence in Policy-Making 
This section will consider the most important influences on economic policy 
making over the period of the three Presidencies immediately following the 
resignation of Soeharto in May 1998. These are the transitional Habibie 
administration (May 1998 - October 1999), the Wahid Presidency (October 
1999 - July 2001) and the Megawati Presidency (July 2001 - ongoing). 
Within 
each administration the general contours of economic policy will be described 
followed by an examination of the sources of economic policy. The degree of 
influence of these sources will also be assessed with particular reference to 
Kadin. 
4.4.3.1 President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (May 1998 - October 1999) 
A close aide of President Soeharto for many years, Habibie had long represented 
the `nationalists" fluctuating fortunes within the New Order administration. The 
nationalist position was presented as a preference for government ownership of 
the economy and an adherence to the principles of a `people's economy' 
(ekonomi rakyat) where. small and medium size enterprises (SME) were 
supported by preferential credit and access to government contracts. However, 
under the auspices of such an ideology, in practice most government effort and 
resources were channelled towards nurturing an elite group of pribumi 
conglomerate owners who in return were expected to finance the personal and 
political needs of their political patrons. 
Upon taking over the Presidency in May 1998 expectations were therefore high 
that Habibie would attempt to implement his long held nationalist beliefs. A few 
months after taking office Habibie obliged by laying the ideological foundations 
to steer economic policy in this direction through a set of guidelines voted on by 
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the MPR. 39 Rather than setting specific policies, these guidelines delineated 
economic principles such as declaring SMEs to be the pillars of the economy 
whilst contrasting them to `groups whose economic strength was not based on 
principles of fairness'. In a bid to capitalise on the anti-conglomerate mood of a 
newly impoverished public, Habibie spoke often of the importance of the 
`people's economy' and even declared a national holiday for the 18`h of October 
to be called `Resurgence of the Small Business Day'. 40 Habibie also installed a 
long time promoter of the people's economy, Adi Sasono (see Box Three), into 
the Ministry of Co-operatives and SMEs, giving him the finances to start 
numerous new credit schemes and local systems of staple food distribution 
41 
Two new institutions were formally created to provide input into economic 
policy, neatly capturing the dual loyalties of the Habibie regime. One was called 
Dewan Pengembangan Ekonomi Rakyat (DPER) (Council for the Development 
of the People's Economy) and was set up to develop policies based on the 
`people's economy' principle. It was driven by Adi Sasono, headed formally by 
the President with ministers as members and sympathetic think tanks as 
advisors. 2 This body created the theory behind the `people's economy' 
principle and served up programmes, such as SME credit, for public 
consumption. 43 
The second group which Habibie used was called the Dewan Pemantapan 
Ketahanan Ekonomi dan Keuangan (DPKEK) (Council for Economic and 
Monetary Resilience) which was actually a hangover from the last days of 
Soeharto containing the backbone of the Soeharto establishment: a mixture of 
technocrats, Golkar executives and conglomerate bosses 44 Compared to the 
39 TAP MPR, Nomor VIUMPR/1998, November 1998. 
ao Warta Ekonomi, 9.11.98. 
41 For further details of Adi Sasono's policies see Warta Ekonomi, 17.8.98; Warta Ekonomi, 
22.6.98. 
42 The think tanks which were reported to have the ear of President Habibie were CIDES and 
Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (PPMI) (Warta Ekonomi, 9.11.98). 
43 Sasono was granted Rp 20 trillion (US$ 2 billion) for re-lending at an interest rate of 16 
4percent, 
a figure which accounted for 10 percent of the state budget (Eklof 2002, p. 233). 
4' The President was Chairperson, with Prof Dr Widjojo Nitisastro as Vice Chair. Members 
included the Minister of Economic Co-ordination Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the Minister of 
Finance Bambang Subianto, Minister of Trade and Industry Rahardi Ramelan, Minister of State- 
Owned Enterprises Tanri Abeng, Secretary of State Akbar Tandjung and Foreign Minister Ali 
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DPER, the DPKEK rather represented the reality of `people's economy' 
principles with the technocrats' adherence to mainstream macroeconomic 
principles, local distribution programmes doubling as Golkar political vehicles 
into the villages and massive corruption with conglomerates. 
However, the most significant new source of economic policy first began to gain 
prominence in Soeharto's last days and has continued to be extremely 
influential, the IMF. To some the IMF simply represents the interests of 
international capital while to others it represents the only realistic chance to 
control the corrupt polity of Indonesia. In any case, the IMF's potential sanction 
of delays in loan disbursements if its programmes are not followed was enough 
to ensure that it was the major source of policy in trade tariffs, subsidies, asset 
sales and macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates and inflation. In 
subsequent administrations the DPR formed a major challenge to the IMF's role 
in policy-making, but under Habibie the general election which brought in new 
MPs and working practices to the DPR had yet to take place. Relations were 
sometimes strained between Habibie and the IMF during his tenure, particularly 
over a banking scandal where money was siphoned out of the government purse 
to pay for the imminent election campaign of Golkar. 45 However, a senior 
economist who was soon to become Minister of Finance under Megawati, 
considers that Habibie was generally supportive of the IMF programme 
(Boediono 2002). Indeed, over US$ 5 billion in loans was disbursed by the IMF 
throughout Habibie's tenure (See figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 below). 
Alatas. Private business was represented by Radius Prawiro, Atmosardjo Subowo and Aburizal 
Bakrie as Secretary General (Kompas, 27.2.99). 
45 This became known as the Bank Bali Scandal. 
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Table 4.2 Indonesia: Disbursement of IMF Support Funds 
Items Period In US$ Equivalent 
(Million)* 
Stand-by arrangement Nov 97 - July 1998 (March - 5,001.7 
July 1998 IMF withheld funds). 
Extended fund facility Aug 1998-Aug 1999 5,202.2 
New extended fund facility Sept 1999 - Sept 2001 (August 1,522.9 
- October 1999, April - June 
2000 and January - September 
2001 IMF withheld funds). 
Remainder of the disbursement October 2001 - December 2003 3,367.0 
Total amount disbursed November 1997-September 11,726.7 
2001 
Total IMF commitment 15,093.7 
* The amounts were originally in SDRs and are the estimated US$ equivalent 
Sources: Feridhanusetyawan (2003), p. 238; ICG (2001), p. 4. 
IMF Funds US$ 5 US$ 5.2 US$ 1.5 US$ 1.5 
Disbursed 1 Billion ý Billion 1 Billion Billion 
Presidents 
May Oct July Dcc 
1998 1999 2001 2003 
Key: = Fund, ý%ithhcld; -= Sucharto -= Hahihic; = Wahid; = Mcgawati 
Due to the concurrence of `people's economy'/ pribumi ideology between the 
Habibie administration and Kadin, Kadin was theoretically well placed to 
influence any policies which could be wrested from the grip of the IMF. 
However, the Kadin executives were undoubtedly more concerned with the 
declining fortunes of their own businesses to look very far beyond their own 
circles for the content of their advocacy. It is also true that most of Habibie's 
time was taken up by fundamental political reforms such as introducing the far 
reaching regional autonomy laws, offering a referendum on independence to 
East Timor and arranging the first free national elections in over four decades 
46 
46 For more details of political reforms undertaken during Habihie's tenure, see Bourchier 
(2000). 
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However, the continuing economic and financial crisis meant that, on the advice 
of the IMF, economic policy-making in the Habibie era became focused on 
saving the banking system from collapse. Except for the regional autonomy law, 
the most important economic decision which Habibie made concerned the 
arrangement of domestic banks into three categories: those which were past help 
and should be closed down, those which could be saved with an injection of 
government capital and those which did not need help. 
The then head of Kadin, Aburizal Bakrie, reportedly made his influence felt on 
the multi-million dollar decisions over which banks were to be closed and which 
were to be injected with government funds through his membership in the body 
which made these decisions, the DPKEK. In order to avoid closure by the 
government, a bank had to have a certain level of money in its coffers compared 
to the money it had lent out, known as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). 
Bakrie's majority-owned bank, Bank Nusa Nasional (BNN), was in a perilous 
state and needed an extra Rp 5 trillion (US$ 500 million) to avoid closure. 
7 
When the announcement of bank closures was delayed by the government, 
suspicions of behind the scenes lobbying by the bank owners were aroused. 
These suspicions intensified when it was announced that BNN had found the 
necessary capital to be eligible for the injection of government funds. There 
were even reports that Bakrie had acquired the extra money through Adi Sasono 
from the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs and from the social safety net 
programme with the permission of Habibie in return for Bakrie's bank 
cooperating in a government credit programme and publicly supporting the 
ekonomi rakyat programme. 8 Subsequent pressure from the IMF ensured that 
Bakrie's Bank was later dropped from the programme 49 However, in the end 
BNN along with six other banks were exempted from liquidation and merged 
into one new bank which meant that although Bakrie lost control of BNN, the 
unravelling of its bad loans and the seizure of the Bakrie family's collateral was 
avoided (Eklof 2002, p. 236). 
47 Tempo, 1.3.99. 
48 Kontan, 8.3.99. 
49 Interview with international banking consultant who was involved in the banking programme. 
203 
In sum, under conditions of extreme instability and flux such as occurred during 
Habibie's short tenure, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the extent of 
corporatist control over economic policy. One interviewee maintained that 
Habibie had exercised a degree of control over Kadin during his tenure, 50 but in 
view of the above account it seems likely that a certain containment was 
achieved through patrimonial inducements rather than any recourse to 
corporatist constraints. Although in Soeharto's time the needs of international 
capital were certainly catered for, throughout Habibie's tenure the reach of the 
IMF extended far beyond that, dictating such sensitive policies as rises in the 
price of electricity. Because of the role of the IMF, Habibie's state was no 
longer as autonomous or `insulated' in policy-making as Soeharto's had been, 
yet at the same time the IMF can hardly be described as a voice from Indonesian 
civil society. Habibie might have maintained that he was addressing the 
inclusion of civil society through his `people's economy' programme, but there 
is no evidence of the inclusion of representative interest groups in policy-making 
either directly or indirectly through political parties and the DPR. 
4.4.3.2 President Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999 - July 2001) 
In contrast to the Habibie regime, Abdurrahman Wahid made some efforts to 
restructure the government decision-making process. With a non-governmental 
background as the independent leader of a 30 million-strong Islamic group, 51 the 
expectation was that he would also accommodate a civil society voice within 
government. In a limited and rather haphazard way, this expectation was indeed 
realised. 
Like the previous administration, Wahid's government had many pressing non- 
economic issues to deal with during his tenure such as the major security issues 
of civilian control of the military, the ongoing bloodshed in the Malukus and the 
occasional bomb in the capital. But it was also clear that improving the parlous 
state of the economy was a major priority when within two days of taking office 
Wahid was already testing the ground for the introduction of a new economic 
50 Interview with John Palinggi (27.11.01). 
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body. 52 Dewan Ekonomi Nasional (DEN) (National Economic Council) was 
subsequently formed with a formal function of providing advice to the President 
on macroeconomic issues. Comprising mainly respected technocrats and 
economic academics, 53 DEN members began work almost immediately and were 
granted the exclusive right to obtain any information they required from all 
government departments. 54 
In concert with the formation of DEN, Wahid formed another economic council 
called the Dewan Pengembangan Usaha Nasional (DPUN) (Council of National 
Business Development). If observers and participants were wary of DEN then 
they were positively scathing about the DPUN, which was composed mainly of 
conglomerate business heads . 
55 The strongest criticisms of DPUN and to an 
extent DEN centred around the perceived connections between some members 
of the councils and the old Soeharto regime. The reputation of the head of the 
DPUN, Sofyan Wanandi was particularly controversial (see Box Three: 
Biographies). From the moment it appeared that Wanandi would be involved in 
the DPUN until the day it was finally dissolved, the newspapers contained a 
constant stream of criticism of him from many sources and demonstrations were 
even held against his appointment. 56 
Apart from the politics of the personalities involved in both DEN and DPUN, 
these bodies caused controversy not particularly because of the economic 
51 Schwarz, A (1999) p. 168. Under Soeharto, Wahid was the only leader of a mass organisation 
who was not sanctioned by Soeharto. 
52 Rakyat Merdeka, 23.10.99; Republika, 23.10.99. 
53 Chairman was Emil Salim (long serving respected Soeharto technocrat), Vice Chair Subiakto 
Tjakrawerdaya (controversial former Soeharto Cooperatives Minister), Secretary General Sri 
Mulyani Indrawati (UI economist) and members: Boediono (Former head of Bappenas), 
Bambang Subianto (Former Finance Minister), Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (Former Minister of 
Mines and Energy), Moh Arsjad Anwar (Economist), H. Hadi Soesastro (Economist), HS Dillon 
(Agricultural Expert), Anggito Abimanyu (Economist), Gumani Soeworo (Senior Banker), 
Hasan Zein A Mahmud (Former head of Jakarta Stock Exchange), Theodore Permadi Rachmat 
Businessman and former President of PT Astra) (Republika, 2.12.99 and Jakarta Post, 3.12.99). 
4 Keppres Nomor 144,1999, article 6 (2). 
ss DPUN members: Chairman: Sofyan Wanandi, Vice Chairmen: Arifin Panigoro and Aburizal 
Bakrie, General Secretary: Yusuf Faisal, Members: Wiwoho Basuki, John A Prasetio, Agus 
Projosasmito, Sunyoto Tanudjaja, Prjadi Parapto Suhardjo, Oesman Soedargo, Fatchur 
Rochman, Shansi Poesposoetjipto, Hariadi Sukamdani, Alim Markus, Anton Supit, H. Bachrun 
Ahmad Baeshowi, Ainun Nain, Tony Agus Ardie (Keppres Nomor 165,1999, Lampiran). 
56 For example see, Republika, 9.12.99; Media Indonesia, 20.12.99; Rakyat Merdeka, 21.12.99; 
Rakyat Merdeka, 12.1.00; Infobisnis, Feb 2000; Detak, 6.3.00; Kompas, 29.5.00; Suara 
Pembaruan, 10.6.00; Suara Pembaruan, 16.8.00. 
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policies they espoused but because of the implications for the distribution of 
policy-making power. It was the widely accepted view that Wahid had created 
these bodies because he had no confidence in his own cabinet's capabilities. 
Because Wahid had only gained the Presidency by forming an alliance with a 
handful of other parties, the criteria for a position in his `gado gado'57 cabinet 
was more about repaying this support than competence or experience. Long 
periods of authoritarianism inevitably lead to difficulties of assembling new 
ruling coalitions as political rivals have usually been actively suppressed for a 
number of years and so are inexperienced in governance. Therefore for a new 
regime there remains only the `Hobsons' choice' of experienced but tainted ex- 
ministers or new faces who are necessarily inexperienced. In any case, 
inexperience and diversity within Wahid's cabinet led to extreme instability and 
a fraught non-cooperative atmosphere. Indeed, the key economic team was 
replaced three times during Wahid's 20 months in office (see Appendix Seven). 
The high profile economic ministers felt especially threatened and annoyed by 
the DPUN in particular. This was in part due to a clash of personalities, 58 but 
also an overlap of responsibilities. After leaving their posts, the ex-Economic 
Coordinating Minister (Kwik Gian Gie) and the ex-Finance Minister (Bambang 
Sudibyo) both complained publicly about the `interference' in their jobs from the 
DPUN. 59 President Wahid had in fact originally planned to abolish the post of 
Coordinating Economic Minister and although this never actually happened, it 
nevertheless indicated from the very outset the President's preference for the 
new economic bodies. 60 
The DPUN had been set up ostensibly to provide advice to the President on 
microeconomic matters and general issues related to the real sector. When 
57 Wahid's cabinet was likened to the Indonesian peanut dish `gado gado' because they both 
involve lots of distinct, separate components. 
58 Most notably between the first Economics Coordinating Minister, Kwik Gian Gie and head of 
DPUN, Sofyan Wanandi. Kwik is known for his vehement anti-conglomerate position whilst 
Sofyan is essentially the conglomerate spokesperson. When Kwik was replaced as Economic 
Coordinating Minister he stated in the Press that there was a businessman called `S' who had 
tried to unseat him. For further details see, Republika, 11.4.00; Rakyat Merdeka, 27.4.00; Suara 
Karya, 11.5.00. 
59 Rakyat Merdeka, 22.8.00 and Media Indonesia, 21.8.00. 
60 Media Indonesia, 23.10.99. 
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Wanandi first became head of the DPUN he stated that the body would 
concentrate on matters of safety, worker unionisation and regional 
decentralisation 61 However, a review of newspaper reports from that period 
suggests that he was more vocal about the work of the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA), the state agency assigned to collect repayments 
from the private sector after a government bail out of the banking sector in 1998. 
Subjects such as who IBRA was selling assets to and the advocacy of debt 
forgiveness, especially for SME indebted companies, were the most frequently 
reported and it is likely to have been these issues in particular which caused the 
friction between the economic cabinet and the DPUN. 62 
If the economic cabinet felt that their rightful role in policy-making was being 
impinged upon by DEN and especially DPUN, Kadin was positively incensed. 
Because Kadin, some national sectoral BAs and DPUN all represented the same 
constituency of large private domestic firms, Kadin and some sectoral BAs 
complained vociferously about DPUN's proximity to policy-making circles 
through the close relationship between President Wahid and head of DPUN, 
Wanandi 63 This may seem anomalous given that the Kadin chairman, Aburizal 
Bakrie, was actually vice chairman of DPUN, but it quickly became apparent 
that Wanandi was the motor behind this organisation. 64 
In contrast to Habibie's tenure, Wahid had no ideological or establishment 
connections with either the chairman of Kadin or Kadin as an institution. 
Ideologically, the state economic guidelines which Wahid presided over did 
draw on the `people's economy' principle but crucially added that its 
implementation was to be through the market mechanism and healthy 
61 Media Indonesia, 21.12.99. 
62 For example, see Bisnis Indonesia, 20.12.99; Infobisnis, February 2000; Jakarta Post, 18.2.00; 
Media Indonesia, 23.5.00; Rakyat Merdeka, 27.5.00. Kwik Gian Gie was famously reported to 
have quipped that the DPUN should stand for Dewan Pengemplangan Utang Nasional (Council 
for the Unpayment of National Debt (Media Indonesia, 21.1.00). 
63 Interviews with Soy Pardede (16.11.01) and Utama Kajo (28.1.02). See also Bisnis Indonesia, 
6.12.99; Bisnis Indonesia, 11.12.99; Kontan, 13.12.99; Bisnis Indonesia, 19.12.99; Kompas, 
10.3.00; Suara Karya, 10.6.00; Suara Pembaruan, 16.8.00. 
64 From the hundreds of newspaper reports which DPUN generated in its 8 months in existence, 
Aburizal Bakrie never once represented the organisation. 
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competition. 65 Personally, Wahid and Bakrie had no history of working together 
in the same way as Habibie and Bakrie had, and reports and comments by Wahid 
himself suggested that there existed a personal antipathy between the two men. 66 
After just eight months both DEN and DPUN were finally dissolved, 
precipitated by calls from the MPR factions and a cabinet reshuffle where 
potential new economics ministers reportedly refused their new appointments 
unless the DPUN was first disbanded. 67 DEN, which was a very different body 
to DPUN due to its academic and technocrat members, was dissolved after 
Wahid considered it to be too critical of some of his policies. 8 
On the day that the dissolutions of both these bodies were announced, Aburizal 
Bakrie declared that a new body under the Kadin umbrella would be their 
replacement. 9 When DPUN had first been created Kadin had formed a body 
called KPEN (Komite Pemulihan Ekonomi Nasional) (National Economic 
Recovery Committee) which had effectively lain dormant ever since. Upon the 
dissolution of DPUN, the majority of the old DPUN members simply moved 
across to KPEN bolstered by some Kadin stalwarts and headed this time by 
Aburizal Bakrie with Sofyan Wanandi as Vice-Chairman. 0 Despite 
proclamations that KPEN could now function more independently vis-ä-vis the 
government because it had not been formed by government decree and was not 
part of the cabinet structure, 71 KPEN has since all but faded into obscurity. 
72 
65 These guidelines are the GBHN and offer the same level of abstraction as the TAP MPR. For 
further information on the role of GBHN see Maclntyre (1991), p. 29 and Warta Ekonomi, 
25.10.99. 
66 Interviews with Faisal Basri (14.11.01), James Castle (29.11.01) and a senior Kadin official. 
See also, Bisnis Indonesia, 19.12.99; Kontan Online, 13.12.99. 
67 Rakyat Merdeka, 22.8.00; Rakyat Merdeka, 17.8.00; Media Indonesia, 21.8.00; Rakyat 
Merdeka, 23.8.00. 
68 Interview with former DEN member, Faisal Basri (14.11.01). DEN criticisms which were 
considered particularly sensitive were around debt deals for well connected companies and 
generally the close relationship which DEN members perceived between Wahid and some 
conglomerate businessmen (Bisnis Indonesia, 23.5.00 and Kompas, 23.6.00). 
69 Suara Karya, 22.8.00. 
70 Some KPEN members are: Chairman, Aburizal Bakrie, Daily Chair, Sofyan Wanandi. 
Committee Leaders: Soegeng Sarjadi, Kusomo AM and Anton Supit. Some of the other KPEN 
members are: Yusuf Faishal, Wiwoho Basuki, John A Prasetio, Sunyoto Tanudjaja, Oesman 
Soedargo, Fatchur Rochman, Alim Markus, Tony Agus Ardie, James T Riady, Benny Soetrisno, 
Rachmat Gobel, Steve Sondakh, Ismeth Abdullah, Subronto Laras, Chairul Tanjung (Business 
News, 8.9.00). 
71 Media Indonesia, 7.9.00; Indonesian Observer, 7.9.00. 
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Even with the continued involvement of Wahid's ally, Sofyan Wanandi, KPEN 
had become a Kadin body and so could no longer capture the ear of the 
President. However, with reference to Section 4.3, the nominal involvement of 
Wanandi in the KPEN shows a slight movement towards more Chinese- 
Indonesian involvement in Kadin. 
Thus, in terms of the representation of domestic, mostly conglomerate business 
interests, DPUN had a limited period of influence whilst Kadin never managed 
to achieve such close contact. 73 DPUN was marginally a more transparent and 
less blatantly corrupt version of DPKEK for a slightly different clientele of 
conglomerate businesses, but still showed that influence relied on personal 
relationships rather than the democratic ideal of institutional relationships. 
Does the fact that Kadin did not achieve influence on economic policy-making 
during Wahid's tenure mean that Wahid's government exercised a state 
corporatist policy towards business? If Kadin had represented anything other 
than just its leaders' own interests then its situation on the margins of policy- 
making could indeed be considered a corporatist strategy. However, because it 
does in fact appear to be the case that Kadin is still used as a vehicle for a 
grouping of large pribumi conglomerates, the unreceptiveness of Wahid towards 
Kadin simply means that he favoured rather those conglomerates grouped into 
DPUN. One of the major motivations for the formation of DPUN had been to 
attract back to Indonesia the domestic capital which had taken flight overseas 
during the economic and political crisis surrounding Soeharto's downfall. 
Because in practice this meant Chinese-Indonesian capital, Wahid knew that 
Kadin was of no use in this regard. It is still nevertheless disappointing that in 
his rash of policy body creation, 74 no real efforts were made by the Wahid 
administration to sponsor the formation of a more inclusive domestic business 
72 Interviews with Soy Pardede (16.11.01), Utama Kajo (28.1.02), Faisal Basri (14.11.01), Tulus 
Tambunan (1.11.01). 
73 Interviews with Anthony Sunarjo (13.12.01), Soy Pardede (16.11.01), Faisal Basri (14.11.01). 
74 At the same time as creating DPUN and DEN Wahid also created Tim Asistensi Ekonomi to 
negotiate with the IMF, Tim Penasihat Ekonomi Internasional (which included ex Singapore 
Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, international financier, George Soros and American ex- 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger), Dewan Keamanan Nasional (DKN) for national security 
purposes and Dewan Sosial Nasional for social development purposes. (Rakyat Merdeka, 
12.1.00; Kompas, 10.3.00). 
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representation body. On the other hand, DEN did function to include a new 
voice into policy networks, that of reform-minded academics, which had been 
absent from both Soeharto's and Habibie's calculations when it came to policy- 
making. However, the fact that DEN was disbanded as soon as its criticisms 
began to make Wahid uncomfortable does not reflect well on his tenure. 
Another way in which Wahid made attempts to open up government was 
through his treatment of the State Secretariat (Sekneg). From the 1970s to the 
1990s, Soeharto had used Sekneg as a major supporting institution for his 
Presidency by expanding its administrative power and later giving it authority 
over the project to nurture pribumi business groups. In his 1995 book, 
Pangaribuan characterised Sekneg as the `eyes, ears and hands of Soeharto' 
because Sekneg officials examined all plans and recommendations that were 
offered to the President (p. 7). Heavily influenced by the military, it was a 
bureaucratic stronghold where all political funds were collected, mass 
organisations monitored, Presidential Decrees drafted and big projects 
approved. 5 Indeed, it was from here that two leading lights of the Kadin 
executive, Aburizal Bakrie and Fadel Muhammad, gained access to the 
76 government facilities which helped their businesses. 
Wahid famously referred to Sekneg as `a state within a state' and attempted to 
break up the power of this monolithic institution. He ordered that it be audited 
for the first time ever by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPKP) which subsequently 
reported `deviations' amounting to US$ 14.96 billion. 7 Wahid also initially 
suggested a reduction of Sekneg staff from 3,000 to 800 and most importantly 
replaced many of the strategic positions within Sekneg with civilian 
professionals from his own circles. 8 The control which Sekneg exercised over 
access to the President from the Soeharto era through to Habibie's tenure was 
effectively discontinued and Wahid became known as a very accessible 
President for all types of interest groups. However, as we shall see in the next 
75 Tempo, 13.8.01. 
76 Detak, 4-10 January, 2000. 
77 Tempo, 13.8.01. 
78 Jakarta Post, 30.8.01. 
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section, these attempts by Wahid to dilute the power of Sekneg have since been 
reversed by President Megawati. 
Similarly, in terms of state input into decision-making, Wahid ignored the long- 
established 45 member Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan 
Agung) (DPA) which Soeharto and Habibie had both used during their tenures as 
a tool to support and legitimise their policies 79 Scores of institutional roles 
which Habibie had created for some conglomerate bosses such as economic 
envoys or advisory posts were also scrapped by Wahid. 80 
As a new domestic source of economic policy, the DPR really began to test its 
powers during Wahid's tenure. Under Soeharto, the DPR had lacked power not 
only because its members were either appointed directly by Soeharto or won 
seats in state-managed elections, but also because the scope of their powers did 
not extend beyond debating infrequent and rather generalised laws. As Ran-flan 
Surbakti explains, detailed regulations dictating policy implementation and 
budget allocation came from the executive branch in the form of Government 
Regulations, Presidential Decrees, Presidential Instructions and Ministerial 
Decrees (Surbakti 1999). 
In contrast, during both the Habibie and Wahid Presidencies, the DPR 
dramatically increased its activities. For example, in the last five years of the 
Soeharto regime, the DPR produced 86 laws, whilst under the 17 month tenure 
of Habibie and the 21 month tenure of Wahid, 75 and 78 laws were produced by 
the DPR respectively. 81 Moreover, constitutional amendments made in 1999 and 
2000 have given members of parliament more powers in initiating legislation 
(Fealy 2001, p. 104). 
Under Wahid the newly elected members of the DPR also exercised their power 
over policy through their rights to scrutinise the government's budget. This right 
is a crucial one as it gives members of parliament an effective veto over all 
79 Jakarta Post, 17.2.00; Jakarta Post, 23.2.00; Tempo, 19.3.01. 
80 Jakarta Post, 27.2.00; Indonesian Observer, 27.2.00. 
81 Tempo, 9.7.01. 
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government expenditures on all government programmes. The DPR's approval 
is now also required for all foreign loans and grants, privatisations and injections 
of state capital into private enterprises (Maclntyre 2003a, p. 143). Throughout 
Wahid's tenure, the DPR exercised these new powers by routinely hampering 
and delaying IMF-inspired policies such as the slashing of fuel subsidies and the 
sale of IBRA assets abroad. 82 
Despite these setbacks, the IMF continued to maintain a high degree of control 
over a wide range of economic policies. The Letters of Intent (LOIs), which are 
regularly negotiated between the government and the IMF, effectively became 
the government's economic policy. 83 Policies such as cuts in fuel and electricity 
subsidies were open to some degree of latitude, with bargaining between the 
IMF and the government over the time scale for implementation of the cuts. 
However, there were also issues which were not open to negotiation as 
evidenced in the damaging suspensions of IMF disbursements throughout 
Wahid's presidency (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 above). 84 Generally, the 
relationship between the IMF and the Indonesian government under Wahid's 
stewardship was unstable and very much dependant on who held the post of 
Economic Co-ordinating Minister. 85 Indeed it was a measure of the importance 
of the IMF in economic policy-making that the level of accommodation towards 
the IMF decided who was installed as the Economic Co-ordinating Minister. 
Thus, in some ways the Wahid administration attempted to dilute the influence 
of the state bureaucratic machine, including Kadin, which had evolved over 
82 IBRA's sale of Bank BCA and the Salim oil palm plantations are two well-known examples of 
the policies hampered by the DPR. 
83 For full copies of these LOIs, go to http: //www. imf. org. /external/country/IDN/index. htm 
84 According to the Head of IMF in Indonesia, the two main issues which caused the IMF to 
withhold a $400 million disbursement for nine months during Wahid's presidency were (1) a 
proposed government amendment to the Bank Indonesia law in relation to the government's 
authority to decide on the Governor of Bank Indonesia, and (2) the IMF's insistence on the 
government imposing a ceiling for the level of loans which regional administrations are allowed 
to take on. (Indonesian Business, July 2001). , 85 Whilst Kwik Gian Gie was in office relations with the IMF were generally smooth, but after 
there were complaints by the DPR that he was too accommodating towards the IMF, Rizal Ramli 
took over the post. Ramli proved outspoken in his criticism of the IMF and relations worsened to 
such a point that Wahid felt obliged to install an ex-IMF employee as Economic Co-ordinating 
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many years under Soeharto and had been continued under Habibie. In their 
place he created some new policy institutions, the most important of which were 
DEN and DPUN, both representing very different constituencies. However, the 
creation of these new bodies also irked a new centre of power, the DPR, because 
they seemed to bypass political party appointees in the cabinet. Indeed, it was 
the bad relations which existed between the DPR and President Wahid which 
eventually led to his impeachment and subsequent removal as President. These 
trends all occurred within the constraints of a tight control over many types of 
economic policy by the IMF. 
4.4.3.3 President Megawati Soekarnoputri (July 2001 - Ongoing) 
At the time of fieldwork for this thesis, Indonesia's fifth President, Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, had been in office only a few months, but with this caveat in 
mind there are nevertheless some tendencies in economic policy-making which 
can be identified. 
In the last section it was possible to review Wahid's broad ideological standpoint 
on economic principles through an examination of the GBHN prepared for him 
by the MPR. Formally, the GBHN is a set of policy guidelines to which the 
President can be held accountable by the MPR and it was in fact one of the tools 
which the MPR used to oust Wahid in 2001. However, the GBHN has now 
become obsolete due to the 2002 constitutional amendment which will see the 
next President of Indonesia directly elected by the people rather than by the 
political parties in the MPR. Thus the next President will be theoretically 
accountable to the people rather than the MPR so that the GBHN as a document 
of accountability to the MPR no longer has any force. 
In the absence of a formal statement of economic principles through the GBHN, 
a brief examination of Megawati's party, the PDI(P), will suffice. Although the 
PDI(P) has strictly speaking only been in its present form since 1998, its roots 
can be easily traced back to the 1950s when Megawati's father, Indonesia's first 
Minister, Burhanuddin Abdullah. (Indonesian Business, July 2001; Indonesian Business, 
August 2001; Warta Ekonomi, 11.9.00). 
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President Soekarno, was its leader. Throughout the long history of this party, the 
broad outline of its economic policies was drawn from Marhaenist philosophy 
with its orientation to smallholders. 86 However, since the PDI(P) rose to power 
in the 1999 elections on the lasting populist appeal of Soekarno, its economics 
have been firmly inclined towards a liberal economic philosophy. 
Megawati's first economic cabinet was generally considered to have met market 
expectations with a concentrated technocratic presence, whilst at the same time 
accommodating the competing interests of the major political parties in the 
DPR. 87 Within the technocratic bracket, however, there are splits within her 
economic team which are defined in terms of support for the IMF programme. 
The `old guard' technocrats who have been around since the height of Soeharto's 
power and have appeared in Habibie's, Wahid's and now Megawati's circle of 
advisors are joined by the Economic Co-ordinating Minister and the Finance 
Minister as broadly pro-IMF. 88 There is also a presence from political figures 
who are considered to be more wary of the extent of the IMF's intervention, 
such as Kwik Gian Gie, Rizal Ramli and Theo Toemion. 89 However, even in 
view of this apparent division, and whether it is over or understated, the 
economic advice of the latter group cannot be considered `nationalist'. The 
nationalist label does not fit as there is no grand industrial protectionist strategy 
and in many ways the macroeconomic policies espoused by these figures are 
very similar to those advocated by the IMF (MacIntyre 2003a, p. 145). 
Such an environment has left Kadin once again on the margins of economic 
policy-making as can be evidenced by the less than receptive attitude by 
Megawati's government to some of Kadin's major policy platforms. For 
86 Marhaen literally means `farmer' in Sundanese (the indigenous language of West Java). The 
concept was developed by Soekarno to describe a future idealised society free from dependence 
on foreign capital with a community of classless but happy Marhaens, rather than greedy 
(Western-style) individualists, that reflected the idealised values of the traditional village. Later 
the concept became synonymous with socio-nationalism and the struggle for independence 
(http: //reference. allrefer. com/country-guide-study/indonesia/indonesia28 html). 
"Jakarta Post, 10.8.01. 
88 The old guard technocrats are Sadli, Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim and Frans Seda. The 
Economic Coordinating Minister is Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and the Finance Minister is 
Boediono. For further details see Warta Ekonomi, 20.8.01. 
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example, one such policy from Kadin is in connection to a controversial 
Ministry of Manpower decree first issued in 2000 which stipulated higher 
severance and long-service payments for workers. After complaints by the 
business community and major campaigns by Kadin, new decrees were indeed 
issued but then later rescinded after a series of strikes and protests by labour 
unions. The latest revision of this decree in February 2003 conceded to some of 
Kadin's complaints, but was still considered by most to be pro-labour 
(MacIntyre 2003a, p. 149). Although organised labour is still very much on the 
margins of any policy-making which is not directly connected to labour, it is 
nevertheless clear that, on these issues at least, the newly liberated labour unions 
can be a force with which Kadin must now contend for the ear of government. 
90 
It is also instructive to note that the illicit payments which Kadin is reported to 
have made to some MPs in connection with this policy (Maclntyre 2003a, p. 149) 
do not seem to have had an enormous impact on the outcome. 
Another key failure for Kadin policy was over the implementation of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) which reduces import tariffs throughout the 
ASEAN region. Kadin had called for AFTA to be delayed until at least 2005 
since the agreements to fully implement AFTA in 2003 were made back in 1994 
before the economic crisis. However, not only did Megawati ignore these 
demands, she even personally chided Kadin for their attitude, suggesting that 
they should instead put their efforts into ways to deal with the `forces of 
globalisation. '91 
Generally, Kadin's complaints about the rises in electricity and fuel prices have 
been no match for the power of the IMF on these issues. Kadin has instead been 
reduced to calling on its members to boycott the payment of taxes on the issue of 
price increases, or in the case of the labour laws, simply ignore them. 
2 
89 Warta Ekonomi, 20.8.01. Note that Kwik Gian Gie was labelled as being too subservient 
towards the IMF whilst he was Economics Co-ordinating Minister under Wahid. However, after 
he was replaced he went on record about his unease with the extent of IMF intervention. 
90 Labour Unions were limited and controlled by Soeharto, and workers were not permitted to 
strike. This changed when Habibie acceded to international labour regulations in 1998 and as of 
February 2003, there are now 72 trade union federations registered at the national level, 931 at 
provincial level, 2877 at district level and 15,762 at plant level (Gardner 2003). 
IndonesiaMu Online, 11.4.01. 
92 Jakarta Post, 22.1.03; Jakarta Post, 9.10.02. 
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A further indication that Kadin is not being welcomed at the State Palace is that 
a new Kadin sponsored body, the `Crisis Centre', aimed at improving the flow of 
information from the business community to the government has been sidelined 
into the Ministry of Trade and Industry by the government. The head of the 
Crisis Centre, a long time Kadin executive Anton Supit, has himself complained 
that the body can not be effective without a high level government patron, such 
as the Economics Co-ordinating Minister or the President, to directly execute 
decisions. The President has also not responded to calls from the body to 
legitimise it with a Presidential Decree. 93 
Megawati's style of government in terms of accessibility is very different from 
the previous regime of Wahid. The experienced Far Eastern Economic Review 
correspondent, John McBeth, describes Megawati's Presidency thus: "Gone are 
the Presidential spokesmen. Rigid protocol and tight security have been 
restored, along with the authority of the State Secretariat. " (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1.11.01). He goes on to report that even some of Megawati's 
closest aides are complaining about the difficulty of obtaining access to the 
President. 
Concerns over the reinvigoration of the power of the State Secretariat (Sekneg) 
have been widely reported since a Soeharto-era Sekneg bureaucrat, Bambang 
Kesowo, was installed by Megawati as the new State Secretary. Kesowo has 
openly pledged to return Sekneg's power and is reportedly reviving the same 
departmental structure as existed before Wahid's reforms in order to control 
access to Megawati 94 When Kesowo was called before the DPR to account for 
his lack of progress in restructuring Sekneg after Wahid's appointees left, the 
press reported that the probable hold-up was caused by plans to appoint extra 
staff from the civil service and political parties to give Megawati a second 
opinion on issues with political overtones 95 This seems more likely in view of 
Megawati's plans to scrap the Supreme Advisory Agency (DPA). 
6 
93 Jakarta Post, 22.8.02; Jakarta Post, 9.10.02. 
94 Jakarta Post, 30.8.01; Tempo, 11.2.02. 
95 Tempo, 11.2.02. 
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However, although Megawati may have decided to use Sekneg in similar ways to 
Soeharto, but this does not mean that it will have the same power. For example, 
some functions such as the authority to draft bills and supervise state owned 
enterprises such as Pertamina have already been withdrawn from Sekneg 97 
Furthermore, Sekneg's power is clearly just a reflection of the President's power, 
which today is circumscribed by, amongst others, a free press and an active 
parliament. In any case, it is a widely accepted belief that Megawati does not 
have a tight grasp on policy-making, preferring instead to leave much of the 
economic decision-making to her aides and co-ordinating ministers 98 This is in 
stark contrast to Soeharto's centralised style of governance. 
In comparison to the antagonistic relationship which existed between Wahid and 
the DPR, Megawati's administration have managed to stay on rather better terms 
with the parliament. Moreover, with the constitutional revision which will see 
the next President directly elected by the people in the 2004 general elections 
instead of chosen by MPs, political parties will no longer be able to remove 
future Presidents in the same way as occurred in Wahid's tenure. This could 
mean that in the future the relationship between the parliament and the President 
may contain less brinkmanship than has been evidenced in the past. 
Megawati's government has also had a fairly stable relationship with the IMF 
since it has adopted many of the IMF's prescriptions of fiscal and monetary 
prudence, reductions in state subsidies and privatisations. But this adherence to 
fiscal austerity has also instigated waves of demonstrations as the populace 
struggle to keep up with the ever-rising prices of staple goods. The four-year, 
multi-billion dollar IMF programme was not extended by the government 
beyond the end of 2003 which means that the IMF has now lost its privileged 
position in economic policy-making. This was precipitated by the activities of a 
loose coalition of thirty five economists under the leadership of Rizal Ramli, 
known as Indonesia Bangkit (Indonesia Arises), which campaigned strongly for 
an end to the IMF loans. 
96 Jakarta Post, 3.8.02. 
97 Jakarta Post, 30.8.01. 
98 Jakarta Post, 19.10.01. 
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With this end to IMF involvement and in the run up to the 2004 elections, there 
has been a rise in the nationalist sentiments which have served to counterbalance 
the liberalist policies of the IMF since the fall of Soeharto. Populist pro pribwni 
policies are likely to become more central as political parties seek re-election 
coupled with trade-offs for party funding from big businesses seeking regulatory 
favours. 
A new wave of Indonesian political literature also reflects widespread discontent 
with the type of liberalist policies promoted by the IMF with titles such as 
'Under the Threat of the IMF' and `Criticising the IMF: Indonesia's Struggle to 
Arise from the Economic Crisis'. 99 Calling on Indonesian academics to teach 
not just neo-liberal economics, these authors generally recognise that some IMF 
policies make sense whilst at the same time re-affirming the need for state 
involvement in key sectors which impact directly on staple goods, and 
promoting land reform and stock ownership programmes for workers. 10° Kadin 
may be better placed to take advantage of this kind of environment with its own 
emphasis on pro-pribumi policies. 
In conclusion to this section on policy-making, it seems that whilst authoritarian 
corporatist control over economic policy-making has largely abated, the 
Indonesian business community as a whole is still struggling to find an effective 
voice beyond the continuing government largesse towards a few favoured 
conglomerates. Although there have been various attempts to co-operate with 
new economic bodies, no new enduring channels have arisen. This is 
particularly true at the level of debate which deals with the broad outlines of 
national policy rather than the more specific, and by nature more particularistic, 
level of policy implementation. 
After a brief period of more open government under Wahid, Megawati seems to 
be returning to the use of New Order structures to limit access to policy-making 
circles. Yet, even with this in mind, it is clear that sucessive Indonesian 
99 Baswir, R. (2003) Di Bawah Ancaman IMF, Jakarta, Koalisi Anti-Utang with Pustaka Pelajar. 
Budisusilo, A. (2001) Menggugat IMF. " Pergulatan Indonesia Bangkit Dari Krisis, Bina Rena 
Pariwara, Jakarta. 
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governments since 1998 have had to contend with a DPR which is both willing 
and able to intervene in economic policy and the pressure of the IMF. In short, 
the Indonesian state is no longer insulated from extra-bureaucratic voices the 
way it was in the New Order. 
Kadin's fortunes have fluctuated with the changes in government elite. The 
threat inherent in the absolute power of Soeharto is no longer there and Kadin is 
now essentially free from state corporatist control, but whether it is listened to is 
a different question. Kadin certainly can and does advocate to the government 
on issues of genuine importance to the Indonesian business community as a 
whole. But unless there is an overhaul of Kadin's structures and elite it will also 
continue to act as a vehicle for particularistic interests, so diminishing its wider 
policy advocacy function. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the notion of state corporatist control as applied to 
the Indonesian business community. It has been shown that state interference in 
the election of BA leaders has dissipated and there is now more freedom for BAs 
to choose the content of their policy advocacy. A more open culture of dialogue 
between BAs and top state decision-makers also seems to be taking root, 
although this is affected quite substantially by the individual style of Presidential 
leadership. Under the very particular circumstances of the multi-billion dollar 
IMF assistance, BAs have been largely sidelined in national level policy-making 
in favour of the IMF. Where domestic business has been represented at the level 
of national policy, sucessive Presidents have chosen to create their own 
groupings rather than rely on existing BAs. 
However, the data presented in this chapter, coupled with the section on the role 
of BAs in government procurement from the last chapter, also highlight the 
persistence of bureaucratic connections as a defining characteristic of Indonesian 
BAs. Sectoral BAs and especially Kadin were conceived of as organisations to 
promote pribumi business through the allocation of government favours and the 
10° Baswir (2003), p. 10 and p. 241. 
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internal logic of many of these organisations are largely dictated by this very 
important function. 
If corporatism is applied more widely to include not just the policy process but 
politics in general, then the relationship between corruption and corporatism can 
be more easily discerned. For the effect of corporatism on corruption is not 
dependent on the intervention of pluralist tendencies, as was suggested in the 
introduction to this chapter by King (1982). Rather, corporatism was used by 
Soeharto to give form to clientelist patterns, to organise and control them. 
Clients are dependent on their positions within corporatist networks to gain 
access to government favours. In their turn, corporatist structures rely on the 
acquiescence of the business community achieved through clientelism to accept 
their imposition. 
Disaggregating corporatism into constraints and inducements and defining 
clientelism as an inducement opens up the possibility of such an inter- 
relationship between the two concepts. Although the corporatism exercised 
under Soeharto was ultimately grounded in his control over the use of violence 
through the armed forces and his ability to marginalise offenders against his 
authority, in practice containment was achieved through the provision of favours 
rather than a recourse to such constraints. 
Thus, the situation today where state corporatist practices are in decline does not 
so much have an impact on the level of corruption, causing it to rise or fall, but 
rather on the pattern of corruption. This corresponds to a theme which arose 
from all of the interviews for this thesis whereby the granting of government 
favours is now based on monetary exchanges rather than the old mixture of 
money and political influence. 
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Chapter Five 
CREDIT AND DEBT 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters have examined some of the features of the system of 
wealth distribution under the Soeharto regime and the changes that have occurred in 
them since 1998. The granting of government contracts to a few favoured private 
businesses from such lucrative sectors as forestry, electricity and oil were conceived 
by Soeharto as a project to build an Indonesian capitalist class whilst at the same 
time preserving his own political power. Such a project was premised on the 
perceived threat of foreign economic domination of the Indonesian economy and the 
delusion that around twenty Indonesian families (and most especially Soeharto's 
own) represented Indonesian economic interests. It was shown in Chapter Two that 
the demise of Soeharto's rule has indeed led to a greater role for private 
international business in the government contract sector, a relative stasis in domestic 
conglomerate participation and a fragmentation of state recipients of patronage to 
include the parliament and local government. 
Chapter Three looked at the role of business associations (BAs) in the distribution 
of wealth. It was shown that BAs have many different functions, but one of the most 
important remains as vehicles of access for medium and large pribumi companies to 
enter the government `contract loop' through bureaucratic channels. 
Chapter Four continued the focus on BAs, highlighting state control of BAs with 
special reference to the peak Indonesian BA, Kadin. Here, it was suggested that 
corporatist state control has now dissipated from Indonesian politics, but that 
continued bureaucratic connections ensure a certain acquiescence of those 
businesses grouped in Kadin to the state. However, where the distribution of wealth 
is played out at a more abstract level in national policy-making, the three successive 
post-Soeharto administrations have eschewed input by Kadin in favour of their own 
groupings of business. With a newly reduced role in policy-making for the IMF, 
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however, a nationalist backlash may provide an environment more conducive for 
Kadin. 
This chapter will examine a final major feature of the Soeharto system of wealth 
distribution: the availability of credit. All businesses are dependent on credit to add 
extra value to the economy, otherwise conceived of as the creation of wealth or the 
accumulation of capital. For many years, the Indonesian private sector was 
dependent on credit provided by the state until the liberalisation of the banking 
sector in 1988 enabled conglomerates to form their own banks with minimal 
amounts of both initial capital and state supervision. ' Coupled with the increasing 
willingness of foreign banks to lend directly to Indonesian businesses, the ease of 
obtaining credit meant that it was not used optimally in businesses that were 
productive enough to be self-sustaining in either the present or the short term future. 
Credit was instead often channelled to businesses that could not make sufficient 
profits to survive on their own or disappeared into complicated networks of real or 
fictitious businesses to eventually end up in clandestine bank accounts overseas. 
With the onset of the economic crisis, the Indonesian government was forced to 
either allow the national banking sector to collapse under the weight of unpaid debt 
or take over those debts and effectively become the main creditor for the majority of 
Indonesian big business. At the height of the economic crisis, immediately prior to 
and after the resignation of Soeharto, both the Soeharto and the Habibie 
governments opted for the latter course of action. In turn, this has led to a situation 
where Indonesian big business today continues to be more dependent on the state 
than it has ever been for the survival of its businesses. In other words, capitalist 
class autonomy from the state, which is often cited as a precondition for a 
functioning democracy, 2 has in this regard suffered a setback. 
1 The initial capital requirement for opening a new bank at that time was about US$ 6 million 
(Schwarz, A. 1999, p. 74). 
2 Barrington Moore popularised this thesis (Moore 1966). 
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Nevertheless, the continuing intensity of the negotiations over debt make this sector 
an interesting case study when examining the post-Soeharto relationship between 
business and the state. As one analyst suggests, the debt negotiations actually 
signify the dismantling of the micro-economic structure formed under Soeharto 
(Sato 2003, p. 4). These negotiations also speak directly to a consideration of the 
distribution of wealth in Indonesia because their results represent nothing less than 
the sharing out of the economy between four main elite constituents: domestic 
pribumi business, Chinese-Indonesian business, foreign business and the Indonesian 
state. Thus, corruption in this sector can be viewed as a system of wealth 
distribution based not just on connections but also on ethnicity. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 5.2 will clarify what 
happened in the early stages of the economic crisis and the origins of debt. Section 
5.3 will then go on to detail some of the issues involved in the negotiations between 
the government and the business sector. It will be shown here how these 
negotiations represent not only the relative power of all the constituencies involved, 
but also the apportionment of blame and responsibility for the debt crisis which in 
turn represent a re-evaluation of the Soeharto system of wealth distribution. Finally, 
section 5.4 will look at the effects of these negotiations on patterns of ownership in 
the Indonesian economy. This last section will particularly provide evidence for the 
social conflict theorists' view of deregulation as simply shifting economic gains 
from domestic to international interests. 
5.2 Sources of Debt 
Indonesia's approximately US$ 200 billion debt is made up of three constituent 
parts. The first part is the US$ 85 billion owed by the government to international 
institutions such as the IMF, ADB, WB and foreign governments. This debt covers 
past loans made by these institutions to both state-owned enterprises and directly to 
the government for development projects and routine budgetary shortfalls. The 
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second part is debt owed by the private sector to the Indonesian government after 
the government pumped emergency and longer-term recapitalization funds into the 
banking sector to stave off a total collapse of the banking sector at the height of the 
economic crisis. Whilst the government is still drip-feeding this payment to 
Indonesian banks through interest payments on bonds, receiving banks are required 
to repay these funds. This part is estimated at around US$ 70 billion. The third part 
of this total US$ 200 billion debt is owed by the Indonesian private sector to foreign 
banks that lent directly to Indonesian business owners in the past. This private 
sector foreign debt amounts to around US$ 60 billion. 
Within Indonesia, there seems to be remarkably little debate about the terms of 
repayment of the first type of debt above, that part incurred by the Indonesian 
government to international institutions .5 Controversy over this part of 
Indonesia's 
debt tends instead to focus on the appropriate level of economic policy influence 
that this amount of debt should reasonably be expected to buy for institutions such 
as the IMF. Similarly, the debt that exists between private domestic firms and 
private foreign banks has received relatively little attention within Indonesia. The 
resolution of this type of debt may have important long-term ramifications for 
ownership within the Indonesian economy, but because there is relatively minimal 
amounts of government involvement and resources, it is largely left to the parties 
concerned to sort out between themselves .6 
3 Prior to the economic crisis, the World Bank made up close to two thirds of these loans, and the 
Asian Development Bank close to a third (Feridhanusetyawan 2003, p. 235). 
Central Bank of Indonesia (March 2003) Indonesia's External Debt. ICG reports even higher 
figures based on a Research Paper by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (ICG 2001). 
s Notable exceptions are the NGOs grouped together under INFID (International NGO Forum on 
Indonesian Development). International organisations such as the Jubilee 2000 Campaign have also 
been vocal on the Indonesian government's indebtedness to international institutions. See also 
Feridhanusetyawan (2003) for a useful overview of alternative debt resolution schemes of this type 
of debt. 
6 Two caveats apply to this statement. There have been some prominent court cases in Indonesia 
involving foreign private creditors and domestic private creditors which have provoked interest for 
their testing of the new bankruptcy court. There was a relatively limited involvement of the 
Indonesian government in the restructuring of debts from domestic private businesses to foreign 
banks through an initiative known as INDRA (Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency). INDRA's 
schemes were largely ignored and it faded away after only two years (EFIC 2002). 
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In contrast, the debt owed domestically to the Indonesian government has raised a 
great deal of interest across a broad range of the Indonesian population for several 
reasons. The Indonesian corporate sector was heavily dependent on state bank 
loans rather than the re-investment of profits in order to develop and with these 
loans now in default this effectively means that the state has paid for private sector 
upgrade and expansion (See Table 5.1). Because the credit flowing from domestic 
banks over the years was also highly concentrated in the hands of a few favoured 
conglomerates, 7 the debt now represents to many the corrupt excesses of the 
Soeharto system of business/state relations. In effect, the present government is 
paying for the profligacy of the Soeharto regime which is passed on to the 
Indonesian population through cuts in public services. 
Table 5.1 Financing Patterns of Publicly Listed Non-Financial 
Com anies 1986-96 
Type of Financing % of total 
Internal (retained earnings) 17.3% 
Bank borrowing 37.9% 
Equity 23.5% 
Trade credit 8.6% 
Other 12.6% 
Total 100% 
Secondary Source: Asian Development Bank (2000) Corporate 
Governance and Finance in East Asia, Volume II, p. 34). Primary 
Source: Author's estimates based on the Pacific Basin Capital Markets 
(PACAP) Databases, PACAP Research Center 1996. 
In terms of the value of the debt which the Indonesian government has to repay, it is 
also the case that the debt incurred from international institutions will similarly 
burden the Indonesian state for many years to come, and the link between this kind 
of debt and reductions in the provision of public goods such as government 
subsidies on electricity, soybeans and sugar is in fact much more direct. 8 
7 For example, in 1994 the top 20 customers of state banks held over 40 percent of the total credits 
rovided by the six largest state banks (Baker et al 1999, p. 26). 
IMF demands for the elimination of subsidies on many everyday necessities are outlined in the 
Letters of Intent (LOIs), http: //www. imf. org/external/country/IDN/index. htm. The IMF's position is 
that past systems of government subsidy on basic goods are inefficient and should therefore be 
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Moreover, if it is accepted that a major cause of the severity of the economic crisis 
was the corruption of the Soeharto regime, then it could be argued that the loans 
from international institutions also represent a shifting of the repayment burden 
from the Soeharto regime to the present time. However, IMF money at least 
provides the tangible present benefits of increasing Indonesia's international 
reserves in order to support the national budget, as well as opening up the way for 
other multilateral and bilateral loans. In contrast, the domestic debt owed to the 
Indonesian government by local conglomerates provided highly disproportionate 
levels of benefit to only a handful of state elite members and conglomerate owners. 9 
Thus, contention over the repayment of domestic debt is borne of a resentment 
towards the Soeharto system of wealth distribution, especially from the 1990s 
onwards. But the repayment terms of domestic debt do not just represent a re- 
evaluation of the past system, it is also effectively the working out of Indonesia's 
current pattern of wealth distribution. For the economic crisis theoretically 
presented an opportunity for far-reaching changes in this regard as the first new 
government for thirty-two years gained ownership of the majority of the Indonesian 
economy. We will return to this point at the end of this chapter to review exactly 
what the post-Soeharto governments have done with this power and the constraints 
which have so far shaped its exercise. 
A final possible reason why domestic debt has received so much attention in 
Indonesia may be due simply to the ease of identification of domestic conglomerate 
bosses. The highly personal nature of the favouritism which conglomerate bosses 
received under Soeharto has meant that their vilification in the post-Soeharto era has 
replaced. Nevertheless, it remains true that the price of basic necessities have risen substantially with 
subsidy reductions. 
9 Although, because of the nature of IMF loans, there are no detailed accounts of exactly how IMF 
money is used, and it is "extremely difficult, if not impossible, to track the specific uses of reserves. " 
(Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF, 
http: //www. imf. orR/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam45/contents. htm). 
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also been highly personal. 1° Being able to identify individuals in order to assign 
responsibility for all the hardships which Indonesian people currently face is 
naturally more satisfying that grappling with ideas of abstract structures or systems. 
It is for these reasons that this chapter will concentrate on the negotiations between 
the government and the domestic private business sector. However, before turning 
to these negotiations, for the purpose of clarification it may first be useful to briefly 
dissect this domestic debt further. 
The first part of domestic debt is derived from the emergency funds which the 
government injected into private and state banks at the end of 1997 and the 
beginning of 1998. Known as BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia) (Bank 
Indonesia Liquidity Assistance), these funds were dispersed by the government 
when the closure of 16 banks in 1997 instigated a rush by Indonesian depositors 
fearful of losing their savings if their own bank was closed down. 
' Banks obtain 
profits from using customer deposits as loans to other customers and all banks are 
vulnerable to collapse if all the depositors suddenly decided to withdraw their 
deposits. This situation was aggravated in the Indonesian case as debt repayments 
to domestic banks dried up in the wake of the rupiah devaluation, leaving the banks 
without adequate cash flow to repay depositors. 
However, the purpose of BLBI, to ensure that depositors could recover their 
savings, was abused by the bank owners who used the funds instead to pour into 
their own collapsing business empires. There were also reports of bank owners 
using the BLBI funds to speculate on dollars and transfer them overseas, thus 
further aggravating the rupiah's devaluation. In addition, BLBI became 
controversial as it emerged that ten well-connected banks received 70 percent of the 
total amount issued (see Table 5.2 below). BMPK (Batas Maksimum Pemberian 
10 The frequent use in the Indonesian media of vocabulary such as konglomerat hitam (black 
conglomerates), dosa (sin) and bertobat (repent) to describe Indonesian conglomerates and their 
activities testifies to the strength of the idea that corruption is a matter of personal morals. 
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Kredit) is the legal lending limit from banks to businesses in the same conglomerate 
group and was set at 20 percent prior to the economic crisis. The BMPK column in 
the table below thus gives some indication of the degree of the violation of these 
limits by the various bank recipients as the BLBI funds flowed in. 
TAM 5.2 Mäjör; BLBI Recipients äs"of Dece"mbe'r 
Bank Owner Amount (RP 
Trillion) 
BMPK 
BDNI Sjamsul Nursalim 37.039 90.7% 
BCA Liem Sioe Liong 26.596 N/A 
Danamon Usman Admadjaja 23.049 43.8% 
Bank Umum 
Nasional 
Bob Hasan and Kaharudin 
On ko- 
12.067 43.9% 
Bank Indonesia 
Raya 
Publicly Listed Company 
(Bambang Winarso) 
4.018 N/A 
Bank Nusa Nasional Aburizal Bakrie 3.020 N/A 
Bank Tiara Asia Publicly Listed Company 
(HR Pandji M. Noe) 
2.978 N/A 
Bank Modern Samadikun Hartono 2.557 63.2% 
Bank Pesona Utama Hutomo Mandala Putra 2.334 N/A 
Bank Asia Pacific -------------------- 2.054 N/A 
Total Amount 115.712 
Sources: IBRA Annual Report 2000, p. 128. For BMPK: Tempo, 17.9.01; Prospek, 
24.8.98; Tempo, 31.12.01; Warta Ekonomi, 7.9.98. 
The initial cost of BLBI to the government amounted to an astonishing Rp 144.5 
trillion (US$ 14.45 billion) and is set to rise as interest payments on the bonds the 
government issued to save the banks fall due. 
The second part of domestic debt is composed of unpaid loans made by state banks 
directly to private businesses throughout the Soeharto era. 12 With the drastic rupiah 
devaluation at the outset of the economic crisis, the dollar denominated loans which 
many Indonesian businesses had taken advantage of became very difficult to pay 
" It was the IMF that advised the government to close these 16 banks and inject BLBI, thus causing 
the public loss of confidence which led to a rush. 
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Kredit) is the legal lending limit from banks to businesses in the same conglomerate 
group and was set at 20 percent prior to the economic crisis. The BMPK column in 
the table below thus gives some indication of the degree of the violation of these 
limits by the various bank recipients as the BLBI funds flowed in. 
Table 5.2 Major BLBI Recipients as of December 2000 
Bank Owner Amount (R1' 
't'rillion) 
BMI'K 
BDNI Sjamsul Nursalim 37.039 90.7% 
BCA Liern Sioe Liong 26.596 N/A 
Danamon Usman Admadjaja 23.049 43.8% 
Bank Umum 
Nasional 
Bob Hasan and Kaharudin 
On ko- 
12.067 43.9ýIr% 
Bank Indonesia 
Raya 
Publicly Listed Company 
(Bambang Winarso) 
4.018 N/A 
Bank Nusa Nasional Aburizal Bakrie 3.020 N/A 
Bank Tiara Asia Publicly Listed Company 
(HR Pandji M. Noe) 
2.978 N/A 
Bank Modern Samadikun Hartono 2.557 63.2% 
Bank Pesona Utama Hutomo Mandala Putra 2.334 N/A 
Bank Asia Pacific -------------------- 2.054 N/A 
Total Amount 115.712 
Sources: IBRA Annual Report 2000, p. 128. For BMPK: Tempo, 17.9.01; Pros/iek, 
24.8.98; Tempo, 31.12.01; Warta Ekonomi, 7.9.98. 
The initial cost of BLBI to the government amounted to an astonishing Rp 144.5 
trillion (US$ 14.45 billion) and is set to rise as interest payments on the bonds the 
government issued to save the banks fall due. 
The second part of domestic debt is composed of unpaid loans made by state banks 
directly to private businesses throughout the Soeharto era. 12 With the drastic rupiah 
devaluation at the outset of the economic crisis, the dollar denominated loans which 
many Indonesian businesses had taken advantage of became very difficult to pay 
11 It was the IMF that advised the government to close these 16 banks and inject BLBI, thus causing 
the public loss of confidence which led to a rush. 
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back. The day to day operations of many businesses were further paralysed by 
sudden price rises of imported inputs. The devaluation of the rupiah also led to a 
sharp contraction in domestic economic demand, and bank interest rates rose 
substantially in an effort to attract money back into the banking system. Thus, a 
combination of foreign bank obligations, a shrinking of the economy and a rise in 
interest rates meant that most of the loans from state banks to the domestic private 
sector became 'non-performing'. 13 
The third major strand of domestic debt comes from loans made by domestic private 
banks directly to Indonesian businesses. As already mentioned, these banks were 
usually owned by the same businesses who were receiving the loans. These loans 
became non-performing as a result of the same factors mentioned above of interest 
rate rises, other debt obligations, a contraction in domestic demand as well as a 
certain degree of wilful default on the part of the loan recipients. 
In order to prevent both state and private banks from collapsing as a result of not 
being able to collect payments on these loans, the government began a 
recapitalization scheme. This scheme evaluated banks according to their capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) 14 and took one of four actions: freezing a bank's operations, 
closing it down completely, recapitalization (injection of government funds with the 
continued involvement of the original bank owners) 
15 or taking a bank over 
completely as wholly government owned. Table 5.3 below shows the ownership 
and status of some major banks. 
12 Although credit from private banks increased substantially due to banking reforms in 1988, state 
banks continued to provide the majority of capital used by private business, which is apparent by the 
fact that loans from state banks now constitute 70 percent of all bad loans (Jakarta Post, 7.4.99). 
13 Loans officially become 'non-performing' in Indonesia when interest and debt principal 
instalments are 90 days overdue. 
14 CAR is the ratio between a bank's capital and risk-weighted assets. In other words it measures the 
level of a bank's stock of capital against its loans. 
15 To avoid closure or take over of their banks by the government, owners had to inject 20 percent of 
the funds needed to bring CAR levels up to 4 percent. For further details see Fane and McLeod 
(2001). 
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Table 5.3 Ownership and Status of Some Major Banks After Bank 
Restructuring Scheme 
Group Name Name of Banks 
Argo Manunggal Bank Bintang Manunggal, Bank Danahutama 
Artha Graha Bank Artha Graha, Bank Artha Prima 
Aspac Bank Aspac, Bank Danpac, Bank Hastin, Bank Kharisma, Rank 
Patriot, Societe Generale Indonesia, Bank Uppindo 
Astria Bank Astria, Bank Budi, Bank Orient 
Bahari Bank Bahari, Bank Metropolitan 
Bakrie Bank Nusa Nasional, Maybank Nusa, Bank Tabungan 
Pensiunan Nasional 
Bank Bumi Daya Bank Bumi Da a, Paribas BBD Indonesia 
Bank Dagang 
Negara 
13I)N, Indovest 
Bank Ekspor Impor 
Indonesia 
Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia, Bank Merincorp 
Bank Indonesia Ficorinvest, Bank Niaga, Bank Pacific, Bank Papan Sejahtera, 
Pesona Kriya Dana, (Utama), PDFCI, Bank Uppindo 
Bank Negara 
Indonesia 
Rank Negara Indone'ia. Finconesia, Bank Sakura Swadharma 
Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Bank Inter-Pacific 
Bob Hasan Bank Duta, Bank Bukopin, IBJ Indonesia, Bank Muamalat, 
Rabobank Duta Indonesia, Bank Tuga 
Ciputra Bank Ci utra, Bank Jaya International 
Danamon Bank Dana Asia, Bank Danamon Indonesia, Korea Exchange 
Danamon Bank 
Dharmala Bank Dharmala, Bank Putra Surya Perkasa, Bank Sewu 
Darum Bank Ha a, Bank Hagakita 
Gajah Tunggal Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Indonesia, 
Bank Dewa Rutji, Bank Ganesha, Bank Sahid Ga'ah Perkasa 
Gemala Bank Dana Hutama, Indosuez Indonesia Bank 
Lakop Bank Bali, Bank Mashill Utama, Sanwa Indonesia, United 
Overseas Bank Bali 
Lippo BNP Lippo Indonesia, Bank Dagang and Industri, Bank iap pO, 
Bank Ma a ada International, PDFCI, Tokai Lippo Bank 
Niaga Bank Niaga, Sumitomo Bank 
NISP Bank Daiwa Perdania, Bank NISIP, OCBC Bank NISIP 
Nugra Santana Bank Pacific 
Ongko Bank Ar a Panduarta, Bank Umum Nasional 
Panin ANZ Panin Bank, Panin Bank, PDFCI 
Ramako IFI, Bank Asta 
Roda Mas Bank Buana, Tat Lee Buana Bank 
Sahid Bank Da an and Industri, Bank Sahid Gajah Perkasa 
Salim Bank Alfa, Bank Central Asia, Bank Dana Asia, Bank 
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Table 5.3 Ownership and Status of Some Major Banks After Bank 
Restructuring Scheme 
Danamon Indonesia, LTCB Central Asia, Bank Multicor, Bank 
Pesona Kriya Dana (Utama), Bank Risjad Salim International, 
Bank Windu Kentjana, Bank Yakin Makmur (Yama) 
Sinar Mas BEI Commonwealth, Credit Lyonnais Indonesia, Fuji Bank 
International Indonesia, Bank Dagang and Industri, Bank 
International Indonesia 
Sudwikatmono Korea Commercial Surya, Bank Hanvit Indonesia, Bank Surya, 
Bank Subentra 
Tamara Bank Tamara, Bank Harda, Bank Hanil Tamara, Bank Hanvit 
Indonesia, Chinatrust Tamara Bank, Bank Indonesia Raya 
Tirtamas Bank Niaga, Bank Papan Sejahtera, Bank Pelita, Bank Kredit 
Asia, Bank Industri 
Key: Closed Bank; Frozen Bank; Taken Over Bank; Roca pitaliscd Bank 
Sources: Data Consult (2001) Indonesian Banking Industry, adapted from pages 20-22, 
26-27. 
By the middle of 2000,83 private national commercial banks were left from the 164 
recorded in 1996 and there were five state banks left from the seven which had 
existed in 1996 (Data Consult 2001, p. 14). In total, 52 banks had their operations 
frozen, 13 were completely taken over by the government and seven were 
recapitalized (IBRA 2001, p. 135). As can be seen from Table 5.3 above, some 
conglomerate groups benefited more than others from these rounds of closures and 
recapitalizations and at the time suspicions were high that political connections 
rather than objective measures of CAR governed decisions about the fate of banks. 16 
In particular, it was often alleged that pribumi-owned banks were receiving special 
treatment. 17 
Thus, the debt negotiations which the next section will deal with are negotiations 
over domestic debt. In turn, this debt is made up of non-performing loans from 
16 In an interview with a senior member of a foreign consultancy firm who advised the government 
on the recapitalization programme, it was denied that there was any favouritism involved in the 
decisions. However, a confidential report prepared by the same firm for Bank Indonesia and leaked 
to the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1999, concluded that Bank Indonesia bent its own rules to 
save seven of the banks in the recapitalization programme (Jakarta Post, 12.8.99). 17 This was because the recapitalization scheme took place under Habihie which had ideological 
leanings towards pribumi businesses (see Chapter Four for more details). See also Warta Ekonomi 
15.3.99, Gamma, 7.3.99 and Infobank, March 1999. 
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closed, taken over and state banks, BLBI emergency liquidity assistance and the 
recapitalization process. Categorising domestic debt in this way may help clarify 
the debt negotiation process. For, whilst most conglomerate debtors owe for all of 
the above types of domestic debt, there are also some who, for example, did not own 
their own banks and were therefore not involved with BLBI. '8 
Section 5.3: The Debt Negotiation Process 
In January 1998 the Soeharto government created an institution to manage all the 
domestic debt owed to the government. Named IBRA (Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency) (Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional -BPPN) this new 
agency was charged with the restructuring of non-performing loans taken over from 
closed and nationalised banks, the sale of assets pledged by debtors as collateral for 
those loans, and the sale of assets pledged by bank owners for their receipt of BLBI. 
Essentially, IBRA is the Indonesian government's debt collecting agency. 
It has been said that IBRA controlled an astonishing 70 percent of the Indonesian 
private sector's assets. 19 Due to such a concentration of wealth under the authority 
of one institution, decisions concerning how much conglomerate debtors can be 
expected to repay and who the assets should be sold to have been the subject of 
many power struggles. In an environment of IMF pressure and the invisible 
influence of the conglomerate debtors, control over IBRA has been played out 
between various Indonesian political constituencies. 
In formal terms, IBRA's top decision-making body is the Financial Sector Policy 
Committee (FSPC) (Komite Kebijakaan Sektor Keuangan - KKSK) which is made 
up of the top economic cabinet portfolios. 20 On the insistence of the IMF, an 
Oversight Committee (OC) (Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Tugas BPPN - KPPT) 
18 For example, the conglomerate Texmaco falls into this category whilst the Salim conglomerate is 
indebted to IBRA for the receipt of BLBI alone. 
19 Indonesian Observer, 30.3.00. 
20 Chairman: Co-ordinating Minister of Economy. Members: Minister of Finance, Minister of Trade 
and Industry, Minister of National Development Planning, Minister of State Owned Enterprises. 
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was set up to monitor the FSPC. Where the OC had a stable membership of 
respected technocrats, bankers and academics, membership of the FSPC changed 
frequently in tandem with cabinet reshuffles. Other oversight bodies included two 
internal audit committees and an International Review Committee made up of the 
IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. As a government agency, 
IBRA also originally fell under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. 
In June 2001 in particular, political struggles over the control of decision-making at 
IBRA spilled out into the public arena as it was announced that conflict between 
IBRA management and the Ministry of Finance on the one hand and the FSPC on 
the other was resulting in IBRA's refusal to implement the FSPC's 
recommendations. 2' Headed at the time by a nationalist-oriented Co-ordinating 
Minister of the Economy, Rizal Ramli, the FSPC was criticised for giving some 
high profile debtors too good a deal on debt repayment. Within days, Ramli 
replaced the Finance Minister in a cabinet reshuffle, thus ensuring that his debt deals 
would go ahead. However, just two days later a cabinet decision to reduce the 
FSPC's role from `decision-making' to `policy recommendation' was announced. 22 
Essentially, then, the route of political party influence on IBRA's decisions through 
the FSPC was first hampered by IBRA personnel, briefly seemed to have prevailed 
but was then once again curtailed. Party influence was also exercised through the 
selection of the IBRA chairmanship, which changed seven times from 1998 until the 
dissolution of IBRA in February 2004.23 For example, Cacuk Sudarijanto 
reportedly had strong support from the `axis force' of Muslim-oriented parties, as 
did Putu Gde Ary Suta24 How far the IBRA chairmen, or indeed the FSPC 
members, used their positions to channel party or private funds from grateful 
debtors must be left to speculation. However, it was clear from the outset that the 
21 Jakarta Post, 21.6.01; Jakarta Post, 22.6.01. 
22 Jakarta Post, 28.6.01. 
23 The chairmen were: Bambang Subianto (1998), Iwan Prawiranata (1998), Glenn Yusuf (1998), 
Cacuk Sudarijanto (2000), Edwin Gerungan (2000), I Putu Gde Ary Suta (2001) and Syafruddin 
Temenggung (2002 - 2004). 24 Jakarta Post 12.1.00; Asia Times 27.6.01. 
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decisions which IBRA made over debt repayment plans were wholly political rather 
than technical. 
On the insistence of the IMF, IBRA presents its financial data grouped according to 
size of debtor and the 20011BRA Annual Report states that the 21 largest debtors 
account for almost 30 percent of the total debt owed (p. 17). The potential for 
corruption in these debt negotiations in particular is thus extremely high and all of 
the IBRA chairmen have come and gone on waves of accusations surrounding how 
these 21 debtors are being treated. 
Trying to ascertain exactly how much of the debt burden the state and the individual 
debtors are each having to shoulder is a complex task. The predominant settlement 
of assets to different economic constituents on a broad scale is in reality composed 
of a huge number of smaller scale decisions25 on a multitude of different companies, 
and no-one really had a full grasp of everything that occurred at IBRA26 Table 5.4 
below presents IBRA's own calculations from the beginning of 2002. 
25 Just some of the issues involved in settlement decisions are: estimations of the value of assets, 
whether additional assets should be given, whether debtors should be held personally responsible for 
debts with personal guarantees, term of repayment, interest rate, penalties, threat of legal process, 
state equity participation in indebted companies and whether a release and discharge clause is 
included which effectively pardons debtors. 
26 For example, independent auditors gave a `no opinion' comment on its findings from an audit 
conducted in 2000. This is an unusual practice and was largely the result of a number of questions 
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Table 5.4 Progress of Debt Negotiations of the 21 Largest Obligors 
25.1.02 
No. Group Owner Outstanding 
Debt* (Rp 
trillions) at 25.1.02 
1 Texmaco Marimutu Sinivasan 17.32 
2 Barito Group Pra oo Pangestu 7.84 
3 M. Hasan Mohamad `Bob' Hasan 6.24 
4 Bakrie Group Aburizal Bakrie 6.13 
5 Hum uss Hutomo Mandala Putra 6.02 
6 Tirtamas Group Hashim Djojohadikusumo 4.56 
7 PSP Group Gondokusumo family 4.15 
8 Ongko Group Kaharudin Ongko 3.69 
9 Na an Group Henry Pribadi 3.76 
10 Danamon Group Usman Admad'a'a 3.07 
11 Bimantara Bambang Trihatmodjo 3.15 
12 Dharmala Group Gondokusumo family 3.00 
13 Bahana Pembinaan 
Usaha Indonesia 
Bank Indonesia 2.94 
14 Tirtobumi Moertomo Basoeki 2.90 
15 Rajawali Group Peter Sondakh 2.90 
16 Djajanti Group Burhan Uray 3.75 
17 Raja Garuda Mas Sukanto Tanoto 2.60 
18 Gunung Sewu Group Kel. Angkosoebroto 3.08 
19 Nu ra Santana Group Sutowo family 2.23 
20 Argo Pantes The Ning King 2.08 
21 Kodel Group Said Umar Husin, Maher 
Algadrie, Soegeng 
Sar'adi, Fahmi Idris 
1.49 
Total: 92.90 
Key: * Includes foreign exchange and rupiah debt 
Sources: IBRA (2001) Annual Report, p. 18; Tempo, 16.10.00; Tempo, 17.9.01; 
Gamma, 29.8.01. 
Another indication of the 21 largest obligors' progress on debt repayments can be 
seen by the amount of debt which has entered stages eight (fully paid) and nine 
(already sold) of the restructuring process. 27 As of the beginning of March 2002, Rp 
3.96 trillion (US$ 396 million) worth of debt had entered stage eight whilst Rp 6.34 
trillion (US$ 634 million) had entered stage nine for the `21 largest obligors' group 
that IBRA itself could not answer about the value of its assets and the extent of its liabilities (ICG 
2001, p. 17). 
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(IBRA 2002a). This means that only II percent of the total 21 largest obligors' debt 
of around Rp 90 trillion (US$ 9 billion) had actually been recovered at the 
beginning of 2002. 
Available information about the progress of debt repayments is problematic for 
several reasons. Firstly, IBRA tends to present figures on the `completion of the 
debt restructuring process' rather than the amount which has actually been paid 
back. For example, the IBRA Annual Report 2001 stated that 91.12 percent of the 
restructuring process had been completed, comprising 298 debtors with total debts 
of Rp 82.47 trillion (US$ 8.2 billion) (p. 17). Essentially what IBRA presented here 
was the amount of debt which had entered the implementation stage where decisions 
such as a timetable and interest rate have been agreed on. However, the ability of 
debtor companies to comply with these agreements into the future is not at all 
certain and the World Bank has itself warned that restructured Indonesian firms are 
still vulnerable to future shocks (World Bank 2000, p. 17). 
On the other hand, it is unreasonable to expect a severely indebted company to be 
able to pay back their debt in full even within a time period of around four years. 
Most companies the world over would struggle to fully repay their debt if all of their 
creditors suddenly pulled out, let alone a debt which had multiplied due to massive 
exchange rate fluctuations. 28 In any case, the point is that the difference between 
debt paid and debt rescheduled is an important one. 
Another reason why it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the level of debt 
repaid is because of drops in the value of assets surrendered by debtors. The assets 
and companies handed over by debtors to repay their debts are in practice only 
27 See Appendix Eight for a full description of the stages of loan restructuring. 
28 It could also be argued that most conglomerate bosses do have funds to repay their debt secreted 
abroad, and that efficient companies would not have such an enormous debt in the first place. 
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worth around 30 percent of their book value. 29 Table 5.5 gives an estimated 
breakdown of the real value of various types of assets. 
Table 5.5 Estimation of the Market Value of IBRA's Assets (rupiah trillion) 
(2001) 
Type of assets Book value Real value Real Value as a 
% of book value 
Recorded assets 466.9 97.8 21% 
Former bank assets 403.4 88.8 22% 
Securities or assets from shareholders 63.6 8.9 14% 
Former shareholder's assets 0.2 0.07 35% 
Promissory notes from shareholders 61.4 17.4 28% 
Bank investments in companies 106.8 42.9 40% 
Debts 9.5 9.5 100% 
Total 644.5 167.7 26% 
Source: Accountancy firm Hans, Tuanakotta and Musto a in Tempo, 3 0.7.01. 
Such re-evaluations of the worth of assets means that a debtor can claim to have 
surrendered enough assets to repay their debt and be absolved of any further 
payments, whilst IBRA can only actually collect on about 30 percent of the assets' 
value. Debt repayment figures based on the value of assets transferred should thus 
be treated with caution. 
Some of this decline in value has been caused by exchange rate fluctuations, but 
many also suspect that it is due to debtors' deliberate over-valuations of their assets 
before transferring them to IBRA. Indonesian companies regularly over-valued 
their assets throughout the Soeharto period in order to secure bigger bank loans and 
both foreign and domestic auditors, relying only on the companies' own financial 
records, did not guarantee realistic valuations. As the U. S. based Enron/Arthur 
Anderson scandal of 2002 shows, collusion between companies and their auditors is 
a potentially devastating problem for all governments. However, the principal role 
of public accountants, to protect investors by verifying a company's accounts, has 
29 Warta Ekonomi, 7.9.98; Jakarta Post, 20.4.99; Jakarta Post, 23.11.99; Jakarta Post, 29.4.00; 
Tempo, 9.10.00; Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 29.2.00. 
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been especially problematic in Indonesia both because of a weak regulatory 
environment and the ease with which firms avoid paying tax. 
30 
The most productive assets and companies left over from the economic crisis are 
more often reserved for either the debtors themselves or their foreign creditors, 
leaving IBRA with companies which have already stopped production, have 
incomplete ownership papers or are mired in ongoing lawsuits. 1 This problem 
dates back to IBRA's early days when President Habibie signed agreements with the 
debtors absolving them of surrendering additional assets in the event of their 
devaluation and including a `release and discharge' clause which promised no 
criminal prosecutions. 32 
A third problem of assessing genuine levels of debt repayment arises from the more 
abstract idea of what exactly constitutes ownership. For, whilst IBRA may 
theoretically own the companies/assets surrendered, in practice control of these 
companies often remains with the original owners. Companies transferred to IBRA 
are often grouped into `holding companies' based on who the majority shareholders 
are. Whilst the boards of directors of the holding companies tend to be appointed by 
IBRA, the constituent companies usually remain under previous management and 
the scope of responsibilities are often blurred between the two. For example, if a 
company is still achieving a profit, decisions over whether profits should repay 
creditors or be reinvested in the company can prove contentious as is the 
identification of who should be responsible for operating costs. 33 Legally, IBRA 
may have the right to sell these companies, but because in practice buyers are hard 
to find for all but the most productive companies, ownership in any meaningful 
sense remains with the original owners. 
30 In countries where tax collection is more rigorous, companies avoid over-valuing their assets 
because they would be liable for taxes on the extra value claimed. In contrast, the payment of tax in 
Indonesia can often be evaded with a bribe to a tax official (Jakarta Post, 20.4.99). 
31 Tempo, 24.9.01. 
32 These very controversial agreements are known as 'Master Settlement and Acquisition Agreement' 
(MSAA). 
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Thus it is that the frantic rounds of domestic debt negotiations over the past few 
years actually belie a situation of relative stasis. In practice, many debtors have 
retained control of their business empires by being granted extended repayment 
schedules, only surrendering their least valuable assets or preserving operational 
control over their companies. 
An alternative to these `commercial settlements' for the resolution of domestic debt 
is the use of legal processes. Championed by the IMF and a considerable 
constituency of government critics within Indonesia, the legal route would entail 
either criminal prosecutions of the debtors for the abuse of BLBI and legal lending 
limits, or the wresting of companies from the debtors through bankruptcy 
proceedings or the seizure of additional assets. 
In terms of criminal proceedings for the misuse of BLBI, frequent announcements 
of impending investigations and the identification of new suspects by the Attorney 
General's Office have more often than not come to nothing. Moreover, Table 5.6 
below shows that even where prosecutions have been followed through, sentences 
have either been negligible or have remained unenforced. In all, until the middle of 
2002 there were 52 criminal investigations in relation to the misuse of BLEI, with 
28 making it as far as the courts and 24 still in the police investigation stage 
34 
Cases against legal lending limit (BMPK) violators have been even more 
problematic, with only a handful making it as far as the court room 
35 
33 Tempo, 9.10.00. 
34 Tempo, 19.8.02. 
35 Some BMPK cases are: AF Fadillah and Candra Wijaya from Bank Citra were sentenced to 3 
months for violations of BMPK in 1999 and the cases against Hashim Djojokusumo and Umar Yudi 
were thrown out on technicalities in 2002 (Gamma, 15.3.00; Lakamana. net, 12.4.02). 
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Table 5.6 Major Criminal Trials of 13LI1I Abuse 1999-2003 
Defendant and Position Crime Outcome Uate 
Hendrobudiyanto Unregulated issuance of 3 years (under April 2003 
(Director, Bank BLBI worth Rp 18.7 trillion appeal) 
Indonesia) 
Heru Supraptomo Unregulated issuance of 3 years (under April 2003 
(Director, Bank BLBI worth Rp 18.7 trillion appeal) 
Indonesia) 
Paul Sutopo Unregulated issuance of 2.5 years (under April 2003 
Tjokronegoro (Director, BLBI worth Rp 18.7 trillion appeal) 
Bank Indonesia) 
Kaharuddin Ongko Misuse of Rp 6.7 trillion Acquitted January 
(Deputy Commissioner, 2003 
BUN) 
Leonard Tanubrata Misuse of Rp 6.7 trillion 10 years (under January 
(Director, BUN) appeal) 2003 
David Nusa Wijaya Misuse of Rp 1.27 billion I year and repay March 
(President Director, misused Rp I. 27. 2002 
Bank Umum Servitia) Did not serve 
sentence, still at 
arge. 
Samadikun Hartono Misuse of Rp 169 billion 4 years; did not July 2002 
(President serve sentence, 
Commissioner, Bank still at large 
Modern) 
Handy Sunardio Misuse of Rp 39.9 billion 10 months; August 
(President Director, Rp500 million 2002 
South East Asia Bank) tine 
Jemy Setiawan Misuse of Rp 39.9 billion 8 months; Rp500 August 
(President million fine 2002 
Director, South East Asia 
Bank) 
Leo Andyanto (Credit Misuse of Rp 39.9 billion Freed August 
Director, South East 2002 
Asia Bank) 
Setiawan Harjono Misuse of BLBI 5 years; Rp30 May 2003 
(Director, Bank Aspac) million fine; in 
hospital 
Hendrawan Harjono Misuse of RP583 billion Rp500 million 2001 
(Deputy Director, Bank fine; 1 year; did 
Aspac) not serve 
sentence; still at 
lar e 
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Table 5.6 Major Criminal Trials of 111,111 Abuse 1999-2003 
Supardi Dhirdjoprawiro Misuse of Rp 3 19 hillion 1.5 years (under August 
(President Director, appeal Aug 2003 
Bank Ficorinvest) 2003) 
S. Soemeri (Director, Misuse of Rp319 billion 1.5 years (under August 
Bank Ficorinvest) appeal Aug 2003 
2003) 
Hendra Rahardja Misuse of Rpl. 9 trillion Life (tried in November 
(President BLBI absentia, died in 2002 
Commissioner, Bank 2003) and Rp30 
Harapan Santosa) million fine 
Eko Edi Putranto Misuse of Rpl. 9 trillion 20 years (tried in November 
(Commissioner, Bank BLBI absentia, still at 2002 
Harapan Santosa) large) and Rp30 
million fine 
Sherny Konjongian Misuse of Rpl. 9 trillion 20 years (tried in November 
(Credit Director, Bank BLBI absentia, still at 2002 
Harapan Santosa) large) and Rp30 
million fine 
Bambang Sutrisno (Vice Misuse of Rpl. 5 trillion Tried in November 
President Commissioner, BLBI absentia; found 2002 
Bank Surya) guilty; life 
sentence, still at 
large 
Adrian Kiki Aryawan Misuse of Rpl. 5 trillion Tried in absentia, November 
(Director, Bank Surya) BLBI found guilty; life 2002 
sentence, still at 
large 
Sources: Suara Merdeka, 14.11.02; Kompas, 16.8.02; Gamma, 15.3.00; Kompas, 28.1.03; 
Gatra, 5.9.98; Warta Ekonomi, 7.9.98; Jakarta Post, 22.8.01; Jakarta Post, 20.6.01; 
Tempo, 27.8.01; Van Zorge Report, 18.3.02; Jakarta Post, 25.1.02; Lakamana. net, 
12.4.02; Komas, 7.4.03; Jakarta Post, 7.3.03. 
There are several reasons why the legal course of action appears to be ineffective. 
The most often cited reason is the prevalence of corruption within the judiciary 
where decisions are routinely bought. This both discourages the government from 
using the judicial system in the first place and ensures that when it is used, the 
outcome favours the party willing to pay the most. 
The second reason is the complexity of the crimes committed and the hitherto 
untested nature of many of the cases. Violations of the legal lending limit (BMPK) 
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from banks to connected companies can be almost impossible to prove. For 
example, Eka Cipta and Bob Hasan were reported to be involved in `reciprocal 
lending' where Hasan's bank would lend Cipta's bank a sum on the understanding 
that this would be lent back to a company of Hasan's 36 Another example was the 
arrangement between two other tycoons, Ongko and Admajaya, that their respective 
banks would lend to each other's companies. 37 In any meaningful sense, such cases 
are violations of legal lending limits, but in practice the informality of such 
arrangements make them extremely difficult to prove. Evidence about the misuse of 
BLBI has also been difficult to collect from uncooperative bank staff. 38 Moreover, 
once collected, evidence can be difficult to hold on to, with the occurrence of 
various fires and thefts in the offices of Bank Indonesia, the audit agency or the. 
Attorney General. 39 
Applying the laws on corporate responsibility is also to a large extent a matter of 
trial and error because they have been little tested in the past. For example, after 
some trials against bank commissioners collapsed because they could not be held 
legally responsible for the actions of bank directors, IBRA is now beginning to 
prepare cases which include the entire management of a bank into one legal action 40 
Although in many cases there may simply be direct bribes from conglomerate 
bosses to political leaders to avoid the legal process, the government's avoidance of 
pursuing legal procedures should also be seen in the light of the above reasons. This 
lack of political will for using the legal route has been evident from the very outset 
of the debt negotiation process. Where the government and IBRA have made the 
recovery of funds their top priority, the IMF and some domestic commentators 
rather see the negotiations as an opportunity to restructure the Indonesian economy, 
or `cleanse' the Indonesian business world of the most incompetent Soeharto 
cronies, in order to rebuild investor confidence. Wahid made his position on the use 
36 Warta Ekonomi, 14.9.98; Gamma, 15.3.00. 
37 Tempo, 25.9.00. 
38 Tempo, 11.9.00; Kapital, 11.4.00. 
39 Tempo, 23.10.00; Laksamana. net, 16.5.01. 
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of legal processes against debtors very clear when he announced the suspension of 
legal actions against the biggest debtors in 2000. Megawati has further endorsed 
this position by issuing a decree in 2002 allowing IBRA to exonerate the banking 
crimes of debtors as long as they were co-operative in settling their debts in 2002.41 
In many ways the diverging positions of the government and the IMF on this issue 
represent the political conflict between short term and long term goals which 
decision-makers everywhere must face. However, the government's willingness to 
let banking violators go unpunished as long as the funds are returned also testifies to 
the ruling elite's ambivalence about the legitimacy of the Soeharto system of power 
and wealth. This is certainly not an ambivalence which is shared by very many 
Indonesians as was proven by the public outcry which met both Wahid's and 
Megawati's announcements. 
Moving away from the question of legal proceedings in the cases of banking crimes, 
it can also be seen that the legal route for dealing with uncooperative debtors has 
been similarly under-utilised. For, as well as the use of commercial settlements to 
oblige recalcitrant debtors to surrender adequate assets, the government also has the 
option of petitioning for bankruptcy through the courts. 42 
A functioning bankruptcy regime is theoretically indispensable in a modem 
economy because it provides creditors with an opportunity to recoup some of their 
funds if a business fails, thereby encouraging creditors to lend in the first place. 
However, both domestic and foreign creditors evidently did not seem to require 
such a safeguard in pre-crisis Indonesia where bankruptcy practices were antiquated 
and petitions extremely rare 43 
40 Indonesian Business, 5.2.03. 
41 Jakarta Post, 5.2.03; Tempo, 6.11.00. 
42 There is a second legal option for the government in forcing debtors to surrender additional assets, 
a regulation known as PP/17. This regulation gives IBRA the power to bypass the courts and seize 
assets. However, this regulation has been little tested, partly for fear of counter-suits (Jakarta Post, 
21.1.02). 
43 There were 13 successful bankruptcy petitions in Indonesia from 1984-1994, only four of which 
were in relation to companies (Backman 1999, p. 35). 
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With an estimated 70 percent of Indonesian companies technically bankrupt in the 
44 wake of the economic crisis, the IMF moved to protect creditors by exerting 
pressure through its loan agreements to reform the bankruptcy regime. As a result, a 
new bankruptcy law was passed in 1998 which established a new commercial court 
(Pengadilan Niaga) for bankruptcy petitions. Table 5.7 below shows the numbers 
of cases which the commercial court has heard since 1998 and their outcomes. 
Table 5.7 Bankrute Cases at the Commercial Court, 1998-20 01 
1998 1999 Jan - 
April 2000 
2001 Total 
Bankruptcy petitions filed 31 100 84 61 276 
Bankruptcy petitions granted 13 26 4 16 59 
Debt payment postponed 9 14 2 3 28 
Bankruptcy petition rejected 4 40 2 25 71 
Cases not received/thrown out 5 20 8 5 38 
Sources: Warta Ekonomi, 17.4.00; Tempo, 31.12.0 I; Marie Christine Schroeder-Van 
Waes, Presentation at ANU Update Conference, 2003. 
Although such a new enterprise inevitably needs time before it can function 
optimally, the figures in the above table must nevertheless be disappointing for the 
commercial court's promoters. When the new law and court were first conceived, it 
was expected that the court would be dealing with around 30 petitions a day and it 
was estimated in 2003 that there should be around 1500 bankruptcies per year in 
Jakarta alone. 45 It was hoped that the new bankruptcy regime would be key to 
clearing the `deadwood' of Indonesian companies, allowing creditors to recoup 
some of their losses and thus bring back investor confidence in Indonesia's 
economy and judicial system. 
Many analysts have also perceived a good deal of the court judges' decisions to be 
questionable, and indications of corruption are high with favourable decisions 
44 Warta Ekonomi, 10.5.99. 
45 Marie Christine Schroeder-Van Waes (Faculty of Law, University of Utrecht, Netherlands) 
Presentation at ANU Update, 2003. By comparison, Australia receives 200 bankruptcy petitions a 
month (Suara Pembaruan, 1.6.99). 
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costing a reported US$ 25,000 to US$ 35,000 46 Thus, despite the government and 
the IMF's efforts to introduce a pocket of the rule of law into the Indonesian judicial 
system through the establishment of the commercial court, many creditors are still 
reluctant to initiate bankruptcy proceedings because of the uncertainty which 
corruption introduces into judges' final decisions. 
IBRA itself has not been particularly active in the commercial court, with its own 
statistics showing that from 1998 until the end of 2002 it has lost 22 bankruptcy 
cases and won 44, with only 5 of the latter so far being executed (IBRA 2002b, 
p. 39). Forcing technically insolvent companies into bankruptcy carries a high 
political price as it speaks to fears of further unemployment and increased foreign 
ownership of the economy when liquidated assets are eventually sold on. For, just 
as the protection of the Indonesian economy against the encroachment of foreign 
business is intrinsically linked to the system of corruption in contract giving, so 
there are associations between the two when it comes to working out debt 
repayments. Such an association will be made more explicit in the next section. 
In sum, the negotiations over domestic debt show that the government has opted for 
long-term repayment settlements of a portion of what they are owed by debtors, 
rather than using the debt crisis as an opportunity to purge the Indonesian economy 
of state-dependent conglomerates. The legal processes which would have enabled 
such a purge are used instead as a bargaining chip to force debtors to pay up but 
ultimately survive. 47 Such an approach does not sit easily with many reformists 
who see the debtor conglomerates as having escaped responsibility for the credit 
which both enriched them personally and brought down the Indonesian economy. 
46 Warta Ekonomi, 17.4.00. See also Jakarta Post, 31.3.99; Jakarta Post, 30.4.99; Tempo, 25.9.00. 47 The government has declared deadlines for the end of commercial negotiations and the beginning 
of legal procedures many times without following through on its threats. For example, see 
Prospektif, 16.8.99; Jakarta Post, 30.4.99; Jakarta Post, 15.5.99; Tempo, 17.9.00; Tempo, 9.10.00; 
Tempo, 25.12.00; Tempo, 31.12.01; Van Zorge Report, 21.1.02; Tempo, 19.8.02. The latest threat 
came in July 2003, days before the government faced the Paris Club creditors (Business Day, 9.7.03). 
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IBRA's mandate to manage domestic debt was ended on the 27th of February 2004 
with a final recovery rate of just 28 percent 48 Unsold assets will now be handled by 
a `clearance team' set up by Presidential Decree. In terms of institution building, 
the creation of IBRA was an ambitious project with a mandate that would inevitably 
be subject to the interests of a multitude of constituents. Political parties, the 
Indonesian executive, the IMF and the debtors themselves all struggled throughout 
the six years of IBRA's existence to gain control over the decision-making 
processes there. With the establishment of IBRA, the corrupt relationships which 
led to obtaining credit under Soeharto simply re-organised themselves to fit this new 
institution whilst at the same time becoming more inclusive with the addition of 
political parties into the fray. 
The low recovery rate of assets transferred to IBRA means that the Indonesian state 
has ended up paying around 70 percent of the costs of the economic crisis. Whilst 
the transfer of the burden of private business debt to the state is manifestly 
undesirable, it would be hypocritical to suggest that Indonesia's case is unique. 
Such a practice is in evidence all over the world, even in the developed economies 
of the West. Writing on the U. S. economy, Chossudovsky states: 
During the merger boom of the late 1980s, the burden of corporate losses 
was shifted to the state through the acquisition of bankrupt enterprises. The 
latter could then be closed down and written off as tax losses. In turn, the 
"non-performing loans" of the large commercial banks were routinely 
written off and transformed into pre-tax losses (Chossudovsky 1995, p. 2). 
The question is rather one of the appropriate share of the burden between private 
debtors and the state and crucially the basis upon which this decision should be 
made. For example, if decisions are made based purely on how much a debtor is 
prepared to pay a political party or an individual politician, then the concentration of 
as Dakar a post, 28.2.04. In comparison, Korea's assets management company, KAMCO, has a 
recovery rate of around 45 percent, Thailand's TAMCO has a recovery rate of around 40 percent and 
Malaysia's Danaharta stands at around 55 percent (Fung et al 2004, p. 66). 
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wealth in the hands of a few will prevail. However, the above account of the debt 
negotiations brings many other factors into the decision of how the debt burden 
should be shared, such as the weakness of legal institutions and the need to recover 
payments as quickly as possible. An additional factor in such a decision is a 
concern with the level of foreign ownership of the economy if domestic businesses 
are dissolved en masse. The next section will examine further such a concern. 
Section 5.4 Post-Soeharto Patterns of Economic Ownership 
This section will now consider changes to the patterns of ownership within the 
Indonesian economy since 1998 and the debates which surround them. Patterns of 
ownership will be gauged in terms of three main categories. The first is the 
domestic private sector and, where the information is available, further distinctions 
will be made within this category between large, medium and small size of business. 
The second category is private foreign business and the third the Indonesian state. 
Whilst the focus is initially on IBRA's asset disposals, broader indications of 
economic activities will also be taken into consideration before turning finally 
towards indications of future patterns in the granting of credit. 
Section 5.4.1: IBRA's Asset Disposals 
The following Table 5.8 shows IBRA's major asset disposals from its inception 
until the end of 2001. The table lists the name of the company sold, the price in 
rupiah, US dollars, Hong Kong dollars or Singapore dollars and the name of the 
buyer or consortium of buyers. `Market placement' indicates that shares of a 
company for sale were floated or placed on the stock market by selling large blocks 
to institutional investors such as pension funds and banks. In addition, the previous 
owner is identified in order to highlight that the large majority of assets sold by 
IBRA came from the Salim Group, which appeared to be the only IBRA debtor to 
have surrendered assets with any immediate worth. 
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Table 5.8 Major IBRA Asset Disposals 1999- 2002 
Asset Sales 1999 Price Buyer Buyer's Previous 
Nationality Owner 
Credit Card Business IDR 39.3 billion ANZ Panin New Zealand 
Unit of Bank Papan Bank 
Sejahtera 
56 auction sales of non- IDR 221.4 
core assets (through billion 
AMC) 
PT Indofood Sukses IDR 373.1 Market Salim 
Makmur billion + USD placement 
28.5 million 
PT Standard Toyo IDR 114 billion Mitsui Japan Salim 
Polymer co/Toso 
PT Pacific Indomas IDR 36.5 billion Dow USA Salim 
Plastics Indonesia Chemical 
Company 
PT Indo-American IDR 39 billion Ongko 
Ceramics 
PT Gatari Air Services IDR 20 billion Bob Hasan 
Asset Sales 2000 
Land lot at block L3/17 IDR 640 
Cinere Mas million 
PT Astra International USD 389.28 Cycle and Singapore Danamon 
million Carriage 
Consortium 
(J. P. Morgan 
Securities 
Asia Pte. Ltd. 
and Batavia 
Investment) 
First Pacific Co. Ltd. HKD 536.9 Market Salim 
million placement 
Wisma BCA IDR 280 billion Keppel Land Singapore Salim 
Ltd 
Karimun Granite IDR 21.7 billion PT Pendawa Co-owner, Salim 
Sempurna Indonesia 
QAF SGD 35.56 Market Salim 
million Placement 
Land lot at block L2/9 IDR 43 million 
Cinere Mas 
Danamon Usaha Mobil IDR 58.3 billion Danamon 
and Lestari 
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Indolakto and Indomilk IDR 400 billion NV Morison Netherlands Salim 
Oleochemicals USD 127.1 Bhakti Indonesia Salim 
million Investama 
consortium 
(Djarum, 
Wings, 
Lautan Las). 
PT Aetna Life IDR 12.4 billion PT ING Indonesia Danamon 
Indonesia Insurance 
Landbanks Property IDR 8.3 billion Modern 
Indomiwon USD 8.5 Daesang Korea Salim 
million Corporation 
Mosquito Coil Group IDR 610 billion Reckitt UK Salim 
Benckiser 
Ltd. 
Saline Palm Plantations USD 350 Guthrie Malaysia Salim 
million Berhad 
Danamon Sanatel IDR 35.1 billion PT Indonesia Danamon 
Gemawidia 
Statindo 
Komputer 
Asset Sales 2001 
Danataru Jaya IDR 2 billion 
First Pacific Co. Ltd. HKD 66.7 Market Salim 
million Placement 
Citicon Gri anu raha IDR 6.3 billion Modern 
Indocoal USD 45.5 PT Centralink Indonesia Salim 
million Wisesa 
International 
PT Indocement USD 43.8 Heidelberger Germany Salim 
Tunggal Perkasa million + IDR Zement AG 
605.4 billion 
PT Indomarco IDR 162 billion Bhakti Asset Indonesia Salim 
Prismatama Management 
PT Kerismas Witikco IDR 297 billion PT Indonesia Salim 
Makmur Sentralindo 
Bumi Persada 
Consortium 
(Trimegah 
Securities) 
PT Indopoly Swakarsa USD 29.2 Jefflyne Singapore Salim 
Industry million Golden 
Holdings 
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PT Yunnan Kunlene USD 14.4 JeFflyne Singapore Salim 
million Golden 
Holdings 
Salim Rengo IDR 204 billion Rengo Co. Japan Salim 
Containers Ltd. 
PT Gumindo Perkasa USD 1.7 Ridwan Co-owner, Salim 
Industri million Socri adi Indonesia 
PT Poli Contindo Nusa IDR 49.5 billion PT Kerismas Indonesia Salim 
Witiko 
Makrour 
Guangdong Jiangmen USD 34.2 Feature Singapore Salim 
Float Glass, Ltd. million Technology 
Limited 
Yakult Indonesia IDR 60 billion Yakult Japan Salim 
Persada Honsha Co. 
Ltd 
Indosiar Visual Mandiri IDR 1.15 PT TDM Indonesia Salim 
trillion Asset 
Management 
Riau Industrial Estate IDR 710 billion PT Dwi Indonesia Salim 
Sinergi Utama 
Indomobil Sukses IDR 542 billion PTTrimegah Indonesia Salim 
Makmur 
Sulfindo Adi Usaha USD 41.2 Durability Hong Kong Salim 
million Enterprise Ltd 
Berdikari Sari Utama USD 21.4 ATS USA Salim 
Flour Mills million Consortium 
Sugar Group IDR 1.3 trillion PT Garuda Indonesia Salim 
Pancaarta 
Total 1999-2002 IDR: 7.4 
trillion (US$ 
740 million) 
USD: US$ 1.13 
billion 
HKD: 603.6 
million (US $77 
million) 
SGD: 35.56 
million (US$ 21 
million) 
Sources: IBRA (1999) Annual Report, p. 30; IBRA (2000) Annual Report, p. 25; IBRA (2001) 
Annual Report, p. 25; IBRA, Asset Disposal Progress Report, http: //ibra2. bppn. go. id/en- 
us/disp prog. asp; Tempo, 4.12.00; Kontan, 5.11.0 1; Bisnis Indonesia, 11.12.01; Tempo, 
8.1.01. 
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From its establishment in 1998 until its closure in 2004, IBRA has contributed Rp 
168.2 trillion (US$ 16.8 billion) to government coffers in cash and bonds 49 The 
total from the table above is considerably less than this figure not only because of 
the extra 14 months but also because it only accounts for the sale of assets 
forwarded by former bank shareholders and does not include receipts from 
restructured corporate loans and non-core assets. 50 
Nevertheless, the above table gives some indication of who bought IBRA's assets. 
Disregarding the assets which were sold on the stock market and those whose 
buyers are unknown, foreign purchases in this table make up 74 percent of the total 
value of sales made. An ex-IBRA employee has estimated that around 40 percent 
of IBRA sales have been made to overseas companies, whilst an Indonesian 
business analyst thinks that the `foreign investors are the principal buyers of IBRA 
assets' 51 
However, there has been a good deal of speculation that behind many of the 
Indonesian buyers of these ex-Salim assets is Salim itself. The government's initial 
ambivalence about the principle of debtors being allowed to buy back their own 
companies turned fairly quickly into prohibition. Whilst some in government 
maintained that debtors should be able to regain control of their old assets as long as 
the sale process was fair and transparent, others saw it as a mechanism for the 
debtors to offload all responsibility for the debt crisis onto the state. 52 For, if these 
`buy backs' were permitted then the difference between the reduced price at which 
IBRA sells assets and the inflated book value of the assets when surrendered would 
be effectively paid for by the state whilst the debtor loses nothing. But more 
importantly, the claims by debtors that they did not have enough funds to fully 
repay their debt to the state could not be reconciled with their ability to buy their 
49 Jakarta Post, 28.2.04. 
50 86 percent of the buyers of the third tranche of the sale of restructured loans were foreign. 
(http: //ibra2. bppn. eo. id/en-us/amc/R portII(eng). pdf) Non-core assets are those derived from the 
liquidation or take-over of banks such as property, office equipment, motor vehicles. 51 Felia Salim, Presentation at ANU Update Conference, 2003. Sato 2003, p. 16. 
52 For example, see Kompas, 4.8.00. 
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assets back, and one of IBRA's oversight committees ruled in 2000 that debtors 
would only be allowed to repurchase their assets once their initial obligations to the 
state were met in full. 53 
Yet despite this ruling, speculation that Salim was behind various consortia bidding 
for ex-Salim assets continued, based on allegations that the consortia did not 
themselves hold enough funds to be able to buy such attractive assets or that none of 
the consortia members had themselves any experience of an asset's particular 
industry. 54 Other commentators suggested that if the management of a newly 
bought company was not changed then this was a sign that the old owner was back 
in charge 55 In all, media reports have alleged that Salim has repurchased QAF, 
Karimun, Indomarco, Indosiar, Oleochemicals, Indomilk and Indomobil. 6 But 
whilst IBRA's oversight committee has made some efforts to ensure that old owners 
do not repurchase their assets, 57 in practice it is difficult to prove one way or the 
other. Although only two conglomerates have been reported to have tried to 
maintain control of their assets in this way, -58 it is certainly possible that it represents 
a future pattern whereby the original owners regain control of their business empires 
after a few years despite initial indications that companies have been bought by new 
players. 
This issue of whether the original conglomerate owners should be allowed to make 
a comeback through IBRA's asset disposals is part of a broader debate concerning 
new patterns of ownership that also includes the DPR, the IMF, the government and 
IBRA. Although IBRA is not legally obliged to seek approval from the DPR for the 
53 Tempo, 20.11.00. 
54 For example, see Tempo, 17.9.00; Suara Karya, 6.1.01; Tempo, 30.10.00; Tempo, 20.11.00; 
Tempo, 18.12.01; Tempo, 23.4.01. 
ss Interview with Lin Che Wie (22.5.02). 
56 Tempo, 24.12.01; Kompas, 25.11.00; Tempo, 8.1.01; Tempo, 13.11.00; Tempo, 27.11.00. 
37 For example, IBRA refused to deal with German company Heidelberger until it dropped Salim as a 
partner and has introduced a declaration which all buyers must sign that the previous owner is not 
involved in the sale. If found otherwise the sale can be unilaterally cancelled by IBRA. The anti- 
monopoly commission (KPPU) even became involved in a similar case with Indomobil (Tempo, 
18.12.01; Tempo, 25.12.00; Tempo, 15.1.01; Tempo, 23.4.01. 
58 In early 2003 a scandal broke surrounding the alleged efforts of Lippo to buy back its Lippo bank 
which led to the government stopping the sale (Maclntyre 2003a, p. 151). 
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sale of its assets, in practice political pressure from the parliament has held up some 
59 high profile sales on the basis that ownership should not be ceded abroad 
A particularly controversial case was the sale of Salim palm plantations which 
serves well to illustrate the power struggles inherent in IBRA's asset disposal 
process. Like the oil, forestry and electricity sectors in Chapter Two, the ownership 
of oil palm plantations is especially sensitive because it is a natural resource which 
affects the lives and livelihoods of many Indonesians. 60 When IBRA found a 
foreign buyer for a bundle of 25 plantations previously surrendered by the Salim 
Group, protestations from the DPR delayed the sale for months amidst bitter 
recriminations that the government was selling out Indonesia's natural wealth. 
Whereas the government's priority in the sale of the plantations was to both recoup 
funds and accede to increasing IMF pressure to speed up the sale of assets under 
IBRA, the people living locally to the plantations saw the sale as an opportunity to 
redress the injustices of the Soeharto regime which had forcibly seized the land for 
the Salim Group many years ago. 1 Approached by local farmers' delegations, the 
DPR became more heavily involved when it became apparent that the plantations 
were to be sold to a Malaysian firm which would tip the balance of global control of 
this resource in favour of Malaysia. 2 However, another version of this episode 
claims that DPR members held up the Salim plantations sale in order to force the 
government into paying them bribes to pass the sale 63 
59 The practice of seeking legislative approval for IBRA asset sales and privatisations started under 
former Finance Minister Bambang Sudibyo as a way of securing political support but is not a legal 
right (Jakarta Post, 25.10.01). 
60 The importance of natural resource ownership is codified into Indonesian political culture through 
the 1945 constitution, article 33, which states that any resource which directly affects the livelihood 
of ordinary Indonesians must be controlled by the state. 
61 Tempo, 5.2.01; Kompas, 25.1.01; Jakarta Post, 7.3.01; Jakarta Post, 20.3.01. 
62 Between them, Malaysia and Indonesia have for many years controlled the crude palm oil (CPO) 
market. With the sale of the Salim plantations, Malaysia now controls 89 percent of the world's 
CPO market whilst Indonesia has been relegated to a raw material provider only, controlling 50 
percent of CPO supplies (Tempo, 11.12.00). 
3 Interview with Ross McLeod (12.10.03). 
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Whatever the real motivations of MPs, the struggle between the DPR on one side 
and the government and the IMF on the other lasted several months with periodic 
contradictory reports that the deal was final, was under review or had been 
cancelled. In the end, the Malaysian company, Guthrie Berhad, became the official 
owner of the plantations, albeit with some rather vague contractual obligations to set 
aside some shares for the local community. TM Three years on from this deal, it 
would be interesting to find out what these obligations have actually produced. 
Similar cases of DPR involvement in the disposal of IBRA assets occurred over the 
sale of Bank Bali and Bank Central Asia where the DPR objected to foreign 
ownership of these two high profile retail banks. 5 But, as the sale of automotive 
giant Astra showed, the rejection of foreign ownership was not the only motivation 
for DPR involvement in IBRA disposals. Here, protestations from both the DPR 
and Astra's board of management effectively blocked Astra's sale to its founding 
owners who had been forced to sell the company in 1992 as the result of the 
collapse of the family's bank. 
These are just some examples which show that the sale of assets under IBRA's 
control is in fact a highly charged political process of wealth distribution involving 
previous conglomerate owners, the DPR, the government and the IMF. Two 
pribumi-oriented business associations, HIPMI and HIPPI, have also attempted to 
gain a share of IBRA's assets, but as a reflection of a decline in pribumi influence, 
they have been largely ignored. 6 Under conditions where the IMF still wielded the 
power which accompanied its loan disbursals and the Indonesian economy was 
desperately short of working capital, the government generally cleared the way for 
foreign buyers of IBRA assets. The DPR, on the other hand, has often advocated 
continued state involvement in the management of some of IBRA's best assets as 
can be seen by its reluctance to allow IBRA to sell a majority stake in BCA. 
64 Media Indonesia, 28.11.01. 
65 The IMF suspended a loan disbursement to the Indonesian government for 8 months over the 
stalled sale of BCA. 
66 Warta Ekonomi, 24.11.98; Tempo, 1.10.01. 
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Meanwhile, the only conglomerate debtor to have handed over assets of any 
immediate value seems to be in the process of regaining control of them. 
Section 5.4.2 Economy-wide Patterns of Post-Soeharto Ownership 
In order to assess the full implications of the initial patterns of ownership shown in 
the last section, it is necessary to move the focus away from IBRA sales to include 
more wide-ranging economic indicators. This section will now therefore consider 
post-Soeharto patterns of ownership within the economy as a whole in terms of 
state, private domestic and private foreign constituents. 
5.4.2.1 Levels of State Ownership 
As already mentioned, the state may theoretically own up to 70 percent of the 
domestic private sector through IBRA, but in practice a lack of control over most of 
these assets coupled with an intention to sell others in the near future reduces the 
significance of the state's ownership. In contrast, the government has committed on 
a long-term basis to some indebted companies through what is known as a debt to 
equity swap. Essentially, this is where the government agrees to swap the debt a 
company owes the state for state participation in that company as opposed to 
demanding the payback of debts by surrendering other assets. The state then 
receives repayment of debts over the long term by taking a percentage of profits. 
Debt to equity swaps are controversial because they are often advantageous to the 
original owners, especially if the state takes a majority share. In such a case, the 
owner maintains a stake in their company, whilst the state takes on responsibilities 
such as paying back the company's other creditors and providing working capital. 
The reasons the government usually gives for entering into such a deal are 
concerned with whether a company, or a project which the company is involved 
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with, is considered to be `strategic' to the Indonesian economy and if its debts are 
sustainable in the long term. 67 
However, because both of these factors are open to interpretation, inevitably there 
have been allegations that by accepting equity instead of debt repayment the state is 
showing favouritism to those companies. In this regard, a pattern seems to have 
indeed developed where the state takes on equity involvement in projects which 
have influential foreign partners who want to save their original investment without 
injecting more capital themselves. For, just as U. S. government support 
strengthened the bargaining position of some U. S. firms in the electricity sector, so 
here Japanese government backing for Japanese companies has forced the 
Indonesian government's hand in deciding which projects to accept equity in. 8 
Indeed, the former Finance Minister, Bambang Sudibyo, openly admitted that the 
government is accommodating Japanese companies' interests in this way because of 
Japanese government support in government debt negotiations with the Consultative 
Group Indonesia (CGI) and the Paris Club. 69 
Some of the major projects and companies which have been involved in debt to 
equity swaps by the government are the Timor national car project, petrochemical 
plant Chandra Asri, the textile giant Texmaco, paper factory Kiani Kertas, and 
shrimp farm Dipasena. 70 Thus, although this type of state ownership is not 
especially prevalent in terms of the economy as a whole, it nevertheless represents a 
new and interesting trend towards state involvement in previously privately owned 
firms. 
Another indicator of post-Soeharto state economic ownership is the progress of the 
privatisation programme. The principle of the privatisation of state owned 
67 Jakarta Post, 12.5.99; Tempo, 16.10.00. 
68 Most notably Marubeni's involvement in petrochemical centre, Chandra Asri. Also KIA's 
involvement in the Timor national car project. 69 Tempo, 16.10.00. 
70 Jakarta Post, 6.5.00; Tempo, 27.11.00; Tempo, 11.12.00; Tempo, 8.1.01; Tempo, 9.10.00; Tempo, 
27.11.00; Tempo, 16.10.00; Indonesian Business, May 2000. 
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enterprises (SOEs) is central to IMF policy prescriptions for the recovery of the 
Indonesian economy. Accordingly, since 1998 there have been numerous 
announcements of restructuring programmes and intended privatisations 7' 
However, both in terms of numbers and sale value, the privatisation programme has 
consistently fallen short of stated intentions and where privatisations have been 
completed they have often represented only a minority divestment (see Table 5.9 
below). From the table below it can be seen that there have been only three sales of 
around 50 percent of an SOE which can actually be said to have changed ownership 
from the state to the private sector. Stock market offerings of small percentages of 
an SOE otherwise ensure that state ownership is maintained but with an additional 
injection of private capital. 
71 Corporate plans for SOEs have been announced from Habibie's administration onwards. Each 
year around 10 SOEs are slated for privatisation (see Jakarta Post, 19.3.99; Jakarta Post, 18.2.00). 
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Table 5.9 Privatisations 1998-2002 
1998 % Sold % still state- Price Method Buyer 
owned 
Semen Gresik 14% 51% Rpl. 317 Strategic Cemex, 
(Cement) trillion Sale Mexico 
1999 
PT JICT (subsidiary of 49% US$190 Strategic Grosbeak, 
PT Pelindo II) million Sale Hutchinson 
(Seaport) Whampoa, 
Hong Kong. 
PT TPS (subsidiary of 51% US$157 Strategic 
PT Pelindo III) million Sale 
(Seaport) 
PT Telkom 9.62% 66% Rp3.188 Stock Block sale to 
(Telecommunications) trillion Market mainly foreign 
institutional 
investors 
2000 
No sales in 2000 
2001 
PT Kimia Farma 9.2% 90.8% Rpl 10 IPO 
(Pharmaceuticals) billion 
PT Telkom 11.9% 54.1 % Rp 3. I Stock Block sale to 
(Telecommunications) trillion Market mainly foreign 
institutional 
investors 
PT Indofarma 19.8% 80.2% Rp 100 IPO 
(Pharmaceuticals) billion 
2002 
PT Telkom 3.1% 51% Rp 1.1 Stock 
(Telecommunications) trillion Market 
PT Indosat 8.06% 54% Rp 967 Stock Private 
(Telecommunications) billion Market placement 
PT Indosat 41.9% 12% Rp 5.62 Strategic Singapore 
(Telecommunications) trillion Sale Technologies 
Telemedia 
PT Tambang Batubara 
Bukit Asam 
Sources: 
http: //www. ipanet. neUdocuments/WorldBank/databases/plink/soceco/ 10indonesia. htm; 
Department of State Owned Enterprises, personal communication; Jakarta Post, 19.5.03; 
Jakarta Post, 18.1.03; Jakarta Post, 20.5.02. 
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In total, from April 1998 to October 2001, privatisation proceeds reached Rp 5.4 
trillion (US$ 540 million)72 and those shares which have been sold have at least not 
followed the Soeharto pattern of going cheap to Soeharto family or well-connected 
businesses. 
As McLeod (2002) points out, in recent years privatisation has progressed as a more 
complicated private sector participation in state run sectors and enterprises rather 
than simple changes of ownership which makes studying changes in levels of state 
ownership a rather more complex task. 73 It is nevertheless apparent that state 
economic ownership has remained relatively static in the sense of companies run by 
state personnel according to state-issued guidelines and targets. Otherwise, the 
partial participation of private capital in SOEs and conversely state capital in 
private enterprises through debt to equity swaps seems to have increased. 
As periodic clashes in the DPR over the timing and level of privatisation show, 
there is little political appetite within Indonesia for further transfers of ownership 
from the state to the private sector even if willing investors could be found. Yet 
despite this, the government's need for additional funds is likely to ensure a slow 
and fitful movement towards partial divestments in the future. 
5.4.2.2 Levels of Private Foreign Ownership 
In terms of perceptions of the levels of foreign ownership within the Indonesian 
economy there seems to be something of an anomaly. On the one hand figures 
show that foreign investment within Indonesia has declined drastically since the 
economic crisis and the Wahid and Megawati administrations especially have been 
very keen to attract foreign capital back into Indonesia through various deregulation 
measures and foreign `road shows' extolling the virtues of investing in Indonesia. 74 
72 Investor, 24.10.01. 
73 Examples of this kind of privatisation are in the oil, electricity and aviation sectors. 74 Controversially, President Wahid prioritised the task of attracting foreign capital back to Indonesia 
over other problems when, soon after he was made President, he went on an extended world-wide 
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On the other hand there is a great deal of unease from some government individuals, 
many members of the DPR and many sections of the media and ordinary 
Indonesians that foreign companies are buying up vast swathes of the Indonesian 
economy. 
So, has foreign investment increased or decreased? In some ways such a 
discrepancy is simply the product of different conceptions of the appropriate level of 
foreign ownership. Too little foreign investment for some may at the same time be 
too much for others depending on how acceptable the concept of foreign ownership 
is to each side. However, it is also very likely that differences in perceptions of the 
degree of post-crisis foreign ownership can be attributed to a lack of clarity in what 
exactly constitutes foreign investment. For, as we shall see, if foreign investment is 
first disaggregated, it then becomes clear that some types have diminished whilst 
others have increased substantially. 
The three main constituents of foreign investment are foreign direct investment 
(FDI), portfolio investment and bank loans 75 FDI is perhaps the most sought after 
type of investment by recipient governments because it reflects a long-term interest 
between an investor and a recipient company. Here investors identify particular 
companies for long-term relationships which imply, under the best circumstances, 
not only the creation of jobs and an improved capacity for production, but also the 
transfer of technology and skills. In order for such transfers to occur, a foreign 
investor needs a significant degree of influence over the management of a recipient 
company which is obtained by at least a 10 percent ownership of that company 
(UNCTAD 2003, p. 232). 
In contrast, portfolio investment does not imply a direct relationship between the 
investor and the recipient company but rather the purchase of shares directly from 
trip to persuade foreign investors of the attractions of investing in Indonesia. Since then, both IBRA 
and representatives from the Ministry of Trade and Industry have organised numerous such trips. 
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the stock exchange where the recipient company has floated its shares. Although 
portfolio investment provides a recipient company with much needed capital, an 
investor does not have any interest in influencing the way the recipient company 
does business and will typically pull out as soon as share prices begin to drop. 
This was indeed the case during the economic crisis in Indonesia, where portfolio 
investment was the first type of investment to pull out, with an outflow of over US$ 
7.5 billion in 1997 alone (see Table 5.10). Portfolio investment is further defined as 
ownership of less than 10 percent. 
Table 5.10 Portfolio Investment in Indonesia 1993-2002 (US$ Millions) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1805 3877 4100 5005 -2632 -1878 -1792 -1909 -243 1222 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, htt : //www. inif. or . 
Lastly, there are injections of capital in the form of loans or trade credits which do 
not imply any degree of control by the investor unless the recipient company 
defaults on the loan, in which case ownership of the assets used as security for the 
loan will move to the investor. 
This section will focus on FDI since this type of investment better represents foreign 
ownership in terms of control of a company rather than simple injections of capital 
through portfolio investment or loans. As Table 5.11 below shows, the net inflow 
of FDI, which peaked in 1997 at nearly US$ 4.7 billion, turned into a net outflow 
with the onset of the economic crisis. Although FDI has rebounded steadily since 
its lowest point in 2000, the latest figures for 2002 indicate a continued reluctance 
of foreign investors to invest in Indonesia. 
7s Another form of foreign investment is known as financial derivatives which includes trade on 
currencies, interest rates, commodities and the like. Because this type of investment does not involve 
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Table 5.11 FDI Inflows into Indonesia 1991-2002 US$ Millions) 
1991-1996 (Annual 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Average) 
2 985 4 678 -356 -2 745 -4 550 -3 279 -1 523 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 251. 
However, these figures alone provide something of a skewed picture which can only 
be redressed once FDI is further disaggregated into its component parts. The first 
part of FDI is equity capital, which is the foreign investor's purchase of shares in a 
company. The second part is other capital, which mainly consists of intra-company 
loans, that is short- or long-term borrowing and lending of funds between investors 
and recipients76 (UNCTAD 2003, p. 23 1). Table 5.12 below shows the values of 
FDI in Indonesia in terms of two of its constituent parts. 
Table 5.12 Sources of FDI Finance in Indonesia 1999-2002 (US$ 
Millions) 
Year Equity Other Capital Total FDI 
Inflows 
1999 1 110 -3 856 -2 746 
2000 992 -5 442 -4,450 
2001 688 -3 966 -3,278 
2002 1 817 -3 339 -1,522 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 225 (data based on 
`national official sources'). 
These figures show that FDI flows continued to be positive in terms of foreign 
investors buying shares of a company, but were only pushed into a negative flow by 
the debt repayments which recipient companies were obliged to make to investors as 
a result of previous loans. In other words, despite the initial picture which the 
negative FDI flows present in Table 5.11, foreign direct investors have not pulled 
out of Indonesian companies en masse and so have maintained a presence within the 
recipient companies it is excluded from this analysis. 
76 UNCTAD distinguishes a further category of reinvested earnings for some countries, but these 
figures are not available for Indonesia. These are earnings which have been reinvested into the 
recipient company with the agreement of the investor rather than forwarded to the investor as profit. 
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Indonesian economy. 77 This is the first main point of relevance to a consideration 
of post-crisis levels of foreign ownership. 
The second major point to be made in this regard is connected to how far the levels 
of FDI represent new investments or expansions of previous investments. In the 
language of investors this is translated as `green field' investment as opposed to 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish 
between these two types of investment within the FDI figures, 78 but there is data 
available for the value of M&As (see Table 5.13 below). 
Table 5.13 Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions in 
Indonesia 1988-2002 (US$ Millions)* 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
530 332 683 1164 819 3529 2790 
Key: * Deals involving the acquisition of an equity stake of more than 
10 percent. 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 292. 
Judging from the rise of the value of M&As captured by the figures above, it seems 
likely that M&As now account for a larger proportion of FDI than in the past 
compared to green field investment. This corresponds to anecdotal information 
which indicates that minority stakes previously held by foreign investors in 
Indonesian companies are increasingly expanding to become controlling majority 
stakes as a result of debt to equity swaps. 79 
77 It would have been more interesting to compare the relative importance of the two constituent parts 
of FDI with before the economic crisis, but unfortunately these figures are not available. 
78 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000, p. 104 for the difficulties involved in assessing the 
relative proportions of M&As and greenfield investment. 
79 For lists of newly foreign owned companies, see SWA, 8.4.99; Warta Ekonomi, 3.1.00. This M&A 
trend was also confirmed by Kelly Bird who listed sectors such as banking, agro-processing, 
manufacturing, property, paper, automobiles and food and beverages where M&As have been 
particularly common (ANU Update Conference 2003). 
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Such an increase in the M&A type of foreign investment is of consequence because 
M&As are widely considered to be not only much less beneficial to host countries 
than green field investment, but in many cases actually deleterious to national 
interests. They do not add to productive capacity, often result in layoffs and can 
lead to market concentration and reduced competition as well as a loss of national 
control over strategic firms or whole industries. In the long term, there may be 
benefits from M&As, such as improved efficiency and corporate governance, hard 
currency inflows, possible sequential investment, technology transfers, world 
market access and crucially they can prevent indebted firms from becoming totally 
bankrupt. However, the prospects of such benefits remain contentious. 80 
The rise in M&As has only been made possible by the introduction of deregulation 
in many areas of the economy. For example, the negative lists which bar foreign 
ownership in some sectors have continued to be reduced whilst 100 percent foreign 
ownership is now permitted in most sectors for companies domiciled in Indonesia 
without the requirement to later divest (Soesastro et al 2001). 
In sum, whilst levels of private foreign investment have indeed decreased within 
Indonesia, conversely levels of private foreign ownership have increased. This 
apparent contradiction can be reconciled once two points are taken into 
consideration. Firstly that foreign investors who have direct relationships with 
Indonesian companies have not pulled out and retain their equity and presence with 
previous partners despite the fact that funds in the form of debt repayments are now 
flowing out of Indonesian affiliates rather than into them. Secondly, new 
`greenfield' investment has now been overtaken by mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) as the predominant pattern of foreign investment. 
Whilst the Indonesian economy desperately needs more investment from any 
source, it is hardly surprising that at the same time many sections of Indonesian 
80 See UNCTAD 2000 for the debates surrounding the merits of M&As. 
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society are privately and publicly resentful of foreign control. At least part of the 
reason why debts were so huge in the first place was because of imprudent lending 
by foreign banks and companies coupled with international advice to deregulate the 
banking sector. The economic crisis was then in part precipitated by panic selling 
of the rupiah on the international foreign exchange markets. Since then, foreign 
consultants have been shipped in to value Indonesian assets, usually at very low 
prices and the best ones have been bought by foreign buyers. All of this takes place 
within an environment where the IMF has more political power than most sections 
of the Indonesian state over important issues of economic deregulation. This is, of 
course, a simplistic and one-sided view and it should be remembered that the only 
alternative to foreign investment is domestic investment, which in poor countries 
such as Indonesia is problematic. Nevertheless, it is understandable why such a 
view might exist and how it can feed nationalist sentiments. As we shall now see in 
the next section, in the absence of effective state economic stewardship, the problem 
for Indonesia is that the only domestic alternative to foreign ownership of these 
large assets are the conglomerates previously nurtured by corruption under 
Soeharto. 
5.4.2.3 Levels of Private Domestic Ownership 
Although foreign direct investment became increasingly important to Indonesia's 
economy throughout the 1990s, even at its peak from 1991-1996 it accounted for 
only around 6 percent of gross fixed capital formation (UNCTAD 2003, p. 275). 8' 
In other words, although largely financed by both foreign and domestic bank loans, 
domestic ownership has historically been much more substantial than foreign 
ownership within the Indonesian economy. Moreover, it should already be clear by 
now that the concentration of this domestic ownership in Indonesia is extremely 
high. This is confirmed by Table 5.14 below which provides comparative estimates 
of the concentration of wealth in several East and Southeast Asian countries. 
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Table 5.14 Concentration of Ownership Amongst Top 
15 Families in Selected East and Southeast 
Asian Countries (Mid 1990s) 
Country % Owned by 'I'o 15 Families 
Japan 2.8% 
Taiwan 20.1% 
Malaysia 28.3% 
Singapore 29.9% 
Hong Kong 34.4% 
Korea 38.4% 
Thailand 53.5% 
Philippines 55.1% 
Indonesia 61.7% 
Source: World Bank (2000), East Asia Recovery and Beyond, 
p. 68. 
The purpose of this section is to briefly consider any information available that may 
indicate changes in this pattern of domestic ownership. In order to do this, the fate 
of some of the biggest Indonesian conglomerates will first be reviewed in the wake 
of the economic crisis since the sales of the top 20 conglomerates are said to 
account for something in the region of 20 percent of GDP. 82 However, it should be 
cautioned that much of the data on this subject represents at worst pure conjecture 
and at best educated guesswork given the complex structures of many 
conglomerates and the continued state of high flux in the economy. 83 
A conglomerate can be defined as a group of companies which are under the 
influence of a single businessman or group of businessmen. 84 A further defining 
characteristic of a conglomerate is its diversification into many different and often 
unrelated sectors. It is precisely this diversification which enables conglomerates to 
R' 'Gross fixed capital formation' can be roughly translated as the value of fixed assets such as land, 
buildings and machinery. 
82 Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 26.10.98. 
"; In interviews with some of the most prominent Indonesian and foreign business consultancies, all 
analysts confessed to a high degree of uncertainty regarding the fate of the top conglomerates given 
the ambiguity surrounding IBRA's ownership of conglomerate assets (interviews at PDBI, Data 
Consult, CISI Raya Utama and Mckinsey). 
84 It can be difficult to precisely define a conglomerate because ownership can he indirect through 
other companies and thus disguised. See Data Consult (1998) Anatomy of Indonesian 
Conglomerates, p. 4. 
266 
control such large sections of the economy, but causes difficulties in assessing their 
post-crisis vigour. 
Although 90 percent of conglomerates are thought to be technically bankrupt, 85 and 
it has been estimated that only 25 out of 300 conglomerates will ultimately 
survive, 86 there are some which are in a better position to make a subsequent 
comeback than others. The ones which are particularly in decline are those which 
were heavily involved in large scale industrial projects such as power plants, 
petrochemicals and ports and the construction of property or toll roads. 87 Many of 
these sectors are also those which were originally conceived as import substitution 
projects, but still relied on imported inputs which, in the wake of the rupiah 
devaluation, have become prohibitively expensive. 88 These are all sectors which 
were particularly lucrative before the economic crisis and so tended to be 
concentrated in the hands of the most well-connected business owners. 
There are many often conflicting reports about the current state of individual 
business groups, but some agreement that the best known and most well-connected 
conglomerates are in serious financial trouble. 89 The conglomerates most 
intimately connected with the Soeharto children such as Humpuss, Bimantara and 
Citra Lamtoro are all unlikely to survive the crisis in their present form. Similarly 
such notorious groups such as Gadjah Tunggal, Bakrie, Texmaco and Dharmala are 
in drastic decline. 
In contrast, the conglomerates which have survived and are doing best now are 
those which did not expand and diversify beyond their core business but instead 
were built from reinvesting profits rather than relying on bank credit. Companies 
involved in basic needs sectors such as food, pharmaceuticals and cigarettes have 
85 SWA, 22.4.99; Indonesian Business, September 1998. 
86 Interview with Wilson Nababan (14.5.02). 
87 SWA, 2.11.00; Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 26.10.98. 
88 Bisnis Indonesia, 13.3.99; SWA, 18.4.02. 
89 For estimations of individual conglomerate health, see SWA, 2.11.00; SWA, 18.4.02; Indonesian 
Commercial Newsletter, 26.10.98; Indonesian Business, Sept 98; Bisnis Indonesia, 13.3.99; SWA, 
22.4.99; Warta Ekonomi, 5.2.01; Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, 27.4.99; Infobisnis, May 1998. 
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now overtaken the high profile, capital intensive conglomerates of the Soeharto era 
(see Table 5.15). 
Table 5.15 Top Post-Soeharto Indonesian Conglomerates (Rp billion) 
2000 1996 
Rank in 
2000 
(sales) 
Sector Group Sales No. of 
Companies 
Rank in 
1996 
(sales) 
Sales No. of 
Companies 
1 Cigarettes Gudang 
Garam 
11,784.2 50 4 6,625.0 47 
2 Cigarettes Djarum 9,000 60 9 3,700.0 44 
3 Cigarettes Sampoerna 7,521.5 34 16 2,600.0 29 
4 Pharmaceuticals Kalbe 4,771.8 145 30 1367.5 82 
5 Financial 
Services; 
Textile; 
Property 
Panin 4,449.9 44 19 2,350.0 46 
6 Metals; Glass; 
Detergents 
Rodamas 4,305.5 57 17 2,550.0 36 
7 Financial 
Services 
Lippo 4,150.6 263 5 4,700.0 240 
8 Agriculture Central 
Pertiwi 
3,050.3 55 27 1,808.9 43 
9 Investments Bhakti 2,146.5 26 
10 Retail Ramayana 1,861.1 6 52 865.6 6 
11 Trade; 
Pharmaceuticals 
Tempo 1,523.5 83 33 1,250.0 67 
12 Distribution Wicaksana 1,372.0 19 51 894.6 14 
Total 55,936.8 842 28,711.6 654 
Source: PDBI (Pusat Data Bisnis Indonesia) in SWA, 18.4.02. 
As a sign of the times, the only conglomerate on the table above to have entered the 
top ten from an unranked position in 1996 is Bhakti, an investment company which 
specialises in mergers and acquisitions of indebted companies. 
Essentially, the `assets' which enabled some conglomerates to grow exponentially 
during the Soeharto period, such as easy access to bank credit, admittance to 
lucrative import substitution sectors and direct connections to Soeharto have now 
turned into `liabilities'. Almost immediately following Soeharto's resignation, 
most of the Soeharto children and other family members distanced themselves from 
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their companies by resigning from their boardroom positions. Other high profile 
conglomerate owners are now left with minority stakes in their companies as a 
result of surrendering equity to IBRA or foreign partners in repayment of the credit 
they received under Soeharto 90 
However, this is not to suggest that these conglomerate owners are finished as 
business people. Many conglomerate owners had already begun to invest abroad in 
the 1990s and, with the onset of the economic crisis, this trend increased 
substantially as liquid assets were moved out of Indonesia en masse 91 Many 
conglomerate owners thus still have at least part of their business empires intact 
overseas and are in a position to wait until the final resolution of IBRA decisions 
before reinvesting domestically. 92 Others, such as Sinar Mas, Salim and Lippo had 
such enormous domestic operations throughout the 1990s that even with a drastic 
reduction of their capabilities they still represent some of the largest business 
operations in Indonesia today. It is also extremely likely that the previously high- 
profile investments of some of these conglomerates have been replaced today by 
smaller investments which are more difficult to trace. Essentially, many are 
restructuring and biding their time abroad from where they will be in a position to 
take up their old positions at the top of the economy in a few years' time. Indeed, 
one analyst maintains that the debtor conglomerates are now better off than under 
Soeharto because they have been effectively cleared of the responsibility to pay 
back the loans that they previously received. 93 
Although many conglomerates have, at least temporarily, reduced their involvement 
in the Indonesian economy, this does not necessarily imply a greater distribution of 
wealth to a wider range of businesses. At first glance, this may seem to be at odds 
with the widely held belief that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have 
90 For example, Aburizal Bakrie has been left with a 2.5 percent stake in Bakrie Brothers. Sjamsul 
Nursalim has 10 percent of Gajah Tunggal, Marimutu Sinivasan has 10 percent of Texmaco. 
91 Otherwise known as `capital flight', estimates of the amount of conglomerate assets moved abroad 
during the economic crisis range from US$10 - 80 billion. Republika, 19.11.99 92 For some information on the levels of investment by Indonesian conglomerates abroad, see 
Prospek, 27.7.98 and Aditjondro 2000. 
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weathered the economic crisis better than the large industrial conglomerates. 
Indeed, the resilience of SMEs has been confirmed by some interesting new 
research which suggests that the limited access of SMEs to credit in the past has 
meant that the debt crisis has had little impact on their present viability and in some 
cases has actually led to an upsurge in SME business (Berry et al 2002). One study 
which concentrated on batik, garment and Jepara furniture manufacturers found that 
from 1996 to 2000, jobs in the smallest firms had declined less than 1 percent, risen 
by 10 percent in medium firms and declined by 3 percent in big firms. 
The only economy-wide data available which may help shed light on this issue is 
derived from the manufacturing sector which accounted for 26 percent of 
Indonesian GDP in 2000 (BPS 2001 ). 94 Table 5.16 below shows percentages of 
value added shared between small, medium and large enterprises. 
Table 5.16 Percentage Share of Value Added in 
Manufacturin Sector 
Scale of Firm* 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Large 83.41 84.64 83.84 84.27 85.93 
Medium 5.92 7.09 6.99 6.68 6.89 
Small 10.67 8.27 9.17 9.06 7.19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Key: *Small = 0-19 employees; Medium = 20-99 employees; 
Large = over 100 employees. 
Sources: Ministry of Trade and Industry, National Industrial 
Strategy, 2001, p. BPS (2001) Statistik Indonesia 2000. 
The table above shows that in the manufacturing sector at least, an initial drop in the 
share of value added accounted for by large scale enterprises in 1998 has since 
turned into an increase at the expense of small enterprises. Such a pattern is 
confirmed at the very top of the manufacturing sector through a consideration of the 
93 Interview with Lin Che Wie (22.5.02). 
94 The Indonesian statistics office (BPS) collects fairly robust data on Indonesian manufacturing 
every year, although BPS staff privately admit that obtaining information from businesses can be 
unreliable as they are unwilling to disclose accurate information for fear of being held liable for 
further taxation. 
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percentage of value-added accounted for by the top ten manufacturing companies 
out of the top 100. Table 5.17 shows that the biggest ten manufacturing firms 
experienced a decline through 1997 and 1998, but began to rebound in 1999 and 
2000. 
Table 5.17 Percentage of Value Added Controlled 
by the Top 10 Manufacturing Firms out 
of the'rop 100 Manufacturing Firms 
Year Percentage 
1996 47.84 
1997 42.75 
1998 39.62 
1999 44.90 
2000 44.48 
Source: BPS 
To summarise this section on economy-wide patterns of ownership, it has been 
suggested that many of the large scale conglomerates, and especially those most 
easily identified with the Soeharto regime, have suffered the most spectacular 
decline of economic ownership. However, at the same time a great deal of them are 
still in a position to re-enter the domestic economy as soon as the threat of asset 
seizure by IBRA has diminished. Furthermore, such a decline represents a 
contraction in the economy rather than a more equitable distribution of resources to 
a wider range of businesses. Meanwhile, foreign ownership has indeed risen since 
the economic crisis through a spate of mergers and acquisitions and IBRA asset 
purchases. Finally, overall state ownership remains static with some new 
involvement in large, previously private-run projects coupled with some partial 
divestments from SOEs. 
Section 5.5 Conclusion 
The current debt crisis in Indonesia is due to the devaluation of the rupiah, capital 
flight, a contraction in economic activity and imprudent pre-crisis bank lending. 
The latter was made up of loans from state banks based on connections rather than 
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business acumen, loans from private banks affiliated to the recipient companies and 
loans from foreign banks keen to be included in what at the time must have seemed 
like a risk-free profit. 
In post-Soeharto Indonesia all of these channels of credit have become much more 
difficult to access. The injection of government bonds into state banks through the 
recapitalisation process has meant that they are today more inclined to collect on the 
guaranteed interest rates of these bonds rather than risk lending again to third 
parties. However, despite the fact that most state banks have been slow to resume 
lending in general, there have still been scattered reports of conglomerates obtaining 
questionable loans95 and using them to buy back their own assets under IBRA 96 
In terms of the private banks with pre-crisis affiliations to business groups, such a 
pattern has now declined quite substantially. Out of the 58 banks previously 
affiliated to conglomerates 28 have now been closed and 10 completely 
nationalised, which includes all of the biggest banks (Sato 2003). Although, again 
there have been reports of some conglomerates trying to regain control of their 
previously affiliated banks, most notably Salim with BCA and Lippo with Bank 
Lippo. Yet these two high profile cases at least were, for the time being, prevented. 
It is also the case that foreign banks are now much more reticent in their lending to 
Indonesian companies (see Chart 5.1 below). 
95 One such story began with a US$ 60 million loan from state Bank Mandiri to the conglomerate 
Texmaco in early 2001 where it was alleged that a close relationship between the heads of Texmaco 
and Bank Mandiri was the basis upon which the loan was to be made (Tempo, 5.3.01). However, it 
was also reported that the loan, requested in order to fill a government contract for buses, was 
eventually refused because Texmaco had not yet settled its debts with IBRA and also because Bank 
Mandiri could not get priority amongst Texmaco's other creditors for repayments (Jakarta Post, 
1.3.01). 
96 In an interview with banking analyst Lin Che Wie (22.5.02), he maintained that a process of 're- 
labelling' was occurring where IBRA debtors were buying back their discounted assets from IBRA 
with state bank loans. 
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Chart 5.1: International and Local Claims of BIS-Reporting Banks 
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In place of these previous credit deals, the post-Soeharto distribution of wealth has 
taken place through the debt negotiations at IBRA. These negotiations have been 
full of largely unsubstantiated rumours around the motivations of decision-makers, 
but cases such as the Bank Bali Scandal97 testify to the truth which is sometimes 
behind them. That is, money being siphoned off one way or another for the private 
interests of the political and economic elite. Judging from the low rate of debt 
recovery for the government, most of the conglomerate debtors seem to have 
avoided much of the repayment, but at the expense of emptying out their domestic 
companies of their most valuable and mobile assets and sitting on them abroad. 
Undoubtedly though, many have sustained heavy losses. Although some private 
foreign firms are likely to have lost money in the Indonesian crisis, others have done 
rather well from the opportunities now open to buy some of the best Indonesian 
assets at a relatively cheap price. 
97 The Bank Bali Scandal arose in 1999 as a payment made by IBRA to Bank Bali as part of the 
government's blanket guarantee programme had an extraordinary US$ 64 million skimmed from it 
by an intermediary company who then passed much of it on the Hahibie re-election campaign. 
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The terms within which the struggle for the control of assets has been played out is 
also of interest, for, it is clear that nationality and ethnicity are still important when 
it comes to decisions over the allocation of resources. Under Habibie, for example, 
there were many calls from pribumi organisations for the assets under the control of 
IBRA to be redistributed in their direction 98 Although this did not occur, it has 
since been suggested that Habibie had an agenda to break up the Chinese- 
Indonesian conglomerates through the negotiations over BLBI and that this is to a 
large extent what has indeed resulted (Sato 2003). In terms of the issue of 
nationality, vociferous objections from MPs and a large section of the media to the 
sale of assets to foreign companies have now become common place. This is in 
contrast to the attitude of the Wahid and Megawati administrations which have both 
cleared the way for foreign ownership under both IMF pressure and the urgent 
necessity to fund the state budget. 
The difficulty with this discourse is in knowing how far these arguments are mere 
justifications for personal enrichment and how far they are genuine. In practice, 
both motivations inevitably intermingle and must be weighed up by the government 
in terms of the employment creation benefits of international investment, the 
disadvantage of profits being channeled away from the Indonesian economy through 
foreign firms and the political advantages which illicit funding from corruption can 
bring them. In any case, the point once again is that efforts to prevent corruption 
must also include a more proactive element to address these nationalist concerns. 
In terms of patterns of corruption, political parties again appear as a set of important 
new constituents in corrupt exchange. Yet, interestingly, their power over decisions 
at IBRA is derived not from any formal legal rights but from their ability to stall the 
political process in the DPR, to leave laws unpassed or otherwise hamper their 
progress through parliament. Such a proliferation of state actors in corruption 
indicates once more the new multi-polar nature of the post-Soeharto state. 
98 Aburizal Bakrie called for preference to be given to pribumi companies in the sale of BCA 
(Kompas, 26.8.98). Two pribumi business associations, HIPPI and HIMPI also made similar 
demands on IBRA assets (Warta Ekonomi, 24.11.98; Tempo, 1.10.01). 
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As the section on private domestic ownership showed, the levels of domestic wealth 
concentration on the business side of the corruption equation has remained the 
same, even in view of the overall contraction of value in the economy. Having said 
this, however, the increasing role of foreign capital in the Indonesian economy 
through the purchase of IBRA assets and an upsurge in M&As is a new 
development as foreign companies entering the economy on this basis no longer 
require the domestic partners of the Soeharto era. In place of the guarantees which 
these domestic partners brought to foreign business in the Soeharto era is, in some 
cases, pressure from their own domestic governments through negotiations on the 
Indonesian state's own terms of international debt repayment. With foreign 
businesses able to circumvent domestic partners in this way, this pattern of 
corruption is likely to decline in the future. However, it was also shown that the 
institutional changes which were implemented in the financial sector, such as the 
introduction of a whole new court for bankruptcies and the creation of IBRA itself 
along with its various oversight bodies, have fallen somewhat short of their ideals 
and patterns of corruption have simply adapted to the new circumstances. 
In echoes of the role of legal institutions in the negotiations over contracts at PLN, 
here again, because the legal process is expensive and unpredictable for all potential 
parties, it has been used more as a bargaining device than as an arbiter of justice. 
Thus, if, as argued in Chapter One, it is accepted that law is an intermediary of the 
political and economic spheres, then this new pattern of courts relying solely on 
monetary inducements rather than a mixture of money and political influence has 
wider implications. Coupled together with the conclusions of the chapter on 
corporatism, this view of law as now relatively more free from political influence 
adds weight to an interpretation of post-Soeharto corruption as having become 
somewhat more inclusive and competitive. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the process of change in Indonesian business/state 
relations in the immediate post-Soeharto period (1998 - 2002). In order to do this, 
the substantive research chapters have focused on three main sites of enquiry. 
These are: firstly, the allocation of government contracts to individual businesses in 
the oil, electricity and forestry sectors, secondly, organisations which group 
businesses into business associations and thirdly, the negotiations over debt at 
IBRA. 
Within these sites of enquiry, corruption is used as an indicator of the way in which 
business and the state interact. Changes in patterns of corruption were discerned in 
the allocation of government contracts and the debt negotiations where there has 
been a proliferation of constituents in corruption but mostly from the state side of 
corrupt exchange. However, the chapter on business associations showed that 
where government favours are accessed by medium-sized companies from 
bureaucrats working underneath the level of the executive, there may also be some 
increased access to corrupt opportunities for a wider range of businesses. Thus, 
where the contracts and debt deals are at their most valuable, there has been a 
proliferation of state actors in corruption but not business, whereas there is now 
more potential for a broader range of medium-sized businesses to be involved in 
corruption at a lower level of contract allocation. 
Another change in patterns of corruption is the decline of corruption based on 
political influence in favour of a system where money is the major currency of 
influence. Although financial rewards are the raison d'etre of all systems of 
corruption, under Soeharto access to corrupt exchange was based not just on bribes 
but also on proximity to Soeharto. Now it is no longer the case that business clients 
can rely on their political connections in the same way since the cultivation of such 
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connections is hampered by a high turnover of different state patrons. This again 
relates to the inclusion of a whole new array of state actors in corruption, but is also 
the result of the new role of political parties in choosing the heads of SOEs as well 
as cabinet members. The decline of corporatism, the lack of state interference in the 
struggle between business associations for access to the government `contract loop', 
and the way in which the legal process has become more unpredictable are all 
reflections of the decline of political influence in corruption. 
The previous chapters also highlighted one particular continuity in patterns of 
corruption from the Soeharto period in the close identification of nationalist `pro- 
pribumi' arguments with corruption. The chapters on the allocation of government 
contracts and debt negotiations in particular showed how corruption is conceived as 
one of the mechanisms through which protection of the domestic economy is 
achieved from encroachment by foreign interests. Where foreign interests are not 
involved, such as in the forestry sector, corruption is instead linked to the promotion 
of economically weak groups from the regions as opposed to the centre. This is not 
to deny the other functions of corruption, such as the maintenance of political power 
or the provision of personal wealth, but simply adds an extra dimension. Thus, 
corruption in Indonesia can be viewed as a system of wealth distribution based not 
only on connections and money, but also ethnicity and nationality. 
These findings give rise to two main conclusions. Firstly, they correlate with a 
growing body of literature linking democratic reforms with the further spread of 
corruption, at least initially. Where there has been a general consensus for years 
that a lack of political competition provides an environment in which corruption 
flourishes (Cassing 2000; Doig et al 2000), there is now much evidence to suggest 
that the increased political competition following democratic reforms enables an 
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expansion of corruption across a broader range of elites. ' The consensus now is 
that, 
when authoritarian control is challenged and destroyed through economic 
liberalisations and political democratisations, but not yet replaced by 
democratic checks and balances, and by legitimate and accountable 
institutions, the level of corruption will increase and reach a peak before it is 
reduced with increasing levels of democratic governance (Andvig et al, 
2000, p. 57). 
Thus, the findings of this thesis uphold the proposition that corruption spreads in 
tandem with political democratisation. However, in the Indonesian context, the 
more controversial question is whether this new inclusion of more actors in 
corruption represents an intermediary stage on the road to a more fundamental shift 
in the system of power or whether nothing has really changed. Robison and Hadiz 
(2004) argue that the `predatory logic' of the political system remains the same and 
that new political players have little choice but to operate within the predatory 
processes already in place (p. 256). Throughout this thesis, it has been shown that 
this is indeed the case. Where local government, MPs and political parties have 
gained more political power, they have entered the predatory process, ruthlessly 
exploiting the opportunities for corrupt exchange. 
Nevertheless, it is also significant that the composition of these predatory interests 
has changed. On the business side, although there still remains a hardcore of 
Soeharto-era cronies attempting to save their business empires through government 
favouritism, many of the least viable crony companies have been fatally weakened 
by the economic crisis, including a large proportion of the Soeharto children's 
enterprises. Whether or not these previous owners make a comeback into the 
Indonesian economy in later years remains to be seen, but they certainly have the 
resources to do so. Currently, however, their place as the most profitable enterprises 
1 See, for example, Philip (2001), Moran 2001, Ockey (1994), Doner et al (1997), Sidel (1996), Doig 
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in the Indonesian economy has been overtaken by those companies oriented towards 
the domestic consumer market with products such as cigarettes and pharmaceuticals 
and in these sectors, the scale of government favouritism seen under Soeharto 
cannot be replicated. 
It is also of note that many more state actors are involved in corruption now than 
under Soeharto, even if the long-term significance of this development for levels of 
corruption remains to be debated. For example, it could be argued that such 
increased competition lowers the return on rent-seeking, thus making it a less 
attractive option (Cassing 2000, p. 166). Equally, it is intuitively credible that more 
participants in corruption means an even wider range of people with a vested 
interest in seeing the predatory logic continued. In any case, such abstract and 
amorphous concepts as systems of power are bound to change slowly and almost 
imperceptibly. In the meantime, trying to uncover smaller changes to patterns 
within these systems can contribute towards an understanding of the evolution of the 
larger relations of power as well as what these relations of power mean in terms of 
the distribution of wealth. For example, if opportunities for involvement in corrupt 
exchange were to expand beyond the elite to become more inclusive of smaller 
domestic businesses, this would surely have an impact on conceptions of the overall 
system of power. As Le Billon states, `corruption may have a corrosive effect on 
economies and rule-based institutions, but it also forms part of the fabric of social 
and political relationships' (Le Billon 2003, p. 416). Thus this endogenous nature 
of corruption means that charting changes in the pattern of corruption *adds more 
value to the identification of a predatory logic. 
In Section 1.5.3 of the literature review it was suggested that institutions have a 
direct effect on the composition of interests compared to the way in which social 
conflict theory tends to think of interests being unaffected by institutional change 
and able to reconstitute around it at will. The evidence upholding such a 
(2000), Harris-White and White (1996). 
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proposition has come from many of the different sectors reviewed in this thesis. For 
example, in Chapter Two on oil contracts the new power of the legislature, a new 
range of oversight bodies and the adjustment to Pertamina's position within the state 
system of accountability have substantially changed the composition of interests on 
the state side of the corruption equation. Similarly, the decentralisation laws and the 
myriad of regulations which accompanies them have decisively redefined the 
composition of interests in the forestry sector to include Biipatis, Governors and the 
regional parliaments. The introduction of new deregulatory laws in the electricity 
sector have also raised the potential for new groups of state interests from local 
governments and other sections of the bureaucracy to benefit from corruption. 
On the other hand, the institutionalist perspective that institutional configuration is a 
`significant and independent' variable in explaining economic and political 
processes is not borne out in this thesis. For example, the case study of the struggle 
between Kadin and sectoral BAs over the certification regime in Chapter Three 
highlighted the ways in which institutional reform proceeds as a reflection of 
contending interests. Here the frequent changes to a new Presidential Decree 
regulating the involvement of business associations in government procurement 
clearly reflected the conflict between Kadin, Kadindas and sectoral BAs. Another 
example of the weakness inherent in focusing exclusively on institutions to explain 
the distribution of power can also be seen in Chapter Four. Here vestiges of 
Soeharto state power in the form of Golkar and HIPMI exercise their influence over 
the election of Kadin's leaders not through institutional structures but through a 
more nebulous form of power derived from their proximity to state elite. Thus, any 
attempts to explain the distribution of power within the business association sector 
which relied on institutional configuration would effectively miss the reality of how 
power is exercised. Such an exclusive focus on institutional configuration also 
leaves no room for situations where institutional reforms are completely blocked by 
vested interests, such as the unceremonious abandonment of reformist measures 
aimed at curtailing the concentration of harvesting licenses in the forestry sector. 
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The institutionalist would run into difficulties trying to explain change in the 
forestry sector if they focused only on institutional configuration. 
The institutionalists' eye for the organisational attributes of legal-rational 
institutions is helpful and there is by now an emerging consensus on what mediating 
institutions in the business/state relationship should look like, the rules and 
regulations which set up theoretical lines of accountability and systems of 
transparency. However, it is not enough to discern obstacles to this ideal 
functioning of institutions in the motivations of political actors, to attribute 
institutional failure to a lack of `political will' or a lack of education in how 
institutions should function. If the use of institutions in this field is to move away 
from these normative considerations of what institutions should look like to become 
capable of analysing corruption, then their very definition must first alter. 
The problem with institutional analysis as it stands is that institutions are largely 
defined as a set of rules. For example, Douglass North (1990, p. 3) has defined 
institutions as `the rules of the game', whilst Hall (1986, p. 7 in Peters 1999, p. 66) 
defines them as `formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
procedures. ' Essentially, `rules define institutions and they are also the means 
through which those institutions have their influence on individuals' (Peters 1999, 
p. 107). Such definitions inevitably lead to analyses of dysfunctional institutions 
which center around suggestions for readjusting their rules. However, if their 
definition can be expanded so that they can also be described as `formalised 
relationships' as well as a set of rules, then the reality of how they function is better 
captured. In this way the element of power can be locked in to the analysis of 
institutions and they can therefore be seen as both a reflection of the more 
fundamental issues which govern power relations as well as the set of rules designed 
to regulate these relationships. In other words, the functioning of institutions 
reflects existing deeper currents at the same time as striving to change them. 
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This leads onto the second major conclusion of this thesis, that one of these more 
fundamental currents governing the functioning of institutions is the state's 
commitment to fostering the accumulation of domestic capital. All states protect 
their major domestic business interests through political influence. For example, 
tying development aid to the attainment of contracts for donor countries' domestic 
business is already established practice. It is also widely accepted, even by 
institutions such as the World Bank, that different stages of economic growth 
require different levels of competition and that the policy of protecting infant 
industries has its merits (World Bank 1998, p. 2). 
However, as Gomez (2002, p. 24) suggests, the absence of autonomy between the 
Indonesian state and the business community under Soeharto meant that state 
protectionism degenerated into corruption. In other words, decisions concerning the 
allocation of resources for the protection of domestic business were based on 
connections and illicit payments rather than merit. One way to conceive of the 
relationship between legitimate protection and illegitimate corruption is to place the 
two on opposite ends of a sliding scale rather than view them as mutually exclusive. 
In this way, where protectionism often degenerates into corruption, it could also be 
suggested that intervention by international institutions in the post-Soeharto 
economy can be located on a continuum between genuine anti-corruption efforts 
and the opening up of the economy to benefit private foreign interests. 
Corruption is a part of all polities the world over, but the point being made here is 
that the structural influence of delayed capitalism should also be considered in any 
analysis of corruption in developing countries. As Szeftel writes: 
In the context of underdevelopment, local accumulation rests heavily on 
political power and the ability it provides to appropriate public resources. 
Corruption provides a means of transferring public resources to the new 
middle class and bourgeois strata which emerged in the post-colonial order. 
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And underdevelopment ensures that dependence on political power for 
accumulation is continuous (2000, p. 287). 
The point is that even though this distribution of wealth through corruption was 
based on connections and the ability to provide illicit political financing, it would 
nevertheless be negligent to omit the concept from analyses of corruption, 
dismissing it as nothing more than a justification. At the very least, the promotion 
of the domestic accumulation of capital in the face of foreign economic domination 
can be seen as an ideological framework within which the corruption discourse 
takes place. 
The involvement of foreign business interests in the Indonesian economy is 
presumed by some to have a natural `regularising' effect, with the potential to 
introduce good corporate governance and a stricter adherence to the rule of law. 
However, as Robison and Hadiz (2004) note, there is nothing inherently liberalising 
about foreign businesses, which are generally prepared to operate under any type of 
regime as long as a degree of predictability and protection for property rights can be 
guaranteed (p. 259-261). Indeed, it was foreign finance that supported all of the 
biggest and most corrupt projects throughout the Soeharto era. In terms of the most 
powerful international institutions such as the IMF, it has also been shown 
throughout this thesis that their efforts to establish neo-liberal institutions have been 
less than successful in combating corruption. Whether it was through attempts to 
apply piecemeal reform in already existing institutions, or the wholesale creation of 
institutions such as the bankruptcy court, institutional engineering on its own has 
already been shown to have a limited impact on corruption. However, if it is 
accepted that concerns over the foreign domination of the Indonesian economy have 
been key to the corruption discourse, then it may be that the increased role of 
foreign interests will indirectly further entrench corruption. Take-overs by foreign 
businesses may help to push out the Soeharto-era cronies in some places, but the 
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opposite tendency could occur at the same time if foreign economic involvement is 
even just perceived as a threat. 
The view taken in this thesis of international interests owes much to the ideas 
developed by the social conflict theorists. Just as Rosser (2002) detailed the 
international interests which lie behind economic liberalisation, so in this thesis it 
has been shown how anti-corruption measures in, for example, Pertamina or IBRA 
have effectively shifted the distribution of economic benefits from domestic to 
international interests. Also in this regard, it has been shown that deregulation does 
not separate economics and politics as the neo-liberals claim. The section on PLN 
in Chapter Two particularly highlighted the ways in which international business 
exerts pressure on the Indonesian government to safeguard their interests through 
the leverage which their own national governments possess as a result of 
Indonesia's sovereign debt. 
Other than nationalist concerns about foreign economic ownership, within Indonesia 
the distribution of wealth is very often defined in terms of ethnicity. The potentially 
explosive situation where an ethnic minority conspicuously controls a large 
proportion of the economy has affected the pattern of corruption in many different 
ways. For example, the preferential state bank loans which were examined in 
Chapter Five were made mostly to pribumi businesses as a kind of compensation for 
the credit boom benefiting the mostly Chinese-Indonesian owners of the private 
banks. The role which pribumi-oriented business associations play in corruption is 
another such example. 
Post-Soeharto, the politicisation of ethnicity has become further ingrained as ethnic 
conflicts have erupted all over the archipelago with tragic consequences. As part of 
this process, the identification of particular ethnic groups as economically weak has 
gained in currency leading to distributional conflicts and calls for state policies to 
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rectify imbalances. One analyst has detailed the conflict between multiple 
ethnically-defined groups over the sale of the state-owned Padang cement plant in 
West Sumatra, concluding that patronage based on loyalty to Golkar has now been 
replaced with patronage based on ethnicity (Van Klinken 2002). In terms of 
corruption, the point here is that imbalances in wealth amongst ethnic groups both 
dictates the pattern of corruption as well as contributing to its cause. Kahn and 
Formosa (2002) make the same point, describing the Indonesian economy as 
characterised by a close embedding of commodity circuits in social and political 
hierarchies which are in many cases also `ethnicised' (p. 55-56). 
Thus, if corruption is to be replaced as a method of wealth distribution, imbalances 
in wealth between ethnically defined groups must also be addressed. Yet, in view of 
both past and present experiences, government schemes aimed at correcting such 
imbalances are very likely to be appropriated by groups of vested interests. This 
then begs the question, how can change possibly occur? As we have seen 
throughout this thesis, policy prescriptions and institutional change have been less 
than successful in eradicating corruption in the face of its more fundamental 
structural causes, such as class conflict, position in the global economy, ethnic 
imbalances in wealth and the disorganisation of civil society. However, the 
struggles which are informed by such structural determinants of power are also 
expressed in how effectively these institutions function. Similarly, institutional 
change has the capacity to alter the pattern of corruption, determining new 
constituents in corruption as well as accommodating those already deeply 
entrenched. The point is not that institution building is always and everywhere a 
futile task, but rather that analyses of why they are unsuccessful should move 
beyond simplistic assertions of a lack of political will to include these underlying 
currents. 
Identifying the role of ethnicity in discourses on the distribution of wealth in this 
way also highlights the idea that class and ethnicity are inextricably intertwined in 
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Indonesia. Such an idea would benefit from a more determined effort to investigate 
its theoretical implications, but it nevertheless remains the case that a relationship 
exists between the two concepts in Indonesia where it does not in classic Marxist 
accounts of class conflict. 
So, how do the findings presented in this thesis contribute to understandings of the 
business/state relationship in Indonesia? One fundamental problem with the 
pluralist, elitist, Marxist and statist models of business/state relationships presented 
in Chapter One is that they all seek to understand the process through which the 
capitalist class dominates the state. Such a characterisation of the business/state 
relationship may have more relevance for Western countries, but in the case of 
Indonesia it misses the essentially reciprocal character of business/state interactions 
which the clientelist model instead captures. Such a reciprocity, a sort of mutual 
dependence, has been further entrenched by the economic crisis. With the parlous 
condition of state finances, private investment is urgently needed and measures to 
attract back the conglomerate capital which was moved abroad at the height of the 
crisis has resulted in many state concessions to the conglomerates, especially 
concerning debt repayments. But equally, the state's control of conglomerate assets 
through IBRA has meant that conglomerates are more dependent than ever on state 
decisions for the survival of their business empires. In terms of international 
business, however, their structural power has been strengthened and translated into a 
much more tangible type of power with the intervention of international institutions 
in the domestic policy process. 
Whilst the existence of a hardcore of politicians and businesses from Soeharto's rule 
still remains constant, the element of a more open competition now apparent in 
business/state relations also casts doubts on the relevance of both statist and elite 
analyses. The reified state of statist analyses and the elite cohesion of elite analyses 
have now been replaced by a fragmented multi-polar state extending into the regions 
and a high degree of instability in the positions of the state elite. Essentially, then, 
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patterns in the business/state relationship in Indonesia have changed quite 
substantially whilst still operating within the logic of reciprocity. 
Finally, there are many aspects of the business/state relationship in Indonesia that 
remain opaque. Beyond the more spectacular examples of corruption reported in 
the media, the relationship between medium and small sized businesses with the 
state at lower levels in the bureaucracy is less well understood. The decentralisation 
process also begs questions about processes of contract allocation and the general 
implementation of regulations at these bureaucratic levels operating away from the 
centre. For example, business association contact with local government was found 
in this thesis to be substantial and understanding on what terms these relationships 
are developing would be useful. Systematic surveys of business attitudes towards 
business associations and the relationship between business associations and the 
parliament are other potential areas of research which have yet to be undertaken. 
Also in relation to the business/state relationship away from the very heights of 
economic activity, it would be interesting to discover more empirical data about the 
functioning of the various government schemes aimed at correcting domestic 
economic imbalances, such as the stipulations for local community involvement in 
large government contracts and the allocation of HPHs to co-operatives. Such a 
focus might also aid the development of further information on potential sources 
and directions of reform. In any case, finding out exactly who benefits from these 
schemes and under what terms would add a great deal to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the political economy of wealth distribution developed in this 
thesis. 
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Ibrahim Z. Fahmy Division of Investigations Indonesia Corruption October '1001 
Badoh Watch 
Danang Widoyoko Division of Investigations Indonesia Corruption October 2001 
Watch 
Wasingatu Zakiyah Division of Investigations Indonesia Corruption October 2001 
Watch 
Amrir Kotto Direktorat Bina Usa/ia Depart einen October 2001 
Dalam Negeri (Directorate Perindustrian dan 
of Domestic Business) Perdagangan 
(Department of Trade and 
Industry) 
Naseer Ahmad Senior Procurement World Bank 19.10.01 
Rana Specialist 
Respondent #2 Banking Analyst International Consultancy 23.10.01 
Gary Andrews Executive Director Britcham Business Centre 24.10.01 
Syahrial Loetan Kepala Biro Pemantauan Bappenas 28.10.01 
dan Evaluasi Pembia wan 
(Head of Bureau of 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
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Bernard Drum Private Sector Development World Bank 31.10.01 
Coordinator 
Arief Hermawan Executive Secretary, Barfan Kadin November 
Akreditasi dan Registrasi 2001 
(BARKI) (Accreditation and 
Registration Body) 
Tulus Tambunan Executive Secretary LP3E, Kadin I. 1 I. 01 
Arfan Sofyan Head of Department of Kadin 2.11.01 
Business Associations 
Elias L Tobing Chairman Kadin UKM 14.11-01 
Faisal Basri Commissioner of KPPN; KPPN; DEN; Perbanas 14.11-01 
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Perbanas University 
` ý, F 
Appendix 1 
Name Position Organisation Date of 
Interview 
Soy Pardede Vice-President Co-ordinating Kadin; KPPU 16.11.01 
Trade Affairs; Kadin and 
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Thomas Darmawan Chairman of GAPMMI; GAPMMI: Gabungan 16.11.01 
Chairman of Compartment Pengusaha Makanan & 
of Multifarious Industry, Minuman Seluruh 
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Ibu Tuti Project Director USAID 5.12.01 
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and International Co- and Regional 
operation Infrastructure 
Sarwedi Procurement Consultant Bappenas 19.1.02 
Utama Kajo Wakil Ketua Kompartemen Kadin 28.1.02 
Kebijaksanaan Publik (Vice 
Chairman of Public Policy 
Unit) 
Parlindungan Consultant CIC Economic and February 
Sihombing Investment Consulting 2002 
Herry Soetanto Head of Research and Agency for Research and February 
Development on Foreign Development of Industry 2002 
Trade and Trade, Ministry of 
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Ayudha Dharma Director Partnership for Business February 
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Respondent #5 Conglomerates Analyst International Consultancy 13.2.02 
Adiatma Sardjito Press Relations Pertamina 20.2.02 
Irfan Muktiono Director, Department of Indonesian Corruption 20.2.02 
Political Corruption Watch 
Stephen Sherlock Governance Advisor World Bank 26.2.02 
Nizar Suhendra Executive Director The Indonesian Society March 2002 
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Mahmud Department of State 16.3.02 
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Suhardo Kabag Humas dan Protokol Bulog April 2002 
(Head of Public Relations 
and Protocol Section) 
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Social Studies (CESS) 
David Brown Advisor, Industrial Ministry of Forestry 8.4.02 
Restructuring Working 
Group 
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Harry Seldadyo Researcher Center for Economic and 9.4.02 
Social Studies (CESS) 
Ubaidillah Researcher Center for Economic and 9.4.02 
Social Studies (CESS) 
Richard Holloway Programme Advisor on Civil Partnership for 11.4.02 
Society/Anti-corruption Governance Reform in 
Indonesia, UNDP 
Graham Rettke Team Leader for `Improving Asian Development Bank 12.4.02 
Public Sector Procurement 
Project', TA 3471 - INO 
Respondent #1 IMF Representative International Monetary 16.4.02 
Fund 
Steffan Synerstorm Senior Advisor for Asian Development Bank 19.4.02 
Governance 
Ayudha Dharma Researcher Partnership on Business 23.4.02 
Pra oa Competition 
Geoff Forester Programme Manager Technical Assistance 24.4.02 
Management Facility 
TAM 
Stuart Andrews Procurement Consultant Asian Development Bank 26.4.02 
Roderick Brazier Project Director The Asia Foundation 26.4.02 
Wawan Sukawan Sub Direktorat Kelembagaan Direktorat Jenderal May 2002 
dan Usaha Perdagangan Perdagangan dalam 
(Sub-Directorate for Trade Negeri (Directorate 
Organisations and General Domestic Trade), 
Businesses) Departemen 
Perindustrian dan 
Perdagangan 
(Department of Trade and 
Industry) 
Tito Pranolo Kepala Pusat Jasa Logistik (Bulog) May 2002 
(Head of Logistical Service 
Division) 
Prof. Lepi Tarmidi Lembaga Penyelidikan Economic Faculty, 14.5.02 
Ekonomi dan Masyarakat University of Indonesia 
(Institute of Economic 
Investigations and Citizens) 
Wilson Nababan President Director PT CISI Raya Utama 14.5.02 
Priambodo Public Relations Officer IBRA 15.5.02 
Indria Samego Lecturer and author of 'Bila Jayabaya University 16.5.02 
ABRI Berbisnis' 
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David Ray Domestic Trade Advisor, Departemen 16.5.02 
Partnership for Economic Perindustrian dan 
Growth: A Joint Project of Perdaganan (Department 
USAID and the Government of Trade and Industry) 
of Indonesia 
Teten Masduki Coordinator of Working Indonesian Corruption 17.5.02 
Committee Watch 
Lin Che Wie Director Equity Corporate SG Securities Investment 22.5.02 
Finance Banking 
Respondent #4 Senior Corruption Attorney General 22.5.02 
Investigator 
Respondent #3 Legal Consultant Indonesian Legal 5.6.02 
Consultants 
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Jakarta 8.2.02 
Jacqueline Hicks, 
JI. Taman Bendungan Jatiluhur 1/2, 
Bendungan Hilir, 
JAKARTA PUSAT 
From the Department of Politics 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
016 
. 
d' 
a 
University of Leeds 
Leeds LS2 9JT 
Telex 556473 UNILDS 0 
Fax 0113 233 4400 
Telephone 0113 243 1751 
Direct line 0113 233 4382; 4383; 4384 
What is this letter about and who has sent it? My name is Jacky Hicks and I am a British researcher from the 
University of Leeds in the UK. I am currently in Jakarta completing fieldwork for my PhD which is about Business 
Associations in Indonesia. I have no affiliations to any institution within or without Indonesia except my own 
university in the UK. As part of my fieldwork I sending this questionnaire to all business associations, Gabungan, 
Himpunan and Ikatan in Indonesia. I obtained the address of this association from a directory of NGOs and 
associations published annually by Masindo which I followed up with a telephone call to your association's office to 
confirm who I should send this questionnaire to. 
" What is this questionnaire about? The questionnaire is designed to find information about three aspects of your 
association. These are (1) simple factual information about your association such as year of formation, membership 
numbers, budget and type of daily activities (2) the frequency of your association's contact with Kadin and how you 
feel about this contact (3) your association's lobbying activities to the government and how you feel about your 
association's relationship with government. 
Why should I complete this questionnaire? I believe that this survey is important feel strongly because there has 
never before been any attempt to canvas the opinions of the business association sector as a whole in Indonesia. I 
further believe that today all associations who represent business have the potential to be involved in the recovery of 
the Indonesian economy in a way that was not possible just a few years ago and as such deserve more attention from 
both observers and government practitioners. I hope my research will contribute towards a better understanding of 
the sector that you work in, but this will only be possible if I receive responses from all of you since the more 
responses that are sent back to me, the more meaningful my results will be. Your opinion about the issues included 
in this questionnaire is very important but will be missing from the final results and any subsequent analysis if you 
do not complete the questionnaire. I must also emphasise that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions I 
have sent to you, I simply want to know your true opinions. I would also like to assure you that all of the 
information you give me will be treated as completely confidential and it will not be possible for anyone to identify 
the information you give me when I write up the results. Your individual response will not be revealed to anyone 
but will go to learn about overall attitudes. 
How long will it take to complete this questionnaire? I know that your time is valuable to you and because of this 
I have tried to make the questionnaire as easy and quick to fill in as possible by providing boxes for all the questions 
where you simply have to tick one. I also realise that because this questionnaire is being sent to such a wide range of 
associations, in some cases not all the questions will be relevant to you or that some of the information I ask for may 
be difficult for you to find. If this is the case, then I ask you to please return the questionnaire anyway with the 
answers that it was possible for you to fill in. I have included a pre-paid envelope for your convenience. 
Please return completed questionnaires before the 28th February 2002. As an incentive, I promise to send a copy of the 
results to every association who has taken the time to complete the questionnaire. I hope you will find the results 
interesting. 
If you wish, please feel free to add any additional information in the section entitled "Additional Comments" at the end 
of the questionnaire. If you have any questions then please feel free to contact me: Jacky clicks (021) 573 6889. 
I would be very grateful to all of you who respond. Thank you 
Jacky Hicks 
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University of Leeds 
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Fax 0113 233 4400 
Telephone 0113 243 1751 
Direct line 0113 233 4382; 4383; 4384 
Surat ini tentang apa dan siapa mengirimkanya? Nama saya Jacky Hicks, saya peneliti warganegara Inggris darf 
Universitas Leeds di Inggris. Saat ini says berada di Jakarta untuk melakukan studi lapangan dan pengumpulan data 
mengenai Organisasi Bisnis di Indonesia. Saya tidak memiliki hubungan institusi di dalam maupun di luar 
Indonesia, kecuali dengan Universitas tersebut diatas. Sebagai bagian darf studi lapangan, saya mengirimkan 
kuesioner terlampir kepada semua Organisasi Bisnis, Gabungan, Himpunan dan Ikatan yang ada di Indonesia. 
Alamat Organisasi ini saya dapatkan darf buku panduan tentang LSM dan asosiasi yang diterbitkan setiap tahun oleh 
Masindo, serta diikuti dengan menelpon ke kantor-kantor organisasi untuk memastikan nama dan alamat yang 
dituju. 
" Kuesionar ini tentang apa? Kuesioner ini di rancang untuk memperoleh informasi mengenai 3 aspek, yaitu: 
(1) Informasi mengenai data faktual seperti tahun berdiri, jumlah anggota, anggaran dan jenis aktivitas harian 
(2) Frekuensi hubungan antara organisasi dengan Kadin dan bagaimana pendapat anda mengenai kontak tersebut 
(3) Aktivitas-aktivitas lobby yang dilakukan terhadap pemerintah dan bagaimana pendapat anda tentang hubungan 
organisasi ini dengan pemerintah. 
Kenapa seharusnya mengembalikan kuesioner ini? Saya sangat percaya bahwa survey ini penting artinya, karena 
penelitian semacam ini yang mencakup seluruh anggota organisasi belum pernah dilakukan sebelumnya. Selain itu, 
saya yakin bahwa organisasi bisnis ini mempunyai potensi untuk berperan dalam pemulihan Krisis Ekonomi di 
Indonesia. Peran ini tidak dimungkinkan berberapa tahun sebelumnya, sehingga pemerintah dan peneliti saat ini 
perlu memberikan perhatian yang lebih besar. Saya harap penelitian ini akan menyumbangkan saling pengertian 
yang lebih besar dalam sektor yang anda kerjakan. Oleh karena itu, saya sangat mengharapkan respon yang baik 
darf anda, karena semakin banyak yang memberikan jawaban akan semakin berarti. Pendapat anda mengenai 
masalah ini sangat penting, tetapi tidak akan ada artinya tanpa upaya anda mengembalikan jawaban terhadap 
kuesioner ini. Perlu saya tekankan bahwa tidak ada jawaban yang benar atau salah dalam kuesioner ini, hanya 
sekedar menginginkan jawaban yang paling mendekati kebenaran. Saya jamin bahwa semua informasi akan 
diperlakukan sebagai data pribadi, dan tidak dimungkinkan lagi orang lain untuk mengetahui jawaban yang telah 
diberikan, dalam penulisan akhir. Jawaban pribadi anda tidak akan diumumkan kepada orang lain, hanya 
menggambarkan situasi umum. 
" Butuh berapa lama untuk selesaikan kuesioner ini ? Saya menyadari waktu anda yang sangat berharga, o1ch 
karena itu kuesioner ini dirancang secara sederhana. Anda hanya perlu menjawab dengan memberikan tanda silang 
pada jawaban yang dipilih. Kerjasama anda bersifat sukarela, dan anda dapat melewati pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang 
sulit dijawab. Akan tetapi, saya harapkan agar kuesioner ini dikembalikan dengan jawaban yang ada. Untuk 
kemudahan anda, bersama ini saya kirimkan amplop berperangko. 
Saya persilahkan untuk mengembalikan jawaban sebelum 28 Pebruari 2002. Sebagai insentif pengembalian kuesioner 
ini, says akan mengerim ringkasan k asar hasil kuesioner kepada anda. Saya berharap hasil penelitian ini merupakan 
informasi yang menarik dan berguna untuk anda. 
Saya persilahkan untuk menambahkan informasi pada bagian "Komentar Tambahan" pada halaman terakhir kuesioner. 
Jika masih belumjelas, silahkan menghubungi saya pada nomer (021) 573 6889. 
Terima kasih atas erjasama yang baik, 
Jacky Hicks 
Appendix 2 Business; 'ýtýssrociations; ins Iiidonesi 
(1) About This Association 
1.1. In what year was this business association formed? 
1.2. How many years has the Chairman of this association held that position? 
(PLEASE GIVE NUMBER OF YEARS) 
1.3. In this association, how many of the following are there? 
(PLEASE GIVE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES) 
Paid full-time employees .................................................. 
Paid part-time employees ................................................. 
II 
Volunteer workers ......................................................... C_I 
1.4. This question is about the office premises of this association. 
(PLEASE TICK ONE BOX BELOW WHICH BEST DESCRIBES YOUR OFFICE) 
Q The office is owned/rented by the association itself 
Q The office is owned/rented by a member of the board of this association and is rented to 
the association for a sum of money 
Q The office is owned by a member of the board of this association and is given rent-free to 
the association 
Q Other, please state 
1.5. Does this association have regional branches? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Q Don't know 
1.6. How many members does this association have? 
(PLEASE GIVE A NUMBER) 
II 
1.7. Please give a rough estimate of who your members are as a percentage of your total 
membership (definition of an SME is an enterprise employing less than 100 workers) 
(PLEASE GIVE A PERCENTAGE) 
Small and medium enterprises (SME) ................................... 
Larger businesses .......................................................... 
I 
Other associations ......................................................... iI 
Other, please state 
1.8. Have you ever had to sanction any of your members for bad conduct? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Q Don't know 
ppcntlit 2 
1.9. What was the total gross income of your association last year? (2001) 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Up to Rp 10 million 
Q Rp 10 million - Rp 50 million 
Q Rp 51 million - Rp 100 million 
Q Rp 101 million - Rp 500 million 
Q Rp 501 million - Rp 1 billion 
Q Over Rp 1 billion 
1.10. Please give a rough estimate of the sources of this association's income as a percentage of 
its total income. (PLEASE GIVE A PERCENTAGE) 
Membership dues ...................................................................... 
Government contributions ....................................................... ýý 
Contributions from other institutions ..................................... {--j 
Contributions from your members .............................................. 
ýI 
Earnings from business association work ..................................... 
CI 
Contributions from the board of this association ........................ 
1I 
Other, please state 
1.11. What are the daily activities of this association? (PLEASE GIVE TWO TICKS FOR 
ACTIVITIES WHICH TAKE UP MOST TIME AND ONE TICK FOR ANY OTHER 
ACTIVITIES THATAPPLY) 
QQ Providing information to your members 
QQ Lobbying the government to try to influence public policy 
QQ Lobbying other institutions in the interests of your members (e. g. media, other business 
bodies, international institutions) 
QQ Technical/ managerial assistance to your members 
QQ Other member services such as providing certification 
QQ Informal meetings and socialisation of members 
QQ Other, please state 
(2) Contact with Kadin 
2.1. Is this association a member of a Kadin? (PLEASE TICK ONE. IF THE ANSWER IS NO 
PLEASE GO TO QUESTION NO. 3.1) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Q Don't know 
2.2. Approximately how many times in the last six months has your association been in contact 
with Kadin Indonesia? (PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Not at all 
Q 1- 5 times 
Q 6- 10 times 
Q 11 - 20 times Q 21 - 40 times Q Over 40 times 
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2.3. In your opinion, how responsive is Kadin Indonesia to the needs of this association? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Not very responsive 
Q Moderately responsive 
Q Very responsive 
2.3. Compared to five years ago, how would you rate the present responsiveness of Kadin to 
the needs of your association? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Less responsive 
Q Equally responsive 
Q More responsive 
(3) Contact with Government 
3.1. Has this association ever been in direct contact with the government? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE. IF NO, PLEASE CO TO QUESTION NO. 3.7) 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Q Don't know 
3.2. Approximately how many times in the last 6 months has this association been in direct 
contact with government officials at the following levels? 
(PLEASE GIVE ONE TICK FOR EACH COLUMN) 
Not at all 1-3 times 4- 10 times 11 - 20 times More than 20 times 
Minister El F-I 
Director General Q 
Echelon 1 Civil Servant 
DPR Members El Ej Q 
Local Government El EJ I EJ r-I 
3.3. For what reasons have you been in contact with the levels of government mentioned in 
question 3.2? 
(PLEASE GIVE TWO TICKS FOR THE MOST COMMON REASONAND ONE TICK FOR ANY 
OTHERS THAT APPLY) 
QQ Laws 
QQ Goods inspection 
QQ Transport and electricity costs 
QQ Tariffs 
QQ Manpower laws 
QQ Other, please state 
3.4. In your opinion, how responsive are senior government officials/agencies to this 
associations' current problems or requests? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Not very responsive 
Q Moderately responsive 
Q Very responsive 
3.5. Compared to 5 years ago, how would you rate the present responsiveness of government 
officials to your problems/requests? 
(PLEASE TICK ONE) 
Q Less responsive 
Q Equally responsive 
Q More responsive 
lppcndix 2 
3.6. In your opinion, which are the most effective ways for this association to influence 
government policy? 
(PLEASE GIVE A NUMBER. USE A SCALE OF I TO SIN TERMS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
FOR YOUR ASSOCIATION WHERE 11S NOT VERY EFFECTIVE AND 5 IS VERY 
EFFECTIVE) 
Q Direct contact with ministers 
Q Direct contact with other senior government officials 
Q Direct contact with members of the DPR 
Q Hold press conferences 
Q Organise demonstrations 
Q Form coalitions with other organisations 
Q Testify before relevant DPR commissions 
Q Ask your association members to contact government departments 
Q Ask your association members to contact members of DPR 
Q Contact Kadin 
Q Other, please state 
3.7. In your opinion, to what extent do the following groups influence policy-making at the 
national level in Indonesia? 
(PLEASE GIVE A NUMBER. USE A SCALE OF 1 TO S IN TERMS OF YOUR 
PERCEPTION OF THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE. WHERE I MEANS NOTVERY 
INFLUENTIAL AND 5 IS VERY INFLUENTIAL) 
Q President and cabinet 
Q Local governments 
Q Labour organisations 
Q Kadin 
Q Business associations and groupings 
Q Mass media 
Q Foreign Conglomerates 
Q Domestic conglomerates 
Q IMF 
Q Universities/research institutes 
Q DPR members 
Q NGOs 
Q Military 
Q Other, please state 
Additional Comments: 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed pre-paid envelope to: Jl. Taman Bendungan 
Jatliluhur 112, Bendungan Hilir, Jakarta Pusat. 
Thank You Very Much For Your Help! 
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CI 
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1.2. Sudah berapa tahun Ketua Umum yang sekarang menjabat? 
(TOLONG DI ! S! DENGAN JUMLAH TA HUN) 
1.3. Dalam menjalankan aktivitas sehari-hari, berapa organisasi ini punya karyawan? 
(TOLONG D1 1S1 DENGAN JUMLAH KARYAWAN) 
Karyawan yang digaji dan bekerja penuh ............................... 
Karyawan yang digaji dan bekerja paruh waktu ........................ 
I I 
Karyawan yang tidak digaji ............................................... II 
1.4. Pertanyaan ini mengenai kantor organisasi ini. 
(TOLONG PILIH SATU JA WABAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Kantor dimiliki/disewa sendiri oleh organisasi ini 
Q Kantor dimiliki/disewa oleh salah seorang pengurus organisasi dan dibayar 
oleh organisasi ini 
Q Kantor dimiliki/disewa oleh salah satu pengurus organisasi ini dan organisasi 
tanpa membayar sewa 
Q Jawaban lain, jelaskan 
1.5. Apakah organisasi ini memiliki cabang di daerah? 
(TOLONG PILIH SA TU JA WABAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Ya 
Q Tidak 
Q Tidak tahu 
1.6. Berapa banyak anggota organisasi ini? 
(TOLONG DI ISI DENGAN JUMLAH ANGGOTA) 
0 
1.7. Tolong berikan perkiraan kasar mengenai jenis keanggotaan organisasi ini dalam 
persentasi total. (Definisi UKM: adalah perusahaan yang punya karyawan kurang darf 
100) (TOLONG DI ISI DENGAN PERSENTASI) 
Usaha kecil dan menengah (UKM) ...................................... 
Perusahaan besar ..........................................................., 
1I 
Asosiasi lain ................................................................. 1 
Jawaban Lain. Jelaskan 
1.8. Apakah organisasi ini pernah memberi sanksi kepada anggota karena melakukan 
kesalahan? (TOLONG PILIH SATU JA WABAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Ya 
Q Tidak 
Q Tidaktahu 
(1) Mengenai Organisasi Anda 
1.1. Tahun berapa organisasi ini berdiri? 
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1.9. Kategori mana yang paling tepat untuk pendapatan kasar organisasi ini di tahun 2001? 
(TOLONG PILIH SATU JAWAIJAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Sampai Rp 10 juta 
Q Rp 10 juta - Rp 50 juta Q Rp 51 juta - Rp 100 juta Q Rp 101 juta - Rp 500 juta Q Rp 501 juta - Rp 1 milyar Q Di atas Rp I milyar 
1.10. Tolong berikan perkiraan kasar sumber-sumber pendapatan organisasi ini menurut 
persentasi pendapatan total. (TOLONG DI ISI DENGAN PERSENTASI) 
Iuran anggota ........................................................................... ý 
Sumbangan dari pemerintah .................................................... ýý 
Sumbangan darf lembaga-lembaga lain ................................... II 
Sumbangan dari anggota ......................................................... 
ýý 
Penghasilan organisasi ............................................................ 
ýý 
Sumbangan darf pengurus organisasi ini ................................. 
II 
Jawaban Lain. Jelaskan 
1.11. Apa aktivitas sehari-hari organisasi ini? (TOLONG MEMBERIKANDUA TANDA SILANG 
UNTUKAKTIVITAS YANG BIASANYA PERLU BANYAK WAKTU, DANAKTIVITAS YANG 
PERLU SEDIKIT WAKTU MEMBERIKAN SATU TANDA SILANG, SERTA AKTIVITAS 
YANG TIDAK DILAKUKAN DIBIARKAN KOSONG) 
QQ Memberikan informasi untuk anggota 
QQ Melobi pemerintah untuk mempengaruhi kebijakaan 
QQ Melobi lembaga lain untuk kepentingan anggota-anggota (contoh: Media, organisasi 
bisnis, lembaga-lembaga internasional) 
QQ Layanan tehnik atau managerial untuk anggota-anggota 
QQ Layanan lain untuk anggota seperti menyediakan sertifikasi 
QQ Pertemuan-pertemuan informal dan sosialisasi anggota 
QQ Jawaban Lain. Jelaskan 
(2) Mengenai Hubungan Organisasi Anda Dengan Kadin 
2.1. Apakah organisasi ini merupakan anggota Kadin? (TOLONG PILIH SATU JAWABAN 
DENGAN TANDA SILANG. KALA U TIDAK, SILAHKAN LANGSUNG KE PERTANYAAN 3.1) 
Q Ya 
Q Tidak 
Q Tidak tahu 
2.2. Kira-kira sudah berapa kali selama 6 bulan terakhir organisasi ini berhubungan dengan 
Kadin Indonesia? (TOLONG PILIII SATU JAWABAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Tidak pernah sama sekali 
Q1-5 kali 
Q6- lO kali 
Q 11 - 20 kali Q 21 - 40 kali Q Lebih darf 40 kali 
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2.3. Menurut Anda, seberapa jauh Kadin Indonesia peduli terhadap kepentingan organisasi 
ini? (TOLONG P/LIII SATU JAWABAN DENGAN TANDA SIGANG) 
Q Tidak terlalu peduli 
Q Kadang-kadang peduli 
Q Sangat peduli 
2.3. Dibandingkan dengan lima tahun lalu, bagaimana sekarang tingkat kepedulian Kadin 
Indonesia terhadap kepentingan organisasi ini? (TOLONG PILIII SATU JAWAI3AN 
DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Kurang peduli 
Q Sama Baja 
Q Lebih peduli 
(3) Mengenai Hubungan Organisasi Anda Dengan Pemerintah 
3.1. Apakah organisasi ini pernah berhubungan langsung dengan pemerintah? 
(TOLONG PILIH SA TU JAWABAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG. KALA U TIDAK, SILAIIKAN 
LANGSUNG KE PERTANYAAN 3.7) 
Q Ya 
Q Tidak 
Q Tidak tabu 
3.2. Kira-kira sudah berapa kali selama 6 bulan terakhir organisasi ini berhubungan 
langsung dengann pemerintah di level di bawah ini? 
(TOLONG MEMBERIKAN SATU TANDA SILANG UNTUK SETIAP LEVEL DI BA WAN INI) 
0 kali I-3 kali 4- 10 kali 11 -20 kali Lebih darf 20 kali 
Level Menteri 
Level DirektoratJenderal 
Level Pejabat Eselon I Q 
Level Anggota Parlemen El El 
Level Pemerintah Daerah 
3.3. Untuk alasan-alasan apa organisasi ini pernah berhubungan dengan pemerintah pada 
Pertanyaan nomor 3.2? (TOLONG MEMBERIKAN DUA TANDA SILANG UNTUKALASAN- 
ALASAN YANG PALING SERING DAN SATU UNTUKALASAN-ALASAN YANG RELEVAN 
SERTA ALASAN-ALASAN YANG TIDAK RELEVAN DIBIARKAN KOSONG SAJA) 
QQ Undang-undang 
QQ Pemeriksaan barang 
QQ Biaya transportasi dan listrik 
QQ Tarif 
QQ Undang-undang ketenagakerjaan 
QQ Jawaban lain, jelaskan 
3.4. Menurut Anda, seberapajauh tingkat kepedulian para pejabat pemerintah terhadap 
masalah-masalah organisasi ini sekarang yang muncul? (TOLONG PICA! SATU 
JA WA BAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Tidak terlalu peduli 
Q Kadang-kadang peduli 
Q Sangat peduli 
3.5. Dibandingkan dengan lima tahun yang lalu, bagaimana sekarang tingkat kepedulian 
para pejabat pemerintah terhadap masalah organisasi ini? (TOLONG PILIII SATU 
JA WABAN DENGAN TANDA SILANG) 
Q Kurang peduli 
Q Sama saja 
Q Lebih peduli 
Appendix 2 3.6. Menurut Anda, cara mana yang paling efektif bagi organisasi ini untuk mempengaruhi 
kebijakan pemerintah? (TOLONG MEMBERIKAN SAL411 SATUANCKA UNTUK 
SETIAP CARA D1 BAWAi1 INI. DI MANA 1= SANCAT TIDA K EFEKTIF, 2= TIDA K 
EFEKTIF, 3= CUKUP EFEKTIF, 4= EFEKTIF DAN 5= SANCAT EFEKTIF) 
Q Hubungan langsung dengan menteri-menteri 
Q Hubungan langsung dengan petugas-petugas pemerintah 
Q Hubungan langsung dengan anggota-anggota DPR 
Q Menyelenggara konperensi pers 
Q Mengadakan demonstrasi 
Q Membuat koalisi dengan lembaga-lembaga lain 
Q Memberikan kesaksian depan komisi-komisi DPR releven 
Q Minta anggota-anggota organisasi Anda menghubungi departemen pemerintah 
Q Minta anggota-anggota organisasi Anda menghubungi anggota DPR 
Q Menghubungi Kadin 
Q Jawaban lain, jelaskan 
3.7. Menurut Anda, sejauh mana kelompok-kelompok dibawah ini mempengaruhi 
pembuatan kebijakan pada tingkat nasional di Indonesia? (TOLONG MEMBERIKAN 
SALAH SATU ANGKA UNTUK SETIAP KELOMPOK DI BAWAII INI. DIMANA I= 
PUNYA PENGARUH SANGATLEMAH, 2= PUNYA PENGARUH SIDIKIT, 3= PUNYA 
PENGARUH CUKUP KURT, 4= PUNYA PENGARUH KUAT DAN S= PUNYA 
PENGARUH KUA T SEKALI) 
Q Presiden dan anggota kabinet 
Q Pemerintah daerah 
Q Organisasi buruh 
Q Kadin 
Q Organisasi bisnis 
Q Media massa 
Q Kelompok konglomerat asing 
Q Kelompok konglomerat nasional 
Q IMF 
Q Universitas dan lembaga penelitian 
Q Anggota Parlemen 
Q LSM 
Q Militer 
Q Jawaban lain, jelaskan 
Komentar Tambahan: 
Tolong kembalikan kuesioner ini dalam amplop berperangko terlampir atau kepada: Jl. Taman 
Bendungan Jatliluhur I/2, Bendungan Hilir, Jakarta Pusat. 
Thank You Very Much For Your Help! 
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Appendix 5 
Appendix Fiye Natural Resource Revenue'Sharing Scheme. F; °=; 
Resource Central 
Government 
Provincial 
Government 
Resource- 
Producing 
Districts 
Other 
Districts in 
the Same 
Province 
All Local 
Governments 
in Indonesia 
(Equal 
Share) 
Oil 85% 3% 6% 6% 
LNG 70% 6% 12% 6% 
Mining 
Land Rent 20% 16% 64% 0% 
Ro alt 20% 16% 32% 32% 
Forestry 
Land Rent 20% 16% 64% 0% 
Resources 
Provision 
20% 16% 32% 32% 
Fisheries 20% 80% 
Source: The Basic Law on Financial Balance Between Central and Regional Government 
(No. 25/1999) in Brodjonegoro (2003), p. 289. 
Appendix 6 
e dni Regülätiöns .;,,.. 4. L.. ß" 
s ApPendix Six Hi rä`rchy öý °Läw ip " ' `'F: f+ 'ý"a"`ý t - ý + ' " "  t t .. y. ay:.., a; " } i rra 3aa. ". :ý .r .N rs r, s', K .' i ro" is ek+5 t°%f1 En{ lýC 4. _ý, ýF ^": f ^r! lj 4., ,: +y` R .. >'S" ,.., ,, - 1:, . 'Äi; K35, f+ý'i; >"V .r', rr.. n, ^, u `f . r. s .: a. r , ý..,. r, +. iý 4 
Type of Law/Regulation Details 
Constitution (Undang-Undang The constitution is the highest legal authority in 
Dasar) Indonesia. It may be implemented by a Decree of the 
People's Consultative Assembly (Ketetapan MPR), by 
statute (undang-undang) or by Presidential Decree 
(Ke utusan Presiden). 
Decrees of the People's Decrees issued by the MPR define the broad outline of 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) national policy for the legislative and executive branches 
of government. Decrees directed to the legislature are to 
be implemented by statute. Decrees directed to the 
executive are to be implemented by Presidential Decree. 
Statutes (Undang-Undang) Statutes are enacted by the House of Representatives 
(DPR) and ratified by the President. Statutes implement 
either the constitution or a Decree of the MPR. The 
President has emergency power to promulgate 
`regulations in lieu of statutes' (Peraturan Pengganti 
Undang-Undang). Such regulations are equal to statutes 
in rank but are required to be withdrawn unless approved 
by the House during the next session. 
Government Regulations Government regulations are promulgated by the President 
(Peraturan Pemerintah) to implement statutes. 
Presidential Decrees Presidential Decrees (Keppres) are promulgated by the 
(Keputusan Presiden) President to implement the constitution, a Decree of the 
MPR directed to the executive branch, or a Government 
Regulation. 
Presidential Instruction Presidential Instructions (Inpres) are promulgated by the 
(Instruksi Presiden) President to implement a Presidential Decree. 
Other Implementing Decrees and instructions may be promulgated by 
Regulations Ministers to implement higher ranking regulations. These 
include: Minister's Letters (Surat Keputusan Menteri) 
(Kepmen), Minister's Regulations (Pertauran Menteri), 
Minister's Instructions (Instruksi Menteri). Circular 
letters are completely internal regulations which can 
issued by heads of department. The difference between 
the various decrees and instructions is not explained in the 
Constitution or other authoritative legal sources. 
Regional Regulations Regional Regulations are made by the three levels of DPR 
(Peraturan Daerah) in the Regions and the Governor or Bupati. 
Sources: Ketetapan MPR No. IV/MPR/2000; Thoolen, H. (ed. ) (1987) Indonesia and the Rule 
of Law: Twenty Years of New Order Government, London, Frances Pinter; Office of the Co- 
ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and Development Supervision (1996) An 
Overview of the Indonesian Procurement System. 
Appendix 7 
rAppendix'Seven "Key, Ecouiömic Positions in 'Cäbinels (1998'-2003);; '; -ft'Ä"; "', °" % 
Habibie (May Wahid Wahid Wahid Megawatt 
1998- (October (August (June 2001) (August 
October 1999) 1999) 2000) 2001) 
Coordinating Ginandjar Kwik Kian Gie Rizal Ramli Burhanuddin Dorodjatun 
Minister for Kartasasmita Abdullah Kuntjoro- 
Economic Jakti 
Affairs 
Minister of Bambang Bambang Prijadi Rizal Ramli Boediono 
Finance Subianto Sudibyo Praptosuhardjo 
Minister of Rahardi Luhut Binsar Luhut Binsar Luhut Binsar Rini M. S. 
Trade and Ramelan Pandjaitan Pandjaitan Pandjaitan Soewandi 
Industry 
Minister of Kuntoro Susilo Purnomo Purnomo Purnomo 
Energy Mangkusubroto Bambang Yusgiantoro Yusgiantoro Yusgiantoro 
Yudho ono 
Minister of Soleh M. Prakosa Bungaran Bungaran Bungaran 
Agriculture Solahuddin Sara ih Sara ih Sara ih 
Minister of Muslimin Nur Mahmudi Marzuki Marzuki M. Prakosa 
Forestry Nasution Ismail Usman (March Usman 
2001) 
Minister for Adi Sasono Zarkasih Nur Zarkasih Nur Zarkasih Nur Alimarwan 
Cooperatives Hanan 
and SMEs 
Minister of Fahmi Idris Bomer Alhilal Hamdi Alhilal Hamdi Jacob Nuwa 
Manpower Pasaribu Wea 
and 
Transmigrati 
on 
Minister of Rozy Munir 
SOE 
Appendix 8 
`Appendix" Eight ' Stäges of IBRA? s Debt Restrüctu"ring 
Stage Description Details 
1 Initial negotiations " Initial negotiation. 
" Preliminary discussion & assessment of debtors. 
" Inter creditor meeting to discuss on mutual 
agreement. 
" Determining debtor category. 
" Classifying debtor category & signing Letter of 
Commitment (LoC) by debtor. 
2 Stand Still Creditor's The debtor and IBRA agree to implement restructuring 
Agreement process according to the agreed 
time-schedule, while at the same time preparing all 
relevant documentation. In the agreed 
period, debtor should have indicated their goodwill in 
settling the obligation. 
3 Advisory Assignment Assigning financial advisor, auditor and legal advisor. 
4 Due Diligence Sourcing data, information and carrying out initial due 
dilig ence. 
5 Restructuring Main activities: 
Negotiations " Commence restructurization negotiation. 
" Debtor to develop proposal & preliminary scenario. 
" Refine creditor's scenario. 
" Check action needed to safeguard and maintain 
continuity of operation. 
" Develop alternative scenarios. 
6 Restructuring This stage consists of several technical aspects such 
Proposal as: 
" Finalize restructuring proposal (MOU / indicative 
term sheet). 
" Discuss with creditors. 
" Finalize debtor's proposal (final term sheet). 
_ 7 Implementation Approval on Business Plan, and implementing 
Restructuring restructuring. 
Proposal 
8 Fully Paid @March 2002: Rp3,957 billion for 21 largest obligors 
IBRA Monthly Report, March 2002) 
9 Disposal @March 2002: R P6,336 billion for 21 largest obligors 
10 In Legal process - 
Initiated and 
Document 
preparation 
11 In Legal process - 
Appropriate legal 
action in process 
Source: IB RA (1999) Annual Repo It, . 116. 
